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ABSTRACT 
No comprehensive history of the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation (AGC) has been 
written yet. While this doctorate thesis, due to time and word limit constraints, 
cannot claim to have achieved this level of completeness it does provide a major 
contribution towards such a comprehensive history by providing for the first time 
an academic account of this African-based gold mining firm from 1895 to 2004. 
The thesis has chronological range: from the firm's incorporation to its demise as 
an autonomous company. Depth of analysis is reserved for the consideration of 
important aspects of the four factors of production and how these resources 
affected the company's fortunes. The thesis will contribute to the business 
historiography of Africa as well as to our understanding of the history of Ghana 
with respect to British foreign investment and the development of the gold mining 
industry. 
The main question under investigation is how the Ashanti Goldfields 
Corporation managed to survive for so long: how the company evolved, what 
accounted for its longevity, and what assessment can be made of its business 
performance over time. 
It is found that AGC's business performance in terms of output experienced 
five distinct phases: steady growth between1898 and1939, decline between1939 
and 1956; strong growth between 1957 and 1974; near-terminal decline between 
1975 and 1986; and rapid growth between 1987 and 2004. A different and more 
erratic pattern emerges on profitability notably with a sharp decline in the 
company's last decade of existence, contributing to its loss of independence. The 
firm's longevity cannot solely be explained by the geological uniqueness of the 
Ashanti mines, although this gave the firm a critical advantage. In the face of 
challenging political and economic changes, managerial decisions and the manner 
in which the factors of production were employed help us to understand the firm's 
successes and failures. 
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Map 1: Ghana, showing the location of Obuasi and other major towns 
Source: www./tanguydly.free.fr/Pays/Carte-Ghana.gif  
Map 2: The Ashanti Region, Ghana, 2000 
Source: www. www.atidekate.com/ CulturalRegions/Ashanti.htm 
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Map 3: Areas of gold mineralisation in Ghana (shaded) 
Source: United Nations' 
Geological information adapted from E. Dumett, El Dorado in West Africa: The Gold-mining 
Frontier, African Labour, and Colonial Capitalism in the Gold Coast, 1875-1900, Athens: Ohio 
University Press, 1998, p. 30. 
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Map 4: Schematic of the concession in 1897 showing the location of African 
mines and the first area worked by AGC in grey. 
Source: MS 24666/1 Final Report of W.R. Feldtmann, 15 July 1905. 
Each square = 1 square mile 
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Map 5: Aerial view showing the spatial relationship between the mines with 
the Obuasi Mine as a central peg 
Source: SPRS 3/1/5, Argenti Sechiari and Co. 11 th Annual Report on AGC, 1938. 
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AFRC 	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
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GLOSSARY OF GHANAIAN TERMS 
Abusa A system of sharing output (or income) derived from the land into thirds 
between a landowner, management and labour. 
Adansihene The king of the Adansis, a polity of second tier importance in the 
Ashanti kingdom. The Adansis sought British protection from 1874. 
Akan A large ethnic group found in West Africa, predominantly in the coastal 
and central forest belt of Ghana, where they make up the single largest ethnic 
group. The Akan consist of several subgroups including the Asante and Fante. 
Asante The kingdom which enjoyed the peak of its geographic expansion in the 
early nineteenth century when it covered much of present day Ghana. The 
administrative capital of the kingdom was Kumasi. The anglicised spelling, 
Ashanti, is used in reference to the smaller geographic area following the 
kingdom's demise at the hands of the British. Asante also refers to a sub-group of 
the larger Akan ethnic group predominantly occupying the forest zone of central 
Ghana. 
Asantehene King of the Asante. 
Bekwaihene Chief of the Bekwai; this chieftaincy was one of five core polities of 
the Asante kingdom. 
Cedi The Ghanaian currency since 1965. 
Fante A sub-group of the larger Akan ethnic group occupying the central coastal 
area of present-day Ghana. The Fante were conquered by Asante in 1807. The 
Fante aligned themselves with the British against Asante. 
Omanhene The ruler of a polity or state. 
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GLOSSARY OF GOLD MINING AND FINANCIAL TERMS 2 
Adit A tunnel driven into the side of a mountain to access ore deposits. 
Amalgamation Addition of mercury to gold-bearing material. The mercury and 
gold combine to form an alloy called amalgam from which the mercury can be 
separated later by dissolving in acid or with heat. The process is most effective on 
coarse, visible free gold. 
Dore bars Unrefined gold bars containing small amounts of impurities such as 
silver. 
BIOX Bio-oxidation, a patented process where bacteria are used to breakdown 
ores containing sulphides. 
Bond issue The sale of a corporate debt instrument. Issuing bonds is one way for 
companies to borrow money. The company promises to repay the amount 
borrowed (the principal) with interest by a specified date. 
Bullion Precious metals in the form of bars or ingots. 
Call options Derivative contracts giving the holder the right, without obligation, 
to buy an underlying asset at a fixed price at a future date. 
Capital gains The increase in the price of an asset between the time it is sold and 
when it was originally bought. 
Cash cost An indication of the average cost of producing one troy ounce of gold. 
It is calculated by dividing the direct costs associated with mine production —
mine labour, extraction costs and processing costs — by the troy ounces produced 
in a given period. 
Convertible bonds A corporate debt instrument used by companies to borrow 
money. Interest is usually paid, but the holder, rather than receiving repayment of 
the principal, has the right within a certain time frame to convert the bond into 
equity shares in the borrowing company. 
Crosscut A tunnel driven through an ore-bearing reef. 
Cyanidation A method of extracting gold developed in 1887 by J. S. MacArthur. 
A solution of sodium or calcium cyanide is added to finely ground ore (which 
may or may not have been roasted) to release the gold from the ore complex. 
Cyanidation is followed by separation processes to recover the gold. 
Some of the gold mining and financial terms are derived from AGC's 1997 annual report and 
www.investorwords.com . 
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Derivatives Financial instruments whose behaviour and value are determined by 
the behaviour and value of an underlying asset such as a commodity or currency. 
Options are a type of derivative. 
Discount rate The rate used to adjust future expected income streams to a 
present value. Discounting reflects the effects of inflation on the value of money 
as well as borrowing rates. The higher the discount rate used the lower the present 
value of the future cash flows. 
Downside protection Protection from falling prices. 
Drawdowns Disbursements from an agreed loan. 
Due diligence The investigation of a company before making an investment. 
EBITDA Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation. EBITDA 
reflects a company's operating cash flow. 
Escrow accounts A limited access account set up in a borrower's name to 
provide a lender with greater confidence and access to the repayment of the 
obligation. 
Flotation (1) An initial public offer, see `1P0'. 
Flotation (2) A metallurgical process where ore is concentrated by first grinding 
it, then water and frothing chemicals are added. Air is blown through the mixture 
attracting the desired mineral to the bubbles, this causes the mineral to float. The 
froth is skimmed off for further refinement. 
Forward selling market A market where the price of goods are fixed today even 
though the goods will not be delivered until some point in the future. Forward 
selling attempts to avoid the adverse effects of price movements in the future. 
Gearing The proportion of a company's capital that is made up of debt as 
opposed to equity. Gross gearing is calculated by dividing total borrowings by 
shareholders' funds, whereas net gearing subtracts from the total borrowings 
figure the amount of cash and other liquid assets the company may hold. 
Grade In the case of gold mining, the relative gold content found in ore. 
Hedge book/hedge portfolio A collection of investments in derivatives. 
Hostile takeover A takeover that proceeds without the support of the target 
company's board of directors. 
Interest cover The calculation of a company's pre-tax income divided by its 
total interest expense. It shows how many times over income can service debt 
payments. 
IPO Initial public offering; the first sale of a company's stock to the public. 
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Level An underground storey accessed via a shaft. Each level at the Obuasi mine 
is approximately 100 feet apart. 
Libor London interbank offer rate. The rate charged by banks when they lend to 
other banks 
Liquidity risk The risk of being unable to raise cash quickly, or dispose of assets 
quickly. 
Margin call A demand for a collateral payment from a counterparty, usually in 
the form of cash, to cover an adverse movement in the price of a financial 
instrument. 
Mark-to -market The price of a security at the close of trading each day to 
calculate profits and losses to determine if margin requirements are satisfactory. 
Market capitalization The value of a company as measured by the share price 
multiplied by the number of shares in issue at a given time. 
Net present value (NPV) calculation Net present value is one way of assessing 
investment opportunities. The calculation looks at future cash flows from an 
investment and based on the cost of borrowing and inflation adjusts these income 
streams to a current value. See also 'discount rate'. 
Ore Rock containing at least one mineral of commercial value that can be 
economically extracted. 
Ounce Troy ounce. A troy ounce is approximately 10% heavier than an 
avoirdupois ounce. One troy ounce equals 31.1g, see table on page 23. 
Proven reserves The existence of ore where the physical character, continuity, 
size, shape, quality, mineral content as well as tonnage have been defined, and 
detailed technical and economic studies justify extraction. 
Probable reserves Mineral resources of sufficient quantity have been indicated 
but no detailed, technical and economic studies have been completed to justify 
extraction. 
Put options Derivative contracts giving the holder the right, without obligation, 
to sell an underlying asset at a fixed price at a future date. 
Refractory ores Ores whose mineral composition make the gold extraction 
process more difficult. Intermediary processes are required to deal with the 
refractory elements before satisfactory levels of gold can be recovered. 
Revolving credit facility A form of flexible corporate borrowing whereby the 
company can draw on funds as and when needed within a certain limit and time 
frame. 
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Roasting Heat is applied to crushed ore (but not to a temperature high enough to 
melt the gold) in order to separate the gold from other minerals. In the heating 
process unwanted minerals, such as sulphur, combine with oxygen and escape in 
gaseous form, leaving behind more concentrated ore for further treatment. 
Scheme of arrangement An agreement between a company and a group of 
shareholders or creditors arrived at by majority vote but which is then endorsed by 
a court. 
Scrip dividends Dividends paid in new shares rather than in cash. 
Shaft A vertical excavation used to transport miners, equipment, waste and ore to 
and from underground mine faces. 
Share dilution The fall in a shareholder's percentage ownership of a firm caused 
by the increase in the number of new shares issued to others. 
Shareholders' equity Company funding attributable to shareholders, equal to the 
value of the company's net assets. 
Spot price The cash price for a financial product if traded immediately rather 
than in the future. 
Stope The mining face; an underground area that has been blasted and from 
which ore is taken. 
Strike The horizontal direction in a geological structure. 
Tailings The residue following ore processing. Tailings are stored in hope of 
future technological processes allowing re-treatment and economic recovery of 
the remaining ore content. 
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NOTE ON NOMENCLATURE 
`Asante' is used throughout the text to refer to the people of that ethnic group, or 
to refer to the kingdom and its geographic location prior to British subjugation. 
After British 'conquest', the anglicised version, 'Ashanti', is used to refer to the 
much reduced geographic area under British administration. 
Ashanti Goldfields Corporation is sometimes shortened in the text to 
`Ashanti Goldfields' or abbreviated to 'AGC'. 
The 'Gold Coast' is used to refer exclusively to the coastal British 
protectorate. 'Colonial Ghana' is the term chosen to describe the British colony 
comprising the Gold Coast, Ashanti, the Northern Territories and British 
Mandated Togoland. 'Ghana' is used to refer to the country post-1957; however, 
if the period under discussion spans both pre- and post-Independence then 
`Ghana' may also be used. 
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USEFUL MEASUREMENT CONVERSIONS 
1 tonne = 1.10231 short tons (2,000 pounds) 
1 gramme = 0.03215 troy ounces 
1 gramme per tonne (g/t) = 0.02917 ounces per short ton 
1 pennyweight (dwt) = 1.56g 
1 troy ounce = 31.10g = 20 dwt 
1 short ton = 29,166 troy ounces 
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PART ONE 
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CHAPTER 1: 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the thesis aim, theme, scope, sources, methodology, 
organization and key theoretical concepts. 
Aim 
The thesis aims to analyse the evolution of the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation 
(AGC) from a nineteenth century stand-alone British investment in pre-colonial 
Ashanti into a twenty-first century African multinational. This is achieved in Part 
One by providing a detailed chronological narrative and in Part Two by exploring 
the four factors of production — land, labour, capital and enterprise - in relation to 
specific questions from specific periods in AGC's history. The thesis covers the 
firm's entire existence as an autonomous corporate entity from 1897 to 2004. In 
April 2004, AGC was taken over by the South African gold producer, Anglogold, 
creating a new company, Anglogold Ashanti. 
AGC merits investigation for several reasons. Business historians 
traditionally use longevity and size as measures of success. In these respects AGC 
was a success for 107 years. Despite ownership changes in 1968 and 1972, the 
firm operated independently from 1897 until 2004. In 2002 market capitalisation 
exceeded a billion US dollars, turnover was over half a billion US dollars and 
more than 10,000 staff were employed. 1 An investigation into how the firm grew 
for over a century is merited. 
Business success must also be measured by profitability and efficiency. 
The thesis therefore tracks the firm's performance over time. Assessments are 
made as to whether the firm's fortunes were largely self-determined or whether 
and to what extent external influences, institutions and events shaped its financial 
results. 
AGC played an important role in the colonial and post-colonial economy 
of Ghana. Throughout the period the company was one of the largest private 
AGC annual report, 2002. 
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employers. 2 AGC quickly became Ghana's single largest gold producer, 
producing between 1912 and 1993 just over 50% of the gross revenue of all gold 
mines in Ghana. 3 The gold industry was, after cocoa, the second (for a few years, 
the first) biggest earner of foreign exchange. 4 Between 1994 and 2004 AGC 
stocks made up 70% of the total equity capitalisation on the Ghana Stock 
Exchange. In 2004 the firm was listed on four international stock exchanges and it 
was the first operating sub-Saharan African company to be listed on the London 
Stock Exchange in 1994 and on the New York Stock Exchange in 1996. 5 
AGC operated in an environment of uncertainty uncommon to most firms 
due to the frequent and often acute changes in the political and economic 
environment of Ghana. In 1895 when an Englishman, Edwin Arthur Cade, bought 
from three indigenous entrepreneurs the 100 square mile mining concession that 
would belong to AGC, the area was under the suzerainty of the Asante Kingdom. 
By 1897, when AGC was incorporated, the British had subjugated Asante 
(although Kumasi would revolt in 1900). In 1957 Ghana gained its independence 
from Britain. The next twenty-five years were characterised by eight changes in 
government, mostly through coups d'etat. This political upheaval was coupled 
with economic policies that proved unsuccessful, such as persistent currency 
overvaluation, over-taxing of cocoa producers and ill-disciplined recourse to 
money supply increases. 6 As a result, there was a drain of foreign investment and 
the near-collapse of the Ghanaian economy, which is evident in the following 
statistics: GDP per capita declined from (cedis) 0230 in 1957 to 0180 in 1982 (in 
1970 prices); the ratio of investment to GDP declined from 22.6% in 1960 to 
6.9% in 1982.7 AGC, however, remained. Obviously, as an extractive firm AGC 
did not have the locational flexibility that others, such as expatriate manufacturers, 
had. Nevertheless, for a company heavily reliant on foreign exchange for supplies 
By way of comparison, UAC employed at its peak 14,400 in 1956 (S. Decker, 'Building up 
Goodwill: British Business and Economic Development in Ghana and Nigeria, 1945-1977', PhD 
Thesis, University of Liverpool, 2006, p. 293). That year AGC employed 5,028, rising to a peak of 
12,860 in 1998, see Appendix 3. 
3 Ghana Chamber of Mines annual report 1993, table of the estimated value of gold produced by 
the largest individual mines since 1912, p. 35; see also Appendix 1. 
4 See Appendix 2. 
5 AGC annual reports 1994 and 1996; Dow Jones and Company, 'Emerging Markets Report', 21 
February 1996. 
6 M. Huq, The Economy of Ghana: the First 25 Years Since Independence, Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1988, pp. 1-32, 112-6, 215-7; D. Rimmer, Staying Poor: Ghana's Political Economy 
1950-1990 , Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1992, pp. 144, 148-9,157; J. Herbst, The Politics of Reform 
in Ghana, 1982-1991,Berkley: University of California Press, 1993, pp. 20-1, 39-40.  
Huq (1988) p. 2. 
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to remain viable throughout the economic crisis years of 1975-1983 was an 
achievement, bearing in mind that other gold mines ceased production. 8 
Furthermore, the fact that AGC's history extends from pre- colonial through to 
colonial and post-colonial times provides an opportunity to assess the relevance of 
these political discontinuities to the firm's performance. Whether these political 
junctures form useful units of analysis in business terms is revealed, and the 
degree of economic continuities surviving political changes is examined. 
It is surprising that a comprehensive history of the firm has not been 
written already in view of the foregoing factors. In addition, relatively good 
company materials covering the period 1897 to 1968 have been available at the 
London Guildhall Library for over fifteen years. 9 This omission may have been 
because there used to be an academic stigma about appearing to celebrate 
imperialism by studying successful expatriate firms. 1° In 2003 there was extensive 
media coverage about a planned takeover of AGC by a subsidiary of the Anglo-
American Corporation, Anglogold. Unlike the takeover by Lonrho in 1968, 
following this deal AGC would cease to operate autonomously with its own 
corporate identity and board of directors. This corporate death signalled an 
appropriate time to begin to record AGC's history before it was subsumed by that 
of Anglo-American. 
Theme 
The main theme is, as stated above, that of longevity and successful business 
performance. The focus is on the endogenous factors that contributed towards this, 
although these cannot be fully appreciated without an understanding of the 
exogenous conditions of the gold market and the political economy. In Part Two 
the four factors of production provide chapter-specific themes for detailed 
analysis. These all contribute to explaining the main theme. 
8 Konongo Goldfields and Dunkwa Goldfields stopped crushing operations in 1980, at two other 
State Gold Mining Corporation mines, Tarkwa and Prestea, gold produced had dwindled to just 
25% of their all time peaks during this period - Ghana Chamber of Mines annual report 1980/81, 
Appendix 2 and 2B. 
9 See the section in Chapter 2 entitled 'Existing Literature on AGC'. 
1° A. G. Hopkins, 'Imperial business in Africa, part 1: sources', Journal of African History, 17, 1, 
1976, pp. 29, 30. 
27 
Scope 
This thesis is a monograph covering the time period when the mine concession 
was acquired in 1895 to the end of the company's autonomy in 2004. It will 
provide a good basis for future comparative work, most obviously with South 
African gold mines and other expatriate businesses in Ghana. However, the 
intention here is to focus on AGC's performance over time, which is an essential 
first step before meaningful historical and geographical comparisons can be made. 
(Very selective comparative data is provided where the bald company data convey 
little meaning in isolation.) 
In view of time and funding restrictions it was impossible to investigate in 
equal detail all the subject areas pertinent to a business history. Subjects such as 
technological change and management organization are discussed in passing in 
Chapter 3, 'A Chronological Narrative', while greater analytical depth is reserved 
for important aspects of the factors of production. The intention here was to 
provide a usefully broad, economic-oriented exposition that, while complete in its 
own limited aspirations, would, at a later stage, form the heart of a comprehensive 
book on the history of Ashanti Goldfields. 
Primary Sources 
In view of the monograph status of this work great emphasis was put on primary 
sources from the company itself such as annual accounts, internal correspondence 
and reports, press releases, board minutes, and interviews with former directors, 
managers and staff. 
Company material from 1895 to 1968 is held at the Guildhall Library in 
London." None of the catalogued items run continuously for this period. Annual 
reports, for example, between 1933 to 1963 are not in this collection. Other 
company documents were held at Lonrho's old offices at Roman House, Wood 
Street, and were accessed by Raymond Dumett, Jeff Crisp and Sarah Stockwell 
over a decade ago. However, with Lonrho's move in 1994 to new offices at 
Grosvenor Place and the retirement and death of history-friendly staff such as 
The efforts of Anthony Hopkins and Raymond Dumett to encourage the deposit of further 
materials at Guildhall deserve acknowledgment. 
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Anthony Orchard and Tommy Rowe respectively, it is believed that a lot of data 
from the era before 1972 has been destroyed. 12 Lonmin, the mining company spun 
out of Lonrho, former owners of AGC, granted access to their board minutes 
between 1968 and 1972. Virtually all of the Spears Papers on AGC at the 
Churchill Archives which had previously been closed for a hundred years were 
opened up to me (although belatedly, limiting the time and scope I had to 
interrogate them). These provided financial and operational data for many of the 
years missing from the Guildhall collection, as well as invaluable personal 
perspectives of AGC's longest serving chairman and managing director, General 
Edward Spears. Fieldwork conducted in AGC's Accra office was very useful and 
permission was granted for me to read all the board minutes and enclosed reports 
from 1972 to 2004. 
As Dumett observes, a business history that relies only on company 
sources would be superficia1. 13 Additional information relating to the company 
and its economic and political context was consulted in the following locations: 
records of the commissioner's office for Obuasi and Bekwai, and records of the 
Chief Commissioner of Ashanti, at the Public Records and Archives Department, 
Kumasi; the Colonial Secretary's files at the Public Records and Archives 
Department, Accra; Ghana Chamber of Mines Annual Reports, Accra; Gold Coast 
Mines Department Annual Reports, Mines Department, Takoradi; certain 
categories of the Gold Coast series at the Public Record Office, Kew; the Stock 
Exchange Yearbook; various peerage directories for biographical information; 
gold-mining industrial reports, magazines and statistics were also available from 
publications such as The Mining Manual and Mining Year Book, The Mining 
Magazine and The Mining Journal. To capture aspects of the company's most 
recent history taped oral interviews were conducted. 
Methodology 
In the context of African economic history, and particularly African mining 
history, authors can broadly be categorised into two ideological groups: 
liberal/market and Marxist. It would be fair to say that ideology has limited the 
12 Conversations with Virginia Rigall, Company Secretary's office, Lonmin. 
13 R. E. Dumett, 'Sources for mining company history in Africa: the history and records of the 
Ashanti Goldfields Corporation (Ghana), Ltd.', Business History Review, 62, 1988, p. 509. 
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scope of African business research agendas. 14 This thesis, however, is not built on 
the foundation of any of the common ideological stances dominant in African 
historiography. My approach in Part Two is perhaps best described in Hopkins's 
words as, "a form of new empiricism which is neither antiquarian nor the slave of 
dogma". 15 I employ microeconomic theories where appropriate to test specific 
hypotheses while paying attention to the political-economic context. 
The availability of data determines to a large extent which performance 
statistics can be analysed. I used AGC annual reports and other internal and 
external documents to create a spreadsheet to record data for the variables listed 
below. 16 The data starts from the first full financial year, which ended in June 
1899, to the company's last full year of operations in 2003. This time-series is in 
effect AGC's history in numbers. The spreadsheet allowed several levels of 
quantitative analysis. It was possible to complete almost the entire time series for 
certain variables such as tonnage milled; the data for other variables (for example, 
the number of employees at the mine) was scanty. 
14 For example the extensive radical contributions have focussed on labour and class formation: C. 
Perrings, Black Mineworkers in Central Africa: Industrial Strategies and the Evolution of an 
African Proletariat in the Copperbelt, 1911-41, London: Heinemann, 1979; J. Crisp, The Story of 
an African Working Class: Ghanaian Miners' Struggles, 1870-1980, London: Zed Books, 1984; B. 
Freund, Capital and Labour in the Nigerian Tin Mines, Harlow: Longman, 1981; P. Konings, The 
Political Potential of Ghanaian Miners: A Case Study of the AGC Workers at Obuasi, Leiden: 
African Studies Centre, 1980. 
15 A.G. Hopkins, 'Big business in African studies', Journal of African History, 28, 1987, p. 120. 
16 The spreadsheet is reproduced in Appendix 3. 
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Table 1.1: Quantitative data collected for AGC, 1899 -2003 
Variable Methodological notes and definitions where 
applicable. (See also Glossary p. 18) 
Tonnage milled Mill head tonnage in short tons 
Gold ounces Gold ounces declared 
Average annual grade Average annual ore quality measured in 
pennyweights per ton 
Recovery rate Percentage of gold content recovered 
Proved and probable 
reserves 
Ore reserves sufficiently well delineated for future 
economic extraction 
Development footage Annual total footage drilled or excavated for 
exploration and production purposes 
Gross bullion revenue Gross gold revenue plus small amounts of income 
from the sale of silver recovered as a by-product 
Gross total turnover Gross bullion revenue plus other sources of income 
such as rents received and hedging income 
Operating costs Direct production costs for mining, milling and 
treating ore including mine wages and salaries, 
mine development and metallurgical costs 
Gross bullion profit Gross bullion turnover - operating costs 
Pre-tax profits Earnings before income tax 
Interest payments Interest charges on long-term debt 
Number of authorised 
shares 
Number of shares issued 
Fully paid-up shares 
Dividends paid Expressed as total dividends and dividends paid as 
a percentage of paid-up share capital 
Shareholders' equity Company funding attributable to shareholders, 
equal to the value of the company's net assets 
Total debt 
Long-term debt Debt payable after one year 
Annual capital expenditure New expenditure on plant and machinery, 
buildings, mine and shaft development 
Fixed tangible assets Net book value of plant and machinery, buildings, 
shafts and mine development 
Number of mine employees Ideally the average daily number; sometimes the 
average for a particular month or the number 
working on a given date is provided 
Royalty and minerals duty 
Export/Gold duty 
Other African-based direct 
taxes 
Such as corporation tax, compulsory savings and 
excess profits tax 
Ghana government's share 
of dividends 
Applicable from 1969 
Peak share price Annual peak closing price on the London Stock 
Exchange 
31 
Ratios such as earnings per share, return on capital employed, gross 
gearing and labour productivity were computable from the above data. Attention 
had to be paid to definitions and changes in accounting policies over time. For 
example, in 1911 AGC changed from using the long ton (2,240 lbs) to the short 
ton (2,000 lbs) so all tonnage has been converted to short tons. 
My approach outlined above will address the criticisms often justifiably 
hurled at business history for being too narrative and insufficiently analytical. 17 
 My methodology has been influenced by the following African and mining 
business histories which are notable for their high degree of analysis: R. J. 
Southall's PhD thesis 'Cadbury on the Gold Coast, 1908-1937', 18 C. E. Harvey's 
The Rio Tinto Company: An Economic History of a Leading International Mining 
Concern 1873-1954, and Peter Greenhalgh's West African Diamonds 1919-1973: 
an Economic History. Southall's work is largely qualitative but where possible he 
makes use of the fragmentary quantitative data available on wages and prices to 
inform his analysis. The thesis challenges Cadbury's claim to be "a model firm"; 
the firm's actions are analysed in light of this single issue, the thesis is therefore 
very focused. Harvey uses appropriate theories to structure his arguments, for 
example in Chapter 3 he uses invention and innovation theories to explain Rio 
Tinto's technological development. The author assesses the direct impact of the 
firm on the Spanish economy for the years 1906-1908 using quantitative evidence 
from company accounts and national accounts. Even where quantitative data is 
absent Harvey's discussion of indirect costs and benefits to the national economy 
is detailed and nuanced. Rio Tinto is discussed in the context of the changing 
economic, social and political environment and the firm's contribution to 
developments in Spain's general history is made clear. Harvey analyses the 
growth of the international market for pyrites, capturing the evolutionary nature of 
metallurgical research and development, thus enabling Rio Tinto to be judged in 
its global industrial context. Greenhalgh's book is impressive in its geographic 
and thematic scope. Both European and indigenous diamond miners are 
investigated. By using the neoclassical concept of marginal revenue product as 
one method of determining whether labour was exploited or not, Greenhalgh 
successfully replaces traditionally emotional arguments of labour exploitation 
17 Hopkins (1976 a) pp. 29-48; 'Imperial business in Africa, part II: interpretations', Journal of 
African History, 17, 1976, pp. 267-290; B.E. Supple, 'The uses of business history', Business 
History, 4, 1962, pp. 81-90. 
18 Unpublished PhD thesis, Birmingham University, 1975. 
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with theoretical considerations. These authors are precise with their definitions 
and concepts. They attempt to assess the firms' relative financial performance and 
make use of available financial records. 
My thesis hopes to build on these aforementioned exemplars by providing 
a greater degree of quantitative analysis thanks to the greater availability of 
numerical data. 
Methodological Problems 
Three types of methodological problems were encountered: those pertaining to 
writing an African history, those to writing a business history, and others which 
are specific to AGC. 
The discontinuity, and sometimes total absence of documents, for the post-
colonial period is a problem with which many African historians grapple. The 
frustration is amplified because there is often evidence that the data was collected 
and probably still exists but trying to locate it proves impossible. For example, I 
was only able to find two full sets of annual company accounts for the 1980s. I 
have made the most of the data that I did manage to find and relied more on oral 
evidence for this later period of AGC's history. The breaks in data demand that 
caution is applied to certain conclusions. 
The principal methodological problem specific to the choice of company 
under investigation relates to the variety of locations where primary data on AGC 
can be found. Due to the company's ownership changes I conducted research in 
the UK, Ghana and South Africa. In the UK I obtained data from London and 
Cambridge, and in Ghana from Accra, Obuasi, Kumasi, and Takoradi. Research 
expenditure was high because of the disparate location of the data. Due to time 
and financial constraints I had to prioritise the treatment of sources starting with 
those where I felt my efforts would garner the broadest and most directly relevant 
results. 
Another drawback of my approach is the absence of a neat framework, 
which is often attained when working within a single, chosen paradigm. 
Restricting oneself to a particular paradigm, however, can lead to over-
simplification of reality. I think that the complexity of AGC's operations and 
relationships are better captured by a variety of theories provided that they are 
appropriate to the issue under discussion and augment our understanding. Care 
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has been taken not to lose the primary focus of the historical evidence and to 
maintain the theories merely as explanatory tools. With these drawbacks an 
attempt has been made to present a thorough and nuanced account of change over 
AGC's 107 years. 
Thesis Organization and Key Theoretical Concepts 
Part One consists of three chapters: Chapter 1, 'An Introduction', Chapter 2, 'The 
Research and Historical Context', and Chapter 3, 'A Chronological Narrative'. 
The purpose of Part One is to provide relevant background information as well as 
fundamental historical facts about AGC. This is achieved by reviewing the 
existing literature on AGC and gold mining in Ghana, by detailing the political 
and economic context of AGC's operations and by describing the historical 
developments at the firm from 1895 to 2004. 
Part Two is devoted to greater analysis of specific themes in specific time 
periods in the firm's history. Chapter 4 on Land uses the concept of property 
rights to investigate the changing institutional framework to land ownership in 
Asante, the security of AGC's title to land, the company's attempts to re-define 
and enforce its original lease rights into landlord rights, and how the historical 
evidence fits the predictions of property rights theory. 
The concept of property rights has been central in the new institutional 
economics literature. In a world of limited resources ownership is a prime 
determinant of the nature and form of economic behaviour. The importance of this 
concept is apparent when factors of production are themselves defined as rights to 
"perform certain (physical) actions." 19 There are three broad categories of 
property rights: private, communal and state. These categories of ownership often 
coexist. Even with a specific asset such as a plot of land, it is possible for property 
rights to be partitioned, that is, several people, or groups of people, may have 
different use rights over the single plot. 20 For an economic agent to maximise his 
personal gains from a resource he would endeavour to secure exclusive rights to it. 
The better defined those rights the easier it is to enforce and protect exclusivity. 
Property rights are not static and they are not only defined by law. They can also 
19 R.H. Coase, 'The problem of social cost', Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 1960, p. 44. 
20 T. Eggertsson, Economic Behavior and Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990, p. 39. 
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be delineated by custom, politics, and the discovery of new technologies or 
markets. 21 A significant body of empirical work has shown how differences in the 
structure of property rights — private, communal or state - leads to predictable 
choices in economic and social organization. 22 The theory is therefore tested in 
AGC's case using historical evidence from 1895 to 1969. 
Chapter 5 focuses on labour. African mine labour has been investigated in 
connection to class formation, labour unrest and unionisation. 23 Lentz and 
Erlmann investigated the social profile of a large section of AGC's workforce and 
their levels of cohesion. 24 Their findings contradict Crisp's thesis that a self-
producing proletariat had sufficiently evolved in the mine community. 25 Like 
Crisp, class consciousness and union activity are the focus of Peter Koning's case 
study on AGC. 26 Instead of revisiting the well-worked class theme, Chapter 5 
employs principal-agent theory to explore the relationship between European 
management and the African labour force during the post —World War II period. 
This was a time of extreme labour unrest. The causes of the strife and AGC's 
attempts to solve the labour problems are explained in principal-agent terms. The 
advantages of this approach are that it dissects the contract between the firm and 
its workers, traces the evolution of internal institutions in an attempt to align 
manager and worker interests, and integrates into the analysis the changing state 
of the external contractual environment which imposed itself on management's 
behaviour. The agency problems and attempted solutions are related to the firm's 
operational performance. 
Principal-agent theory is concerned with the costs associated with formal 
and informal contracts in hierarchical economic relationships. The principal can 
be defined as the party in the relationship with ownership or control rights. The 
agent can be defined as the party owing some contractual duty or performance to 
the principal. Due to bounded rationality, asymmetric information and differences 
21 H. Demsetz, 'Toward a theory of property rights', The American Economic Review, 57, 2, 1967, 
p. 350; A.A. Alchian, Economic Forces at Work, Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1977, p. 129; 
Eggertsson (1990), p. 34. 
22 L. De Alessi, 'The economics of property rights: a review of the evidence', Research in Law 
and Economics, 2, 1980, pp.1-47; 0. Hart, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995; P. Milgrom and J. Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management, 
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1992. 
23 See fn.14 above. 
24 C. Lentz and V. Erlmann, 'A working class in formation: economic crisis and strategies of 
survival among Dagara mine workers in Ghana', Cahier d' Etudes Africaines, vol. 29, 113, 1989, 
pp. 69-111. 
25 Crisp (1984). 
26 Konings (1980). 
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in risk appetite the agent may not always act in the principal's interest. 27 Lack of 
observability, information and commitment from the agent creates costs for the 
principal as the agent is able to behave opportunistically. The agent usually has 
more knowledge than the principal but less incentive, whereas the principal has 
greater incentive but less knowledge. Effort is costly for the agent, which 
encourages slacking. This undesirable situation leads to the imposition or 
evolution of control, coercion and incentive mechanisms in an attempt to align the 
behaviour of the agent to the principal's wishes. An array of opportunistic 
behaviour is possible in such conditions including moral hazard and hold-up. 
Moral hazard arises post-contractually. Here, the prohibitive cost of 
monitoring an agent results in either the neglect of critical aspects of the principal-
agent contract or the commission of acts that are outside the contract and to the 
detriment of the principal. 28 In a mining context, for example, the use of bonuses 
to encourage better employee performance in certain measured areas can, in 
pursuit of the bonus, increase accidents and fatalities as well encourage the 
neglect of other non-measured tasks. 
Hold-up is a situation where an agent's property rights over an asset 
needed by the principal allow the agent to withhold the asset with a view to 
increasing his private gains. In Chapter 5 the rights concern the miners' labour, 
and the hold-up manifested itself in frequent strike actions. How the company 
mitigated principal-agent problems is the focus of Chapter 5. 
Chapter 6, 'Capital', explores three different aspects of capital: company 
finance, the capital intensity of production and the social distribution of earnings. 
The section on finance looks at the changing sources and proportions of equity, 
debt and retained earnings, and the relationship between this and the firm's 
longevity. Section two examines the capital-intensity of production with respect to 
labour and land ratios. Section three treats the social distribution of earnings for 
two stakeholders — the shareholders and the government. Evidence on share 
values and dividend payments show how AGC shareholders fared over the years. 
Changes in the government's share of AGC's revenue in the form of taxation is 
analysed as well as the impact of this on the firm's investment decisions. 
A fourth factor of production which is often neglected or undifferentiated 
from labour, is enterprise, or entrepreneurship. As one writer put it, 
27 Milgrom and Roberts (1992), pp. 30 -34. 
28 Eggertsson (1990), p. 45. 
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"entrepreneurship, the most forceful, dramatic, and obvious phenomenon in all of 
economic life, has perforce been ignored by theoretical economists". 29 The 
neoclassical formulation of the firm precludes any entrepreneurial role because of 
the assumptions of certainty, perfect knowledge and rationality. 30 A firm's 
existence and growth are attributed to inanimate developments in technology and 
markets. Transaction costs theory has improved on the neoclassical theory of the 
firm to better account for the reality of uncertainty, bounded rationality and 
information costs; however, even here the endogenous role of the entrepreneur in 
initiating the internalization of market failures and coordination activities of an 
organization is not given prominence. 31 Changes in a firm's boundary, according 
to transaction costs theory, are induced by the costs of exchange and market 
failures. This downplay of the agency of the entrepreneur has been rectified in 
resource-based theories of the firm that focus on a firm's capabilities, foremost of 
which is entrepreneurship. The resource-based view stems from Penrose's 1959 
book, The Theory of the Growth of the Firm. 32 In Schumpeterian fashion, Penrose 
places huge emphasis on entrepreneurship — with respect to individuals and to a 
firm's culture. A firm's internal resources comprise human skills and services as 
well as physical assets; this bundle of internal resources combined with the 
productive possibilities that the firm's entrepreneurs can see and take advantage 
of determine a firm's growth. Chapter 7, 'Enterprise', focuses on the 
transformation of AGC into an African multinational towards the end of its 
autonomous life. It is found that the critical role of entrepreneurship is neglected 
in the MNE literature, but was paramount in AGC's modern history. 
Kirkpatrick and Nixson define a multinational as a firm that engages in 
direct investment in more than one country or which owns or controls income-
generating assets in more than one country. 33 By this definition, AGC was not a 
multinational enterprise at its establishment in 1897. When Lonrho bought the 
company in 1968 it became a subsidiary of a multinational conglomerate. 
Between 1996 and 1998 the firm became a multinational in its own right by 
29 J.R. Hughes, The Vital Few: The Entrepreneur and American Economic Progress, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1986 edition, p. x; W. J. Baumol, 'Entrepreneurship in economic theory', 
American Economic Review, 2, 58, 1968, pp. 66-7. 
3° N.M. Kay, The Emergent Firm: Knowledge, Ignorance and Surprise in Economic Organization, 
New York: Saint Martins Press, 1984, p. 57. 
31 See for example, R.H. Coase, The nature of the firm', Economica, 4, 1937, p. 388. 
32 E.T. Penrose, The Theory of the Growth of The Firm, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966 edition. 
33 C. Kirkpatrick and F. Nixson, 'Multinational corporations and economic development', The 
Journal of Modern African Studies, 19, 1981, pp. 369-70. 
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acquiring five mines in four countries: Ghana, Guinea, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. 
At the end of AGC's corporate life, although North American and British 
institutions owned the majority of shares, the firm could be described as an 
African multinational. First, all its income-generating sources were in Africa. 
Second, the nationality of a firm is usually assigned by the location of its 
headquarters, which for AGC was Accra, Ghana. Third, the majority of 
management and staff were African. An African multinational is a rare business 
entity and this particular phase of the firm's history is worthy of detailed 
investigation, which is provided in Chapter 7, 'Enterprise'. 
Finally, in the concluding chapter the historical findings and analyses are 
synthesised and related back to the main theme of firm survival. Associated topics 
arising from the thesis which are worthy of future research are also discussed in 
Chapter 8, 'Conclusions'. 
Summary 
Dumett lamented the dearth of "sophisticated and detailed monographs in African 
mining business history", 34 noting that too much that has been written has been 
Euro-centric and concerned with colonial territorial expansion rather than 
business performance, finance and operations — the very issues this thesis focuses 
on. In relation to African business history, my approach taken can be described as 
novel in three respects: it veers away from the simple chronological narrative, 
microeconomic theories are used to test specific questions related to the overall 
theme, and the availability of fairly good financial records has allowed a good 
degree of quantitative analysis. 
34 Dumett (1988), fn. 22, pp. 502 -3. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
THE RESEARCH AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
The existing literature on the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation is reviewed in this 
chapter. Then, to set the context for the thesis, a brief history of the gold mining 
industry in Ghana is presented. This is followed by an outline of the political 
economy of the Gold Coast and Ghana from c.1895 to 2004, which provides an 
important backdrop for the company's activities. 
Existing Literature on AGC 
This section considers what has already been written on AGC. Detailed literature 
reviews pertaining to the separate themes of land, labour, capital and enterprise 
are treated in the relevant chapters. 
AGC produced its own internally-generated corporate histories. A 
consulting engineer wrote one in 1916 (which was updated in 1919), 1 a general 
manager and future consulting engineer wrote another in 1932, 2 and again in 1947 
for the firm's jubilee celebration; 3 in 1991 Tommy Rowe of Lonrho's technical 
department wrote an account of the firm's early history to 1905. 4 Professor 
Ayensu was commissioned to write a glossy publication in 1997 for the firm's 
centenary. 3 These works are important for understanding the key stages of 
development in the firm's life, production records, and the management's 
perspective on their own achievements. However, the public relations motivations 
render them of limited critical value. The in-house histories have no theoretical 
content nor do they provide much external comparative or contextual information. 
Important academic contributions have been made by McCaskie and Wilks 
to our understanding of the company's establishment. These authors put a 
particular emphasis on the firm in the context of British imperial expansion. 
McCaskie exposes the firm's inflated perception of themselves as do-gooders for 
' MS 24661/5, W.R. Feldtmann, 'Ashanti Goldfields Corporation Limited' published in The 
Mining Magazine, May 1916, updated in 1919 as a circular to shareholders. 
G. W. E. Tumer, 'The Ashanti Goldfields Corporation', The Mining Magazine, June 1932. 
3 G. W. E. Turner, A Short History: Ashanti Goldfields Corporation Ltd., 1897-1947, London: 
1947. 
4 MS 24669, T. Rowe, 'The Early Pioneers, 1895-1905%1991. 
5 E. S. Ayensu, Ashanti Gold: The Legacy of the World's Most Precious Metal, London: Marshall, 
1997. 
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the uncivilized natives, and how this attitude tied in with Chamberlain's 
expansionist views of empire. 6 Wilks touches on Cade's Obuasi transaction in 
relation to the failed George Reckless concession which was a modernisation plan 
by Asante ambassadors in the UK to appoint a foreign company to exploit the 
kingdom's resources on the model of the British South Africa Company. 7 Based 
on Governor Maxwell's own writing, Wilks suggests that a relationship existed 
between Cade and the firm of Radcliffe and Durant of Liverpool who supported 
Reckless, 8 but this was not so (see Chapter 3, 'A Chronological Narrative'). 9 
 Nevertheless, placing Cade's actions in the chronology of Asante's last-gasp 
efforts to maintain independence was insightful. That the British government 
should have supported Cade's deal but rejected the Kumasi-controlled Reckless 
proposal demonstrates the no-compromise, aggressive stance assumed against the 
Asantehene from mid-1895. 1° 
While the role of African entrepreneurs in the Gold Coast cocoa industry is 
well documented, their involvement in the gold mining industry has been less 
publicised and Dumett makes a valuable contribution in this respect with specific 
reference to the Fantes who sold the Obuasi concession to Cade. 11 
These authors' historical contributions on the firm are helpful primarily 
because of the focus on the British and Asante political context. However, they 
only cover the firm's early years. McCaskie himself states the desirability of a 
complete history of the fu-m, 12 which this thesis goes some way to provide. 
Another work concerned with the firm's relationship with government is 
Stockwell's The Business of Decolonization: British Business Strategies in the 
Gold Coast. " Stockwell traces AGC's views towards nationalism and 
T. C. McCaskie, 'The creation of Ashanti Goldfields Corporation, Ltd., ca. 1890-1910: an 
episode in the colonial impact upon Asante', Asantesem, 9, 1978, p. 42; Turner (1947), p. 20. 
I. Wilks Asante in the Nineteenth Century: The Structure and Evolution of a Political Order, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975, pp. 647-52. 
Wilks (1975), p. 646; PRO CO 879/43/490, telegram from Governor Maxwell to Marques of 
Ripon 18 June 1895. 
9 PRO CO 879/43/490, enclosure, E. A. Cade and R. D. Fry to Colonial Secretary, Cape Coast, 19 
June 1895. 
1° I. Wilks, 'Asante at the end of the nineteenth century: setting the record straight', Ghana Studies, 
2000, pp. 38-40. 
E. Dumett, El Dorado in West Africa: The Gold-mining Frontier, African Labour, and Colonial 
Capitalism in the Gold Coast, 1875-1900, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1998, pp. 280-3. As 
early as 1861, a Fante entrepreneur, Thomas Hughes had invested in European mining machinery 
only to be thwarted in its use by a chief's suspicion and superstition — T. F. Garrard, Akan Weights 
and the Gold Trade, London: Longman, 1980, p. 144. 
2 McCaskie (1978), p. 46. 
13 S. Stockwell, The Business of Decolonization: British Business Strategies in the Gold Coast, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
40 
decolonization from c. 1938 to Independence in 1957 in a comparative work 
including the Gold Coast mercantile and service sectors. She concludes that 
AGC's chairman over this period, Major General Sir Edward Louis Spears, 
"demonstrated greater appetite for political participation than any other 
businessman" in his efforts to resist nationalism. I4 This thesis covers a longer 
period and provides insight on the firm's dynamic relationship not just with the 
colonial government but also with post-colonial governments - an era less treated 
by historians, particularly not continuously between 1957 and 2004. 
Decker's Ph.D. thesis is a comparative analysis of the attitudes and actions 
of British business, including AGC, faced with increasing state participation and 
Africanisation of their workforces. I5 The thesis straddles the colonial and post-
colonial era from 1945-77 in Ghana and Nigeria. Decker's analysis is framed 
within the wider debate of the role played by foreign capital in economic 
development. It is particularly useful for this thesis in that it compares AGC's 
behaviour (unfavourably) during this limited time frame with that of other British 
firms - UAC, John Holt and Barclays. While Decker's interest in AGC is more 
political and macroeconomic this thesis is microeconomic in perspective with an 
emphasis on the firm's operations and financial performance. 
AGC was an obvious target for the investigation of labour issues being one 
of the largest private employers in Ghana. Lentz and Erlrnann, Crisp and Konings, 
referred to in Chapter 1, have all written about AGC in connection with class 
consciousness. This is a popular subject area for African historians because mines 
provided one of the few sources of waged, industrial labour. 
The foregoing works have provided methodological help by listing useful 
primary and secondary sources - in particular, Dumett's 'Sources for Mine 
Company History in Africa: the history and records of the Ashanti Goldfields 
Corporation (Ghana) Ltd'. I6 
The literature survey shows that only specific periods and themes in AGC's 
history have so far been documented, in particular, the imperial context, 
decolonization and labour. This thesis, being broader in themes and time scale, 
will therefore fill important gaps in the literature and will allow the existing 
findings to be assessed in the context of the whole corporate story. 
14 Stockwell (2000), p. 195. 
15 Decker (2006). 
Dumett (1988), pp. 502-15. 
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The gold industry in pre-colonial Ghana 
Evidence of pre-modern gold production has been found scattered along what we 
now know to be two gold belts (see Map 3). In the 1930s the Gold Coast 
Geological Survey Department systematically assessed the gold-bearing 
geological formations in present day Ghana.' 7 The two main gold bearing areas 
are centred on Tarkwa, the Tarkwaian system, and on Obuasi, which is part of the 
Birimian system. Both systems run in a northeast-southwest direction and are 
characterised by faults and folds. The Tarkwa system is described as a banket 
formation, similar to the Rand reefs. This means the gold is contained in cement-
like conglomerations, and is not of a particularly high value although the gold 
occurrence tends to be uniform. The Birimian system, on the other hand, contains 
somewhat erratically distributed, high-value gold ore in dense quartz and sulphide 
reefs with significant occurrences of arsenopyrites, carbonates, silver, and copper 
bearing sulphides. Mining the latter type of gold ore presents greater engineering 
and metallurgical challenges than the former. 
The importance of the Gold Coast's pre-colonial gold production is seen in 
the estimate that before the Rand discoveries in 1886 a third of the world's gold 
came from here. 18 Gold mining, smithing and trading from the region predated the 
arrival of the Portuguese in 1471 with an overland trade to North Africa. 19 Malian 
gold artisans are thought to have been attracted by gold to develop a mining 
industry around the fifteenth century town of Bighu and the older town of Jorga 
on the northwest, forest-savannah edge in the present Brong-Ahafo region of 
Ghana.2° Further south, the name Elmina given by the Portuguese to their coastal 
trading point, may derive from 'el mina', the mine, a reference to the gold brought 
to them in exchange for their goods. This gold was likely procured at the time 
from internal trade and from streams, rivers and coastal gravel and sand. 21 
Dredging riverbeds and diving were early extraction methods which were later 
17 N. R. Junner, Gold in the Gold Coast, Gold Coast Geological Survey, Memoir 4, 1935. 
" Cited in T. E. Anin, Gold in Ghana, London: Selwyn Publishers, second edition, 1990, p. 3. 
is Anin (1990), p. 3; Garrard (1980), pp. 1, 3, 6-8. 
Wilks (1975), pp. 244-5; Garrard (1980), p.41. 
zi Wilks (1975), p. 4, reference to W. Bosman, A New and Accurate Description of the Coast of 
Guinea, 1704; Garrard (1980), pp. 1, 3, 25-6. 
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overtaken by pit-mining. 22 Arhin describes some of these pre-modern mining 
tools and techniques.23 
Technological and trade influences from the savannah belt southwards along 
with the geographic expansion of the Asante kingdom in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries combined to increase the uses of gold and the ancillary trades 
associated with it in the forest zone. 24 The role of gold widened from ceremonial 
and ornamental use into a store of value, a means of exchange and wealth 
accumulation, as well as a source of ideology, power and conflict. 25 
Family, communal and slave labour and the abusa system were involved in 
gold production.26 In Asante, both private individuals (with permission from local 
chiefs) and the monarchy carried out gold production. 27 This sector was taxed in 
that nuggets found above a certain size were supposed to be sent to the 
Asantehene who would return some gold to the sub-chief and the miner who 
discovered the nugget. 28 
Mining and producing gold manually was time and labour-intensive hence 
the advantage of engaging slaves.29 Private individuals used slaves incorporated in 
the family unit to work in gold mining. 30 Royal pits and alluvial workings made 
use of slaves.31 An example of this was provided by Dupuis: in the rainy season 
thousands of slaves in Nsoko (a district of Bighu), 32 would be involved in 
production for Kumasi. 33 At the height of Asante's territorial expansion, the 
monarchy controlled gold mines in many of the areas highlighted in Map 3. 
22 J. Silver, 'The failures of European mining companies in the nineteenth-century Gold Coast', 
Journal of African History, 22, 1981, p. 511. 
23  K. Arhin, 'Succession and gold mining at Manso Nkwanta', Research Review (Institute of 
African Studies, University of Ghana), 6, 1970, pp. 104-6; Silver (1981), p. 511; Garrard (1980), 
pp. 131-3. 
24 Garrard (1980), pp. 24-6, 37. 
25 J.R. LaTorre, 'Wealth surpasses everything: an economic history of Asante, 1750-1874', Ph. D. 
Thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1978, pp. 57, 62-4, 198-9; Garrard (1980), pp. 2, 3, 38, 
63; T. C. McCaskie, 'Accumulation wealth and belief in Asante history: I. To the close of the 
nineteenth century', Africa, 53, 1, 1983, pp. 28-9; I. Wilks, Forests of Gold: Essays on the Akan 
and the Kingdom of Asante, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1993, pp.128-50; T. C. McCaskie, 
State and Society in Pre-colonial Asante, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 37-9. 
26 Dumett (1998), pp. 66-74; for a definition of iabusa.' see Glossary; Garrard (1980), p. 135. 
27 LaTorre (1978), p.63, Garrard (1980), p. 135; G. Austin, "No elders were present": commoners 
and private ownership in Asante 1807-96', Journal of African History, 37, 1996, pp. 10-11; Wilks 
(1975), p.197, reference to J.E. Casely Hayford, Gold Coast Native Institutions, 1903, pp. 95-6. 
26  LaTorre (1978), pp. 63, 128 249; Garrard (1980), p. 135. 
29 J. A. Skertchley, 'A visit to the gold-fields of Wassaw, West Africa', Journal of the Royal 
Geographical Society, 44, 1878, p. 280; Austin (1996), p. 19. 
30 R. E. Dumett, 'Pre-colonial gold mining and the state in the Akan region: with a critique of the 
Terray hypothesis', hi G. Dalton (ed.), Research in Economic Anthropology, 2, 1979, pp. 45-6. 
31 Wilks (1975), p. 436 
32 Garrard (1980), p. 41. 
33 Cited in Wilks (1975), p. 435. 
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Notable goldfields included those in the Wassaw region in the southwest, 
although these were lost soon after defeat at the hands of the British in the battle 
of Katamanso in 1826. 34 Closer to the Asante capital, Kumasi, important pits and 
alluvial workings existed in the Oweri Valley in Asante Akyem and at Manso 
Nkwanta. 35 
Following the abolition of the slave trade gold dust dominated exports from 
the Gold Coast in the middle of the nineteenth century. Various estimates of 
export and production totals have been provided by Wilks, LaTorre and Garrard. 36 
 Despite measurement difficulties it seems there is some certainty that gold 
production by Africans rose in the first half of the nineteenth century, peaking in 
mid-century (perhaps to 30,000 ounces per annum) and tailing off in the last 
quarter (to approximately 5, 000 ounces per annum). 37 
With respect to European commercial investment in the gold industry in pre-
colonial Ghana there is some evidence that the Portuguese and Dutch attempted 
prospecting, dredging and mining ventures along the Ankobra river, in Komenda 
and Egwira as far back as the seventeenth and early eighteenth century. 38 But for 
various reasons, including local opposition and superstition, 39 nothing came of 
these ventures. 
Excited talk of abundant gold from British soldiers returning from the 
Asante wars of 1873-4 coupled with the publication of travellers' eyewitness 
accounts initiated a gold rush. 40 This first expatriate gold rush, centred on the 
villages of Tarkwa and Abosso in the Wassaw region of the British Gold Coast 
protectorate, occurred between 1877 and 1885. Dumett comprehensively 
documents this episode previously neglected by researchers who have focused on 
the more intense rush that followed at the turn of the twentieth century. 41 
One of the first European enterprises employing imported machinery was 
Pierre Bonnat's French-financed Societe des Mines d'Or de l'Afrique Occidental 
Wilks (1975), pp. 180-5; A.G. Hopkins, 'Asante and the Victorians: transition and partition on 
the Gold Coast', in R. Bridges (ed.), Imperialism, Decolonization, and Africa, New York: St 
Martins Press, 1999, p. 37. 
35 Wilks (1975), p. 436; Arhin (1970), p. 101. 
Wilks (1975), p. 193; LaTorre (1978), pp. 375-6; Garrard (1980), pp. 163-5. 
37 Garrard (1980), p. 165. 
38 Garrard (1980), pp. 142-3. 
39 Garrard (1980), p. 130. 
40 A. McPhee, The Economic Revolution in British West Africa, London: George Routledge and 
Sons, 1926, p. 51; R. F. Burton and V. L. Cameron, To The Gold Coast for Gold: A Personal 
Narrative, London: Chatto and Windus, 1883, p. ix; Garrard (1980), p. 145. 
41 Dumett (1998). 
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in 1877 in the Abosso area. 42 This company was later reconstituted with 
Liverpudlian backers as the African Gold Coast Mining company, which became 
the Tarkwa and Abosso Gold Mining Company. Dumett discusses other European 
entrepreneurs active in the Tarkwa location at this time. The common fate of 
nearly all these ventures was financial failure.° Estimates of gold exports in the 
period 1851-1900 were lower than in 1801-50, in part reflecting the negligible 
contribution of European commercial production. 44 Silver puts this down to the 
difficulties encountered with management, technology, capital-raising, labour 
supply, dishonesty on the part of African and European middlemen, competition 
from African traditional miners and the administrative failures of the British 
protectorate. 45 The government's initial inability to control land ownership and to 
provide a railway were critical. 46 The absence of profit (in many cases the absence 
of production) quickly led to disillusionment in the European investment 
markets. 47  
The Wassaw (Gold Coast) Mining Company, which had backing from the 
Swanzy mercantile house, stands out from this period because it was one of the 
few actually to produce any gold and, interestingly, employed two Gold Coasters 
as mining engineers.48 (Africans were extensively involved in the gold industry as 
promoters, concession brokers, lawyers, mine owners, even mine engineers, 
besides of course, mine labourers). 49 Even this relatively successful company 
established in 1882 had not paid a single dividend by 1896. 5° 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century at least some of the royal mines 
in Asante had adopted more modem forms of mining, such as King Prempeh's 
Mine discovered by the British in 1896 southwest of Kumasi, which had 300 feet 
long timbered adits. 51 
There is no documentary evidence at the time of Cade's transaction in 1895 
to suggest that any other European had managed to secure a mining concession in 
the Obuasi region, although it had long been known that some of the finest gold 
42 Dumett (1998), pp. 91-6; K.B. Dickson, A Historical Geography of Ghana, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1969, p. 182. 
13 Silver (1981), pp. 511-29. See also Skertchley (1878), p. 274. 
44 Garrard (1980), p. 165. 
45 Silver (1981), pp. 516-25. 
46 Dumett (1998), pp. 274-78. 
47 Silver, pp. 514-7; Dickson (1969), p. 183; McPhee, p. 52. 
48 Dumett (1998), pp. 218-9. 
49 Silver (1981), p. 513; Garrard (1980), p. 144. 
50 The Mining Manual 1894, Silver (1981), pp. 515-6, 523. 
51 Wilks (1975), pp. 435-6. 
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traded at the Coast came from this area. 52 Asante's foreign policy towards white 
men had been cautious and discriminate, for example with respect to missions and 
schools,53 and it would seem also with gold production. The Asantehene revealed 
to his captors in March 1896 that "No whiteman has ever been allowed to dig for 
gold; neither English, French or Dutch, nor German".54 
In a marked change of foreign policy the Asante embassy in the UK in 1895 
attempted to conclude a wide-ranging agreement with George Reckless that would 
have allowed the development and modernisation of Asante's resources including 
her goldfields, but in a manner controlled at the centre by the monarchy. 55 This 
was preferable to an influx of private concessionaires. It was also hoped that such 
a forward-thinking move would safeguard the kingdom from British incursion. 
However, with the political turmoil in Asante (discussed below) and the "large 
numbers" of Fante entrepreneurs who had migrated to gold producing areas in 
Asante such as Atobiase and (Manso) Nkwanta,56 it was surely only a matter of 
time before individual Asante chiefs took advantage of the economic 
opportunities presented by Europeans. 
Cade's initial transaction for the Obuasi concession in 1895 therefore took 
place at a time when Asante was tottering and her occupation by Britain was 
rumoured. African production of gold was affected by the political instability and 
European disenchantment following the failures of the first gold rush had not yet 
dissipated. In these less than propitious times Cade's first-mover advantage in 
Asante would prove fortuitous. Following Britain's unopposed occupation of 
Kumasi in 1896, Cade's newly formed Ashanti Goldfield Corporation concluded 
with Governor Sir William Edward Maxwell an unprecedented and legally 
peculiar concession in 1897 (detailed in Chapter 4, `Land'). 
AGC made quick profits enabling them to pay a maiden dividend in 
September 1900. 57 This early success together with the Boer War's disruption of 
gold production in South Africa and the completion of the railway from Sekondi 
port to Tarkwa in 1901 encouraged a second 'jungle boom'. 58 Some two hundred 
52 Garrard (1980), pp. 140-1. 
n T. C. McCaskie, 'Innovational eclecticism: the Asante empire and Europe in the nineteenth 
century', Comparative Studies in Society and History, 14, 1, 1972, pp. 30-45; Wilks (1975), pp. 
202-4; 
54 PRO CO 96/272, enclosure in Maxwell to Chamberlain, 9 April 1896. 
ss Wilks (1975), pp. 720-3; Hopkins (1999), p. 54. 
56 Dickson (1969), p. 181. 
57 MS 14169/2, p. 91. 
58 Dumett (1998), p. 9. 
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mining companies were established in 1901 alone in the Gold Coast and Asante. 59 
 At a peak, 3,500 concessions were taken.6° AGC was nearly five years ahead of
this later scramble for concessions, which would come to mark a turning point in 
European commercial mining overtaking African small-scale production. 
Ghana's modem gold industry: 1900-2004 
Indigenous mining techniques, albeit more cost-effective than the early European 
efforts,61 were limited in growth prospects to the gold-containing rocks visible to 
the eye and at relatively shallow depths. Two factors soon gave Europeans an 
advantage over Africans: the advent of cyanidation and the railway. The cyanide 
metallurgical breakthrough made gold recovery from low-grade ore viable. The 
railway to Tarkwa, which was later extended to Kumasi (1903), reduced the cost 
and the time to import the machinery needed to dig deeper shafts, to pump out 
underground water and to break up ore in more efficient ways. These two factors 
allowed commercial-scale gold production to expand.62 
Figure 2.1 and Table 2.2 below show the development of the gold industry 
in Ghana from 1900 as indicated by output in gold ounces and the number of 
companies in production. 
Figure 2.1 
59 Cited in McCaskie (1978), pp. 42-3. 
a' Dickson (1969), p. 188. 
61 P. Rosenblum, 'Gold Mining in Ghana, 1874-1900', Unpublished PhD thesis, Columbia 
University, 1972, pp. 2-3. 
92 Dumett (1998), pp. 15, 193-98. 
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Ghanaian gold industry: total production and AGC production, 1880-2002 
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Joseph Chamberlain was appointed Secretary of State for the Colonies in 
June 1895. He held hopes that the gold industry in this part of Africa would be 
"one of the highest importance", and with a railway in place even "gigantic". 63 In 
fact a more modest performance would be realised with gold production 
representing 0.83% of total world production in 1910, 64 (this compared to 33% 
from the Witwatersrand in the same year). 65 Government exuberance for the 
sector is seen in the fact that direct involvement in gold production was attempted, 
but failed.66 
The graph shows steady growth in production from 1900 to the First 
World War. The British administration established the Mines Department in 1903 
headed by a Chief Inspector of Mines to act as a regulator and collector of 
industrial statistics. The Gold Coast Geological Survey Department was set up in 
63 PRO CO 879/57/578, notes on the meeting of Gold Coast traders etc. with reference to taxation, 
held at the Colonial Office, 28 March 1899. 
64 Gold Coast Chamber of Mines Eighth annual report, 1935, p. 38. 
65 S. E. Katzenellenbogen, 'The Miner's Frontier, Transport and General Economic Development', 
in L. H. Gann and P. Duignan (eds.), Colonialism in Africa, vol. 4: The Economics of Colonialism, 
London: Cambridge University Press, 1975, Table 67; Gold Coast Chamber of Mines Eighth 
annual report, 1935, p. 38. 
66 This was attempted by Governor Maxwell in 1897 — see R. E.Hainilton, 'Asante, 1895-1900: 
Prelude to War', unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Northwestern University, 1978, pp. 222-5. For an even 
earlier trial in the 1880s see Dickson (1969), p. 186. 
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1913 to locate and map the economically viable mineral resources in the 
country. 67 
A persistent problem in this early period for the Tarkwa-based mines was 
reliability of labour supply. The colonial administration assisted with this between 
1906 and 1924 by providing these private enterprises with labour recruited from 
the Northern Territories through chiefs under the guise of 'communal' labour. 68 
A difficult interwar period was endured by the industry owing to scarcity 
and the sharp rise in the cost of inputs, followed by a global depression. 
Production more than halved between 1914 and 1928 (410,000 ounces to 168,933 
ounces). The Gold Coast Chamber of mines was established at a low point in 
1927 to represent the industry's concerns. The memorandum of association listed 
seventeen objectives including liaising with government and securing labour 
supplies. 69 
The Geological Survey Department concluded its first maps in the early 
1930s. Its discovery and publication of new gold areas, coupled with the collapse 
of the gold standard, led to the formation of several new gold mining companies 
including Marlu Gold Mining Areas Ltd and the Ashanti-Adowsena (Banket) 
Goldfields Ltd. 
A new production peak of 701,417 ounces was reached just prior to the 
outbreak of World War II. From the output statistics there was no negative impact 
of the war on production until 1943. In 1942 a new record of 880, 000 ounces was 
set by the industry. After 1943 scarcity of fuel oil in particular necessitated a gold 
concentration scheme. Under this scheme a number of producing gold mines were 
closed by the government and placed on a care-and-maintenance basis in order to 
channel the limited inputs to the remaining mines. 70 
The post-war decolonization period was marked by industrial unrest 
throughout the country's mines. 71 The rising cost of frequent labour disputes led 
to the abandonment of gold mines in 1955-6, most notably the oldest in the 
country, the Tarkwa and Abosso inine. 72 When other gold mines threatened to 
67 Dickson (1969), pp. 190-1. 
66 R.G. Thomas, 'Forced Labour in British West Africa: The case of the Northem Territories of the 
Gold Coast 1906-1927', Journal of African History, 14, 1, 1973, pp. 79-103. 
69 Gold Coast Chamber of Mines Eighth annual report, 1935, pp. 5, 6. 
70 MS 14170/ 77 chairman to mine manager, 15 February 1943. 
71 Crisp (1984), pp. 94-121. 
72 Crisp (1984), p. 133 mentions four mines, but the Gold Coast Chamber of Mines reported the 
cessation of three mines in this time period: Lyndhurst Deep Level Ltd, Marlu Gold Mining Areas 
49 
close in 1960 President Nkrumah paid an attractive purchase price to the 
European owners and nationalised them. Four gold mines, Bibiani, Dunkwa, 
Prestea and Tarkwa, created the State Gold Mining Corporation (SGMC). 73 
 Output after World War H did not exceed the 1942 peak until 1959. In 1960 
915,317 ounces were produced setting a new record which would not be broken 
until 1991. The decline in gold output after 1970 was partly attributable to the end 
of the Bretton Woods System and the free gold price allowing lower levels of 
profitable production, and partly due to deteriorating political-economic 
conditions in Ghana (discussed below). A period of sharp industrial decline was 
witnessed from 1975-83. 
Rapid recovery thereafter was due directly to Structural Adjustment 
policies. The liberalised Minerals and Mining Act of 1986 made a considerable 
impact. This legislation exempted mine imports from import duty and allowed 
hefty depreciation of capital expenditure in the first years. It also permitted tax 
losses to be carried forward, gold producers to retain foreign exchange earnings 
abroad in order to buy supplies, and the free transfer of currency for dividend and 
loan payments. The government also commenced the divestment of State gold 
mines. There was consequently an influx of foreign investment allowing the 
sector to be rehabilitated and to grow. In the first eight years following the 
introduction of the new law US$lbn of new investment was made in Ghanaian 
mines and seven additional mine companies were established. 74 Explanations for 
the evolution of the gold industry in Ghana are inextricably linked to the political 
economy which is now discussed. 
Ltd, and Tarkwa and Abosso Mines Ltd — Gold Coast Chamber of Mines annual report, 1980, 
Appendix 2B. 
73 Crisp (1984), p. 133. 
74 'Investment Inflow into the Mining Sector', Finance and Research Unit, Minerals Commission, 
Accra, Ghana, April 2004. 
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Table 2.2: Gold Mining Companies in production for selected years 
(including dredging operations) 
Year Number of producing 
companies 
Total production 
(ounces) 
1910 6 183,691 
1920 11 207,506 
1930 5 218,494 
1940 16 818,911 
1950 10 679,173 
1960 0 7 915,317 
1970 ° 5 714,442 
1980 ° 5 439,669 
1990 ° 7 522,517 
1999 12 2,404,604 
Sources: Gold Coast Mines Department Annual Reports, Gold Coast Chamber of Mines Annual 
Reports, Ghana Chamber of Mines Annual Reports, The Mining Manual. 
° State Gold Mining Corporation mines have been treated as individual producers. 
The political and economic background c.1895 to 2004 
The transition from pre-colonial Asante to colonial Gold Coast and post-colonial 
Ghana is outlined here. This provides important background information on the 
company's activities between 1895 and 2004. More detailed discussions of the 
events sketched here which are directly relevant to AGC's history are provided in 
the appropriate places in the body of the thesis. 
Wilks's Asante in the Nineteenth Century provides an impressive account of 
the political situation between the British and the Asante who held ultimate 
suzerainty over the Obuasi area, where the gold mines acquired by Edwin Cade in 
1895 were located. By 1895 Asante political control and territories were greatly 
diminished: in 1874 the British invaded Kumasi, the seat of Asante government, 
and incorporated nearly all of Asante's southern provinces into the British Gold 
Coast Colony. Thereafter, Kumasi struggled to firmly maintain the allegiance of 
her central, metropolitan provinces. Divisions over the best policy to take with the 
British and revolts against increased taxation and forced conscription led to civil 
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war between 1884 and 1888. 75 Weakened by this internal strife, the institution of 
the monarchy was left in acute crisis. 
A military unit led by Colonel Francis Scott invaded Kumasi on 17 January 
1896 despite the royal house's overtures for peace and good trade relations and 
their agreement to an ultimatum to accept a British resident with assurances of 
security for the Asantehene. 76 The British force entered Kumasi unopposed. On 
20 January the Asantehene and his mother, the Asantehemaa, embraced Governor 
Maxwell's feet before an assembly of a thousand in a humiliating act of 
submission. 77 Following such a submission they were shocked to be deported as 
prisoners to Elmina in the Gold Coast Colony, then to Sierra Leone on 5 January 
1897, and to the Seychelles on 19 August 1900. 78 The monarchy had been caught 
unawares in what Hamilton describes as a "coup d'6tat". 79 
Resistance followed in the 1900 Yaa Asantewaa uprising when Kumasi-
based royals fought against British occupation. The rebels were soon quelled. On 
26 September 1901 the Ashanti Order in Council was passed declaring the 
annexation of Asante on the grounds of military conquest. In fact, with the 
exception of the Kumasi insurgents, the rest of Asante had not engaged the British 
in military action, and could not accurately be described as conquered. s° 
The varied explanations for British imperial expansion in general contribute 
to our understanding of different facets of the British annexation of Asante. The 
economic explanation expounded by Hopkins in his seminal An Economic History 
of West Africa is relevant. 81 According to this economic thesis, commercial 
interests in tropical raw materials prompted British authorities into positive action 
to formally secure power during the depression of 1873-96. This was motivated 
by increasing trade competition due to the advent of steam shipping and 
widespread use of modern money which reduced foreign entry barriers to West 
African trade. This view is supported by the petitions made by British commercial 
interests (and African ones in the Gold Coast Colony) to the Secretary of State for 
75 McCaskie (1983), pp. 35-9. 
76 Willis (2000), pp. 33, 40-1, 43. 
Wilks (1975), p. 657. 
78 Wilks (1975), pp. 304, 656-7. 
79 Hamilton (1978), pp. ix, 37. 
80 Wilks (2000), pp. 13, 58-9. 
81 A. G. Hopkins, An Economic History of West Africa, Harlow: Longman, 1973, p. 124. 
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decisive action against Asante whose frequently bellicose stance disrupted trade. 82 
 From the late 1880s the Gold Coast administrators proactively secured trade 
treaties with Asante's outer provinces. 83 
Britain also had political motives to expand geographically so as to ward off 
France's military expansion across West Africa and the threat of Almamy Samory 
whose potential alliance with Asante could have blocked British influence in the 
interior. 84 
African agency, specifically the African political factor external and internal 
to Asante, cannot be ignored. Externally, the complicated alliance of the Fante 
with the British deserves emphasis in understanding Asante's downfall. This 
partnership, at times thorny, enhanced Britain's regional control and gave them a 
political, even moral excuse, to defend their friends (the Fantes) against Asante 
`barbarians'. 85 Another political dimension is the internal conflict within Asante 
itself which contributed to British military and imperial success. An important 
factor behind the weakened monarchy was the opposition it faced internally from 
wealth-seeking Asante citizens who protested against prohibitive taxation of their 
extra-subsistence activities such as gold production and marketing. 86 There was 
also growing awareness of an alternative way of governance and development as 
offered by the British. 87 
European agency is apparent from the hell bent views of the individual Gold 
Coast governors Griffith and Maxwell on the destruction of the Asantehene. 88 By 
1895 there was a decisive change in policy towards Asante from ambivalence to 
agreement on military action. 89 In the metropole, Hopkins and Cain's 
`gentlemanly capitalism' thesis highlights another dimension of European 
agency. 96 This Eurocentric perspective highlights the social network between the 
political elite, financiers and industrialists as a major driving force for imperialism 
and is supported by the story of AGC's founding (see the next chapter, 'A 
82 PRO CO 879/43/490, E. Helm of Manchester Chamber of Commerce to Colonial Office, 5 
October 1895, and T. H. Barker of Liverpool Chamber of Commerce to Colonial Office, 8 October 
1895; Wilks (2000), p. 31. 
83 T. Lewin, Asante Before the British: the Prempean Years, 1875-1900, Lawrence: The Regents 
Press of Kansas, 1978, p. 178; Wilks (2000), pp. 20, 22, 46-7. 
84 Wilks (1975), pp. 636-7; Hopkins (1999), p. 51. 
85 Wilks (1975), pp. 169-70. 
86 McCaskie (1983), pp. 35-8; Austin (1996), pp.24-25. 
87 McCaskie (1983), pp. 35-6. 
88 Wilks (2000), pp. 28-9, 45. 
89 Lewin (1978), p. 177; Wilks (2000), pp. 35-6. 
90 P. J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688-1914, New York: Longman, 2001, 
second edition. 
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Chronological Narrative'.) Impelled by a combination of economic and political, 
external and internal factors the British succeeded in colonising Asante. 
Significant events affecting the gold industry occurred during colonial rule. 
The railway extension from Tarkwa to Kumasi was completed in 1903 thanks to 
AGC's provision of a revenue guarantee to the government of £30,000 per annum 
(see Chapter 3). 91 Although Chamberlain had anticipated gold to be the main 
driver of the Gold Coast economy, this proved to be incorrect. The phenomenal 
increase in cocoa farming led to the Gold Coast, within about a decade of the 
introduction of the crop, overtaking Brazil as the world's largest cocoa producer 
in 1911. The First World War and ensuing depression seriously diminished gold 
and other export incomes. 92 
Governor Guggisberg (1919-27) set a ten-year development programme 
during which large infrastructure projects were undertaken. This demanded 
labour and would impact the supply to mines. 
The 1930s saw a new level of unrest with major cocoa hold ups and strikes 
in the gold mines. Following the Caribbean disturbances in 1930s, the Gold Coast 
administration responded to London's new recommendations and established a 
Labour Department in 1938. 
Austere economic measures were endured by Africans during the Second 
World War as imports were directed towards the production of manganese, 
bauxite and industrial diamonds to support the war effort. The war led to the 
introduction of a state marketing board, which monopolised the export of cocoa 
beans. The scarcity of consumer goods and inflation immediately after the war 
caused enormous discontent. 
The political changes precipitating the Gold Coast's Independence in 1957 
started in the aftermath of the 1948 Accra riots. This was triggered by a policeman 
shooting and wounding several protestors on a march organized by ex-servicemen 
over their pensions. The riots spread to other municipalities on a wave of general 
dissatisfaction over the rising cost of living that took the administration by 
surprise. A state of emergency was declared throughout the country. 
91 96/684/1, Notes on the record of the corporation since 1897, 21 February 1929; MS 24661/1, 
debenture prospectus information 21 July 1905, reference to contract between the Crown Agents 
for the Colonies and AGC dd 19 August 1901; AGC annual report, 1905; letter to shareholders 9 
January 1905; MS 14164/2, minutes 9 August 1904. 
92 Hopkins (1973) , p. 238. 
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An array of nationalist, African-led political parties were able to capitalise 
on the economic hard times to crystallise anti-colonial feelings. The United Gold 
Coast Convention (UGCC) established in 1947 emerged as the most prominent, 
led by J. B. Danquah. In October 1949, the UGCC Secretary, Kwame Nkrumah 
split from the party accusing Danquah of conservatism and formed his own 
Convention People's Party (CPP). At risk of over-simplification, the CPP broadly 
won the support of the youth, farmers and trade unions, which left the UGCC's 
natural constituency as the African elite: mercantilists, professionals and chiefs. 
This broad-brush distinction would permeate Ghana's post-colonial politics. 
The British government was forced to dramatically fast-forward plans for 
political devolution in response to the Watson Report into the 1948 riots. 93 To 
ignore the CPP's demand for "self-government now!" would have risked further 
political unrest from one of the most economically important colonies. 
As a first step towards this, elections for a Legislative Assembly were 
scheduled in 1951. The elections, following the recommendations of the Coussey 
Report, were the first to allow Africans democratic involvement in government. 
While in prison, Nkrumah's CPP won these elections and he was released 
dramatically to be appointed Head of Government and later Prime Minister. The 
Governor, Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, maintained veto powers, but, politically, this 
would not have been easy to exercise. 
Thanks to post-war reconstruction and the Korean War commodity boom 
the Gold Coast enjoyed rising prices for important exports such as cocoa and 
timber. 94 The boom allowed the commencement of ambitious visible 
development projects. 95 The pace of this expenditure would accelerate despite the 
adverse turn in trade terms for primary producers from the end of the 1950s. 
Further constitutional changes permitted a general election in June 1954, 
which the CPP won. An exclusively African cabinet was formed. In August 1954 
the CPP reneged on a promise to increase the producer price of cocoa, deciding to 
freeze it instead. This was the proximate cause of the creation of an opposition 
93 PRO, CO 847/36/1, no. 9, papers prepared by the Agenda Committee on the Conference of 
African Governors, no. 2, 'Constitutional Development in Africa', May 1947, cited in Stockwell 
(2000), p. 1; F. Cooper, Decolonization and African Society: the Labour Question in French and 
British Africa, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 112-13. 
94 Stockwell (2000), p. 55. 
95 Stockwell (2000), p. 59. 
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party, the National Liberation Movement (NLM). 96 Underlying issues also 
contributed to the incongruous combination of interest groups that formed the 
NLM. Nkrumah's dilution of traditional authority structures through the creation 
of local councils which replaced Native Authorities aggrieved many chiefs as well 
as the intelligentsia, who were often related to chiefs. Plans to reduce the number 
of parliamentary seats for the Ashanti region after Independence stung in view of 
the wealth of this area, particularly from cocoa production. The capture of 
economic opportunities, such as government contracts, by CPP members provided 
a strong economic motive for excluded aspirant 'young men' to use politics to 
create access to wealth. Rathbone and Allman identify this petite bourgeoisie 
group, who, disillusioned with the CPP's ability to improve their financial lot, 
became the critical instigators of the NLM. 97 This was reminiscent of the 
economically-motivated revolt of commoners who tipped Asante into civil war in 
1884. 98 
However, the old elite - the chiefs and intelligentsia - quickly usurped the 
small businessmen and the cocoa farmers in the NLM's leadership. The NLM was 
first led by J. B. Danquah and then Dr. Kofi Busia. The party initially made 
demands for complete secession of Ashanti in opposition to Nkrumah and the 
British government's Independence plans. Eventually the NLM lobbied for a 
federalist system of government, which forced another election in 1956. CPP 
victory in 1956 ended the federalist movement and Independence quickly 
followed on March 6, 1957, when the new name Ghana replaced the Gold Coast. 
Initially, there was continuity between Nkrumah's economic policies and 
those of the British. Nkrumah's first major deviation from the capitalist colonial 
economic model was his vast development programme in non-productive 
sectors. 99 Nkrumah's Dawn Broadcast of April 1961 is seen by many as a turning 
point in his ideology and policies. 100 Increasingly radical and statist economic 
96 1. M. Allman, 'The young men and the porcupine: class, nationalism and Asante's struggle for 
self-determination, 1954-57', Journal of African History, 31, 1990, pp. 263-79. 
97 R. Rathbone, 'Businessmen and politics: party struggle in Ghana,1949-1957', Journal of 
Development Studies, 9, 1973, pp. 390-401; Allman (1990), pp. 263-79. 
9s Allman (1990), pp. 268-9. 
n Govemment expenditure in 1955 was four times the 1950 level in real terms, much of this was 
allocated to community and social services: construction, roads, power and water supply, 
education and health. See J. Frimpong-Ansah, The Vampire State: the Political Economy of 
Decline in Ghana, Trenton: African World Press, 1991, ch. 6. 
100 Text of President Nkrumah's Dawn Broadcast, 8 April 1961, Accra: Government Publication, 
1961; Killick suggests the turning point was earlier in 1959 when Nkrumah gave a speech to the 
CPP emphasising socialism (1978), p. 36. 
56 
policies followed. Monopoly rights were given to new state corporations such as 
the Ghana Trading Corporation that imported a wide range of consumer goods. 1°1 
 A new national currency, the cedi, having been completely de-linked from sterling 
was made inconvertible; tight restrictions were placed on import licences, foreign 
exchange and remittances. These measures reduced the openness of the economy. 
Although reassurances were given to foreign enterprises that they would not be 
forcibly nationalised without fair compensation, 102  these economic policies 
impacted negatively on the profitability and operations of expatriate firms. 1°3 
A Seven Year Economic Plan was launched in 1964 to promote socialism 
and rapid industrialisation. It was hoped that this would be achieved through a 5-
pronged approach comprising a visible, if not dominant, state sector, 104 a joint 
state-foreign private capital sector, a co-operative sector, a foreign private 
enterprise sector, and a small-scale Ghanaian business sector, 105 
The elimination of political freedoms was another feature of Nkrumah's rule. 
In 1958 the Preventive Detention Act was passed and used to silence political 
opposition and constitutional changes rendered the country a one-party state in 
1964. 
1964/5 marked a peak in cocoa production, the bedrock of the economy, at 
571,000 tonnes. This was followed by long-term decline of the sector partly 
caused by sharp price falls on the world market. Other commodities were affected 
and coupled with abuses in the import licences system a period of economic 
hardship ensued. In 1965 the costly Volta River Project to provide electricity was 
finished. A year later Nkrumah's government was ousted in a military coup which 
met with considerable public support. 1°6 
The military led National Liberation Council (NLC) and the subsequent 
democratically elected Progress Party (PP) of Dr. K. Busia shared the NLM 
legacy. 1°7 They achieved limited success in their partial attempt to shift economic 
1°1 Rimmer (1992), p. 19. 
1°2 G. Kay (ed.), The Political Economy of Colonialism in Ghana: A Collection of Documents and 
Statistics, 1900-1960, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972, pp. 89-92; Crisp (1984), p. 
140. 
103 Decker (2006), pp. 132-3. 
104 M. Fahnbulleh 'The elusive quest for industrialisation in Africa: A comparative study of Ghana 
and Kenya, c1950-2000', Ph. D. Thesis, University of London, 2005. p. 121. 
105 Text of President Nkrumah's Dawn Broadcast, 8 April 1961, Accra: Government Publication, 
1961; text of speech by President Nkrumah, 'Overseas Capital and Investment in Ghana', 24 
March 1962, Accra. 
106 See for example Spears's eyewitness observations from Obuasi at the time of the 1966 coup in 
SPRS 3/60/5 'Twenty-two years with AGC in the Gold Coast and Ghana', 3 February 1969. 
107 Rathbone (1973), p. 391. 
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focus onto rural policies and to usher in free market reforms. The NLC and PP 
were opposed to high levels of state-ownership in private enterprise, to the benefit 
and relief of large expatriate businesses, such as AGC. At the same time the NLC 
and PP introduced the first Ghanaianisation laws to assist Ghanaian entrepreneurs, 
to the detriment of small and medium-sized Levantine and Indian businessmen. 108 
The democratic period under the PP was short-lived as a second military 
coup in January 1972 headed by Colonel LK. Acheampong overthrew Busia. The 
policies of Acheampong and his National Redemption Council (NRC) exhibited 
significant continuity with Nkrumah's regime with respect to the relationship 
between the state and the economy. In his May Day 1973 speech, 1°9 Acheampong 
largely blamed "evil" neo-colonialism and the "sharks" of international finance 
for shackling the economy. He declared a policy of self-reliance and increased 
government participation in the timber and precious metals industries. This led to 
55% state-ownership of the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation and the summary 
removal of its headquarters from London to Accra. Operational control, however, 
remained firmly in expatriate hands. Acheampong's philosophy of self-reliance 
involved raising exports and reducing imports of food and industrial raw materials, 
hence the Operation Feed Yourself and Operation Feed Our Industries 
programmes. For the benefit of urban workers, the NRC outlawed redundancies 
and improved social security. The Industrial Relations Act of 1971 was repealed 
thereby increasing trade union rights. The currency devaluation of 1971 was 
partly reversed. The state-led distribution system, controlled prices and import 
licensing system were widened. (How these policies affected AGC is seen in 
Chapter 3). Acheampong went on to repudiate the country's foreign debt 
obligations. 
Economically, the self-reliance strategy and the rising commodity price of 
gold and cocoa helped to improve the economy in the NRC's first two years. 
From 1975, however, fiscal, inflationary and exchange rate disincentives to 
produce, mismanagement, corruption, the oil price shock and NRC internal rifts 
all led to sharp economic decline. 110 Survival responses included reversion to 
Decker (2006), pp. 147-8. 
109Text of speech by Col. I. K. Acheampong, May 1973, from Speeches and Interviews by Col. I. 
K. Acheampong, vol. 2, n.d. but Accra 1973, pp. 119-25. 
11° Inflation in 1977 was 116.5%, money expansion between 1976 and 1978 rose 165.7% - A. 
Boahen, The Ghanaian Sphinx: Reflections on the Contemporary History of Ghana 1972-1987, 
Accra: Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1989, p. 10; export volumes drastically declined, see 
Rimmer (1992), Table 7.1, p. 143. 
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subsistence production, smuggling, kalabule (rent-seeking tactics) and emigration. 
Acheampong's consolidation of power in 1975 by the creation of the Supreme 
Military Council (SMC) to replace the NRC, coupled with increased patronage to 
buy silence and political support allowed the regime to continue as long as it did. 
By 1978 opposition from professionals, students and churches led to 
Acheampong's removal from the SMC in a palace coup to be replaced by General 
Akuffo. 
The "June 4 Revolution" in 1979 witnessed Ghana's bloodiest coup under 
the leadership of Flight Lieutenant J.J. Rawlings and junior officers. The military 
did, however, allow the SMC's planned democratic elections in September of that 
year to proceed. Dr. Hilla Limann won the election on an Nkrumah platform. On 
31 December 1981, however, Rawlings's Provisional National Defence Council 
(PNDC) dissolved parliamentary democracy and replaced it with a self-styled 
"participatory democracy". 111 Rawlings also claimed the Nkrumah legacy. The 
PNDC comprised three Marxist factions: the June 4 Movement, The Peoples' 
Revolutionary League of Ghana and the New Democratic Movement who were 
divided over the appropriate policy response to make to tackle the economy's 
acute problems. 112 
In the budget of May 1983 the most significant post-colonial change in the 
political economy occurred with the rejection of the state-led, socialist approach 
in favour of the adoption of Structural Adjustment policies. The Ghana 
Commercial Bank Quarterly Review of 1984 spoke of the "establishment of a 
liberal market system in the near future" evidenced by the abolition of controlled 
prices, currency devaluations, "less government intervention in economic 
activities" and divestments. 113  Frimpong-Ansah and Tsatsu Tsikata write that 
Ghanaians and not the IMF initiated structural adjustment. 114  Although Herbst 
argues that there was nothing deterministic about the PNDC policy change -
"there is no clear relationship between an African country's economic condition 
and its willingness to undertake reform measures" - 115 Frimpong-Ansah explains 
that the about-turn in ideology was forced by the government's realisation of the 
ill Text of broadcast by Flight-Lieutenant J. J. Rawlings, Chairman of the PNDC, 'No Turning 
Back', 29 July 1982. 
112 Boahen (1989), p. 45. 
113 Nearly 6,000 price controls were abolished by the PNDC — Herbst (1993), p. 62. 
114 Frimpong-Ansah (1991), p. 153; Text of speech by Tsatsu Tsikata, 'The Human Dimension of 
Africa's Economic Recovery and Development: Ghana's Country Experience', 1988, Khartoum 
conference of UN Economic Commission for Africa, p. 15. 
115 Herbst (1993), p. 30. 
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depths of the economic problems. 116 The economic situation in 1983 was 
aggravated by a drought and the expulsion of about a million Ghanaians from 
Nigeria. 117 
Since 1983, Ghana has implemented successive stages of Structural 
Adjustment reforms. Bold and harsh policies ensued, including significant 
devaluations and the return to a convertible cedi. Despite the public, particularly 
urban, discontent following removal of petrol subsidies in 1990, the government 
continued on the path of reform. The export sectors, including gold production, 
were highlighted for particular attention through the liberalisation of regulations 
to encourage foreign direct investment. 
Political changes commenced in 1990 with preparations for the return to 
democratic rule. Rawlings's PNDC reconstituted itself as the National Democratic 
Congress and won the November 1992 elections. Political and economic recovery 
paralleled each other. 
The NDC were re-elected in 1996 but lost in 2000 to the main opposition 
party, the New Patriotic Party (in the Danquah-Busia tradition) led by John 
Kufuor. This proved to be a landmark election because it was the first time that 
there had been a peaceful change from one civilian administration to another since 
Independence. 118 
Summary 
Ghana's post-colonial economic policies showed a surprising degree of continuity 
between 1961 and 1983; during this time, although the economic and political 
pressures varied, policy changes worked within the state-led development 
paradigm. It was not until the severe economic crisis of 1983 that changes were 
made to the paradigm itself, ushering in a market economy: Macroeconomic 
policies had direct microeconomic effects on AGC as will be seen in the 
following chapters. 
Table 2.3 shows the important role played by gold in the colonial and post-
colonial economy. For most of the twentieth century the gold industry was the 
second largest export earner. Within the industry AGC was by far the largest gold 
116 Frimpong-Ansah (1991), p. 153. 
117 An increase of nearly 10% of the population. 
118 J. Ayee, 'The 2000 General Elections and Presidential run-off in Ghana: An Overview', 
Democratisation, 9, 2, 2002, p. 148. 
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producer. As such, its performance and evolution is relevant to our understanding 
of Ghana's colonial and post-colonial economy. 
The political economy outlined above provides essential background for the 
next chapter, 'A Chronological Narrative'. 
Table 2.3: The gold industry's contribution to export earnings in colonial and 
postcolonial Ghana 
Year Total Export value Gold export 
value 
Gold% of 
total 
Cocoa% of 
total 
1900* £797,000 £38,000 5% 3% 
1910* £2,509,000 £790,000 31% 35% 
1920* £12,170,000 £889,000 7% 83% 
1930* £9,848,000 £1,056,000 11% 71% 
1940* £13,449,000 £7,208,000 54% 33% 
1950* £75,393,000 £8,719,000 12% 72% 
1960* £111,408,000 £11,088,000 10% 60% 
1970° 0460 mn 026 mn 6% 72% 
1980° 03,104 mn 0540 mn 17% 65% 
Sources: * Kay (1972), Table 2IA, pp. 334-5; ° Hug (1988), Table 10.5, p. 203; *Earth Trends 
Country Profiles, Economic Indicators Ghana: 
http://earthtrends.wri.org/pdf  library/country_profiles/eco_cou_288.pdf, accessed 15 May 2006. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
A CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a descriptive narrative of the company's 
history. It is organized in six parts broadly corresponding to important turning 
points in corporate and operational leadership: the Cade era (1895-1905), the 
Feldtmann era (1905-30), the Batty era (1930-45), the Spears era (1945-68), the 
Lonrho era (1968-86), and the Jonah era (1986-2004). 
The Cade era, 1895 to c.1905 
In March 1890 two Fante merchants based in Cape Coast, Joseph Etruson Ellis 
and Chief Joseph Edward Biney along with their accountant, Joseph Peter Brown, 
purchased from the king of Bekwai (the Bekwaihene) the right to mine an area of 
Asante territory spanning 100 square miles around the village of Obuasi, for 100 
years . 1 
Ellis was born in Kuntu, near Saltpond in 1845. He attended the Wesleyan 
School in Cape Coast after which he trained as a tailor and moved to Freetown for 
some time. He returned to Cape Coast to work as an agent for European merchant 
firms, eventually establishing his own trade company. One product he imported 
was a gunpowder machine for rock blasting which unfortunately led to a horrific 
explosion in his house killing many of his family members. Ellis died in July 1917 
at the age of 72. 
Biney was not a traditional chief but was called "Chief' because of his 
prominence in his community. He too came from the Saltpond area, from a village 
called Anyemaim, and studied at the Wesleyan School. Like Ellis, he worked as a 
clerk for European commercial houses before going it alone. Biney and Ellis were 
part of an African syndicate including Dr Ernest Hayford, J. W. Sey and John 
Mensah Sarbah established to acquire mine and timber concessions. 2 The men, if 
'The following details are derived from MS 24669, T. Rowe, 'The Early Pioneers'. Rowe, a 
Lonrho employee, does not cite his sources for these details. 
2 In this period many African enterprises were engaged in the concessions business including the 
African Gold Coast Company, The Gold Coast Native Concessions Purchasing Company, The 
African Concessions Trust and the Ashanti Exploration Company — Wilks (1975), p. 625, fn. 202. 
Biney, Ellis and Brown may very well have been connected with some of these other companies. 
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not directly involved in the gold rush of 1877- 85, would have known of the 
opportunities. Biney died in December 1937 aged 88. 3 
According to Dumett the Akan chiefs kept the location of their mines close 
secrets and "next to nothing was known [by Europeans] about the location of 
Asante mines at the time of the first European gold rush to Wassaw in the 1870s 
and 1880s."4 Wilks cites British government correspondence between Accra and 
London showing that young men from the Coast were attracted by the gold 
mining and rubber opportunities to settle in Asante provinces. 5 These men were 
allegedly defiant towards both the Asante and the British authorities and 
instigated villagers to rebel against their chiefs. A specific reference is made to 
"numerous Cape Coast educated natives, who are working at the gold mines in 
Inquanta". 6 Migration from the coast into forested areas was not unprecedented. 
Earlier in the nineteenth century, with the shift away from the slave trade, 
southerners moved northwards to exploit the expansion of 'legitimate' trade in 
palm oil. 7 Ellis, Biney and Brown's venture supports the administrators' 
observation of migration for rubber and gold mining later in the nineteenth 
century. Ellis and Biney owned a house in Bekwai. 8 Biney at least would also 
have maintained a main residence at Cape Coast where his trade merchant 
business was based. 9 Biney was one of a growing number of Africans engaged in 
importing and retailing cheap European, mostly British, manufactured consumer 
goods. 10 He appears to have contributed more of the finance for the Obuasi 
venture since he was later allocated a greater number of shares when the 
concession was sold to Edwin Cade. 11 Ellis was more involved with the 
operations of the mine as one of the principal mines worked at the time was 
3 MS 24669, 'The Early Pioneers', p. 10. 
4 Dumett (1998), p. 35. 
Wilks (1975), p. 534, reference to Further Correspondence, British Parliamentary Papers C.4052, 
1884, p. 53: Barrow's report dd. Accra, 5 July 1883, and C.4477, 1885, p. 79: Kirby to Colonial 
Secretary, dd. Kumase, 5 February 1884. 
6 Wilks (1975), p. 534, reference to Further Correspondence, British Parliamentary Papers C.4477, 
1885, p. 79: Kirby to Colonial Secretary, dd. Kumase, 5 February 1884. 
Hopkins (1973), ch. 4. 
8 McCaskie (1978), p. 39, citing from Cade Mss., University of Birmingham, Typescript Fragment 
of a Visit to Bekwae and Adansi. 
Bliley was appointed Cade's Cape Coast agent to handle and relay imports for this reason: MS 
24670, Cade to directors, 25 December 1897. 
" Hopkins (1973), pp. 126-7. 
11 MS 24669, 'The Early Pioneers', pp. 8, 9. 
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named after him and when visiting the site in 1895, Cade refers to "Ellis and 
company", rather than `Biney and company .12 
The details of the transaction between the Fante entrepreneurs and the 
Bekwaihene, Yaw Boakye, are unclear. Although they claimed their concession 
was for 100 square miles the limits of it had definitely not been measured or 
demarcated. None of the area had been surveyed or mapped. Ellis and company's 
mining appliances were at Obuasi and the Ellis Mine was located just south-
southeast of Obuasi, indicating the small area actually being worked. 13 The 
Bekwaihene's ignorance of the real extent of 100 square miles would become 
apparent later (see below). It was a unit of land that probably sounded neat and 
there is evidence that it was offered repeatedly by the Bekwaihene.' 4 
Despite sometimes violent rivalry at state level, the Fantes had closer 
language and cultural affinities with the Asantes than Europeans had and these 
advantages no doubt enabled them to discover the location of Asante's richest 
mines. The Bekwaihene may have been impressed by the educated, English-
speaking Fante merchants who may have boasted of their connections to English 
merchants who could supply them with machinery to greatly increase the gold 
output. This would have benefited the Bekwaihene by increasing his share of 
production. The Fantes may have been more trusted than a chief's own miners 
who had a reputation for robbing chiefs of their tribute payments. 15 The custom 
was for miners to pay the landowner a third of their output and it would appear 
that the Ellis, Biney, Brown agreement was also based on this sharing system 
known as abusa. Cade reported in 1895 that, "the whole system seems to be built 
up upon some absurd arrangement of sharing". 16 This confirms McCaskie's 
thought that the original Fante concession of 1890 was not the transfer of 
inalienable title to the land. 17 
Perhaps the strongest incentive the Bekwaihene Yaw Boakye had to sell 
leases in the Obuasi region was that he had no security of tenure there. The 
Obuasi area actually belonged to the Adansihene. In 1879 the Adansihene Nkansa 
12 MS 24666, Cade to directors, 'Report on Obuasi Gold Mine Estate, Cape Coast, August 1895, 
pp. 3, 26, 27. 
13 MS 24666, report on Obuasi, 1895, p. 27. 
14 PRO CO 879/57/578, Chamberlain to Hodgson, 11 August 1899, regarding the 100 square miles 
concessions of Mr Low and Captain Campbell granted by the Bekwaihene. 
15 Silver (1981), p. 525. 
16 MS 24666, report on Obuasi, 1895, p. 28. 
17 McCaskie (1978), p. 38. 
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sought secession from Asante to join the British protected territory. 18 According 
to McCaskie and Cade himself, the then Bekwaihene, Yaw Gyamfi, incensed at 
Adansi's disloyalty to Kumasi, invaded Adansi. 19 However, Wilks provides 
evidence that the Bekwaihene Yaw Gyamfi and his predecessor, Kakari, may have 
had their own secessionist agenda to create a new Bekwai Federation, independent 
of both the Asantehene and the British. 20 After a series of battles in 1886 (not 
1884 as Cade thought) 21 the Adansi people and their king fled to the Gold Coast 
Colony and the Bekwaihene assumed control over parts of Adansi territory, 
including Obuasi 22 
That the Fantes had not sought approval from the Adansihene, nor it appears 
from the Asantehene, could be due to the fact that either the venture was only 
perceived as a profit-share rather than an ownership agreement, or because they 
were contemptuous of the old, and weakened, authority structures. 23 In any case, 
the three Fantes can rightly be called entrepreneurs because they responded to a 
business opportunity with a high degree of risk using their own capital. Dumett 
writes, "The very idea of indigenous African entrepreneurs taking the lead in 
modern mining concessionaire activity deserves emphasis because it was 
extraordinary on the continent of Africa at this early juncture". 24 
In February 1895 after five years of difficulty in using the equipment 
procured through the firm of Smith and Cade, who were one of Biney's English 
trading agents, a particularly high-grade sample of ore was sent to Edwin Cade in 
London with an invitation to "come and see". 25 The Fantes' equipment consisted 
of "small appliances", a small, hand-powered 3-stamp mill and amalgamated 
plates. 26 Crucially, they had no ventilators or fans needed to work deeper shafts. 27 
 Cade had the sample assayed by Johnson Matthey and it was found to have a high 
gold content. A second larger sample was requested and this confirmed the 
extraordinarily high quality of ore: 10.5 ounces of gold to the ton.28 
18 Wilks (1975), p. 522. 
19 McCaskie (1978), p. 39, and MS 24666, report on Obuasi, 1895, p. 3. 
Wilks (1975), pp. 533, 567-70. 
21 MS 24666, report on Obuasi, 1895, p. 3. 
22 Wilks (1975), pp. 569-70. 
23 Wilks (1975) refers to the Important and catalytic role" played by educated Gold Coasters in the 
demise of Asante after 1874 by their rebelliousness, pp. 533-4. 
Dumett (1998), p. 23. 
25 Turner (1947), p. 3. 
26 MS 24666, report on Obuasi, 1895, pp. 27, 29. 
27 Ibid., p. 3. 
28 Turner (1947), p. 3. 
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A land "pregnant with the precious metal"29 
The assay results were received on 20 April 1895. 30 Within a month Cade had 
formed the Cote d'Or Mining Company in the UK to raise funds for a 
reconnaissance trip. Cade is described as "a shortish, wirey man" with red hair 
and beard. 31 He was born in Ipswich on 26 July 1856. After training as an 
apprentice in his father's watch-making and photography shop, Cade moved to 
London in 1882 to work in a photographers studio. Through church, he met and 
married Sarah Elisabeth Smith on 20 November 1883. Cade joined his father-in-
law's West African merchant business which was renamed Smith and Cade. Mr 
Smith had not shown any interest in Biney's earlier overtures. 32 
Cade set sail from Liverpool in May arriving in the Gold Coast in June 1895. 
He sent a telegraph from his boat, SS Loanda off Sierra Leone, on 31 May to the 
colonial secretary in Accra informing him that he and his companion, a Robert 
Douglas Fry of Ipswich, were on their way to "the boundary of Ashantee (further 
if needful)" for a commercial expedition. 33 He asked for an appointment with the 
Governor and offered his services to the administrators to gather intelligence for 
them during his trip. 34 Cade already had good information on the state of the 
colony's affairs, likely gathered from London and Liverpool, since he knew the 
positive state of the colony's reserve funds and he was able accurately to predict 
that Asante would be annexed within a year and without a full blown war but 
through the show of British might. 33 
The initial reception given him from the local administration was negative. 36 
 This probably stemmed from the colony's bad experience of the gold rush of 
1877-1885 from which not a single company had sustained success, as well as 
anxiety over the Asante embassy that had recently arrived in the UK and the 
course of action ultimately to be taken against Asante. Governor Maxwell knew 
that any concession negotiated in Asante would be outside British jurisdiction. 
29 MS 24666, report on Obuasi, 1895, p. 8., Cade quotes Richard Burton. 
3° MS 24669, 'The Early Pioneers'. 
3 ' The following details are found in MS 24669, 'The Early Pioneers'. p. 12. 
32 Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
33 PRO CO 879/43/490, Cade to Colonial Secretary, 31 May 1895. 
" Ibid. 
35 MS 24666, report on Obuasi, 1895, p. 6. 
35 PRO CO 96/258, Maxwell to Ripon and minutes dd. 18 and 20 June 1895. 
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Maxwell advised Cade not to proceed and took advice from London. 37 He 
wrongly reported to Marques Ripon, Secretary of State for the Colonies, that Cade 
carried credentials from Messrs Radcliffe and Durant of Liverpoo1, 38 associated 
with the unwelcomed Asante embassy. Cade denied any such connection: "I may 
say at once, that neither myself, nor my firm (Smith and Cade, 2, Aldermanbury 
Postern, London), nor my friends here have anything whatever to do with the 
Ashanti Embassy now in London or in any firm connected with them." 39 He did 
provide five referees, but these did not include Radcliffe and Durant. 411 
Once at Cape Coast Cade was highly critical of the administration for the 
lack of infrastructure, particularly any wharfing facilities. 41 He pretended to the 
administrators that had he known that his destination was outside the Gold Coast 
Colony he would never have left England.42 However, his earlier letter from SS 
Loanda betrayed his eagerness to venture into Asante if needed. Ripon responded 
to Maxwell that they could not stop Cade but he was to be warned of the risks he 
had chosen to bear and not to meddle in the politics at his destination. 43 
The journey to Obuasi required travelling about 70 miles on foot and by 
hammock from Cape Coast inland to Prahsu using the military road built about 
twenty years before by the British in the Asante Wars of 1872-74 but which had 
fallen into disrepair."`' From Prahsu to Obuasi as the crow flies is just over ten 
miles. However, there was no road at all here, and the winding, hilly route through 
forests, swamps, and bridgeless streams felt like another 50 miles to Cade. He 
used this transport problem to threaten Biney, Ellis and Brown that he might pull 
out of the deal, "I declared to my friends that while this insuperable difficulty 
existed I would not arrange any terms". He was an astute businessman and 
negotiator because, although making this verbal statement, he had already 
calculated to himself that about 40-70 miles of road building from Prahsu to 
Obuasi would be needed at an estimated cost of £100 per mile and he figured he 
could therefore reduce the purchase price by £7,000-£10,000. 48 
47 PRO CO 96/258, Maxwell to Ripon and minutes dd. 20 June 1895. 
38 PRO CO 879/43/490, Maxwell to Ripon telegraph received 18 June 1895. 
39 PRO CO 879/43/490, Cade and Fry to Colonial Secretary, Cape Coast, 19 June 1895. 
4° PRO CO 879/43/490, Cade to Colonial Secretary, 31 May 1895. 
41 MS 24666, report on Obuasi, 1895, p. 12. 
42 PRO CO 879/43/490, enclosure, Cade and Fry to Colonial Secretary, 19 June 1895. 
43 PRO CO 879/43/490, Ripon to Maxwell, 20 June 1895. 
44 MS 24666, report on Obuasi, 1895, p. 14. 
45 MS 24666, report on Obuasi, 1895, p.15. 
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Cade was impressed by the indigenous mining skills, "I have given the 
Ashantees every credit for their acuteness and skill in knowing where to work, 
and unstinted praise for the courage and patience of their endeavours". 46 However, 
on the balance of all his comments concerning Africans, his attitude was racist. 
His report is littered with derogatory remarks: "revoltingly dirty... the most ideal 
models of absolute laziness... useless... they have no ambitions, no pastimes or 
zeal, art or desire beyond an animal existence. (I think I could say something in 
opposition to the modem general views on slavery)." 47 
The Fantes employed a headman, a Mr Wilson (a Fante too it seems). 48 
 There was no mine plan and the majority of production was carried out by 
independent workers who produced for themselves at their own expense, but paid 
a proportion of their winnings to the Fante entrepreneurs. However, Wilson 
attempted to use the imported machines to process ore from one shaft at Ellis's 
Mine. 49 Cade agreed to buy this equipment from Ellis. In considering his own 
production needs, he gathered information on labour rates which varied depending 
on the role as well as the labourer's tribe (the Fantes being paid more than the 
Adansis). 
Twenty-eight bags of random rock samples were filled and carefully 
labelled to show the location they were taken from, for assay tests in London. 
Cade was wise to gather his own samples from locations of his choice as it was 
not unknown for Africans to dig holes and claim they were indigenous mines or to 
place gold in particular locations to boost the price for a concession, a practice 
called "salting". 5° 
The price paid for the concession is not found in any AGC report - the 
amount is blanked out. That Cade obtained a bargain is evidenced by his own 
words and the reaction of the vendors to the price agreed, it was "a very bitter 
disappointment to them all". 51 The vendors informed him that they had rejected a 
previous offer of £40,000 from a London firm and were seeking £250,000. Cade 
paid a little, "though not much", above his original figure but agreed to consider a 
timber concession that the vendors also wanted to se11.52 Payment was made in 
46 ibid., p. 9. 
47 Ibid., p.30. 
McCaskie (1978), p.39. 
49 MS 24666, report on Obuasi, 1895, pp. 27-9. 
59 Silver (1981), p. 518. 
51 MS 24666, report on Obuasi, 1895, p.22. 
57 Ibid. 
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cash and shares. Cade paid a deposit of £200 at Cape Coast Castle. Two years 
later £2,500 was minuted as the balance to be paid to Biney, Ellis and Brown and 
shares of 1,000, 770 and 299 respectively were reported. It is unlikely that any 
other payments were made as the early board minutes, which cover all types of 
cash transactions, fail to mention any. 53 The value shown in the AGC balance 
sheet for the concession - £45, 937 - was the amount paid to the Cote d'Or 
Company in the form of AGC shares to take over the interest. There would have 
been at least four copies of the sale agreement — one to each vendor and a fourth 
to their barrister, whose name is blanked out of Cade's 1895 report. It is possible 
that a copy may have survived in Ghana. 
Although the indigenous merchants had transacted with the Bekwaihene 
alone, Cade sought the agreement of the Bekwaihene Yaw Boakye (who asked 
Cade to "petition for their annexation to the Gold Coast Colony") 54 and then he 
visited the aged and blind Adansihene Nkansa in Assin. 55 He wrote to his board 
members, "I am determined, however, to proceed at all risks and so to shape my 
course that even in the event of a purchase not being at present possible the 
position of the company may still be a desirable one in the event of annexation [of 
Asante] (by Her Majesty's Government) taking place! To this end I made a good 
friendship with the two native kings concerned (Becquai and Adansi) and 
endeavoured to so word the deed of concession as to meet every contingency 
which presented itself to my understanding as likely or possible".56 The terms of 
these agreements set the Bekwaihene's rent at £133 and the Adansihene's at 
£66. 57 The Fantes had been paying £100 to the Bekwaihene alone. Cade felt the 
Bekwaihene needed a premium to encourage him to abandon his original 
agreement with the Africans, and the sum for the Adansi merely served political 
purposes.58 These rental amounts remained unchanged until 1969. 
A certain Reverend Somerville of the Methodist Missionary Society, who 
was in Bekwai in 1896, wrote that the Asantehene, Agyeman Prempeh, was 
" MS 14164/1 minutes, 12 July 1897, and 
www.ashantigold.com/culture/agchistory.jsp?subsection=1  accessed 10 November 2004. 
54 McCaskie (1978), pp. 39-40, reference to Cade Mss., University of Birmingham, Typescript 
Fragment of a Visit to Bekwae and Adansi. 
"Ibid. 
56 Turner (1947), p. 3. 
57 Paragraphs 2 and 3. 
58 MS 24666, report on Obuasi, 1895, p. 5. 
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displeased with Cade's transaction but powerless to act. 59 Indeed, when the 
Asante ambassadors in England heard of Cade's deal with the Bekwaihene and 
Adansihene they, wrongly assuming that the Englishman had commenced 
operations, despatched a stern letter to Asante kings and chiefs warning them not 
to let white men know the wealth of the country. 69 McCaskie concludes that the 
Asante government never accepted Cade's deals.61 
Cade was knowingly deceptive in his dealings with the Africans. He 
exploited the absence of any official maps to include two mines belonging to the 
Bekwaihene within the boundaries of his concession — these were Korkortaswia 
and Ayeinm. Cade openly admitted: "Whether or not he (King of Becquai) will 
think that I have overlapped him by my measurements later on, I do not here 
discuss. The deed is fully accepted, and what is now therein must remain. 1 am 
only going to suggest that for the present this matter may remain unlooked at. At a 
later period the desirable policy will duly develop." 62 Cade added in his report that 
the kings were illiterate and did not comprehend measurement. 63 He proceeded to 
Cape Coast to lodge his agreements with the colonial administration. 
The establishment of the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation 
On 4 September 1895, Johnson Matthey reported on the 28 samples shipped from 
Cape Coast. Twelve bags assayed more than seven fine ounces of gold to the ton. 
There was significant silver content too. If Cade had hoped that the speedy British 
occupation of Asante, which occurred in January 1896, would lead to a 
straightforward recognition of his concession, he was wrong. The Cote D'Or 
Company, which had raised finance for Cade's exploratory trip, was initially 
unable to obtain the government's recognition. 64 It was not until the recruitment 
of Frederick Gordon, a lawyer and owner of a nationwide chain of Gordon Hotels, 
that progress was made with the Colonial Office. 65 
59 McCaskie (1978), pp. 41-2, reference to Methodist Missionary Society, London, Somerville to 
Hartley, Bekwai, 20 April 1896. 
65 PRO CO 879/44/504, enclosure from John and Albert Owusu Ansah, London 27 September 
1895 to kings and chiefs of Ashanti. 
61 McCaskie (1978), p. 41. 
62 MS 24666, report on Obuasi 1895, p. 6. 
62 Ibid., pp. 5, 6. 
64MS 24661/3, report on AGM, 14 December 1911, p.11. 
65 Ibid. 
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Frederick Gordon was associated with Edward Ponsonby, the Viscount 
Duncannon, who would later become the eighth Earl of Bessborough (1851-1920). 
It seems this was the connection that opened doors for Cade, for Duncannon's 
wife was the sister of the first Baron Wimbome, Ivor Bertie Guest. The Guests 
had owned iron and steel manufacturing companies in the Midlands since 1750. 
They were also in the coal mining business. Gordon and Duncannon served as 
directors on the board of Guest, Keen and Nettlefolds Limited, which was a 
conglomerate of Baron Wimborne's companies. (Nettlefolds had once been in the 
family of Joseph Chamberlain). 66 Wimborne was married to Lady Cornelia 
Spencer-Churchill, daughter of the seventh Duke of Marlborough. Besides the 
familial relationships with peers of the House of Lords, Duncannon was the 
secretary to the speaker of the House of Commons from 1884 to 1895. 67 
 Duncannon held private meetings with Chamberlain concerning AGC's 
establishrnent. 68 It is unclear how Cade met Gordon but through him Cade was 
able to benefit from the confluence of old industrial wealth, landed aristocracy and 
political connections. 69 
A letter from Downing Street to the Cote D'Or Company dated 28 February 
1896 listed the following requirements. Proof was needed that, first, the persons 
who sold the concession had the power to do so; second, that the arrangement was 
fair and reasonable and third, that it would be advantageous to the country and the 
chiefs. In addition, a report was requested from the Gold Coast government to 
ascertain their views. The Cote d'Or company had to provide the Colonial Office 
with their articles of association and any other information supporting "a 
reasonable prospect of efficient and continuous work being done within a 
reasonable time" if the concession were to be recognised. 7° 
Recognition came on 27 April 1896. 71 To exploit the concession a new 
company was required with larger capital. Ashanti Goldfields Corporation 
Limited (AGC) was incorporated in London on 25 May 1897. The founding 
McCaskie (1978), p. 43. 
67 Dod's Peerage, Baronetage, and Knightage of Great Britain and Irleand for 1893, London: 
Whittaker and Co.; Burke's Landed Gentry of Great Britain and Irleand for 1886, London: 
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68 MS 14164/1, minutes, 7 March 1898. 
69 Cain and Hopkins (2001), p. 43; McCaskie (1978), p. 43. 
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directors were Cade, Gordon (chairman), Viscount Duncannon, George Edwards 
who was an engineer, and one Edward Byas. Duncannon must have been 
instrumental in raising AGC's required capital at a time when there was growing 
disappointment with South African gold companies. Two hundred and fifty 
thousand shares of £1 each were authorised. This level of capitalisation was about 
average. Harvey and Press calculate that the mean capital employed by British 
foreign direct investment in non-ferrous metal mining in 1894 was £205,033. Half 
of all such companies had a capitalisation between £0.1m - £0.499m. 72 The first 
allocation of shares was completely taken up by the founding directors and their 
friends. 73 
Cade's concession was validated by the issue of a new government 
agreement dated 3 June 1897 between the Governor of the Gold Coast Colony, Sir 
William Edward Maxwell, the Fante vendors, Cade's Cote d'Or Company and the 
newly formed Ashanti Goldfields Corporation (see Chapter 4, `Land'). The Cote 
d'Or Company was liquidated, its shareholders received £50,000 in fully paid-up 
AGC shares in consideration. 74 
The AGC memorandum of association listed a wide range of sanctioned 
activities abroad, not just in Africa. 75 This included banking. The only operation 
expressly excluded was life assurance business. A mine engineer who worked at 
Obuasi in 1899 associated AGC (because of the background of the directors) with 
hotels, furniture, soap and beef extraction. 76 One objective of the company was to 
promote emigration and the creation of towns, 77 in support of Chamberlain's 
imperial goals. Thanks to the British government invasion of Kumasi, Cade's 
failure to seek the Asantehene's consent in purchasing his concession became 
immaterial. The lease granted by the British government was for 90 years 
commencing 1 January 1897. The fact that 90 years was offered instead of 93 
(from the Bekwaihene's grant of 100 years to the Fantes in 1890) suggests that 
this was viewed as an entirely new concession, rather than the transfer of the 
Fantes' concession. This would support the view that, in the eyes of the 
72 C. Harvey and J. Press, 'Overseas investment and the professional advance of British metal 
mining engineers, 1851-1914', Economic History Review, 42, 1, 1989, p. 68. 
75 MS 24661/3 report on AGM, 14 December 1911. 
74 MS 14164/1, minutes, 25 May 1897 and 3 June 1897. 
75 MS 24661/1 AGC Memorandum of Association, attached to Debenture Prospectus, 21 July, 
1905. 
76 MS 24669, Reminiscences of Thomas George Madgwick Mine Engineer, 1899-1900. 
77 MS 24661/1 AGC Memorandum of Association, attached to Debenture Prospectus of 21 July, 
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authorities, the original concession was only a profit-share agreement. In the 
immediate aftermath of the 1896 invasion there was confusion over the laws 
governing the grant of concessions in Asante. 78 AGC's 1897 concession 
agreement was legally peculiar (these issues are examined in Chapter 4, `Land'). 
The start of operations 
On 24 November 1897, Cade along with a mining engineer, John Daw, recruited 
as mining superintendent, and fifteen European employees arrived at Cape Coast 
with 40 tons of equipment to transport on foot to Obuasi. 79 John Daw (1851-1934) 
was born in Devon and had extensive work experience in the Norwegian copper 
mines. 80 The rest of the group comprised miners, carpenters, a medical officer and 
a civil engineer. Cade recorded that there were a large number of ships at Cape 
Coast and packages were lost. There was a shortage of carriers due largely to the 
government monopolising recruitment and its bad reputation in delaying payment 
which discouraged labour supply. Some carriers feared travelling inland because 
of rumours of raids by the Muslim guerrilla leader, Almamy Samory, who was 
fighting the French, and others. Seven hundred and fifty men and women (some 
with babies on their backs) were recruited as carriers, mostly Kroo men and Sierra 
Leoneans, and sent with single AGC loads. Another 300 were needed. A single 
load weighed between 70 and 100 pounds. The first carriers set off with the 
fifteen Europeans, Cade remained in Cape Coast to receive and transfer the rest of 
the shipment. 
Prior arrangements had been made for the manager of the British Bank of 
West Africa (BBWA) in Accra to approach two UK-based firms with Cape Coast 
agents to provide AGC with banking facilities — Miller Bros and Mclvor [spelling 
unclear]. Three thousand pounds had been cabled from London to BBWA 
Accra. 81 However, Cade found that the merchants hated the Bank, and resented 
helping its customers. They would only cash Cade's cheques for him at an 
expensive 1.5%. Six months later the discount rate on offer was 2.5%. Cade wrote 
angrily to a Mr Paterson, presumably of the BBWA, about the uselessness of their 
cheques and his regret at depositing money with them in Accra which was 
78 Hamilton (1978), p. 198. 
79 The following details are taken from MS 24670, Cade Letters, November 1897 to August 1898. 
8° MS 24669, 'The Early Pioneers', p.17. 
81 MS 14164/1, Minutes of AGC Board Meeting, 15 October 1897. 
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inaccessible and did not pay interest. He urged them to open facilities in Cape 
Coast.82 
Cade gave each carrier a card with details of the date and the load which 
would be signed for in Obuasi and returned to him in Cape Coast for payment. 
Since he paid immediately on receipt of the chit and without quibbling he found 
an increase in the supply of carriers for AGC work and was able to reduce the 
transport costs from £70 to £50 per ton. 83 
Cade left Cape Coast for Obuasi on Christmas Day. Unable to afford to 
retain a European forwarding agent he appointed Biney to that role. Arriving at 
the mine on 10 January 1897 Cade was pleased with Daw's progress. The 
inhabitants of Obuasi were shooed away, about 1,000 African gold miners moved 
to Ayeinm on the western boundary of the concession. Nine miners, including 
Daw, had international mining experience and they declared that they had never 
seen goldfields as rich as the pits in Obuasi. The dozen hills in sight from Obuasi 
remained to be explored. Cade was conscious to keep his excitement private as he 
did not want the share price to go up until his return to London. 
The mining camp made use of old war department hospital tents until more 
permanent buildings were constructed. Tinned food supplies were quickly 
depleted and delays were experienced in obtaining food deliveries from European 
trade stores such as Swanzy, Eastland and Mann. An invoice from Swanzy listed 
claret, pipes, cigars, pate, tobacco, almonds, raisins and dynamite. 84 
Ever politically conscious, Cade took photographs of the company's new 
African recruits and volunteered to write Chamberlain a report with the 
photographs as evidence that at least in AGC's mine, accusations of ill-treatment 
were unfounded. 86 Labourers, as well as trained carpenters and masons were 
recruited from the coastal towns. Some were then trained to be miners. 86 The 
initial African pay scale is tabled below. 
" MS 24670, Cade to Mr. Paterson, Cape Coast, 31 May 1898. 
"MS 24669, John Daw, report on expedition, 12 December 1898, p. 20. 
84 MS 24670, Cade to Daw, Cape Coast, 28 May 1898. 
" MS 24670, Cade to directors, 20 April 1898. 
86 MS 24669, John Daw report, 12 December 1898, p. 21. 
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Table 3.1: African daily wage rates, 1897/8 87 
Role Daily wage 
Labourers 9d — 1 s/3d 
Skilled labourers 1 s/6d — 2s/6d 
Miners 1 s/6d — 4s/Od 
Using the location of existing native pits to work from, Daw's strategy was 
to commence surface mining in a small one to two square mile area. The miners 
only looked for gold-bearing quartz which was identifiable with the naked eye —
there was no geologist among them. The local topography lent itself to driving 
adits into the sides of hills. Depths up to 1,000 feet below the apex could be 
excavated without hauling or pumping machinery. The adits were separated by 
100 —150 feet vertical intervals, and some were driven horizontally up to 1,000 
feet. The first mines worked were the Obuasi, Ashanti, Insintsiam and Cote d'Or 
(see Map 4). Korkortaswia remained untouched and Ayeinm was left to private 
African miners who worked pits to depths of 200 feet. 88 They were eventually 
evicted from Ayeinm in April 1900. 89 
The Bekwaihene's ignorance of the true extent of 100 square miles and 
Cade's shrewdness in actually naming existing mine areas in his 1895 agreements 
quickly became apparent. The Bekwaihene had granted a concession over Sansu 
to a Kwaku Bissa in 1883 and this African had sold it on to a European, a Claude 
Beddington. Beddington therefore disputed AGC's inclusion of Sansu in their 100 
square miles. Korkortaswia was also disputed by the Bekwaihene. The 
Bekwaihene remarked to Daw, "I beg to state that the Sansu Mine in question was 
not given to you. Even Ayimim and Kokotasiasua were not in addition...Through 
all of which beg to say am cheated why? Because I have not heard the miles... had 
I heard the said miles I would not hence sell it." 90 Daw was incorrect when he 
retorted that "Mr Cade took very great care to explain to you the exact area asked 
for, and that you expressed yourself satisfied therewith" 91 — Cade had 
87 Ibid. 
88 MS 24669, Extracts from John Daw's reports, p. 1. 
89 Ibid, p. 3. 
9' PRO CO 879/57/578, Hodgson to Chamberlain 4 January 1900, enclosure, King of Bekwai to 
AGC 7 June 1899. 
91 Ibid., enclosure, Daw to King of Bekwai 7 June 1899. 
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intentionally done quite the opposite! 92 Due to the impregnable forest and high 
survey costs the exact limits of AGC's 100 square miles, (ten miles north of 
Obuasi, ten miles south, and five miles wide) would not be definitively surveyed 
and demarcated even as late as 1969. 93 Daw's further defence to the Bekwaihene 
was that the concession was an imperial concession, granted by the British 
government and that the Bekwaihene had to contact the Governor if he had any 
issues. Daw also threatened to have the king arrested and imprisoned in Kumasi. 94 
 This had the desired effect and the Bekwaihene submitted, settling for some gifts 
including alcohol and an umbrella. 95 
Daw organized the construction of a mill, which came to be known as the 
Cote D'Or treatment plant. This initially comprised five stamps of 380 lbs each, a 
stonebreaker, sawmill, boilers and engines. 96 Timber supplies were ample for fuel 
and construction purposes. Water was available from the liver Jimi a few miles 
away. On 19 February 1898 the first trial of running the mill on steam proved 
successful. Rails were laid and trucks built to connect the mines and to transport 
the ore from the pits to the mill. The only disappointment was with the civil 
engineer who failed to cut a straight road (presumably from Obuasi to Prahsu). A 
critical success factor, Cade quickly realised, would be to select new recruits very 
carefully. 
The first gold ounces were poured on 10 March 1898. A wet process was 
used whereby water was added to the ore which was crushed and ground into 
smaller pieces and passed through mesh screens. This was followed by 
amalgamation and smelting. Cyanide experiments commenced in 1900 but 
cyanidation would not be fully adopted until 1904. 97 The mine was officially 
opened by the governor of the Gold Coast. By 30 June 1898, the accounting year 
end, 263 tons had been milled producing 615 ounces of gold, and a further 102 
ounces was bought from African miners. 98 
92 MS 24 666, report on Obuasi 1895, p. 6. 
93 When AGC's mine lease was surrendered and a new one issued to Lonrho with effect from 1 
January 1969 it is noteworthy that the original concession was referred to as "approximately" 100 
square miles - 'Agreement and Lease dated April 15 1969, The Government of the Republic of 
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94 PRO CO 879/57/578, Hodgson to Chamberlain 4 January 1900, enclosure, Daw to King of 
Bekwai 8 June 1899. 
95 Ibid. 
95MS 24669, 2 December 1898. 
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Cade quickly ran out of coins, unwilling to cash the £1,900 of cheques he 
held at the exorbitant rates. A bi-monthly shipment of £500 in silver (representing 
one to two months' cash needs) to Obuasi would be needed, as Cade feared that 
running out of cash would ruin the company's reputation and labour recruitment 
prospects. To this end a strong-room was built from metal plates and code words 
were used in cables with Biney who took charge of the money courier. 
The company's attitude towards the local chiefs is perhaps seen in the 
comment that visiting the Bekwaihene was a "necessary nuisance" 9 9 The 'king' 
complained about the delay in receiving his rent, which Cade explained was to be 
paid directly by the government. 100 The Kumasi Resident, Captain Aplin, a 
Reverend Morris of Kumasi, a captain McAustin of Uganda, Major von 
Wiesman's expedition from Kumasi, the Bekwaihene, his chief linguist, the 
king's nephew, the Adansi chiefs and linguists and some Gold Coasters were 
invited to the camp on 29 April 1898 to bid Cade farewell. 
Cade arrived back in Liverpool on 22 June 1898. No time at all was wasted 
to get the mine's management on a sound footing. At a directors meeting on 30 
June, production targets and budgets were set. Initially, the aim was to crush 225 
tons of ore to yield £2,160 of gold a month. This would be doubled with the 
addition of fifteen more stamps at the mill. Monthly outgoings were not to exceed 
£700 of which £300 would be spent on development work. A goal was set to erect 
100 stamps of 950 lbs each in two years. An extraordinary general meeting of 
shareholders was convened on 21 July to allow Cade, the managing director, to 
report fully on his visit. The directors met regularly, initially on a weekly basis to 
discuss operations, finance, purchases and recruitment. 101 At this stage £50,000 in 
AGC shares were fully paid-up, and a cash call was made for a further £75,000. 
The share price was trading at a £1 premium.' °2  
By 1899 the workforce was recorded as 2,312 including the private African 
miners still on the property from whom AGC obtained some gold, and 30 
expatriates. 1°3 The mine stopped production from July to December 1900 because 
of the Kumasi uprising and fears of attack. Eighteen anxious expatriates resigned 
99 MS 24670, Cade to AGC directors, 20 February 1898. 
1°° MS 24670, Cade letters, p. 37. 
101 MS 14164 series. 
102 MS 14164/1, report on EGM, 21 July 1898. 
103 MS 24669, Extracts from John Daw's reports, p. 2. 
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before the end of their contracts and returned to the UK. 104A defensive stockade 
was built around a group of bungalows at the top of the camp hill as a precaution 
although no mine property was attacked. From 1896 the Adansis began to return 
from exile to their lands surrounding Obuasi. They did not take part in the Yaa 
Asantewaa war, remaining loyal to the British, 1°5 which explains the absence of 
hostilities at the mine camp. 
In 1899 Cade attempted to obtain the same type of privileged concession 
that he had acquired from the British government for the Obuasi area to operate 
King Prempeh's Mines near Kumasi. AGC were undoubtedly surprised to hear 
from Chamberlain that the government had no power to make such a grant (see 
Chapter 4, `Land'). 1°6 
In 1902 Daw set up the following departments each with its own manager: 
assay office, survey office, plate-laying department, brickyard, buildings (by this 
time there were 40 at Obuasi including housing, offices, workshops, stores), the 
machinery department, sawmill, estate department (in charge of forestry, land 
clearing, growing rubber and fruit and food crops for the workers), and the mining 
department. A secretarial department handled administration and accounting. An 
accountant was sent to the mine to establish recording and reporting systems. 107 
 An emphasis on good organization is apparent both at the mine and at the London 
head office. 
Construction of a railway by government had started in April 1898 from the 
port town of Takoradi to Tarkwa. From Tarkwa the plan was for the line to 
proceed north-northeasterly to Kumasi via Obuasi. The railway reached Obuasi in 
June 1903 and the first daily passenger and goods service commenced on 1 July. 
AGC had been instrumental in the railway's extension, guaranteeing the colonial 
government's revenue which permitted construction to proceed. 108 Along with 
steam ship developments the railway significantly reduced the London to Obuasi 
journey time from four weeks to two weeks. 109 
104 MS 24661/1 John Daw report, 1900, p. 23. On 30 June 1900 there were 2lexpatriates on the 
mine. 
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107 MS 14164/1, minutes, 24 November 1902. 
108 MS 24661/1, letter to shareholders, 9 January 1905, and report on AGM, 14 December 1905. 
109 MS 24661/1 John Daw report, 26 June 1903. 
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Two subsidiary companies were established in 1903. Ashanti Goldfields 
Auxiliary Limited was set up to exploit other concessions acquired in Ashanti. Its 
major operation was a gold dredging concession on the River Offin. It was while 
visiting this site that Cade died of malaria in June 1903. John Daw replaced him 
as managing director and left for London. The Ashanti Sansu Mine Ltd was set up 
to mine the Sansu mine southwest of the Obuasi group of mines. A similar 
arrangement was planned for Korkortaswia, although it never materialised. The 
following year the mines' trading store was isolated to form the Ashanti-Obuasi 
Trading Company to look after the staff's consumer needs. It would later be 51% 
owned by the United Africa Company. 
Quick Growth to Disillusionment 
Daw's reports from the mine were continually optimistic. His over-confidence is 
apparent from comments such as "There is a magnificent revenue near at hand", 
and "AGC will be the premier gold-producing corporation of the world". 110 Daw, 
however good his organizational skills, was not of the new breed of scientific 
mine engineers. He did not work to a mine plan and no attention was paid to ore 
reserves until May 1904. By this time the quick and relatively cheap returns to 
adit mining appear to have ended. From then on the ore sent to the mill was 
increasingly difficult to process with the presence of other minerals with the 
quartz and gold, and the gold recovery rate declined despite increases in ore 
mined. Revenues fell as gold production fell and costs rose from the initially 
unsuccessful implementation of cyanidation. Cash flow problems necessitated 
short-term borrowing from the firm's London bankers, each director also lent the 
firm £800 at 5% and some of the company's portfolio investments were sold to 
raise cash. 111 
A 5% dividend had been paid every quarter between September 1900 and 
December 1901. This was an impressive start considering that operations had only 
started in March 1898. Out of twenty-five British companies formed to mine gold 
between 1878 and 1882 only Swanzy's Wassaw (Gold Coast) Gold Mining 
Company had managed to pay a dividend and that came after fifteen years of 
110 MS 24661/1, report on AGM, 16 December 1903. 
I " MS 14164/1, minutes, 24 March, 26 May, 21 July 1902; vol. 2, 19 December 1902, 26 January, 
23 February, 23 March , 13 July 1903, 4 July, 9 August, 24 August 1904. 
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production. I12 No AGC dividend was paid in the calendar year 1902 but payments 
resumed in 1903 only to be stopped again until 1907." 3 
Figure 3.2 
Early Production: Quick growth to disillusionment 
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The Feldtmann era, 1905-c.1930 
The board of directors responded quickly to the decline in gold output, 
profitability and liquidity. A metallurgist experienced in the cyanide process from 
Johannesburg was recruited in autumn 1904 after unsatisfactory results were 
obtained from the new cyanide plant.' i4 The company secretary, Charles Mann, 
was appointed head of the mine's commercial affairs and visited Obuasi between 
July and October 1904 to curb expenditure, and an independent mine consultant 
was hired to assess the situation. W. R. Feldtmann, a chemist and metallurgist, 
with his assistant James MacTear, a mine engineer, arrived on the mine in 3 
March 1905 and spent seven weeks with the remit to provide "a full and 
exhaustive report" on the state of the mine and its prospects.' 15 
112 The Mining Manual, 1894; Silver (1981), p. 523. 
113 MS 14169/2, dividend statement, p. 91. (Appendix 3 shows the dividends attributable to each 
financial year, rather than that paid during the calendar year). 
l ' 4MS 24661/1, letter to shareholders, 7 September 1904. 
115 MS 24661/1, report on EGM, 22 May 1905. 
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Feldtmann's preliminary report was received in May 1905; it was sealed and 
only opened to be read for the first time in front of the shareholders gathered for 
the extraordinary general meeting of 22 May. The directors' desire not to be 
spoken of in the same breath as speculators of ill repute made them conscious of 
taking every reasonable opportunity to prove their honesty and probity — hence the 
sealed delivery of Feldtmann's report. The report blasted Daw's mining strategy. 
No attention had been paid to the development of ore reserves — only nine 
months' worth of ore was in sight. Unsystematic adit mining for quick returns had 
compromised the optimal mine development plan and extraction possibilities, 
leaving the ground insecure in many places. The good news was that the ore 
bodies of the working mines appeared to be chutes with permanent and 
continuous depth. Whereas Daw had focused on increasing tonnage to feed all the 
stamps in the mill, Feldtmann recommended reducing tonnage (from 8,000 to 
3,000 tons per month) to concentrate on good quality ore. This would result in 
economies by leaving many of the stamp mills redundant (30 to 20 to be used out 
of the 40). This policy would allow time for ore reserve development by removing 
the pressure to utilise 100% of the mill capacity. The results would be more even 
ore grade and greater economy. Feldtmann discovered that Daw had been 
measuring the amount of ore sent to the mills incorrectly. The ore trucks 
contained more ore than Daw had calculated. This increased weight reduced the 
calculations of the value of gold extracted which were expressed per ton. 
Feldtmann recommended ore reserve development and systematic stoping at a rate 
of 100 feet in depth each year. A shaft sinking programme would permit the 
transition from adit to deep mining. Regarding the cyanidation problems, 
Feldtmann ordered experiments to ascertain the cause of the difficulties. The 
consulting engineer also recommended prospecting the entire concession. 
Feldtmann estimated that based on his policy the Obuasi, Insintsiam and Ashanti 
group of mines, excluding Ayeinm, could produce a gross income of £250,000 a 
year of which £100,000 would be profit before tax. With patience and reasonable 
expenditure he felt the future outlook could be very profitable. The gold produced 
from stored tailings would fund the stope development programme but new 
capital would have to be raised for vertical shaft development. 116 
' 6 See Glossary for definitions of `stope' and 'tailings' 
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The Introduction of Scientific Mining 
Feldtmann was appointed as the company's consulting engineer to implement his 
policy with immediate effect. Daw resigned but remained on the board of 
directors for another year. Debentures were issued to raise £80,000 to finance 
Feldtmann's development programme, after clearing certain liabilities. 
Subscription opened in July 1905 for 1,600 5-year, first mortgage debentures of 
£50 each, paying 7% . Each debenture was convertible into 40 fully paid shares of 
4s. each, if exchanged before the maturity date. The company would pay a 5% 
premium if the debentures were repaid before the 5-year maturity date. 117 
 Feldtmann's preliminary report was attached to the debenture prospectus. 
Monthly production and mine development reports started from July 1905. 
Feldtmann concentrated on the Ashanti and Obuasi mines, which held the largest 
and richest gold resources but provided difficult mining conditions because of the 
depth, the heavy ground and the need for selective stoping. In some areas the 
Ashanti ore assayed 84 dwt per ton; 118 Ayeinm provided lower quality ore 
(averaging 10 dwts per ton) 119 but it was easily extracted; Cote d'Or was an 
irregular gold mine in that the occurrence and the grade of its gold ore were 
erratic; and Korkortaswia was an adit mine nearly three miles north of the Ashanti 
group of mines which was worked by Africans with minimal white supervision. ' 20 
 It was therefore a low-cost mine producing small quantities of low grade but 
payable ore. Insintsiam had been heavily worked by Daw and the mine was made 
secure under Feldtmann and then abandoned. 
In April 1908 an important mineral discovery, Justice's Find, was made 
southwest of the Ayeinm mine, thanks to Feldtmann's new emphasis on 
systematic prospecting and the creation of a new sampling and assay office. 
Unlike the existing mines, Justice's had no quartz content. Its upper levels 
comprised oxidised clayey ore and at lower levels increasing proportions of 
arsenic sulphides. The upper levels were easily extractable with open pit mining. 
Until further vertical extension was made to each mine with new shafts sunk, 
Justice's provided the bulk of proven ore reserves. Similar geology was uncovered 
at Sansu. Other prospects discovered at this time were Blackie's, Old Chief, Big 
117 MS 24661/1, debenture prospectus, 21 July, 1905. 
1 " MS 24661/2, cable to shareholders, 23 September 1909. 
119 MS 24661/2, report of the Consulting Engineer, 31 October 1909. 
120 Ibid. 
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Blow and Tom Collins. Feldtmann proposed a scheme to reduce the company's 
prospecting costs where Africans could apply for prospecting licences on the 
company's property; they would only be paid if successful results were 
achieved. 121 
A new debenture offer had to be made in 1908 to further accommodate 
Feldtmann's development plans. The repayment date of the first debenture was 
extended from 1910 to 1913 and more attractive share exchange terms were 
offered to encourage more debenture holders to convert to shares. In addition, in 
January 1909 a new share issue was made which increased the share capital by 
£15,500 and raised £67,812 from the share premium. 122 Some of the funds were 
used to finance the first dividend paid in two years. 123 
The cyanidation problems were resolved when experiments showed that the 
refractory nature of the ore from the Obuasi group of mines could be dealt with by 
dry crushing and then roasting the ore, followed by cyanidation. The old 
procedure of wet crushing and amalgamation continued to be used for Cote d'Or, 
Ayeinm and Korkortaswia ores which had greater quartz content. A new roasting 
plant was therefore commissioned and delivered gold recovery levels of 93% 
compared to 67% without roasting. 124 A filter press was found to be the most 
economical way to treat Justice's oxidised ore. The roasting process and filter 
process are described in detail below. A choice of treatment processes based on 
ore type ensured better recovery rates. Another option employed by Feldtmann 
was not to treat certain ores at all if he felt the current state of technology would 
not allow satisfactory recovery rates. Such ores would be left unmined or, in the 
case of tailings containing large gold residues, they would be stored in tailings 
dams. Roasting and cyaniding additions had initially been bolted on to the old 
stamp mill but by June 1910 a purpose-built roasting plant, the Central Treatment 
Plant (CTP), was in full operation. It was located at the centre of the property near 
the Ashanti and Obuasi mines. 
121 MS 24669, Feldtmann's report, 1905, p. 7. 
122 MS 24661/2, report on proceedings, 12th AGM, 16 December 1909. 
123 MS 24661/2, letter to shareholders, 30 January 1909. 
124 MS 24661/2, report on meeting of debenture holders, 3 July 1908. 
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Table 3.3 Treatment processes during the Feldtmaim era 
Treatment processes125 Suitable ore type and mine 
Wet crushing + amalgamation (ceased 
October 1909) 
Quartz, visible gold, "free milling". 
Dry crushing + roasting + amalgamation Lower grade ore. Cote d'Or, 
Ayeinm, Korkortaswia. 
Dry crushing + roasting + cyanidation High-grade and/ or refractory ore. 
Ashanti, Obuasi, Insintsiam mines. 
Filter press Oxidised ore. Justice's Mine 
Straight cyanidation Tailings 
Table 3.4: The roasting process 
- Rock breaker reduces ore to about 2 1/2"cubes 
- Rotary cylinders dry the ore which arrives wet from the mines 
Dried ore is fed in to Krupp ball-mills which reduces the 21/2" cubes into sand 
fine enough to pass through 30-mesh screens 
- The sand is conveyed automatically through Edwards' roasting furnaces and 
then cooled. It loses 12-15% of its weight when roasted because of the loss of 
graphitic, sulphide and arsenic compounds 
- The roasted grains are put into cyanide vats for 10 days 
- The cyanide dissolves around 90% of the gold content 
The gold is precipitated on zinc shavings 
The precipitated gold is collected and smelted. 
125 ibid. 
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Table 3.5: The filter press process 
- Wet crushing in a stamp mill to produce a pulp 
- Hydraulic classifiers separate the sand from the pulp leaving the slimey 
pulp 
- Brown agitators are used to agitate the slimey pulp 
- The pulp passes through a filter press to filter the slime, wash and clarify it 
- The refined pulp is put into cyanidation vats for leaching 
- Precipitation as for the roasting process 
- Smelting 
Experiments in Obuasi and in London were conducted continually to tweak 
and improve the treatment process. The number of days for cyanide leaching, the 
mesh sizes, and types of fuel to use in the furnaces, for example, were constantly 
tested in an attempt to find the optimal recovery rate. When the old wet crushing 
stamp mill was decommissioned, the site was adapted to a small experimental 
treatment plant to carry out such tests. Feldtmann emphasised the need to keep 
visible ore reserves ahead of the amounts milled because of the lack of uniformity 
in the gold deposits. From less than a year's production available in sight when he 
took over, the visible reserves increased to and were maintained at amounts 
equivalent to four or five years' production. Establishing reserves required 
knowing the full cost of mining, treatment processing, royalties and other 
expenses. Knowing the price of gold, the total costs arrived at would be used to 
determine a minimum grade of gold which would be "payable". This minimum 
would determine the ore to be included in reserves and the selection of ore to 
mine. Changes in cost structure or gold price would impact immediately on the 
reserve situation and the selection and quantity of ore to mine. 
Feldtmann's reports reveal a constant balancing of ore grade and quantity to 
mining and treatment costs. He aimed for certainty of steady and regular income 
rather than fabulous short-term gains. When he was based in London, his partner 
MacTear assumed the day-to-day management role in Obuasi. Feldtmann would 
visit the mine once a year for about a month. The shareholders' confidence in him 
grew as his reasonable but steady income targets were achieved. Five new 
concessions of five square miles each were acquired adjoining the original 
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concession to the west, east and south boundary, taking the total area to 125 
square miles. 126 
From 1910 regular dividends were paid three times a year, even throughout 
the First World War. During this period the mine produced gross income between 
£25,000 and £35,000 each month, and pre-tax profits in excess of £100,000 a year. 
A further subsidiary was established, Ashanti Rivers and Concession Ltd, but 
none of its properties developed successfully. It was also decided at this time to 
put the 93 square miles of the original concession which was not being mined 
along with the newly acquired 25 square miles of adjacent property into a new 
company focussed on prospecting, Ashanti Goldfields Territories Limited 
(AGTL). AGTL was reacquired by AGC in 1914 after no major discoveries were 
made. The more risk-friendly of the existing shareholders had been given the 
opportunity to take up shares in the speculative AGTL. 
The main operational obstacles between 1905 and 1916 related to firewood 
shortages. These were caused predictably between April and June (the main 
planting season) when the wood cutters would attend to their own farms. Wood 
shortages affected the steam power supply for the treatment plants which ran on 
wood, and the underground timbering activities. These seasonal interruptions 
were satisfactorily resolved by stockpiling wood. The dependence on wood fuel 
necessitated ever-increasing capital expenditure on extending tramlines further 
away from the mines and deeper into the forest. African contractors were also 
used to obtain wood and were paid by the stack delivered. There was no scarcity 
of wood but delivery costs led to experiments and cost comparisons for the use of 
anthracite gas with an electric generator versus wood fuel from 1911. 
Machine breakdowns were a cause of further problems. A foundry was 
established at Obuasi to manufacture spare parts where possible; however, at 
times, critical parts would have to be shipped from the UK. As far as possible a 
degree of redundancy was built into the treatment process to allow some machines 
to be turned off for cleaning and maintenance without disrupting output. 
Unlike the mines in the Tarkwa area that experienced acute labour shortages 
pre-1909, AGC's internal reports continually describe local labour as (ample„127 
This explains why AGC did not participate in government-organized forced 
126 MS 24661/2, AGC annual report 1909, and report on AGM, 16 December 1909. 
127 See for example, MS 24661/2,report on AGM, 15 December 1910, p. 5; MS 24661/1, report on 
AGM, 16 December 1903; report on AGM, 15 December 1904; Feldtmann report, 15 July 1905. 
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labour for the mines in the Gold Coast early in the twentieth century, confirming 
Thomas's observations of Ashanti. 128 Obuasi was located approximately 80 miles 
to the northeast of the main Gold Coast mining district centred on Tarkwa, and for 
most of the period to 1913 there were no European mine competitors in continual 
production in the immediate vicinity. AGC was therefore spared from competing 
with neighbouring mines for workers. This geographic isolation largely explains 
the different labour demand and supply experiences between the Tarkwa mines 
and AGC (other explanatory factors are considered below). 129 Contrary to 
Thomas's statement that during the early 1900s "there was a distinct shortage of 
wage labour in the Colony and Ashanti" the company records show that until 
1913 African labour in the Obuasi area was sufficient. So it was not for any moral 
reasons that AGC did not get involved in the coercive, government-organized 
recruitment schemes of 1906-10: the firm simply did not need these services. 
In 1911 "some slight scarcity" was reported at AGC, especially for hammer 
boys underground. 13° The company attributed this to the increase in prospecting 
companies in the area and expected it to be temporary unless a major mine was 
discovered. Economy was achieved by introducing light drills underground to 
reduce the number of hammer boys required. The following year numbers 
returned to normal. It was not until 1913 that the firm first experienced an 
"exceptional" shortage of African labour, outside the usual seasonal shortage in 
the wood cutters department. Nearly every department was affected which 
impacted on production. 131 As a result, the Cote d'Or filter press treatment plant 
was shut down and the treatment of tailings was suspended. The lack of wood led 
to an increase in costs from using imported coal. In response, output targets were 
reduced rather than importing expensive expatriate labour. Mining was focused on 
the richest ores in the Obuasi chute of the Ashanti mine which was expensive to 
mine and treat because of the depths and the refractory nature of the ore. Monthly 
income levels fell by 12.5% and profit by 32.5% in July that year compared to 
February's returns. 132 Some African wages had to be increased. The cause of the 
exceptional shortage was identified as the growth of the cocoa industry. The chief 
engineer viewed the problem as a temporary one because the cocoa farming 
128 Thomas (1973) fn. 2, p. 79. 
129 Crisp (1984), p. 29. 
139 MS 24661/2, Feldtmann report, 12 April 1911. 
131 MS 24661/4, July 1913 monthly progress report to shareholders; and Chief Engineer's report, 
30 September 1913. 
132 MS 24661/4, February to July 1913 monthly progress reports to shareholders. 
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process (they wrongly believed) only required men for the initial land clearing, it 
was hoped that their womenfolk would then take over the farming and that the 
"first touch of adversity" would bring workers back. 133 (The First World War 
would actually relieve the labour situation, as will be seen below). A policy 
change was made to convert the CTP to be gas-electric motor driven instead of 
wood-steam. The experiments with the gas producer were advanced to the 
construction of a gas plant in response to labour supply uncertainty. 
After 1919, labour competition stiffened from cocoa farming and 
Guggisberg's government construction projects. AGC suffered one acute year of 
constant labour shortage. This eased up by December 1920 for mine labour and by 
March 1921 for firewood labour. I34 The directors acknowledged that they were 
not as badly affected by the severe labour shortages of 1919-22 as other mines in 
the country. 135 AGC were able to partially relieve the problem by increasing 
wages (a strategy which the more marginal mines could not afford). 136 The 
company also benefited from a steady stream of Northerners who had been 
recruited originally by the government to work on the railways but who later 
found their way to Obuasi. 137 AGC being closer to Kumasi than the mines in the 
Tarkwa region had an earlier opportunity to employ workers who were travelling 
south. Another possible reason for the company's better labour supply was the 
visible gold known to exist in Obuasi reefs. This may have tempted some as a 
source of supplementary income. 138 (From the 1940s AGC attempted their own 
unilateral schemes in the Northern Territory using chiefs. It was the involvement 
of chiefs in the process that could have given rise to coercion. 139 The company 
established direct relationships with Northern Territory chiefs and government 
133 MS 24661/4, Chief Engineer's report, 30 September 1913. 
134 MS 24661/5, Consulting Engineer's report 30 September 1921 
138 PRO CO 96/684/1, Notes on the record of the corporation since 1897, 21 February 1929. 
136 MS 24661/5, report on AGM, 14 December 1920; Crisp cites one example in 1904 of mine 
workers at Akrokerri (Ashanti) Mines demanding that their wages be increased to match those at 
AGC. But it was not always the case that AGC paid better, the company adjusted its wages to the 
labour supply conditions - Crisp (1984), pp. 29, 30. In September 1945 they had to increase the 
pay scales to match that suggested by the Chamber of Mines — SPRS 3/1/34, Spears to Batty, 25 
November 1945. 
137 MS 24661/5, Consulting Engineer's report 30 September 1920. 
' 38 A. Phillips, The Enigma of Colonialism: British Policy in West Africa, London: James Currey, 
1989, pp. 56-7, fn. 81. 
139 MS 14170/71, Secretary to Thomson, GM, 6 March 1940; vol. 88, Secretary to GM, 6 May 
1949; vol. 89, Secretary to acting mine manager, 15 September 1949, unsigned but Spears to Park, 
consulting engineer, 27 September 1949; vol. 90, Secretary to J.W. Cairns, Bibiani GM, 21 
February 1950; vol. 96, Chairman to Norman, GM, 24 April 1953. AGC also joined the Chamber 
of Mines' Mines Transit Welfare Centre Recruitment Scheme which similarly ended in failure — 
MS14170/94, Spears to Edwards, GM, 5 February 1952; vol. 96, Secretary to Norman, GM, 14 
January 1953. 
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officials with the aim of securing a steady labour supply. 140 The future managing 
director and chairman, General Spears, made a request to the Commissioner of 
Labour for AGC to adopt a Northern Territory tribe. 141 Although this plan failed it 
showed the subtle measures the company considered employing in order to obtain 
Northern recruits.) As it happened these recruitment schemes invariably failed -
market forces attracted Northern labour freely to Kumasi and then to cocoa 
opportunities before mining would be considered. 142 Ultimately, therefore, AGC 
had to rely on the voluntary arrival of workers. 
The minutes from shareholder meetings during this pre-World War I 
period show a great awareness by them of comparative international mining costs 
and techniques. Many held other mining shares and kept abreast of mining 
literature. 143 A minority were vocal in criticising the directors over their pay and 
the extent of London office costs.' The existence of founding directors on the 
board, however, kept the majority of shareholders in support of the board. 
The frequency of communication between Obuasi and London and between 
the board and the shareholders was high. In addition to submitting monthly 
progress reports, the mines manager in Obuasi would cable any important daily 
events when necessary. Before the war these cables were issued to each 
shareholder within a day or two of receipt. The level of detail in the monthly 
reports, such as the breakdown of costs, supported the firm's policy to be as 
"explicit and informative as possible". 145 The Secretary, Charles Mann, operated 
an open-door policy and shareholders were able to visit him in London to put their 
queries forward in person. 146 
The Effects of World War I 
On the announcement of war, orders for stores from the UK were sharply 
increased. No immediate impact of the war on African labour supply was felt, but 
740 MS 14170/71, Secretary to Thomson, GM, 6 March 1940; vol. 88, Secretary to GM, 6 May 
1949; vol. 89, Secretary to acting mine manager, 15 September 1949, unsigned but Spears to Park, 
consulting engineer, 27 September 1949; vol. 96, Chairman to Norman, GM, 24 April 1953. 
141 MS 14170/ 90, Secretary to J.W. Cairns, Bibiani GM, 21 February 1950. 
142 Phillips (1989), p. 44. 
143 See for example MS 24661/3, report on AGM, 14 December 1911. 
1441bid. 
445 Turner (1932). 
146 MS 24661/5, report on AGM, 12 December 1916. 
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military recruitment in Kumasi had commenced and this won-led the company. 147 
The African workers managed without the usual complement of white supervisory 
staff. 1 " UK Customs quickly banned the export of certain mine inputs. The 
company increasingly turned to South Africa, Canada and the USA for 
supplies. 149 Negotiations were ongoing with the Ministry of Munitions and the 
War Trade Department to seek export allowances. The company failed to obtain 
exclusion from the war Finance Act's excess profit tax and joined with other gold 
companies to lobby for some relief. During the war a bullion embargo was 
imposed which required all of AGC's gold to be sold to the Treasury at a fixed 
price. 
An agreement was secured with the firm's UK cyanide supplier to hold 
prices at the pre-war levels until the end of 1915. Good terms were also sought 
from UK spares suppliers. Investigations were made into obtaining Nigerian coal 
from the newly-discovered Udi coal fields. A batch of this coal was obtained for 
testing in the U.K. and discussions with the Nigerian colonial authorities over 
price and quantity started. 
For the years ending 30 June 1915, 1916 and 1917 the company continually 
exceeded its profits records. 15° This was remarkable considering that as the war 
progressed costs rose for stores, rail and shipping freight, bullion transport 
insurance and white staff war bonuses. Savings were attempted at Obuasi by 
suspending prospecting, reducing expenditure on mine development and 
focussing extraction on identified high-grade resources. The Cote d'Or treatment 
plant was shut down (December 1916) and mining was suspended at the Old 
Chief, Big Blow and Justice's mines and Ayeinm (February 1917) to conserve 
supplies for the treatment of higher grade ore from the Obuasi chute of the 
Ashanti mine. In 1917 shaft sinking was completely stopped. The reduced output 
plan meant that labour and fuel needs were also reduced. The gas power plant 
which ran on imported anthracite was in full operation from September 1914 until 
April 1918 when the availability and price of anthracite necessitated a return to 
wood-steam operations. African labour supply was described as "comfortable" 
147 MS 24661/5, report on AGM, 11 December 1914. 
148 MS 24661/5, report on AGM, 16 December 1915; Consulting Engineer's report 30 September 
1917. 
149 The Guildhall series MS 14170 contains details of AGC supplies shipments including quantities 
sent from ports around the world. 
15° MS 24661/5, AGC annual reports 1915/16/17. 
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during the war largely due to the slump in the cocoa prices from 1916, 151 and 
firewood stocks were good. Comments were made for the first time that the 
mines' timber requirements were leading to deforestation. A reforestation project 
of 75 acres of teak and 25 acres of the indigenous odoum was extended. 152 This 
was not done for conservation purposes, but to ensure future supply for the firm. 
During the war, the scarcity and expense of paper and labour forced the 
company to reduce its monthly progress reports to quarterly reports. Monthly 
returns along with any important news cabled from Obuasi were instead published 
in the national press. Shareholders with fewer than four shares were offered the 
market price for their shares to encourage them to sell up in order to reduce 
clerical costs!" This was a further example of head office's speedy response to 
problems impacting profitability. 
Just prior to the signing of the Armistice, the Spanish flu pandemic shut the 
mine down for twelve days. On 26 October the situation had improved to allow 
half the planned tonnage to be crushed. 154 The number of African deaths was 
unknown but 157 were buried in one week alone in Obuasi, an estimated 400 died 
in total; four whites died. 155 
The company's wartime production performance was a commendable 
achievement. They were able to pay dividends regularly of between 67% and 75% 
of paid-up share capital throughout the war. Gold output at the end of 1918, which 
had been reduced to ore exclusively from the rich Obuasi chute of the Ashanti 
mine, was slightly higher than the pre-war output levels. Mine development had 
been halted for the best part of four years and only critical repairs and 
maintenance were carried out during this time. Extensive rehabilitation was now 
needed. 
Difficult rehabilitation and the origins of labour unrest 
The bullion embargo was lifted in July 1919 allowing the company to find any 
market for its gold and a considerable premium above the par value paid by the 
Treasury was earned. 
151 MS 24661/5, Consulting Engineer's report, 30 September 1917. 
152 MS 24661/5, report on AGM, 12 December 1916. 
153 MS 24661/5, letter to shareholders, 12 August 1918. 
154 MS 24661/5, cables from Obuasi, 10, 14 and 26 October 1918. 
155 MS 24661/5, report on AGM, 17 December 1918 
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The company rightly expected a lag between the end of the war and an 
improvement in the cost and availability of mine stores. But two unexpected 
problems arose which seriously hampered production and rehabilitation plans. 
The unavailability of silver for paying African wages led to a switch to paper 
currency. High denomination paper currency of £20 and £10 had been introduced 
during the war without complaint but the addition of £1 notes after the war was 
strongly disliked by the Africans because the paper was discounted by 1.5% when 
used to purchase goods or to trade in the area. 156 The silver shortage was 
attributed by management to the cocoa buyers. It was difficult for the miners to 
understand why the cocoa farmers received silver from European buyers while 
they had to make do with lower value paper. This grievance led to industrial 
action initiated by the hammer boys who went on strike at the end of September 
1919. After nine days, they returned on the old terms. 157 However the workers' 
effort and attitude deteriorated and absenteeism increased. 188 AGC responded by 
complaining to the government in London and the Gold Coast who admitted that 
they could not mint silver quickly enough. AGC promised to pay the miners at 
least half their wages in silver in the future and small quantities of sovereigns 
were purchased at a premium in London for use in Obuasi. Partial payments were 
also made in gold. According to the mine's manager, the strike was "mainly 
caused" by the change to paper currency. "Mainly" shows that there were other 
grievances. However, these were not elucidated by the mines manager. 169 (See 
Chapter 5, `Labour'). 
The brief but sharp revival of the cocoa market after the war caused labour 
problems for the company, particularly, but not exclusively, in the firewood 
department. The discontent with the paper currency and the cocoa boom resulted 
in the depletion of all firewood stock by June 1919. Anthracite had to be imported 
at exorbitant prices to operate the Central Treatment Plant. Urgent repairs to the 
Ashanti Main Shaft necessitated a cessation of underground work in February and 
March 1920. Two further labour strikes occurred that year in June (the African 
clerks) and in August (the CTP workers). The reduction in output combined with 
the expected post-war supply difficulties and the unexpected local labour costs 
156 MS 24661/5, Consulting Engineer's report, 30 September 1919; report on AGM, 11 December 
1919. 
157 MS 24661/5, Consulting Engineer's report, 30 September 1919. 
158 MS 24661/5, Consulting Engineer's report, 30 September 1920. 
159 MS 24661/5, circular to shareholders, 13 November 1919. 
92 
caused a surge in working costs per ton from 44s/11d in 1916, and 59s/45d in 
1919, to 85s/3d in 1920. 
The consultant engineer provided a fuller analysis of the labour problems 
than his mine manager. Mine employment had obviously become a less attractive 
option — cocoa, timber felling and trading were seen as more attractive. There was 
at this time no surplus of labour to permit competition for AGC jobs. The "small 
but regular stream" of northern migrant miners had been lured away in Kumasi by 
a government recruitment campaign for railway workers. 16° Discontent over 
payment in paper currency was related to the rising price of foodstuffs. In addition, 
traders had taken advantage of the new currency to round prices upwards; the 
scarcity and cost of foodstuffs justified the workers' demand for increased wages. 
The company therefore appreciated that the labour problems were a combination 
of AGC-specific employment conditions and external alternatives. Considerable 
increases in African pay were made in October 1920 to avert a general strike. 16I 
 Attempts were also made to sell food to the workers at cost price. Increased rates 
were offered for firewood while additions were made to the gas plant to eliminate 
the dependence on the wood cutters, even though the ratio cost of firewood to 
imported anthracite was 27: 34 (: 44 for coal). The company saw the labour 
problem firstly as a fuel problem. Feldtmann's priority was to substitute gas-
electricity for wood and he felt this single strategy would "normalise" the local 
labour issues. Reducing their demand for wood cutters, he hoped, would free them 
up to take up mine jobs. The continual reference to the labour situation as a 
"temporary" difficulty suggests that although employment conditions had been 
recognised as one cause of the unrest, 162 the need to improve the worker's lot to 
make the miner's job as attractive as the external opportunities was never 
considered by management. For them the permanent remedy was to "do with less 
labour". 163 The labour situation improved from 1921 when the prices for cocoa 
and mahogany fell. 
Extensive construction work was needed to re-open the old mines safely and 
to improve the shaft and haulage systems; boilers, extra gas producer units and a 
generator, additional machine tools and spare parts were required to overhaul and 
clean all machines. To finance this the remainder of the authorised share capital 
160 MS 24661/5, Consulting Engineer's report, 30 September 1920. 
161 ibid. 
162 MS 24661/5, report on AGM, reprinted in The Mining World 18 December 1920. 
163 Ibid., p. 2. 
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was issued on a pro rata basis to existing shareholders and this raised just over 
£67,000. 
If it had not been for the gold premium, the company would have made 
losses for the years 1921 — 1924 when the cost of stores remained over 100% of 
the pre-war costs. The gold premium at the end of 1920 was 40% above the pre-
war price; its value was determined largely by the US/UK exchange rate. It was 
thought that more than half of all mines globally had ceased operations because of 
the uneconomical working costs. Feinstein calculated that in the period before 
1933 most of South Africa's gold mines would not have remained viable had it 
not been for the direct and indirect coercive measures used to obtain cheap black 
labour. 164 The fact that AGC were able to withstand these difficult times is a 
measure of the geological richness of the Obuasi mines and the cost-
consciousness of management. 
For years after the war the rich Ashanti mine was still the only mine being 
worked at Obuasi. The main shaft had reached 1,800 feet below ground. The fuel 
cost problem led the consulting engineer to look for more fuel-efficient means 
than roasting to treat Ashanti's refractory ores. It was hoped that the fuel cost 
savings from wet crushing this ore would be greater than the loss of income from 
reduced levels of gold recovery (81.2% from wet crushing compared to 93% from 
roasting). A new wet crushing plant was erected next to the CTP for this purpose. 
The Cote d'Or treatment plant was restarted to experiment between oil and water 
concentration processes with a view to shipping the concentrated ores to London 
for treatment there. Further experiments were commissioned to test wood-gas 
producers which burnt waste wood such as sawmill waste and had been 
successfully employed in South Africa. A separate experiment using pulverized 
coal for the roasting furnaces commenced. A mechanical and electrical 
engineering consultant was sent to the mines to review the entire energy supply 
system and to make economising recommendations. 
Supply costs started to fall from 1922 which was timely because the gold 
premium was also diminishing — it was completely removed in April 1925 when 
Britain returned to the gold standard. Diesel oil was found to be a cheaper fuel for 
the gas plant than anthracite, and equally efficient. And so it was decided to revert 
to roasting again in December 1924. (Discussions to obtain Udi coal from Nigeria 
164 C. H. Feinstein, An Economic History of South Africa: Conquest, Discrimination, and 
Development, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 110-111. 
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came to nothing because of costs). Other working costs however, still remained 
too high to reopen the other mines. 
Labour relations remained fundamentally unaddressed. This is seen in the 
flash strike that occurred for five days from 20 June 1925 affecting over- and 
underground staff. No comment was made about it whatsoever by the consulting 
engineer perhaps because the efforts to substitute other fuel types for wood had 
successfully reduced the mine's labour needs. Management was dismissive of the 
strike. The language used in regard to African labour suggests a reactionary view 
to unrest and a growing disengagement between management and the 
workforce. 165 (See Chapter 5, `Labour'). 
A return to Growth 
Feldtmann resigned as consulting engineer at the end of the 1925 financial year 
after twenty years' service. He was replaced by J. S. Watkins who had previously 
served as chief metallurgist (1905 —1911) and as the Obuasi General Mines 
Manager (1911- 1920). The completion of the Timber Way shaft in the Ashanti 
mine in 1925 allowed greater tonnage to be hauled from there as the Timber Way 
was used for men and materials, freeing the Main Shaft for ore haulage. Working 
costs in 1925 were back to the 1914 levels. The wood-gas producers successfully 
produced electricity at a cost of less than ld per unit which was comparable to the 
UK's public electricity supply costs. This permitted the electrification of all 
underground equipment including miners' lamps. Plans were made to erect a 
central power station. The wood-gas producers could operate with soft woods so it 
was decided to add 68 I/2 acres of cedar and senna to the teak and odoum 
reforestation project. 
In 1927 AGC bought 66% ownership of the Bibiani Mine and Timber 
Concession company which was located about fifty miles northwest of Obuasi. 
The remaining share was kept by the British vendors who had ceased work there 
in 1913 because of transport problems. Mining operations commenced at Bibiani 
soon after July 1927 when a new motor road between Bibiani and Dunkwa was 
completed. It was not a high-grade mine but the mining and treatment methods 
were straightforward. AGC managed Bibiani from the same London head office. 
165 MS 24661/5, Consulting Engineer's report, 30 September 1926. 
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The Batty era, 1930-45 
J. H. Batty was described as a reserved, seclusive man. 166 He had lived in the 
Gold Coast for fourteen years from 1888 working for the Millers trading firm. He 
held interests in Millers and other West African companies and was a founding 
director and chairman of the African and Eastern Trade Corporation. Batty's 
initial involvement with AGC was through the Ashanti-Obuasi Trading Company 
established in 1904 in which Millers held shares. 167 Batty joined AGC's board in 
1921 becoming chairman in 1930. 
In the early 1930s geological experts reported on the downward 
development of the Ashanti reef. 168 Norman Junner, a geologist and future 
director of the Gold Coast Geological Survey, assisted the company with this. (He 
would be retained by AGC on and off until 1968). The Ayeinm and Justice's 
mines were reopened in 1933, the Cote d'Or and Obuasi mines were restarted 
around this time. Development for new reserves increased sharply from 14,571 
feet in 1934 to 28,748 feet in 1937. 169 As a result ore reserves in the same period 
rose from 584,818 tons averaging 24 dwt to 1,311, 485 tons averaging 22.3 
dwt. 17° These efforts led to the opening up in 1937 of Level 29 in the Ashanti 
Mine (approximately 2,900 feet below the surface), which proved to be very rich. 
Development focussed more on vertical than lateral extensions. Integration work 
was completed at this time to connect all shafts using aerial ropeways to the CTP. 
The development surge was financed by new share issues which raised the 
authorised share capital from £250,000 to Elm. 
By 1937 development of the Cote D'Or reef, reached via the South Shaft, 
contributed the largest proportion of tonnage and the highest grade ore. To fully 
exploit this area of the mine work started on the construction of a new shaft. 171 
 The existing South Shaft went down to Level 18, and the Main Shaft, accessing 
the Obuasi and Ashanti Reefs, had reached the lowest point in the mine, Level 29. 
An exciting discovery that year was that the Obuasi, Ashanti and Cote d'Or reefs 
appeared to meet near Level 23, but the Main Shaft would need to be sunk much 
166 SPRS 3/1/34, an obituary by Major Gen. W. H. Grey, African Affairs, n.d. but 1946. 
167 MS 14164/2, minutes, 5 and 31 October 1904. 
168 Turner (1932), p. 6. 
169 Turner (1947), p. 13. 
1 " Ibid. 
171 AGC annual report, 1938. 
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deeper to explore the prospect. The indications though were that the life of the 
mine would be longer and richer than hitherto anticipated. 172 
The firewood roasting units in the treatment plant were gradually being 
replaced with gas-firing roasters. A pilot flotation plant was erected in 1935 along 
with the construction of a Residue Retreatment Plant (completed in January 1939) 
which together could handle 20,000 tons per month, once in operation. The aim of 
the flotation process was to concentrate the gold ore before cyanidation to 
increase gold production capacity and improve recovery levels. The technology 
had been first developed at the turn of the century. AGC had themselves 
considered it back in 1921. The process is outlined below in Table 3.6. An 
Australian expert, T. B. Stevens, was recruited to manage , the experiments. I73 The 
following year, results from the pilot justified the decision to build a new flotation 
plant capable of handling 1,000 tons per day. A South African metallurgy expert 
in this field, Chad Norris, was retained to assist the firm to successfully 
implement the technology on a large scale. 
Table 3.6: The flotation process 
- Ore crushing and grinding in primary and secondary mill 
- Water is added to produce a slurry. 
- Chemicals are added to the slurry to attract the gold. 
- Air is passed through the slurry from the bottom of Denver flotation 
cells; as the air rises the gold-trapped chemicals attach themselves to the 
air bubbles creating a froth. The froth contains gold. 
- The froth is collected, filtered and dried. 
- This concentrated ore is then roasted. 
- Cyanidation and extraction. 
De-watering and shaft preparation work started in order to re-open the 
Ayeinm, Justice's and Sansu mines. 174 At Sansu erection of a new shaft and 
requisite air station and power supply started. 
in Turner (1947), p. 13. 
173 Ms 14170/63 , Batty to Turner, 20 March; Turner to mine manager, 26 June; Secretary to mine 
manager, 21 August 1934. 
174 The Times, 7 February 1938. 
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AGC benefited when the official gold price was increased by 65% from 
US$20.67 to US$35 in 1934. This heralded a new era of profitability for gold 
producers globally. AGC's pre-tax profits for the first time exceeded £lm in the 
financial year ending September 1937. Despite this improvement in the industry's 
economics, the firm resisted demands for wage increases. 
It had been a policy for the company to hold extensive shares in other 
African gold mining companies and in all those producing in the Gold Coast. 175 
 These investments throughout the 1930s appreciated in value and earned steadily 
increasing dividend income. AGC's largest shareholdings were in the Tarkwa and 
Abosso Mines and the Bremang Gold Dredging Company. t76  Other substantial 
shareholdings were in Ariston Gold Mines (1929) Ltd and Gold Coast Selection 
Trust Ltd (GCST), on whose board J. H. Batty served as a director. 177 GCST 
controlled nearly all the concessions and mines along the gold belt between 
AGC's property to the north and Ariston in the south. Unlike Bibiani, which was 
actively managed from AGC's head office, these other interests were only 
portfolio investments. 
GCST also owned the West African Gold Corporation (in which AGC had a 
stake as well as board representation), I78 The West African Gold Corporation, 
established in 1933, provided technical advice to many mines in the colony. AGC 
often took advantage of the experts available from this company to resolve 
specific metallurgical, mining and engineering issues. 179 
The Gold Coast mines were loosely grouped into three by financial analysts 
of the sector. The AGC Group comprised AGC, Bibiani and Tarkwa and Abosso 
(in which AGC held substantial shares). This group had a high market reputation 
for being well-managed companies offering good, long-term stocks. There was 
the Consolidated Gold Fields Group of mines comprising the GCST, Ariston, 
Konongo and Lyndhurst. These had a reputation for sound technical management. 
175 In 1938 these were Amalgamated Banket Areas Ltd, Ariston Gold Mines (1929) Ltd, Bibiani 
(1927) Ltd, Bremang Gold Dredging Co Ltd, Consolidated Gold Fields of South Africa Ltd, 
General Mines Investment Ltd, Gold Coast Selection Trust Ltd, Konongo Gold Mines Ltd, 
London and African Mining Trust Ltd, Lyndhurst Deep Level (Gold and Silver) Ltd, Marlu Gold 
Mining Areas Ltd, Tano Gold Dredging Ltd, Tarkwa and Abosso Mines Ltd — SPRS 3/1/S 
Schedule of shares and stocks held in other companies, 15 December 1938. 
176 The Times, 7 February 1938. 
177 SPRS 3/1/5 Schedule of shares and stocks held in other companies, 15 December 1938; The 
Mining Manual, 1934, pp. 203, 600; 1935, p. 44. 
178 The Mining Manual, 1933. 
179 MS 14164/7 minutes 23 January 1933; 28 March 1934; MS 14170/70, Turner to G.W. 
Thompson of WAGC, 10 May 1939; vol. 71, Secretary to mine manager, 31 August 1939. 
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And then there was the Latilla Group of less well regarded mines such as 
Amalgamated Banket Areas, Bremang and Marlu Gold Mining. These were 
viewed as excessively capitalised companies with fair-weather shares. 18° There 
were several director relationships criss-crossing these groups, for example, H. G. 
Latilla and J. H. Batty were both on the board of GCST. 181 
World War II halted the remarkable period of year-on-year growth in output, 
reserves, development and profitability since 1924. 
World War II 
At the outbreak of war AGC was fortunate to have good stocks of critical 
materials at the mine. The earlier erection and extension of power engines that 
consumed either firewood, gas or fuel oil also stood them in good stead by 
reducing the demand for imported fue1. 182 Firewood, although relatively cheap, 
was sensitive to labour supply problems and variations in quality which affected 
ore roasting and gold recovery results. In addition, the government was 
increasingly conscious of deforestation and AGC feared future restrictions would 
be imposed on tree cutting. 183 These factors had motivated diversification in 
power generation. Tonnage and gold output held up in the first year of the war. 
Work to re-open the outside mines at Ayeinm and Sansu that had 
commenced in 1939 had to be abandoned in 1941 to concentrate resources on 
gold production from the Ashanti group of mines. The production policy followed 
throughout the war was to maximise yields with minimal tonnage by mining the 
highest grade ore from the Cote d'Or, Obuasi and Ashanti reefs. Exploration, 
stope development and shaft sinking ceased. 
In February 1943 a gold concentration scheme was put in place by the 
British government. The lack of fuel oil necessitated the closure of six gold mines 
in the colony, leaving eight, including AGC, to operate on a limited basis in line 
with the shortage of supplies. 184 The mines that were permitted to continue 
production paid into a fund to allow the closed mines to be kept on a care-and-
maintenance basis. 
180 SPRS 3/1/36, enclosure in Argenti Sechiari and Co to Spears, 26 July 1945. 
181 The Mining Manual, 1933, 1939, 1945. 
182 AGA annual report 1939. 
183 The Times, 7 February 1938. 
184 Gold Coast Mines Department Annual report 1945-6; CSO 19/2/101, Reopening of Gold Mines, 
1944-6. 
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The lack of human and capital resources during the war also contributed to 
the drop in production from 242,865 tons milled in 1940 to 161,870 tons in 
1944. 185 Increased rations of imported fuel and de-concentration of the sector 
occurred in November 1945 and March 1946, respectively. 186 Throughout the war 
AGC maintained dividend payments of between 34% and 80% of paid-up share 
capital. 
It was not easy to resume the pre-war rate of growth after the cessation of 
hostilities. Rich ore reserves at the more accessible higher levels of the Ashanti 
mine had been steadily depleted as a result of the high grade strategy. The Main 
Shaft and Timber Shaft were in poor condition with inadequate capacity for lateral 
or vertical expansion. 187 Surface plant and equipment had again fallen into a poor 
state of repair. In order to return to, and exceed, pre-war growth a new, modern, 
deeper shaft was needed to the north of the Main Shaft with hoisting ability from 
the surface to Level 42, and potentially beyond. This shaft was planned from the 
end of the war, it would make the Main Shaft redundant and would not be 
completed to Level 42 until 1955. 188 The shaft would be called the Eaton Turner 
Shaft (ETS) after G.W.E. Turner a New Zealander who had been employed for 
many years as Obuasi's general manager and then as consultant engineer (see 
Appendices 4-7 for lists of AGC's key historical personnel). The South Shaft, 
which gave access to the Cote D'Or reef and had reached Level 20 before the war, 
needed to be extended to Level 33 to supplement the hoisting capacity of the aged 
Main Shaft until the completion of ETS. Before the war a rich ore shoot off the 
Obuasi South Reef at Level 20 had been discovered. To mine this area 
construction had started for a new West Shaft, this needed to resume. 189 Since the 
company's future lay to a large degree in the deeper mine levels it became 
imperative to provide good ventilation. Planning and construction of a Circular 
Ventilation Shaft (CVS) commenced in 1945. A refrigeration scheme was also 
researched, 19° although nothing came of this. To provide a second outlet to Level 
42 for machinery and men a Sub-Vertical Shaft between Levels 31 and 42 was 
185 The Mining Manual, 1942-46. 
186 CSO 19/2/101, Reopening of Gold Mines, 1944-6. 
187 SPRS 3/1/106, R. D. Power, consultant engineer, report on the Ashanti mine, 22 December 
1952. 
n's MS 14170/98, consultant engineer to GM, 19 February 1954. 
1" MS 14170/98, Park to Edwards 22, 23 December 1953. 
190 SPRS 3/1/106, Power, report on the Ashanti mine, 22 December 1952, p. 7. 
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started soon after the war (the Outen Shaft). 191 Each of these shaft construction 
programmes necessitated reorganization and expansion of the electricity supply, 
air supply and pumping schemes. 
Another priority was to complete the new flotation plant, the Pampora 
Treatment Plant, to allow greater milling capacity (from a war time average of 
17,000 tons per month to 30,000) and better economy from reductions in the use 
of wood for roasting. While this extensive and expensive shaft rehabilitation 
programme centred on the Ashanti group of mines was carried out it was planned 
for increased tonnage to be supplied in the interim from the low grade outside 
mines at Ayeinm, Sansu, Justices and Blackies (re-opened in 1947, 1948, 1949 
and 1952 respectively). Although tonnage would start to increase from 1945, the 
gold recovered would not exceed the pre-war levels until 1957 because of this 
increased reliance on the low-grade outside mines. By comparison, four to five 
tons of outside ore yielded the same gold as one ton from the Cote d'Or group of 
mines. 192 
The reforestation scheme continued during the war and covered an area of 
6.5 square miles of wood suitable for lumber, stoping and fuel by 1945. ' 93 
 However, labour shortages for cutting and the breakdown of locomotives to 
transport the wood had created acute problems by the end of the war which also 
needed attention. I94 
Obuasi's immediate problem, along with other Gold Coast mine companies, 
was to seek government help to expedite import licences for machinery and for 
the Overseas Manpower Board to provide Certificates of Essentiality to allow the 
speedy recruitment of skilled British workers to enable the redevelopment work to 
commence. 195 
In 1940 there had been 140 white workers and AGC estimated they needed 
180 to complete the flotation plant, which had been left 80% finished when the 
war started. 196 The type of labour and qualifications requested (for example, for a 
general fitter and an assistant fuel superintendent) could have been filled 
191 Consultant engineer's report in AGC annual report, 1949. 
192 SPRS 3/1/106, Power, report on the Ashanti mine, 22 December 1952, p. 6. 
193 Chairman's address reported in Financial Times, 30 April 1946; ARG 7/5/60/1 GM, to DC 
Obuasi, 3 January 1941. 
194 Chairman's address reported in Financial Times, 30 April 1946. 
195 Ibid. See also CSO 19/5/35, GM, to acting Colonial Secretary, 11 October 1945. 
196 CSO 19/5/35, GM, to Colonial Secretary, 5 July 1946. 
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conceivably by trained Africans, but the company deemed it essential to recruit 
UK workers. 197 
During the war the African labour that remained at the mines was mostly 
skilled. I98 It was at this time that conversations started with the government and 
Gold Coast Chamber of Mines about training Africans at a proposed mine school 
in Tarkwa "for advancement to the duties of Assistant Shift Boss and, possibly, 
Shift Boss." 199 Such was the low height of aspiration and confidence in African 
aptitude. 
The Spears era, 1945-68 
J.H. Batty stepped down as AGC's chairman in 1945, assuming the unpaid, 
advisory role as the company's President for a year until his death. 20° Major 
General Sir Edward Spears (1886-1974) was his named successor for the 
chairmanship. In February 1950 Spears took on the joint role of managing director 
and chairman. Spears had served with distinction in both World Wars. He had 
been a Liberal and a Conservative MP. During World War Two he had been 
appointed as Britain's Minister in Syria and Lebanon and he also represented 
Winston Churchill to the French government. His business career really took off 
after the war with AGC, and besides his dynamic role at the mine, he made a 
significant contribution while President of the Institute of Directors.2°1 
Similar to the aftermath of the First World War, mine economics became a 
difficult balancing act after the Second World War. AGC became even more cost 
conscious. There were many incidents in the company records where even small 
inconsistencies in accounts and reports, mistakes and other irregularities would be 
chased up with explanations demanded and measures put in place to prevent 
reoccurrence. 202 After the war the level of cost-consciousness bordered on penny-
pinching when London decided that UK recruits should have their inoculations 
197 CSO 19/5/35, GM, to Chief Inspector of Mines, 28 November 1945. 
198 CS019/2/10, Notes of meeting held at government house on 18 September 1945 to consider the 
de-concentration of the mining industry in the Gold Coast. 
199 Ibid. 
299 AGC annual report, 1944, Chairman's address reported in Financial Times, 30 April 1946. 
201 M. Egremont, Under Two Flags: The Life of Major General Sir Edward Spears, London: Orion 
Publishing Group, 1997,   pp. 283, 295-6. 
"'For examples see MS 14170/ 82, Secretary to acting mine manager, 18 September, and 
Secretary to GM, 18 December 1946. 
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administered in the Gold Coast rather than London to save money. 203 Medical 
advice later forced a turn-around on this policy. 
The price of gold remained fixed by the Bank of England who compulsorily 
purchased 100% of AGC's output until November 1951. Thereafter 40% of 
production could be sold on the free market; and 100% from May 1952. 204 The 
sterling devaluation of September 1949 was welcomed because it increased the 
price of gold from 172s/3d to 248s a fine ounce 2 05 However, the 44% increase 
was outstripped by greater rises in the cost of mine supplies, 206 and frequent 
increases in the salaries and wages of Europeans and Africans. Between 1946 and 
1951 African nominal wages doubled. 207 A favourable change in taxation for 
mines saw the abolition of the gold duty and a change in the minerals duty to off-
set the amounts paid as royalty (see Chapter 6, `Capitar). 208 However, the 
ambitious development plans of the African-led government in the colony only 
increased the likelihood of high taxation. In addition to trying to contain costs and 
rehabilitating the mine, AGC faced new challenges of a political nature. 
The war ushered in changed political circumstances and consciousness in 
the Gold Coast. AGC appreciated that they were on "the threshold of a profound 
change in colonial administration, which, under pressure of political and public 
opinion, made sharper and more sensitive by the war, will tend more and more to 
subordinate the interests of organized commerce and industry to those of the 
owners of the soil and the native workers." 209 
Channelled protests against management emanated from various quarters. 
Chiefs and elders of villages in and around the concession expressed growing 
concern about the impact of the mine's activities on local rivers, plants and 
health. 210 By 1940 AGC's operations had made a visible impact on the 
environment owing to the rapid and extensive tree cutting. With regard to 
deforestation the company had come to a "gentleman's agreement" with 
successive chief conservators of forestry that "regard should be paid to the needs 
of posterity", which, without any explicit translation into rules, left AGC to do as 
203 MS 14170/85, Secretary to acting mine manager, 27 June and 30 July 1947. 
204 AGC annual report, 1952. 
203 Chairman's address reported in Financial Times, 15 May 1950. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Chairman's address reported in Financial Times 22 May 1952. 
208 AGC annual report, 1952. 
209 GC London office despatch of 25 June 1943, cited in Crisp (1984), p. 71. 
For example, ARG 7/5/60/1, a joint the Akrofuomhene, Krotihene, Bamuhene, Gyasihene, 
Safuhene, Ankobiahene and 3 others to General Mines Manager, dd. 19 November 1940. 
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it pleased. 211 A Forest Reserve was demarcated in 1949 in the Obuasi rain 
catchment area to stop erosion of the drainage basin and a 10-year plan put in 
place in 1954 to maintain forest cover. However, the project administrator 
conceded that their plans were at the mercy of AGC's actions. 212 
It was over the issue of deforestation that the first signs of organized 
environmental protest are evident from the archives. In 1953 the Akrofuom Youth 
Association and Rate Payers Association wrote to their chief, elders, local council 
president, government agents, press, forestry department and minister of local 
government in Accra complaining about the grant by their chief to AGC of a 
concession renewal at a place called Fum. Their grievances were the lack of 
transparency over the terms and conditions and concern over the mahogany trees -
although it is not clear if this concern was about conservation or an equitable 
share in the economic value of the trees. The latter was probably the case because 
they went on to highlight the injustice that the chief and his palace would benefit 
privately from the concession rather than the masses in the form of education 
facilities and other public amenities. 213 The level of anger is evident from the 
threat of rioting alluded to in the con-espondence.214 The protestors also raised the 
folly of signing away natural resources to foreign capitalists on the eve of full 
self-government. 215 With the success of AGC's reforestation scheme and the 
change in fuel technology away from wood the Fum concession was not needed 
after 1957. The film successfully reduced firewood needs by half through the 
conversion from wood—gas fired roasters to oil fired ones. 2t6  
Regarding other forms of environmental damage, the Akrofuomhene 
recalled in 1940 that just a decade earlier the waters of the River Jimi (less than a 
mile south of the Ashanti Mine workings) had been pure enough for drinking and 
211 ARG 7/5/60/1, chief conservator of forests to Colonial Secretary, 3 January 1940; 
the pre-World War II attitude of the authorities in this respect is perhaps reflected in the instance 
where AGC's GM, was advised by the DC at Obuasi to seek a firewood concession from the 
Omanhene of Adansi who would not stipulate any prohibitions on types of tree cut, whereas the 
Akrokerrihene wanted to impose restrictions on trees such as mahogany — ARG 7/5/59 18 August 
1925; MS 14170/73, Batty to Thomson, 10 December 1940. 
212 ARG 7/4/17, 'A working plan compiled by the assistant conservator of forests following 
Ashanti divisional conference in February 1953'. 
213 ARG 7/5/42 Secretary of the Akrofuom Youth Association to Akrofuomhene and others, 15 
July 1953; Rate Payers Association to the Minister of Local Government, Accra and others, 15 
September 1953. 
214 ARG 7/5/42 Rate Payers Association to the Minister of Local Government, Accra and others, 
15 September 1953. 
215 ARG 7/5/42 Akrofuom Youth and Rate Payers Associations to government agent Obuasi, 2 
December 1953. 
216 Chairman's address reported in Financial Times, 4 April 1957; AGC annual report, 1956. 
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washing. However, it had since turned black and foul-smelling owing to coal tar 
from AGC's works. AGC pumped effluence into the River Pampora, a tributary of 
the River Jimi. 217 The chief drew attention to clauses 9 and 12 of AGC's 1897 
agreement requiring the company "not to foul any river, spring or watercourse" 
and to comply with all regulations. Other villages also lodged complaints; and 
besides tar there was concern about cyanide entering water streams. 218 
AGC's response was that coal tar was actually beneficial because it was an 
antiseptic and warded off mosquitoes! 219 The cause of the tar was the wood 
burning carried out in the gas producer plant completed in 1923. In the absence of 
any regulatory bite, 22° AGC were not forced to act quickly. A decade later the 
matter was taken up by the Adansi Banka member of the Legislative Assembly, N. 
B. Abubekr. 221 
While not publicly admitting liability, AGC's engineering department tried 
to find a technological solution to separate the tar from the water waste and 
possibly to reuse it in construction work. 222 The cost of this perhaps explains why 
nothing came of it and attempts were then made to divert the problem by 
channelling the effluence through the Obuasi town drainage system. This met with 
opposition from the Obuasi Urban Counci1. 223 No permanent solution was found 
until the use of wood to produce gas was completely abandoned in favour of 
oi1.224 In the meantime AGC provided Akrofuom with a water pipe and tanks of 
treated water.225 
Allegations of air pollution caused by poisonous smoke from AGC's 
treatment plant were made by local farmers. 226 The central Ashanti Agricultural 
247 ARG 7/5/60/1 Akrofuomhene to DC Obuasi, 13 September 1940. 
218 ARG 9/5/2 government agent Obuasi to government agent Bekwai 10 August 1953, 13 April 
1954. 
219 ARG 7/5/60/1 GM, to Akrofuomhene and others, 26 November 1940. 
220 S. 126 of the Criminal Code and regulation 10 of the Mining Regulations as well as the Rivers 
Ordinance provided criminal sanctions. The administrators awaited scientific proof of the 
allegations although AGC's constant talk of action being taken to rectify the problem was in itself 
admission of pollution - ARG 9/5/2 ministry of commerce and industries to chief regional officer 
Kumasi, 5 September 1952; government agent Obuasi to chief regional officer Kumasi, 24 July 
1953; government agent Obuasi to government agent Bekwai, 10 August 1953. 
221 ARG 9/5/2 'Petition regarding the contamination of the Jiini River by Messrs AGC Ltd', 25 
August 1951. 
222 ARG 9/5/2, GM to Chief Commissioner Ashanti, 31 January 1952 and to government agent 
Obuasi, 26 August 1952. 
227 ARG 9/5/2, 24 December 1953, Obuasi Urban Council to government agent Obuasi; 
government agent Obuasi to government agent Bekwai, 12 January 1954. 
224 ARG 9/5/2 GM, to government agent Obuasi, 17 April 1953. 
225 ARG 9/5/2, DC Obuasi to DC Bekwai, 25 August 1951; general manger to government agent 
Bekwai 2, 11 April 1954. 
226 ARG 9/5/2, DC Obuasi to Kofi Fofie and others, 31 August 1951. 
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Division inspected some of these farms and carried away specimens for testing. 227 
 Although the acting director commented, "I consider it probable that the smoke 
from the ore treatment plant is a main cause of the trouble", 228 his department did 
not publicise its opinion. Instead, another, more specialist, investigation was 
requested from the West Africa Cocoa Research Institute. 229 The final comment 
on the matter came from the director of the Ashanti Agricultural Division to the 
Ministry of Agriculture who rejected the complaints in support of AGC. He cited 
the existence of "flourishing" food crops near the treatment plant as proof that the 
PTP was not causing air pollution. 23° 
AGC carried out its own assessment of the impact of its chimney waste, 
principally sulphur dioxide, arsenic trioxide and dust. Not surprisingly they 
concluded that there was no foundation for the accusations. 231 The company's 
responsibilities in this regard would not be taken seriously until the 1980s when 
environmental protection and improvement became a precondition for external 
finance (see below). 
Deteriorating labour relations and nationalism 
The Gold Coast government increasingly investigated the labour conditions on 
mines and the duties of management toward the welfare of their African 
workers.232 AGC received heavy criticism in a report from a J. Balfour Kirk to the 
Colonial Secretary dated 29 October 1942 following his visits to Gold Coast 
mining areas. AGC's management had, in his opinion, "cleverly avoided" their 
responsibilities regarding mining health regulations and housing by shifting the 
onus to the Obuasi Sanitary Board (the precursor to the Obuasi Urban Council) 
which was a partnership between the government and the firm set up to oversee 
the town's welfare. 233 Kirk sought legal opinion from the Attorney General to 
227 ARG 9/5/2, Asst. director Agricultural Division to DC Obuasi, 13 September 1951. 
228 ARG 9/5/2, Acting director of Agriculture Division to DC Obuasi, 10 October 1951. 
229 ARG 9/5/2, Acting director of agriculture to DC Obuasi, 10 October 1951. 
230 ARG 9/5/2, Permanent Secretary Ministry of agriculture to Kofi Fofie, 4 April 1952. 
231 ARG 9/5/2, AGC Superintendent Metallurgist Office 14 January 1952 enclosed in GM, to DC 
Obuasi, 18 January 1952. 
232 CSO 19/9/37, reports from the Chief Inspector of Labour, Captain Dickinson, 1938; CSO 
19/1/72, report from J Balfour Kirk, 1942; CSO 19/1/72, Major Orde Browne's memo to the 
Colonial Secretary, 16 February 1944 and his 1941 Labour inquiry; CSO 19/1/65, House of 
Commons question on welfare of Gold Coast mine workers; Secretary of State to Governor, 29 
January 1941. 
233 The Board was managed by a committee which included the Obuasi District Commissioner and 
the AGC GM, — MS 14170/89, Morgan to G. G. Shiel, lawyers, 18 October 1949. 
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force mines such as AGC to shoulder their responsibilities. 234 While the company 
reports create the impression that Obuasi was a model town thanks to the 
company's efforts, it is interesting to note the conclusion of the Gold Coast 
Labour Officer's inspection that conditions there for workers were an "indictment 
to [sic] our trusteeship". 235 
Increasing pressure from workers and government for better employment 
conditions was felt after the war. The rising cost of living caused continual 
conflict with workers over wages. The most serious bouts of labour unrest 
coincided with falls in gold production between 1945 and 1956. 236 (For details of 
the labour unrest and management's responses see Chapter 5, Tabour'). 
Government intervention in the form of the Gorman Award for increased 
wages in 1947 and the Report of the Mines Labour Enquiry Committee in 1953 
forced AGC to address welfare. 237 The company attempted to win over the 
support of the Asantehene and local chiefs to help improve relationships with 
African staff. 238 
While the mercantile companies responded to the political changes towards 
Independence by implementing Africanisation policies, the mining sector was 
slower to react. AGC was the slowest of all, and the colonial administration 
doubted their commitment. In 1953 the highest African position in the mine was 
that of shift boss. 239 The mine argued that Africanisation was in their interest 
because of the salary costs savings, and that the slow rate of progress was caused 
by the lack of enthusiasm on the part of the Africans for English and maths 
evening classes and the basic mining school established in 1946 and 1947. 240 
 Greater efforts to Africanise would start after Independence, but even then, the 
small number of senior African staff were restricted to clerical and support roles. 
The most influential technical management positions remained firmly in 
expatriate hands until the 1980s. 241 
234 CSO 19/1/72, report from J Balfour Kirk, 1942. 
235 Report by I. G. Jones on labour conditions at AGC', 20 March 1942, Ghana National Archives 
file no. 1211 S.F. 23, cited in Stockwell (2000), p. 177. 
238 See Appendix 3; Stockwell (2000), p. 167. 
237 Regarding impact on wages see AGC annual report, 1948. 
238 Egremont (1997), p. 281. 
239 Stockwell (2000), p.172. 
240 Ibid. 
241 Interviews, Sam Jonah, London, 15 January 2004, and Johannesburg, 15 December 2004. 
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Stockwell writes that Spears opposed the political changes towards 
Independence more than any other businessman in the Gold Coast. 242 His racialist 
opinions undoubtedly affected this viewpoint. He believed that "there was no 
advance in Africa for thousands of years until the arrival of Europeans on the 
continent."243 
Spears started publishing the Ashanti Times in 1947 as a propaganda tool for 
the purpose of advancing AGC's interests. 244 The benefits of the gold mining 
industry and the importance of Europeans in it were recurring themes in the 
papers articles.245 Spears's own public statements at times criticised Nkrumah's 
CPP (he described them as "revolutionary", an "extremist" party), while 
supporting the chiefs and Ashanti interests. 246 Spears instructed B. C. Freestone, 
the Ashanti Times editor, to inform the Asantehene that he and any chiefs who 
were in favour of Anglo-African commercial partnerships had AGC's backing. 
Freestone was to put across the Asantehene's views anonymously in the 
newspaper.247 After emphasising his longstanding friendship with the Asantehene, 
Spears was reported in the Financial Times to have pressed Prime Minister 
Nkrumah for an Upper House to include the chiefs and industrial interests such as 
a representative of the Chamber of Mines. 245 Such comments suggest support for 
the National Liberation Movement (NLM) and the old African elite whose powers 
were being eroded by legislative changes. 
However, Spears was an astute diplomat. His prime concern was AGC's 
fortunes and a more credible assessment of his stance on NLM and CPP politics 
was that he had to hedge his bets. He himself stated: "The opposition of the 
Ashanti to the C.P.P. is very deep. All I would say is that I believe both sides 
realise the part we have to play in the country and our political impartiality." 249 
 And on a later occasion he added, "Both the Government and the Opposition, 
242 Stockwell (2000), p.168. 
243 Chairman's address reported in Financial Times, 22 May 1952. 
244 MS 14170/85 Spears to Gale, 8 October 1947. 
242 See for example, MS 14170/88, Secretary to Freestone, 25 March 1949 and enclosure; unsigned 
by Spears to Freestone, 4 April 1949; vol. 89, Spears to George, 30 December 1949. 
246 Chairman's address at AGM, 12 May 1950; Spears's biographer states that his support for 
Busia — Spears's "protégé" who came to lead the CPP opposition party, the NLM - stopped short 
of any financial assistance: Egremont (1997), pp. 306, 311. 
247 MS 14170/89, Spears to George 30 December 1949. 
248 Chairman's address reported in Financial Times, 28 April 1955. 
249 ibid. 
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which is strongest in Ashanti, are well disposed towards the Corporation". 25° He 
soon learnt to get on with Nkrumah. 25 ' 
As Independence neared, a major concern for mines in the Gold Coast was 
the matter of compensation should mining land be forcefully acquired by the 
soon-to-be independent government. The mining companies in the Gold Coast 
appointed an Accra Representative, Donald Sutherland, who had previously 
worked in the Gold Coast Colonial service as the permanent secretary responsible 
for mining activity, to liaise with and promote the industry's interests to the newly 
independent African government and local chiefs.252 
The operational performance of the mine between the end of World War II 
and Independence was virtually flat in terms of gold ounces produced, as seen in 
the graph below. This was due in part to the series of strikes over the period and 
the fact that a heavy programme of shaft sinking over this decade absorbed labour 
from mine production. The decade 1946-56 had been difficult both politically and 
operationally (see Chapter 5, `Labour'). But by 1957 the mine's infrastructure had 
been adequately improved to support significant expansion in output. 
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Independence and a 'patriotic' workforce 
Gold production from 1957 to 1972 showed year-on-year increments and 
improvements in labour productivity. Completion of the post-war redevelopment 
projects (in particular the ETS, CVS and the sub-vertical Outen Shaft) allowed 
lateral and vertical development. 
The appointment of Production Engineering Ltd, a mining services 
company between October 1954 and March 1957 made a significant impact on 
productivity. 253 The remit for these consultants was to improve productivity and 
reduce costs. Through the introduction of different work organization, particularly 
underground, it was possible to reduce underground staff numbers by 31.6% 
during this time. Total staff numbers reduced by 23.5%. Productivity underground 
increased by 72%, and 54% for surface workers. 254 Although African wages had 
increased between 1954 and 1957 by 17.5% the wage cost per ton and per ounce 
produced had fallen. 255 Cost control systems were introduced especially to 
monitor Sunday and overtime working. Labour control innovations such as crush 
barriers underground to monitor the comings and goings of workers were 
implemented with resistance but helped to improve worker discipline. At the same 
time incremental technical improvements were made to enhance grade control in 
mining and metallurgical results in the treatment plant. 
253 Chairman's address reported in Financial Times, 4 April 1957. 
254 Ibid.; SPRS 3/1/180 African labour productivity table, 1953-57. 
255 Chairman's address reported in Financial Times, 4 April 1957; SPRS 3/1/180 African labour 
productivity table, 1953-57. 
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Figure 3.8 
Labour productivity, 1954-63 
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Spears later described his relationship with Nkrumah as "extremely 
friendly". 256 Assurances that the firm would not be nationalised were continually 
sought. Nkrumah in fact took a pragmatic line with respect to foreign investment 
and during his government only ailing mines whose foreign owners were about to 
pull out were nationalised to save them from closure because of the consequent 
job losses.257 There came to be six such firms: Tarkwa, Prestea, Dunkwa, Ghana 
Main Reef, Bibiani (acquired from AGC by the government in 1961), and 
Konongo (acquired in 1965). Bibiani's geology made it a more marginal mine 
than AGC; after suffering losses following increased labour costs AGC accepted 
the Ghanaian government's offer for all Bibiani shares. 258 These mines were 
grouped under the State Gold Mining Corporation. Spears endeavoured to meet 
with the President once a year during his annual trips to the mine, usually every 
January/February. 
Government relations focused on tax issues. The colonial administration had 
started the trend of higher taxation for the mining sector (see chapter 6, `Capital'). 
Spear's reminded Nkrumah of AGC's large foreign exchange contributions and 
256 MS 24661/7, Spears report on visit to Ghana, May-June 1964. 
257 Konings (1980), p. 9. 
258 MS 14170/112, Secretary to GM, 12 January, cable 7 February; Spears to head office cables 
received 6 and 20 February; D. Waley, director, to Spears, cables, 15 and 20 February 1961. 
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the company's inability to raise new capital for growth because of the (in his 
opinion) "crippling" corporate and personal tax burden 2'9  The latter inhibited the 
employment of expatriate staff. The company was aware of the new government's 
growing budgetary problems and therefore it did not realistically expect any tax 
reductions. In response, AGC threatened to slow down their expansion policy. 260 
The company's UK Overseas Trade Corporation status provided relief from 
double corporation tax and income tax on dividends until 1966, when it was 
progressively removed. 
The increase in the Ghanaian cost of living affected white and black staff 
during the 1960s. The high turnover of general mine managers at Obuasi may 
reflect the living difficulties. Between 1962 and 1967 there were four. 
Spears's patronising accounts of his annual visits and his continual praise for 
his firm's contributions to Obuasi life border on the delusional. These visits 
involved meetings with department heads, consultants and the General Mines 
Manager followed by royal-like tours with his wife, 26I on one occasion in his 
Rolls Royce shipped from London for the duration of his stay. 262 His description 
of Obuasi as a "beautifully ordered and impeccably maintained" town was not 
accurate according to those who lived there in the 1950s and 60s. 263 Spears may 
have confused AGC's pristine senior staff residential estates with the town itself, 
which was and still is, as would be expected of most mining and industrial towns, 
very shabby. Konings, conducting fieldwork in Obuasi in 1975, described it as a 
shanty town. 264 Spears's true feelings for the African is perhaps captured in his 
comment concerning a local chief, "The best way to treat these people is as if they 
are children" he wrote in 1968. 265 In 1965 there were still no senior African 
technical staff, the most senior Ghanaian post being that of the Chief Welfare 
Officer and Chief Cashier. Many long-serving Africans resigned in 1965 in 
protest at the withdrawal of gratuities. The firm took this decision in order to 
259 MS 24661/7, report on AGM, 3 April 1964. 
260 Ibid. 
261 Egremont (1997), photograph 31. 
262 Ibid., p. 309. 
263 Interviews, Victor Jonah, Tema, 7 May 2004, and Reverend Arthur Garnett Prah, Obuasi, 8 
May 2004. 
264 Konings (1980), p. 18. On my own recent visits in 2004, although shabby, the town looked 
rather similar to other medium-sized towns in southern Ghana, except there was a noticeable lack 
of multi-storey buildings. This is because of the control the mine used to exercise over building 
permits: tall buildings were undesirable because of the risk of subsidence affecting underground 
operations. Obuasi is by far more orderly and cleaner than Tarkwa. 
26
5 Cited in Egremont (1997), letter to directors, 12 July 1968, Spears Churchill College 1/109. 
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reduce total wage costs after the introduction of employer social contributions in 
1964.266 
Production the following year was affected by the loss of their experience. 
In addition, output fell because of increasing absenteeism, a drop in productivity 
and a strike in December 1966 which lasted for four days. The company reports 
are characteristically mute about the details, but the strike was likely related to the 
difficult living costs combined with the mine's attempts to make savings on staff 
perks. When wages were negotiated upwards with the Mine Workers Union the 
following March the company planned to further reduce staff numbers in order to 
meet the increase. 
The main reefs worked at this time were the Ashanti (which had reached 
Level 41), Cote d'Or, Obuasi and Ayeinm. The treatment process using flotation 
tanks and roasting furnaces had not changed significantly since the completion of 
the PTP in 1947, but it was continually refined. A new metallurgy research 
laboratory was constructed near the PTP in 1964. Mechanised felling and 
transportation of timber from the firm's timber concessions were introduced in 
1964 to save on labour costs. From September 1965 AGC became the Volta River 
Authority's second largest electricity customer, allowing the company's power 
stations to act as standby. 267 
AGC's cautious and experimental approach to the adoption of innovation 
applied not only to mining technology but also to administrative technology. A 
case in point being the adoption of a computer for the accounting department in 
Obuasi. Discussions started in January 1967. This was followed by the firm 
seeking external advice from their auditors. The auditors were asked to visit 
Obuasi to assess the department's actual needs. They then produced a report on 
the competing IBM and ICT models along with recommendations. It was 
suggested that an initial trial be conducted using a rented computer. Training was 
given to internal staff and the manufacturer chosen for the eventual purchase was 
contracted to provide after-service. An accounting computer was finally installed 
about two years from the start of the investigation process. 268 
266 AGC annual report, 1965. 
267 MS 14170/121, consultant mechanical engineer to GM, 21 September 1965; AGC annual report, 
1966. 
2" MS 14170/124, consulting engineer to GM, 13 January 1967, Secretary to GM, 3 March and 28 
June 1967; vol. 125, Secretary to acting mine manager, 5 October, 29 November 1967; vol. 129, 
cable received from Obuasi 28 August 1969. 
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Extending the Mine Lease 
Spears was in Obuasi at the time of the 24 February coup, 1966. Mounting 
difficulties in obtaining import licences and clearing stores held at the docks as 
well as unpaid remittances due from the Bank of Ghana since November indicated 
to Spears that Nkrumah's government had gone bankrupt. 269 The coup was met 
with "excitement and jubilation" by the Obuasi workers. 27° Before Spears left for 
London he paid a courtesy call on General Ankrah and his deputy Mr Harlley of 
the National Liberation Council (NLC). 
The NLC were viewed by the firm as pro-West and pro-capitalist. 271 Some 
regulatory changes made by the NLC were welcomed such as the devaluation of 
the new cedi from 2: £1 to 2.86 in 1967 which reduced the cost of stores. 
Availability of sterling to AGC became speedier. 272 The NLC gradually reduced 
and eventually removed withholding tax on dividends. However the budget of 
July 1967 increased income tax from 45% to 50%. 
Following the NLC coup, plans were made to further increase milling 
capacity. The motivations for this were to exploit the outside mines which were of 
low grade, as well as the low grade sulphide ores in the Ashanti group of mines at 
levels 31-33 and Ayeinm levels 9 and 11. 273 Phenomenally high gold values were 
also proved at Ayeinm Levels 20, 21 and 29 — at level 20 the ore body assayed 
109.9 dwts for 1,220 feet at a width of over eight feet. 274 It was felt that an 
ambitious growth strategy, especially to develop the outside mines would put the 
company in a more favourable light to discuss with the government an extension 
of the mine's lease, which was due to expire in 1987. 
Two approaches were contemplated. A modest growth target of 600,000 
tons per annum and a more ambitious one of 960,000 over a 5-year window. The 
lower option was affordable; to achieve the upper option it was felt that outside 
finance may be necessary. It was a Professor Reddaway (director of Applied 
Economics at Cambridge University who acted as an advisor to the Ghanaian 
259 MS 24661/7, report on Spears's visit to Ghana January - March 1966. 
270 Ibid. Spears wrote that there was "no doubt whatever of the enthusiasm with which the new 
regime was welcomed". 
271 SPRS 3/56/4 chairman's address AGM, 4 April 1967. 
272 MS 14170/123, Secretary to GM, 30 December 1966. 
273 SPRS 3/55/3, memo from Power to Spears, 6 June 1968; MS 14170/126 consulting engineer to 
GM, 21 June 1968; SPRS 3/56/4, chairman's address AGM, 4 April 1967. 
274 SPRS 3/56/4, chairman's addresses AGM, 4 April 1967 and 4 April 1968; see Taylor (2006), 
pp. 82-3. 
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government and had also been retained by AGC to independently assess their 
mining strategy) who recommended to AGC that they should contact the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), an arm of the World Bank. 275 Two 
unexpected developments then obviated the need for external investment: the cedi 
devaluation by 43% in July 1967 (however, some of the benefits of this were 
eroded when sterling was devalued by 17% to the US dollar in November 1967 
and the new cedi remained unadjusted). Second, in the same year the NLC 
reduced withholding tax from 20% to 12.5%, with plans to abolish it completely 
over three years. 276 The sterling devaluation translated into an increased gold price 
of US$40 (from US$35) which made previously unpayable low grade ores 
economic to mine. These measures improved the firm's profitability and cash 
flows enough to allow the higher output goal of 960,000 tons per annum by 1974 
to be adopted and paid for from internal earnings. 277 This level of milling would 
produce 585,000 fine ounces of gold and it was planned that the average mine 
grade would gradually be reduced from over 19 dwt in 1967 to around 12 dwt in 
1974. 278 
Towards this target, Biocides and Old Chief mines were re-opened, the 
Sansu shaft was dewatered and the mine redeveloped. 279 Modifications to the PTP 
would be needed to handle the increased throughput as well as the low-grade ore. 
This included the extension of the crusher section, additions to the Fagergren 
flotation cells, additional Edwards roasters, the introduction of rod milling, stage 
flotation and the use of higher cyanide strengths. 28° Plans were made to modify 
and partly mechanise stoping operations and ore removal with a view to greater 
productivity, output and lower working costs. 281 Trials were started with hydraulic 
backfilling of stopes, rock bolting, and Eimco underground rock shovels. 282 
 Corresponding increases were made in haulage, shaft, waste and filling capacities. 
275 SPRS 3/57/8, memo to Spears from Secretary, 1 April 1968; Secretary to Accra Representative, 
28 March 1968. 
276 SPRS 3/56/4, chairman's address AGM, 4 April 1968. 
277 SPRS 3/57/8, memo to Spears from Secretary, 1 April 1968; Secretary to Accra Representative, 
28 March 1968. 
278 SPRS 3/56/2, 'Operations and valuation', report by Turquand and Youngs and Co, 16 October 
1968. 
279 MS 14170/127, consultant mechanical engineer to GM, 9 August 1968; consultant engineer to 
GM, 30 August 1968. 
280 MS 14170/124, P. A. Pozzoni for consultant mechanical engineer to GM, 27 June 1967; vol. 
126, consulting engineer to GM, 21 June 1968; SPRS 3/55/3, memo from Power to chairman, 6 
June 1968. 
ost MS 14170/122, London manager mining, to acting GM, 18 February 1966. 
282 MS 14170/122, London manager mining, to acting GM, 18 and 25 February 1966; P. A. 
Pozzoni for consultant mechanical engineer to acting GM, 25 January 1968; 
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Mining on the main reef in 1966 had reached Level 41, but exploration was 
underway up to Level 50. There was sufficient geological confidence to start 
considering the extension of the sub-vertical Outen shaft to ultimately reach 
between Levels 52 and 72. 283 Construction started for a loading station at Level 52, 
and approval was given to construct the mine's most advanced shaft system from 
the surface to Level 54, the Spears Shaft, to carry men, materials, ore and 
waste.284 The capital expenditure for the 5-year growth plan between 1969-74 was 
estimated to be £3.512m. 283 
In 1967, with twenty years remaining on the mine lease, and a government 
perceived to be more conducive to western private investment, AGC decided to 
broach the issue of a lease extension. Although by the end of that year the 
currency devaluations had removed the need for AGC to ask for finance from the 
IFC for the expansion programme, it was felt that it would be politically useful to 
involve the World Bank in the form of the IFC in any lease renewal proposa1. 286 
 The thinking here was that IFC partnership would protect AGC from undue 
government interference in the future. 287 
The proposal put to the NLC government was as follows. A new subsidiary 
company, either domiciled in Ghana or the UK (depending on tax implications) 
would be created. AGC in London, the parent company, would manage its 
operations and the marketing of gold for a fee of £150,000 per annum plus costs. 
Mining strategy, consulting services, capital expenditure, dividend policy, 
recruitment and purchasing would remain in the control of the parent company. 288 
The new subsidiary would seek from government an open-ended mine lease of at 
least 60 years or until the exhaustion of ores. The Ghanaian government would be 
offered 10% -15% ownership in fully paid-up shares in the new company and one 
directorship. The exact level of ownership would depend on the tax concessions 
the government could guarantee for the firm. The IFC would be sold 5% — 15% of 
the equity and also offered one directorship. The IFC would pay for their shares 
283 MS 14170/122, consultant engineer to GM, 4 April 1966; vol. 124, consultant mechanical 
engineer to general manger 3 January 1967; SPRS 3/56/4, chairman's address AGM, 4 April 1967. 
284 MS 14170/124, consultant mechanical engineer to general manger 3 January 1967; consultant 
engineer to GM, 6 April 1967; vol. 126, consultant engineer to GM, 24 May 1968; vol. 127, 
Secretary to GM, 24 July 1968. 
285 MS 14170/126, Power to GM, 21 June 1968. 
286 SPRS 3/57/8, unsigned but Spears to Foden, 10 April 1968. 
287 SPRS 3/57/1, report from company auditors, Turquand, Youngs and Co to chairman and board 
of directors, 26 February 1968. 
288 SPRS 3/57/1, 'Ashanti Goldfields Corporation Ltd negotiations with Ghana Government /IFC 
March 1968, requirements basic to corporation's case'. 
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(£1.5m for 15%, valuing the company at £10m). Valuing the company was a 
difficult exercise since a lot depended on whether the mine life remaining was 
twenty years or more if the lease was extended. AGC valued its assets in Ghana at 
£5m, and proved and probable reserves could generate £50m to £100m of gold. 289 
 The existing AGC shareholders were to be promised a minimum regular dividend. 
A critical part of the proposal was that the Ghana government were to cap all 
taxes to 50% of pre-tax earnings. Reassurances would be sought that no 
Africanisation legislation would be imposed, which, in the company's opinion, 
would risk efficiency. From the point of view of shareholders the consideration 
they would receive for diluting their shares in order to allow government 
participation would primarily be the tax concessions and minimum dividend 
promise, as well as the extension of the mine lease itself. 290 Of prime importance 
to Spears and his board was that the UK shareholders should not be worse off. 29r 
AGC's staff manager, Anthony Orchard, who spent a considerable amount 
of time in Accra as acting Accra Representative appears to have had a more 
realistic and pragmatic assessment of the political climate than Spears and the 
other directors in London. He sent a memo providing a Ghanaian perspective on 
these proposals. In his opinion it was unlikely that the Ghanaian government 
would accept participation below 15%, advising that 25% would be more 
attractive. Ghanaianisation of the proposed company's domicile, management, 
and the chairmanship would be very important to the Africans, much more than 
London realised. (An internal document confessed that London wanted "the 
Board of the new Company [to] be virtually powerless.") 292 The Ghanaian 
government would be looking for a joint venture not a silent, minority partner role. 
The management charge would be questioned and compared to the costs of 
running the State gold mines. The government would quickly calculate that the 
dividends offered with 10% ownership in exchange for tax caps would not be 
attractive, especially since they had the prerogative to increase taxes as they saw 
fit.293 
280 SPRS 3/57/1, 'Notes on proposal submitted by Turquand Youngs and Co', 26 February 1968. 
290 SPRS 3/57/1, report from company auditors, Turquand, Youngs and Co to chairman and board 
of directors, 26 February 1968; 'Ashanti Goldfields Corporation Ltd negotiations with Ghana 
Government /WC March 1968, requirements basic to corporation's case'. 
291 SPRS 3/57/1, Spears to James Raj of IFC, 8 January 1968; report from company auditors, 
Turquand, Youngs and Co to chairman and board of directors, 26 February 1968. 
292 SPRS 3/57/1, 'Ashanti Goldfields Corporation Ltd negotiations with Ghana Government /IFC 
March 1968, requirements basic to corporation's case'. 
293 SPRS 3/57/1, Orchard to Miss Maurice, Spears's personal assistant, 5 March 1968. 
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Orchard also offered some practical suggestions to be included in a new 
lease such as explicit and guaranteed timber rights and immigration quotas.294 In 
addition, AGC had for several years strongly disapproved of clauses (referred to 
as Legislative Instrument 554) in the Mines and Minerals (Conservation and 
Development) Act no. 278 of 1965. L.I. 554 gave the Chief Inspector of Mines the 
power to "prescribe the quality of minerals to be mined" and required his approval 
of all mining programmes with regard to ore reserve positions. 295 AGC felt these 
provisions dangerously removed their managerial freedoms. They were 
dissatisfied both with the verbal reassurances given by the government that the 
clauses would not be used arbitrarily and with a suggested amendment giving 
mines the right of appeal. Orchard advised the firm to insist that any lease 
extension should provide written exemptions for AGC from these L.I.554 
clauses. 296 
London's unmodified proposals were put to a formal delegation of 
representatives of the Ghanaian government and the IFC at the offices of AGC's 
external auditors, Turquand Youngs, on March 18 and 19, 1968. In attendance for 
Ghana were R. S. Amageshie the new commissioner for lands and mineral 
resources; J. V. L. Phillips the outgoing commissioner who had been in first 
contact with AGC; a Mr. Cooke of the Ghana National Investment Bank; a Mr. 
Quershi and Michael Dixon both of the IFC. AGC's delegation was led by D. 
Garrett, an accountant from Turquand Youngs, and included the consultant 
engineer, R. D. Power, and the company secretary, E. W. Morgan. 
The Ghanaians found the proposals unacceptable and withdrew from the 
talks. The package was simply not in their interest. For a start the dividend income 
from a 10% stake would need to exceed the government's current minerals duty 
and royalty income to make the government better off under this proposal than the 
status quo. But such an outcome could not be guaranteed. The Ghanaians wanted 
more day-to-day management. Furthermore, Amageshie's team did not 
understand the involvement of a third party in the shape of the IFC when AGC's 
presentation of 7-year forecast figures clearly showed that they were not in need 
of any external funding. They had objections to AGC being treated in an exclusive 
way when it came to matters of taxation and foreign exchange guarantees which 
294 thiel. 
295 Ibid.; SPRS 3/57/1, 'Ashanti Goldfields Corporation Ltd negotiations with Ghana Government 
/IFC March 1968, requirements basic to corporation's case'. 
296 SPRS 3/57/1, to Miss Maurice, Spears's personal assistant, 5 March 1968. 
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were national issues. As for AGC's abhorrence of L.I. 554 the Ghanaians thought 
the company was totally overreacting and that the appeals amendment provided 
sufficient protection for mines to carry out economic mine planning and maximize 
production without regulatory interference. The IFC were also surprised to learn 
during the conference that they had no business rationale for involvement as AGC 
did not need their money. If they injected £1.5m they would simply be repaying 
shareholders funds, whereas they had been enticed originally by the idea of 
investing in expansion and new projects. The proposal would have to be presented 
in a completely different way if they were to participate.297 
Spears was under the illusion that the Ghanaian government needed AGC 
more than they needed them. He wrote to James Raj of the IFC, "I think sooner or 
later the Ghanaians are bound to come to the conclusion that it is much more in 
their interests than in those of Ashanti to prolong the lease". 298 The more sensitive 
antennae of Orchard had rather advised AGC to take the initiative and conclude 
lease extension negotiations while the NLC remained in office before the 
elections for a civilian administration (planned for 1969). 299 But Spears did not 
want to make the first move to restart negotiations. He, rather arrogantly, 
attempted to get the IFC to instigate further talks, but the IFC declined because 
AGC had stubbornly refused to put on the table any additional offer to the 
Ghanaians. 300 Spears's attitude is captured in this comment he made to a fellow 
director regarding the negotiations, he wrote that they had been, "a very useful 
exercise in educating the Ghanaians in the facts of life. When they realised that we 
could manage perfectly well without them and that if the Ashanti shareholders' 
interests were to be safeguarded they could not have more than 10% of the equity 
in a Ghanaian company, they were greatly dismayed but could not avoid 
accepting the position."3°1 
Although the conference records noted that the March meetings had ended 
amicably, it seems some bitterness lingered. 302 It was during this no-love-lost 
stalemate that the London and Rhodesia Mining and Land Company (Lonrho) 
arrived in Ghana. 
297 SPRS 3/57/8, telex to Ghana, 'Notes on talks with Ghanaian government', 20 March 1968; 
Foden to Spears, 3 April 1968. 
298 SPRS 3/57/8, 10 April 1968. 
299 SPRS 3/57/8, Orchard to Secretary, 27 May 1968. 
300 SPRS 3/57/8, Spears to Raj at IFC, 10 April and 21 May 1968; Raj to Spears, 15 May 1968; 
unsigned by Spears to Orchard, 6 June 1968. 
301 SPRS 3/56/5, unsigned but Spears to Martin Rich, 8 May 1968. 
302 SPRS 3/57/12, Amageshie to Spears, 16 December 1968. 
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The Lonrho era 
Despite AGC's constant complaints about tax, it was making decent profits. In 
1967 AGC made pre-tax profits of £3.04m of which it retained a still considerable 
25% (£757,000). The Financial Times commented that AGC had been given a 
"reasonably fair deal even during the difficult days of the Nkrumah regime." 3°3 
The tax burden and political upheavals did not make the firm any less 
attractive to Lonrho. No doubt this interest was enhanced by the existence of a 
free gold price alongside the official price from 18 March 1968, and in 
anticipation perhaps of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. 304 
Another company had targeted AGC for a friendly merger. In May 1968 an 
approach was made by William Baird and Co Mining Company. This company, 
like AGC, had a single mining operation in West Africa, an iron ore operation in 
Sierra Leone. It also operated a metal broking and merchanting company, a 
shipbrokers, a travel agency and an overseas recruitment agency. William Baird 
hoped a merger with AGC would allow synergies in recruitment, procurement and 
African training, as well as the spread of commercial and political risks by 
diversification in commodities and the geographic location of activities. The 
proposal was rejected because AGC had no desire to increase their exposure in 
Africa which they felt would be too risky. 305 CAST had also tried to take over 
AGC but had been rejected because AGC did not want to lose its independence by 
becoming a subsidiary of the Selection Trust. 306 
Lonrho's approach to AGC was more determined. In autumn 1968 the 
Obuasi general manager informed London that there had been a series of visits to 
Ghanaian mines by large mining houses. 307 One team from Lonrho had stopped at 
AGC as part of a tour to the State gold mines, CAST, the African Manganese 
Company and the Volta Dam. AGC's Accra Representative, Foden, was asked to 
find out their intentions. 308 From his government sources nobody appeared to 
3°3 Cited in Egremont (1997), p. 310, Chairman's address reported in Financial Times, 26 October 
1968. 
3°4 A.G. Kenwood and A.L. Lougheed, The Growth of the International Economy, 1820-2000, 
fourth edition, London, 1999. p. 275. 
303 SPRS3/55/1 memo produced by James Campbell, director William Baird, 7 May 1968; 
correspondence to Spears 31 May; from Spears 23 May and 6 June 1968. 
3°6 SPRS unsigned but Spears to Foden, 9 October 1968. 
307 SPRS 3/56/2, GM, to Secretary 26 September 1968. 
3°8 SPRS 3/56/2, Foden to Spears, 27 September, 9 October 1968. 
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know anything, it seemed Lonrho's discussions had been held with the minerals 
commissioner Amageshie alone. Amageshie confessed to Foden that he was 
encouraging Lonrho with respect to various large-scale projects in Ghana, 
including a brewery in the Northern Region. Foden's comment to Amageshie that 
no foreign investor would be interested in Ghanaian mines while L.I. 554 
remained on the statute books must have grated with Amageshie since he was 
well aware of the interest being shown by foreign mining companies including 
Lonrho. 309 Foden's remark followed earlier threats made by AGC to cancel their 
5-year expansion plans if L.I. 554 was not amended to their satisfaction. 31° 
At the end of September, Lonrho's chairman, Alan Ball, contacted one of 
AGC's directors, Martin Rich. Lonrho themselves revealed to Rich that they had 
been offered the management of five State gold mines as well as an exclusive deal 
to grow all of Ghana's sugar needs. 311 Ball added that his firm were interested in 
buying AGC.312 
There had been a connection between AGC and Lonrho through Harley 
Drayton, a well known City financier who served on Lonrho's board as well as 
AGC's, the latter between 1954 and 1966. 313 Whether through their City contacts 
or from Amageshie (details of the growth strategy were not published in the 
annual reports), Lonrho had possibly learnt of AGC's 5-year growth plan, which, 
if realised, held out the promise of £10m gross revenue each year. AGC was a 
very attractive target being debt free, highly liquid and a regular payer of 
dividends.314 It was exactly the sort of 'cash cow' that Lonrho at the time needed 
to support their acquisitive strategy throughout Africa. 315 Under the managing 
directorship of Roland 'Tiny' Rowland, Lonrho had been revitalised from an 
ailing conglomerate focussed in white southern Africa to an aggressive one 
targeting newly independent black African countries with ambitious projects in a 
variety of sectors from agriculture and mining, to manufacturing and hotels. 
Although Lonrho was growing fast in terms of gross revenue (in 1968 it had 
309 SPRS 3/56/2, Foden to Spears, 9 October 1968. 
310 MS 14170/127, Secretary to GM, "we will not go on with our plans for expansion until the 
Regulations under L.1.554 are modified...If no settlement is reached in at the most 6 months time 
we would have to stop work", 9 August 1968; 13 September 1968. 
3n SPRS 3/55/4, Martin Rich to Spears, 30 September 1968; Konings (1980), p. 11; Cronje et al 
(1976), p. 54 
312 SPRS 3/55/4, Marlin Rich to Spears, 30 September 1968. 
313 Executive Intelligence Review, Tiny Rowland: The Ugly Face of Neocolonialism in Africa, 
Washington D.C., 1993, p. 37; AGC annual report 1966. 
314 SPRS 3/55/4, unsigned but Spears to Foden, 9 October 1968. 
315 Cronje et al (1976), p. 94. 
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operations in fourteen countries with over 80,000 employees grossing £100m 
income) it was not nearly as profitable as AGC with pre-tax profits in 1967 of 
£3.6m compared to AGC's £3.04m, nor was Lonrho as liquid as AGC. 
Ball's first proposal to Rich was well received. Ball presented an outline of 
their intentions: a loan stock plus shares offer versus a cash one at 16s/9d per 
AGC share (which had not reached this height since 1961); Spears would be made 
president of AGC; Rich would be offered the deputy chairmanship and Ball the 
chairmanship with Rowland as managing director). In Rich's opinion Lonrho had 
relevant mining experience, Rowland had an excellent relationship with African 
politicians and he described him as "able and decent", ideal to be Spears's 
successor.316 Spears was less enthusiastic. The loss of independence was a prime 
concern for him. Lonrho gave assurances that although they would put Ball and 
Rowland on the AGC board the mine would continue to operate under its own 
board for five years and AGC would not be merged with any other Lonrho 
subsidiary. 317 The possibility of retrieving the IFC/Ghana government partnership 
in a Ghana-based company now seemed more attractive to Spears. 318 The position 
taken by the Ghana government would be decisive in AGC's response to Lonrho. 
A week after the initial approach, Rowland informed Spears of the Ghana 
government's support for their bid for all of AGC's shares. 319 The Accra 
Representative by this time was able to add that General Ankrah, the leader of the 
NLC, had corroborated this. 37° Working against AGC was the government's 
disappointment with the breakdown of lease extension talks earlier in the year. 
The company had also been unnecessarily threatening regarding L.I.554 — 
Lonrho's eagerness to invest in Ghanaian mines confirmed government's opinion 
that AGC's fuss over this regulation had been unwarranted and imperious. In 
addition, Lonrho offered assistance with the State mines, the development of other 
industries and greater state participation in AGC than Spears had offered. 
According to Spears's biographer, it was Rowland who gave the NLC 
government the idea to end AGC's 90-year lease and replace it with a Lonrho 
lease of 50 years in exchange for 20% ownership of the new company and the 
option to buy a further 20% for £1 a share. Appealing to the Ghanaians' sense of 
316 SPRS 3/55/4, Rich to Spears 30 September, 1968. 
31'1 SPRS 3/55/4, file note, unsigned and undated, likely written by Rich, September 1968. 
318 SPRS 3/55/4, unsigned but Spears to Foden, 9 October 1968. 
319 SPRS 3/55/4, Rowland to Spears, 7 October 1968. 
326 SPRS 3/55/4, Foden to Spears, 11 October 1968. 
122 
ownership of their natural resources, Rowland offered four directorships to 
Africans and requested that Lonrho be paid a management fee in cedis and not 
hard currency. Lonrho presented themselves sensitively as merely custodians of 
the gold mine. Rowland got on very well on a personal level with the 
commissioner for mines, Amageshie, whereas the minister had clashed with 
Spears in March 1968 (and would do so again). 321  
Another version of events is that Spears threatened to flood the mines rather 
than make greater contributions to the government. Consequently, Amageshie 
made it known that the Ghanaian government were actively looking for new 
investors for the mine and Lonrho responded to this. 322 Konings writes, 
erroneously I think, that it was Nkrumah who had originally refused to negotiate a 
new mine lease. 323 But the timing is wrong: Nkrumah had been in exile for two 
years before Lonrho appeared on the scene. 
In any case, when Lonrho's formal public offer was made for the company 
on 23 October 1968, Amageshie's announcement on 24 October that AGC's lease 
would not be renewed forced AGC to accept Loru-ho's deal. 324 Amageshie 
remarked at a press conference his delight, "especially for the opportunity which 
such a move [Lonrho's takeover] would offer in the revision of the Agreement 
made with Ashanti Goldfields Corporation in 1897 which would normally have 
come to an end in 1987."325 
Spears consoled himself in the knowledge that AGC's bankers and board 
members supported the transaction, he did not have a successor and the takeover 
would resolve that problem. Furthermore, the status quo would have given just 
seventeen years of production on the original mine lease. 326 Rowland added a 
sweetener by offering Spears a seat on Lonrho's board in addition to his new role 
as President of AGC. 327 Assurances were given to the mine's African and 
European staff about job security. 328 
An unconditional offer for AGC was made on 8 November 1968. The 
original terms of 23 October were improved on 6 November when each AGC 
321 Egremont (1997), p. 310. 
322 AGC website: http://www.g-ir.com/ashantigold/culture/agchistory.jsp?subsection=3,  accessed 
10 November 2004. 
323 Konings (1980), p. 9. 
324 SPRS 3/55/4, speech by R. S. Amageshie at press conference, 24 October 1968, Accra. 
325 Ibid. 
325 SPRS 3/55/4, Spears to unnamed, 23 October 1968. 
327 SPRS 3/55/4, Spears to unnamed, 23 October 1968. 
321 SPRS 3/55/4, Rich to Spears, 30 September 1968. 
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share was valued at 20s which exceeded the share price of 18s/6d on 23 October 
and was far greater than the share price had reached at any time in the previous 
seven years, although it was considerably short of AGC's auditors' valuation of 
32s per share. 329 The consideration would be paid in ordinary Lonrho shares (one 
Lonrho share for every three AGC shares) and 71/2% convertible unsecured loan 
stock. There were 14,982,696 AGC shares; at 20s each this made the cost of the 
all-share purchase of the company just short of £15m. The loan stock option 
would potentially generate an additional £5.99m. Ashanti's net tangible assets 
totalled £4.4m. AGC had already declared a dividend earlier in the year and this 
would be paid along with Lonrho's final dividend. In addition, AGC shareholders 
would receive a special interim dividend. AGC directors advised shareholders to 
accept the terms based on Lonrho's successful record in Africa and the Ghanaian 
government's support of the deal. 
AGC would become Lonrho's single largest asset and increase Lonrho's 
post-tax profits by 50%. While AGC's share price increased between April and 
October that year by 17%, Lonrho's bid for the company caused its share price to 
surge 150%. 33° The acquisition was back dated to 1 October 1968. AGC as a 
wholly-owned private subsidiary of Lonrho was de-listed from the London Stock 
Exchange. 
Discussions then started with the Ghana government for a new mine lease. 
These discussions involved the Adansi stool. The Adansi stool had served a writ 
on AGC late in 1968 challenging the 1897 agreement along with specific 
complaints about AGC's collection of ground rent in Obuasi, the pollution of 
streams, the denudation of vegetation caused by PTP fumes and the extension of 
underground workings beyond the concession boundaries. 331 The commissioner 
for land and minerals, Amageshie, took part in these legal discussions between 
AGC and the Adansis. The government encouraged an amicable solution rather 
than a legal dispute. An increase in payments to Adansi chiefs and representation 
on the AGC board were mooted for inclusion in any new mining lease negotiated 
329 MS 24661/7, circular to shareholders, 8 November 1968; SPRS 3/56/2, 'Operations and 
valuation', report by Turquand and Youngs and Co, 16 October 1968. 
33° MS 24661/7, circular to shareholders, 8 November 1968. 
331 SPRS 3/56/2, Spears to GM, 15 November 1968; 3/55/4, board minutes, 19 November 1968; 
3/55/3, J. J. Peele and Co, solicitors for Adansi stool, to GM, 6 December 1968. 
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with Lonrho. 332 The Adansihene and his aide travelled to London with Amageshie 
for these talks with Lonrho. 333 
During the lease negotiations the contrast in attitude towards Africans 
between AGC and Lonrho became stark to Amageshie. In a frank letter to Spears, 
copied to Lonrho, the commissioner accused Spears of rudeness compared with 
Lonrho's friendliness and courtesy. Spears had apparently found the suggestion of 
Ghanaian directors on AGC's board "utterly repugnant" as well as the idea of 
paying compensation to the Adansi traditional authority for environmental 
damage caused by the mine. "You showed little respect for my Government and 
the people of Ghana", Amageshie wrote, and a lack of concern for people living in 
the area outside the mine. This was not the first time Amageshie had experienced 
such an attitude from Spears and he recalled the occasion of the March 1968 
conferences. "I wish to point out to you clearly that the people of Africa and 
particularly the Government and people of Ghana, in this day and age, will not 
tolerate this sort of disrespect and insult from persons of your type." Amageshie 
was angry enough to seek permission from his government to prevent Spears and 
his personal assistant, Miss Maurice, from entering Ghana. 334 Spears wrote back 
regretting the misunderstanding. 335 However, in raising AGC's Africanisation 
policy in his defence as proof of his good intentions towards Ghana Spears 
showed just how out of touch he was with African needs and sentiment. AGC's 
achievements in this regard were pitiful.336 
The terms of the new lease dated 15 April 1969, but granted from 1 January 
1969 for 50 years, were as follows. 337 AGC's existing lease was surrendered and 
extinguished. The parties to the new lease were the Government of Ghana, AGC 
and Lonrho. The government claimed entitlement to "the freehold reversion of the 
said premises".335 It would appear that the legal basis for such sovereign rights lay 
in the Minerals Act 1962 which vested in the government all minerals and 
332 SPRS 3/55/3, J. J. Peele and Co, solicitors for Adansi stool, to GM, 6 December 1968. 
333SPRS 3/56/2, Foden to Secretary, 10, 11 December 1968. 
334 SPRS 3/57/12, to Spears, 16 December 1968. 
335 SPRS 3/57/12, Spears to Amageshie draft reply, n.d. but December 1968. 
336 Compare Stockwell (2000), pp. 170-6. 
337 'Agreement and Lease dated April 15 1969, The Government of the Republic of Ghana in trust 
for the people of Ghana and Ashanti Goldfields Corporation Limited and Lonrho Limited', 
Lonmin, Grosvenor House, London. 
338 Paragraph 2. 
125 
waterways. 339 Lonrho's lease covered the area of "approximately" 100 square 
miles, the mines and mineral substances and timber. 
There were two parts to the consideration. The first part was 20% equity 
capital fully paid-up (3,745,674 shares valued at £1 per share) with the option for 
a further 20% at no more than £1 a share; 34° the second part was occupational rent 
of 030,000 (about £120 per square mile) per annum to be paid half-yearly. 341 It is 
possible that the government made a distinction between state ownership of the 
minerals and the Adansi ownership of the land because it seems that this rent 
of 030,000 was to be paid to the government on behalf of the Adansis (see below). 
However, there is no mention whatsoever in the lease document of the 
Adansihene or Bekwaihene. 
If the 20% dividend income in any year amounted to less than 5% of the 
gross revenue from mineral sales (the equivalent of the 1897 royalty terms) then 
AGC were to pay the deficit. If no dividends were paid in any one year then the 
5% gross value would be payable in full. The government would not charge tax 
on its share of dividend income.342 
Critical additions to the lease compared with the 1897 document (for details 
of the 1897 document see Chapter 4, 'Land') was the requirement for AGC to 
give the State Gold Mining Corporation technical guidance and assistance when 
required by the government without charge, except out of pocket expenses. In 
addition, the company had to submit within eighteen months a detailed training 
scheme for Ghanaians with particular emphasis on skilled tradesmen, supervisory 
posts, senior professionals and management roles.343 At the end of each year the 
lease terms required AGC to account for and pay full compensation for damage 
and injury to "owners, lessees and occupiers" as well as workers caused by their 
mining activities. 344 
At the signing ceremony on 15 April 1969 a marked contrast to the approach 
and tone of AGC's aborted lease negotiations in March 1968 was apparent. 
Lonrho made endearing comments to the Ghanaians recognising their sovereignty 
and the changed conditions in Africa. They expressed content at the mutually 
beneficial lease terms and berated the former AGC board for its tardiness with 
339 The Minerals Act 1962, Act 126, Laws of Ghana. 
340 Paragraphs 1, 6. 
341 Paragraph 1. 
342 Paragraphs 2B1 and 2. 
343 Paragraph 2H. 
34-1 Paragraph 2Q. 
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Africanisation. 345 The new lease was capitalised in AGC's balance sheet at 
£15.2m. 346  
On 2 September 1969 a Supplemental Agreement was concluded which, 
besides refining some definitions, limited Lonrho's timber rights by permitting the 
government to grant to third parties timber licences on AGC's concession, while 
allowing AGC to cut wood only for mine use. 347 A clause was also added 
requiring all reasonable measures to be taken "to minimise the pollution of rivers 
and water courses."348 Paragraph 2F spelled out the government's right to acquire 
land not being mined for public purposes without compensation. The government 
would also nominate not more than four (out of a possible ten) directors to the 
AGC board.349 An accurate survey and plan of the land was also demanded.35° 
The supplementary changes had been partly in response to negative public 
reaction to the April 1969 lease. Lonrho's Rhodesian connections and Ghana's 
sanctions against that country were highlighted by the press.351 A Ghanaian Times 
editorial criticised the military NLC government for concluding any agreement 
instead of waiting for the victors of the planned democratic elections. 352 Other 
grievances were over the initial inclusion of timber rights and the absence of 
protections for indigenous surface rights. It was also felt that the government had 
missed an opportunity to take over the refining and marketing of gold, indeed to 
buy AGC outright. 353 
AGC workers were also unhappy. The takeover seemed to benefit the 
company, the government, the Adansi stool — everyone but them. The mine 
experienced a severe strike culminating in riots in March 1969 when police shot 
and killed strikers, wounding others. 354 Konings explains that the immediate cause 
of the unrest was the workers' demand for some form of bonus related to the 
345 SPRS 3/60/1, "Speech for Signing Ceremony —15 April 1969', the speaker was probably 
Rowland. 
346 AGC annual report, 1969, note 6. 
347 Supplemental Agreement to 15 April 1969 lease dated 2 September 1969, paragraph 2Ci, 
Lonmin, Grosvenor House, London. 
3" Supplemental Agreement, paragraph 2E. 
349 Supplemental Agreement paragraph 3. 
350 SPRS 3/62/2, 'statement by the Minister of Lands and Mineral Resources on the new 
agreement/lease with Lonrho Ltd and Ashanti Goldfields Corporation Ltd', n.d. 
351 SPRS 3/56/2, telexes received from Foden 24, 29, 30 October 1968; Foden to Secretary 29 
October 1968. 
352 SPRS 3/62/2, n.d. but March 1970. 
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n.d. 
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takeover. Uncertainty over job security and the age-old resentment over 
management's lack of concern for welfare issues also played a part. 355 The strike 
ended when Lonrho made an ex-gratia payment equivalent to three months' pay 
(termed in the profit and loss statement as "Goodwill award to employees"). 356 
Konings and Cronj6 et al write that the Adansihene after 1969 received an 
increase in annual rent to £100,000,357 from £66. However, this is not stated in the 
lease agreement. As mentioned above, the Adansihene and Bekwaihene were no 
part of the 1969 lease. The only rent mentioned in the document was 030,000 
(about £12,000). It seems that this was paid via the government to the Adansis. 358 
 The recently enstooled Bekwaihene later made claims directly to AGC for rent.359
 AGC's response suggests that the rent in the 1969 agreement was ultimately for 
Adansi alone. The company informed the Bekwai stool that no provision had been 
made in the 1969 agreement to pay him rent and that Bekwai land only covered 
six square miles of the concession, which they were prepared to surrender as no 
mining took place there. 36° 
The £100,000 cited by Konings and Cronje et al is inaccurate. This number 
may have been confused with the 0100,000 (just over £40,000) compensation for 
environmental damage awarded to the Adansi traditional authority in an out-of-
court settlement of their writ. 361 
This payment is shown in the 1969 annual report as "Compensation for 
damage arising out of past mining operations", an amount of £40,816. This 
appears to have been a one-off payment (and not an annual assessment as 
suggested by Paragraph 2Q of the April 1969 lease agreement). Nevertheless, it 
reflects the changing expectations from the Ghanaian government of the mines' 
new owners, as well as Lonrho's greater appreciation than the previous AGC 
board of their corporate responsibilities. 
Four Africans were appointed as non-executive directors: A. Karbo, M.K. 
Mensah, A. J. Prah and Nana Kwaantwi Barimah II, the Adansihene. 362 Spears 
355 Konings (1980), p. 89. 
356 AGC annual report, 1970 p. 3. 
357 Konings (1980), p. 10; Cronjd et al (1976) p. 56. 
358 SPRS 3/62/2, 'Statement by the Minister of Lands and Mineral Resources on the new 
agreement/lease with Lonrho Ltd and Ashanti Goldfields Corporation Ltd' n.d. 
359 SPRS 3/6/2, board minutes, 20 October 1970. 
369 Ibid., SPRS 3/6/2, file note, 30 September 1970. 
361 SPRS 3/60/5, unsigned but Spears to Rich, 28 February 1969; 3/62/2, 'Statement by the 
Minister of Lands and Mineral Resources on the new agreement/lease with Lonrho Ltd and 
Ashanti Goldfields Corporation Ltd' n.d. 
368 AGC annual report, 1970. 
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found it difficult to deal with the Africans on the board. 363 For all of Lonrho's 
rapport with African statesmen he was disappointed with the new owners' 
inability to receive assurances from government concerning the deterioration in 
the foreign exchange, import licence and tax situation. 364 Busia's government that 
came to power in September 1969 imposed temporary tax increases of 5% on 
corporation tax and on machinery as well as an import surcharge on general 
import licences. Over £300,000 pounds of general and specific import licences 
requested by AGC were outstanding and delays were once again experienced in 
receiving sterling. 365 
Spears had at first been impressed by Rowland, whom he had found, along 
with Ball, "very pleasant to deal with". 366 However he soon felt that the was being 
sidelined in important decisions despite his long experience.367 Without Spears's 
knowledge, and to his irritation, for example, the consulting engineer, R. D. 
Power, had been given greater responsibility by Lonrho to give direct instructions 
to the general manger (previously he was only the conduit of instructions from the 
board of directors). 368 
In March 1971, Spears was asked to retire at his 85th birthday that August. 369 
 On his resignation he would be appointed a non-executive, ex-officio, honorary 
president for the rest of his life. Although his remuneration remained the same he 
was prohibited from giving instructions to any AGC staff in the UK or in Ghana. 
Spears in exchange was to cease complaining about Lonrho and to promote the 
firm's success. He accepted these terms, 37° but found it difficult to keep his voice 
out of executive decisions. For example, he opposed the rearrangement of AGC's 
London office early in 1972 with the abolition of the London manager role and 
the merger of AGC's and Lonrho's purchasing departments. 371 By June that year 
AGC's London office was completely absorbed into Lom -ho's Head Office 
363 Egremont (1997), pp. 310-11. 
364 SPRS 3/60/1, file note by Spears 9 September 1969; 3/62/2, minutes of board meeting, 20 
October 1970. 
365 SPRS 3/60/5, unsigned but Spears to Rich 12 February 1969; 3/62/2, minutes of board meeting, 
20 October 1970. 
366 SPRS 3/55/4, unsigned but Spears to Foden, 9 October 1968; Spear to W.B. Reddaway, 
director of Applied Economics Cambridge University, 4 November 1968. 
367 SPRS 3/60/1, file note by Spears, 9 September 1969. 
365 SPRS 3/60/5, 'secret and confidential' note, unsigned but Spears, n.d., likely March 1969. 
369 SPRS 3/63/1, Duncan Sandys, AGC director, to Spears and reply, 12 and 23 March 1971. 
37° Ibid. 
SPRS 3/63/7, Spears to unnamed, 26 April 1972. 
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organization. 372 Lonrho's set up was in Spears's opinion disorganized and the 
changes would lead to inefficiencies. 
Busia's Progress Party was toppled in January 1972. The newcomers, 
Colonel. I. K. Acheampong's military government, the National Redemption 
Council (NRC), partially nationalised AGC (see below). The delicate 
expropriation discussions gave an ostensible reason to keep Spears away from 
Ghana. 373 The final severance from AGC, though, came when Spears provided 
evidence against Rowland in a court case brought by Rowland in 1973 to maintain 
his place on the Lonrho Board. 374 A majority on the Lonrho board voted for 
Rowland's removal. Even though Rowland lost his court case, he succeeded in 
putting the matter to a shareholder vote that supported him to stay. The eight 
boardroom mutineers, including Spears, resigned. 375 
Spears's name was removed from the schools, roads, buildings and other 
areas in Obuasi town and from the mine: the Spears Shaft was renamed the 
Adansi Shaft, the Spears School the Ashanti Goldfields Primary School, Lady 
Spears Memorial Child Welfare Clinic the Ashanti Goldfields Children's Clinic, 
General Spears Road the Onyinase Road, and Lady Spears Estate the Onyinase 
Estate. It was explained to him that the changes had been requested by the 
Ghanaian commissioner of lands and mineral resources. 376 Spears, however, 
believed it to be Rowland's retaliation. 377 
Spears never appreciated the fact that AGC was not looked upon favourably 
by the populace. He was genuinely shocked to read the mines union comment in 
the Ghanaian press that "the Spears era was one of misery and suppressed anger 
which cannot be allowed to return". 378 Spears had served on the AGC board since 
1937 and as chairman from 1945. He had a romantic affection for Obuasi and 
belonged to a management era when leadership was prized above technical 
knowledge. 
AGC's performance in the first few Lonrho years was marked by serious 
labour discontent. An unofficial strike in 1969 was followed by another that 
377 SPRS 3/63/6, board minutes, 20 June 1972. 
373 SPRS 3/63/10, Spears to a Christine Mensah of the Military Hospital, Accra, 22 February 1973. 
374 Cronj6 et al (1976), ch. 6. 
375 Cronjd et al (1976), p. 131. 
376 Board minutes, GH, 25 June 1973, reference to the Ministry of Land and Mineral Resources 
letter of 9 May 1973. 
Egremont (1997), p. 313. 
373 SPRS 3/63/8, Spears to Ian Corner, GM, 19 July 1973; memo GM, to heads of department, 31 
May 1973. The GM, denied sending this memo to Spears, letter dd. 13 August 1973. 
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started on 14 June 1970 in protest at the lack of publication of the Bedu 
Commission report into the previous year's strike and fatalities. Additional 
demands were for a further post-takeover ex-gratia payment and the release of 
arrested agitators. The TUC, Ghana Mine Workers Union, Ghana police and the 
government supported AGC's management during the strike. Management made 
no concessions and the strike was broken on 5 July. The daily loss of production 
equalled 1,900 tons and 1,400 fine ounces; in money terms that was £20,500 gross 
revenue and £7,000 profit per day. 379 
Working costs per ton averaged £5.65 in the four years leading up to the 
takeover, this rose to £6.59 in the following four years, 386 partly due to the 
increased indirect taxes and the minimum wage under Busia's government. A 
further devaluation of the cedi in December 1971 helped to offset this somewhat 
as did the gradual rise in gold prices from the last quarter of 1971. However the 
first four years of Lonrho's era were less profitable than the preceding four years 
with return on capital employed averaging 17% compared to 44%. 381 Lonrho 
attempted to accelerate the expansion programme's target of 960,000 tons per 
year by 1974 by two years to reach that output in 1972. 382 This was constrained by 
the mine's infrastructure as well as frequent hiccups in obtaining import licences 
and foreign exchange. 383 Shareholders wrote to Spears of their regret of the 
takeover, expressing concern too with Lonrho's aggressive and diversified 
expansion.384 
Partial Nationalisation 
Soon after Colonel Acheampong came to power Rowland met with the new head 
of state and Major Baah, the new commissioner for lands and mineral 
resources. 385 The meeting was described as "very cordial". 386 The government's 
379 SPRS 3/62/2, diary of a strike; 3/62/5, note on miners' strike by R.D. Power, 17 June 1970; 
Power to Spears, 9 July 1970. 
3" See Appendix 3. 
381 See Appendix 3. 
382 SPRS 3/56/2, 'Operations and valuation', report by Turquand and Youngs and Co, 16 October 
1968; 3/60/1, note by Spears, 9 September 1969. 
383 SPRS 3/60/1, note by Spears, 9 September 1969. 
3 " SPRS 3/63/10, correspondence with a John Birrell, former AGC shareholder, Easter Monday 
and 5 April 1972; 3/62/3, a Mr R. Perry, former AGC shareholder from 1934-68, to Spears, 19 
March 1970. 
385 SPRS 3/63/6, board minutes, 21 March 1972. 
386 ibid. 
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chief concern was the lack of progress with Africanisation and the managerial 
centre being in London rather than Ghana. The role of the AGC Accra 
Representative reflected both of these grievances — there was no obvious reason 
why this post was filled by a European who flitted between the UK and Ghana. At 
the meeting Lonrho agreed to publish statistics on the reduction of expatriates, to 
retire the English Accra Representative, and in future to do more from Ghana with 
Ghanaians. Lonrho also made some management suggestions for the State gold 
mines to which the government was receptive. 387 
In keeping with these promises AGC released Management Directive 52. 
This created a new post of General Manager (Ghana) to sit above the Obuasi 
general manager and the Accra Representative. The General Manager (Ghana) 
would interface with the consultant engineer and London. George Cappendell, 
who had been employed by AGC since 1940 and acted as an assistant consulting 
engineer, was appointed as the first General Manager (Ghana). 388 The Accra 
Representative was replaced by a Ghanaian, David Awotwi, from 1 July 1972. 389 
 Lonrho also promptly delivered to the NRC a technical report and 
recommendations on the State mine at Tarkwa and declared their readiness to act 
as consultant engineers and to manage purchases and recruitment for this mine. 390 
 They publicised their policy towards Ghana as one that was integral to the whole 
economy, not an isolated interest in AGC 391 
Rowland and Ball travelled to Ghana on several occasion for discussions 
with the government. They had demonstrated their willingness to satisfy 
government concerns perhaps with the motive to ward off nationalisation. 
Nevertheless, on 6 December 1972 the NRC issued Decree No. 132 (NRCD 132). 
This was a fundamental tool in Acheampong's policy to capture "the commanding 
heights of the economy", 392 namely those extractive industries dominated by 
large foreign enterprises. Lonrho's mining lease was cancelled. Effective from 1 
October 1972, the company's assets were transferred to a new Ghanaian entity, 
Ashanti Goldfields Corporation (Ghana) Limited, 55% owned by the state and 
45% by Lonrho. 
3" Ibid. 
388 SPRS 3/63/6, board minutes 14 April, 20 June 1972. 
3" SPRS 3/63/6, board minutes 30 October 1972. 
39° SPRS 3/63/6, board minutes 20 June 1972. 
391 Ibid. 
392 Text of speech by Col. I. K. Acheampong, May 1973. 
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The precise details of the partial-nationalisation were to be discussed in a 
"White Paper on State Participation in the Mining Industry" which was issued 
simultaneously with NRCD 132. 393 Negotiations intensified in January 1973. The 
meetings were chaired by F.W. Beecham, deputy secretary to the NRC. Among 
the government team were the commissioner of income tax, the principal state 
attorney and the minister for trade and tourism. For Lonrho were the finance 
director, F.A. Butcher, R.D. Power the soon-to-be appointed managing director of 
AGC (Ghana) Ltd, George Cappendell and David Awotwi as well as an 
accountant and administrative officer. 394 
The government's chief concerns were the size, method and period of 
payment for the additional 35% shares expropriated; the management arrangement 
for the new company; obtaining management services; and employment 
conditions. Lonrho's priorities were compensation, the regulation of the new 
company, safeguarding their minority rights as well as the management 
arrangements. 
On the matter of management the Ghanaian team proposed that Lonrho 
should nominate a managing director for appointment by the board of AGC 
(Ghana). Lonrho suggested that the managing director should remain their 
employee to ensure his services to them after the end of his Ghanaian assignment, 
and to enable his salary to be kept secret to avoid friction about salary disparities. 
Both teams agreed that the deputy managing director should be a Ghanaian 
nominated by government, but with Lonrho's consultation. The Ghanaians were 
adamant that his role should be meaningful, someone in the line of command, 
actively involved with operations and being groomed to eventually fill the 
managing director post.395 However, Lonrho confessed that the line of technical 
communication would necessarily have to be between the general manager at 
Obuasi and the managing director who had the expertise and the experience. 
Decree 132 stated that Lonrho would be responsible for technical 
management. Lonrho were happy to do this provided that the government gave 
undertakings for the timely receipt of foreign exchange. Lonrho were currently 
pre-financing purchases until remittances were released by the Bank of Ghana. 
393 Konings (1980), p.11. 
394 SPRS 3/64/3, ' Negotiations with Messrs Lonrho Limited on the outstanding issues of NRC 
Decree 132 for government participation in the Ashanti Goldfields Limited Obuasi', minutes of 
the first meeting held on 22 January 1973. 
395 SPRS 3/64/3, third lease negotiations meeting. 
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The Ghanaian negotiators agreed that any such pre-financing should receive 
interest at the same rate as Lonrho's London overdraft. 396 Both parties were able 
to agree on the definitions and scope of a technical management agreement (see 
below for details). 
Lonrho sought minority protection from a wide array of corporate changes 
such as acquisitions, capital expenditure and dividend policy. Unlike the 
government, who had both commercial and political concerns, Lonrho's only 
concern was profitability and hence their strong demands for minority 
protection.397 The Ghanaian negotiators felt sufficient protections were available 
in Ghana's Companies Code 1963. 3" Nevertheless they conceded that the new 
company's regulations should specify the need for at least 75% of the board of 
AGC (Ghana) to agree on certain corporate changes. These were the disposal of 
assets, assignment of rights, acquisitions and the creation of companies, asset 
transfers, any purchases not made at market prices, committee appointments, 
powers of attorney, and the appointment and removal of auditors. 399 
The thorniest issue was the matter of compensation. Decree 132 stated that 
compensation would be based on the net book value of assets for tax purposes. 
Lonrho wanted liabilities to be considered, as well as assets not considered for 
income tax purposes such as the ore reserves. 400 The fact that Lonrho had 
capitalised the new lease as an asset worth £15.2m in the accounts was irrelevant 
as far as the government was concerned since the lease had been unilaterally 
cancelled. Furthermore, as the government pointed out, it would be wrong to 
include the lease value in the compensation calculation because although Lonrho 
had paid for the right to the concession that was "a right which the Government 
already has and need not pay for." 401 Lonrho argued that a better basis for 
compensation would be future profits or the replacement cost of their assets, 
rather than the taxable values. 402 At the least, Lonrho had paid £l5m for all of 
AGC's shares in 1968. The government's 20% was then worth £3m, on this basis 
a further 35% would be worth £5.25m. Besides the issue of the amount owed, 
Lonrho hoped to secure payment in sterling plus interest of 6.5% on deferred 
3" Ibid. 
397 SPRS 3/64/3, seventh lease negotiations meeting. 
398 SPRS 3/64/3, second lease negotiations meeting. 
399 SPRS 3/64/3, eighth lease negotiations meeting. 
499 SPRS 3/64/3, second lease negotiations meeting. 
401 ibid. 
402 Ibid. 
134 
amounts by making deductions from dividends due to the government in the 
future. 403 However no assurances were given that this would be the payment 
method — the government wanted to pay in cedis and at 2.5% for deferred 
amounts, and the funds would not necessarily come from future mine income. 404 
No agreement could be reached between the parties on the appropriate 
compensation amount. In the meantime a capital suspense account appeared in the 
balance sheet to represent the 35% expropriated on the basis of the net written 
down assets subject to income tax. This totalled just 07.6m (£2.4m at the official 
exchange rate) and the amount appeared in the new company's balance sheet as a 
special reserve. 405 Compensation settlement and the reinstatement of the mine 
lease would remain under negotiation for over a decade. 406 
The new company, AGC (Ghana) Ltd, was inaugurated by the Head of 
State on 26 January 1973. On 11 April 1974 a Technical Management Services 
Agreement was signed by the government and Lonrho, whereby Lonrho managed 
the mines in exchange for annual fees initially set at £200,000, and reimbursement 
of agreed costs incurred in the course of executing the management duties. 407 The 
scope of management services covered all the existing mine operations. 408 
 Lonrho's responsibility for Africanisation was given prominence in a separate 
clause. 409 Paragraph 2 stated that the board's role was to determine policies, 
capital expenditure, the mining programme and general operational guidelines. 
Day-to-day management and the implementation of board policies was the 
responsibility of the managing director and his deputy. 410 The management 
agreement and fee would be reviewed every five years. 411No taxes were payable 
by AGC (Ghana) Ltd on the transfer of assets from AGC.412 Arbitration from the 
World Bank's International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes was 
provided for. 413 
403 SPRS 3/64/3, memo from F. A. Butcher, Lonrho finance director, 12 December 1972. 
4°4 SPRS 3/64/3, fourth lease negotiations meeting. , 
4°5 AGC annual report, 1973. 
406 AGC annual reports 1972, Note 1, 1974, p.7; Rowland to PNDC Secretary for Finance and 
Economic Planning, 12 September 1984, Lonmin, Grosvenor House, London. 
407 Special Services Agreement, 20 December 1974 between Ashanti Goldfields (Ghana) Limited 
and Lonrho; board minutes, GH, 1 April and 29 November 1974. 
408 Agreement on Management Services for Ashanti Goldfields Corporation (Ghana) Limited 
made 11 April 1974, Lonmin, Grosvenor House, London. 
409 Paragraph 9. 
410 Paragraphs 4 and 5. 
411 Paragraph 6. 
412 Paragraph 8. 
413 Paragraph 14. 
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A further Special Services Agreement was concluded in December 1974. 
This stated that Lonrho were to provide consultancy and other special services 
such as inspecting purchases made in the UK and recruiting expathates. 414 The 
December agreement also put greater detail on some of the Technical 
Management Services Agreement clauses such as the timing of payments for the 
management fee. 415 
In 1974, nearly two years after the Decree, the capital situation was 
formalised. The government allocated 5,500,000 'A' shares of no par value to 
itself and 4,500,000 'B' shares to Lonrho. Both parties paid a token cedi each for 
these shares 416  AGC had effectively become a state-owned enterprise. 
After the decree, AGC's registered office was changed from Cheapside, 
London to Diamond House, Airport Residential Area, Accra. The auditing firm 
associated with the company since 1897, Turquands, was replaced with local 
firms, Tettey Ussher and Partners and Pannell Fitzpatrick and Co. The accounts 
would henceforth be presented in cedis at the official (overvalued) rate. Further 
changes were made to the board. The `A' shareholder, the government, was 
allowed to appoint six out of eleven board positions, including the chairman and 
two executive directors, one being the deputy managing director. The first 
chairman of AGC (Ghana) Ltd was J. H. Frimpong-Ansah, the former Governor 
of the Bank of Ghana. The firm's bankers were also Africanised: Standard Bank 
Ghana Ltd, Ghana Commercial Bank, and the National Finance and Merchant 
Bank Ltd. 
George Cappendell, referred to the change as a "new joint venture". 417 
 Rowland allegedly remarked, "I am totally in sympathy with this type of 
revolutionary capitalism (the partial takeover of national resources). If you have 
that, you won't get nationalization". 418 The mine was rich enough, particularly 
with a free gold market price, to provide decent minority shareholder income in 
spite of the expropriation, the cancellation of the mine lease, the import shortages, 
and the increased expenditure on new priorities such as junior (African) housing 
414 Special Services Agreement, 20 December 1974 between Ashanti Goldfields (Ghana) Limited 
and Lonrho, paragraphs 4a — 4d. 
4" Ibid.; Board minutes, GH, 29 November 1974 and 31 January 1975. 
416 Board minutes, GH, 26 July 1974. 
417 AGC annual report, 1973, p. 20. 
418 Cited in Konings (1980), p. 13, from L. Cliffe, 'Lonrho', Review of African Political Economy, 
8, Jan. - April 1977, pp. 130-133. 
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and the 98% increase in the minimum wage in 1974 followed by a reduction to a 
five-day working week from 6 October 19754 19 
With the new emphasis on Ghanaianisation statistics appear for the first time 
in the annual report showing the number on scholarships, in training and the ratio 
of black to white senior staff. 
In 1974 the government obtained the equivalent of 55% of the gross bullion 
revenue of £23m through taxes, levies, minerals duty, royalty and dividends. 
The rising gold price dictated further expansion in tonnage of lower grade 
ore. However, this could not be easily achieved - even the original 960,000 tons 
per annum target by 1974 was delayed by difficulties in obtaining plant and 
machinery, chemical reagents, cement and other materials caused by import and 
foreign currency restrictions and world inflation 4 20 Retention of expatriates and 
experienced Africans was an added problem because of the rising cost of living 
and, for the Africans, dissatisfaction with housing provision. 421 In 1975 the target 
of 954,438 tons was reached, one year behind schedule. A million tons was 
treated both in 1976 and 1977. However, further growth in output could not be 
sustained. The policy set by the board was "to mine with the minimum of costs" 
with respect to stores and capital expenditure. 422 
Hikes in the annual average gold price from US$64 in 1972 to US$595 an 
ounce in 1980 enabled the company to earn pre-tax profits up until 1982 despite 
difficulties in obtaining mine stores and maintaining machinery. The financial 
year ending in 1982 was the first since the start of operations that a pre-tax loss 
was made, despite a buoyant gold price. 423 The loss was due to failure to meet ore 
production targets, caused by the dilapidated state of mine equipment and 
infrastructure and inflationary rises in working costs. 424 
The mining strategy adopted each year was a function of the gold price and 
working costs. The rising gold price from the 1970s led to a deliberate and 
rational reduction in the grade of ore mined. 425 This led to a fall in the output of 
gold recovered, so the reduction in gold ounces alone is not an indicator of poor 
performance between 1972 and 1986. Ideally, a surging gold price should have 
419 AGC annual report, 1974, p.8; 1975, p. 8. 
420 AGC annual report, 1974, Board minutes, GH, 27 October 1973; 1 April 1974. 
421 AGC annual report, 1974, Board minutes, GH, 27 October 1973; 23 January 1976. 
422 Board minutes, GH, 30 July 1976. 
423 Board minutes, GH, 18 November 1982. 
424 Board minutes, GH, 17 February 1983. 
425 Board minutes, GH, 1 April 1974. 
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resulted in a reduction in the grade of ore mine while the tonnage of ore mined 
remained at least constant, if not increased. Such a strategy was successfully 
employed by AGC until 1976 when tonnage peaked at 1,044,576 tons. A decline 
in tonnage after 1976, however, suggests that production was below optimal. The 
completion of the Adansi Shaft (formerly the Spears Shaft) in the Ashanti mine to 
a depth of 5,400 feet in December 1974 (the largest capital project since the 
construction of the Pampora Treatment Plant in 1947) should have facilitated 
sustainable expansion in tonnage. Exceptional profits could have been earned 
from the gold price surge of the 1970s and early 1980s had output been 
maximised. The problematic supply of inputs and foreign currency made it 
difficult to increase production and there was no comprehensive capital 
reinvestment programme for a decade from 1974. 426 
The Ghanaian economy's difficulties at the end of the 1970s were perhaps 
reflected in an increase in the incidence of gold theft at the mine. 427 Two armed 
robberies at the PTP were recorded in 1975. By 1979 there was an "almost total 
absence of consumer goods" which aggravated employee relations.428 
Following the partial nationalisation, the inclusion of labour representatives 
on the board of directors, such as the TUC General Secretary in 1972 and then a 
Workers Defence Committee and a Senior Staff Association representative in 
1983, did not stop the occurrence of protracted and violent (albeit unofficial) 
strikes (see Chapter 5, `Labour') 429 
Ironically, it was under a self-proclaimed "revolutionary" government of the 
left, Flight Lieutenant J. J. Rawlings's People's National Defence Council 
(PNDC), that the most drastic economic reforms in the country's post-colonial 
history were embarked upon. In 1983 Ghana began to implement a series of IMF-
assisted Structural Adjustment policies. These aimed at creating a free market 
economy and highlighted export industries, such as gold mining, which could be 
rehabilitated. 
Rehabilitation and Rapid growth 
426 Board minutes, GH, 4 April 1984. 
427 AGC annual report, 1975, p. 8. 
428 AGC annual report, 1979, p. 4. 
429 Board minutes, GH, 26 January 1973, 19 May 1983, 14 February 1994. A major strike in 1979 
lasted from 3-16 October. 
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In 1984 the government established a Minerals Commission to oversee the 
rehabilitation of the mining sector. AGC's Ghanaian deputy managing director, 
Sam Jonah, joined a committee set up by the Commission to review the state of 
Ghana's mining laws and to make recommendations. A new Minerals and Mining 
Law was passed in 1986 in consequence. The aim of the Act was to encourage 
new investment in Ghana's mining sector as well as making it easier to make and 
distribute profits. 43° 
The Jonah era, 1986-2004 
Coinciding with the bold, national economic changes, a management revolution 
occurred at AGC with the appointment of the first Ghanaian managing director in 
September 1986, Sam Jonah. 431 Contrary to the expectation that expropriation in 
December 1972 would lead to Africanisation of management and control, this did 
not occur for fourteen years. Practical impediments were quickly understood by 
the board. For example, although expatriates were more expensive than African 
equivalents and their retention was difficult, which added to costs, it was 
calculated in 1976 that only 3% of the senior African staff had the educational 
qualifications to really allow them to advance. Of this minority there was a 
general lack of experience in comparison with expatriate candidates. 432 The 
African-dominated board responded by increasing the monitoring of progress of 
the African training policy. 433 
Prior to 1973, the highest technical appointments at AGC had always been 
the General Mines Manager in Obuasi and the Consulting Engineer who was 
based in London and would visit the mine once or twice a year. Neither had a seat 
on the Board. But following the Technical Management Agreement between the 
government and Lonrho it was decided that Lonrho would second an employee to 
act as AGC (Ghana) Ltd's managing director. From 1973 these were all 
technically qualified men, unlike before when AGC's MDs had no technical 
experience but relied on the services of Consulting Engineers (with the exception 
of John Daw when he took over Cade's MD role for two years between 1903 and 
430 PNDC Law 153, The Minerals and Mining Law, 1986. See Chapter 2 for details. 
4" Board minutes, GH, 1 October 1986. 
432 Board minutes, GH, 23 January 1976. 
4" Ibid. 
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1905). Nevertheless, the MDs were European and the driving force for mine 
strategy remained the London-based Consulting Engineer supported by Lonrho's 
Technical Department in London 434 
The Accra head office was mostly occupied with obtaining import licences 
and foreign exchange through the official procedures, as well as the government 
liaison activities of the old Accra Representative post. There was a parallel or 
duplicate management structure in London and at the mine. For example, there 
were both an Obuasi and a London office surveyor, chief geologist, chief sampler 
and personnel manager. But only those in Lonrho's London office could authorise 
any technical or operational decisions. 435 
Sam Jonah had been nominated by the new PNDC regime for the deputy 
MD position in 1982. 436 That year, AGC's' managing director, George 
Cappendell, began consultations with the IFC regarding loans for much-needed 
capital expenditure.437 Jonah, as deputy MD, participated in the IFC discussions. 
When Cappendell fell ill in 1986, it was the head of the IFC team, John Pott, who 
recommended to Rowland the appointment of Sam Jonah as MD 438  Jonah had 
worked at Obuasi for thirteen years, he was technically qualified, the beneficiary 
of AGC scholarships to the Camborne School of Mines and the Royal School of 
Mines at Imperial College. Jonah started work underground at Ayeinm as a 
student learner in 1969.439 He had grown up in Obuasi and so could look on the 
mine from a citizen's perspective as well as that of an employee. As managing 
director he would become a Lonrho employee seconded to AGC. 
Jonah's appointment represented a departure not only in his race, but more 
significantly, in the locus of management power. It was his opinion that the 
London consultants were an unnecessary layer, expensive, distracting and 
ineffective. Their periodic trips to the mine in a Spears-like manner did not help 
morale either. To align authority with responsibility he put a stop to the daily 
correspondence between Accra and London and the department heads in Obuasi 
were instructed to make their own decisions. Jonah describes a positive change in 
434 Interview, Sam Jonah, Johannesburg, 14 December 2004. 
4" Ibid. 
436 Taylor (2006), pp. 97-99. 
437 Board minutes, GH, 20 January 1982. 
438 Telephone conversation, John Pott, former head of 1TC Africa desk, 6 June 2005; Taylor (2006), 
pp. 97-99. 
43
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attitude as managers took ownership for the first time over their actions. 44° 
 According to him, it was from this time that daily operational decisions were 
taken at Obuasi with strategic decisions being made in Accra. It seems that it was 
from 1986, with Jonah's appointment as managing director that remote 
management ended and the location of power shifted to Ghana. 
Following the adoption of Structural Adjustment, the IFC were actively 
looking for investment opportunities in Ghana. 441 In 1985 AGC successfully 
arranged the first of three syndicated loans from international commercial banks 
led by the IFC to modernise and expand Obuasi. 
Rehabilitation and expansion 
In the course of negotiations to lend AGC money, the IFC insisted that the 
outstanding compensation dispute from the 1972 partial-nationalisation be settled. 
Lonrho's chief executive therefore accepted a nominal £1.7m to allow the loan 
discussions to proceed.442 The IFC demanded that the suspended mining lease be 
reinstated and that the Ghana government provide a sovereign guarantee for any 
loans agreed. 443 Once all these conditions had been met, the 1FC led in 1986 a 
commercial syndicated loan of US$45m, the Standard Chartered Merchant Bank 
lent US$40m and AGC contributed US$75m from retained earnings for a 5-year 
rehabilitation and expansion project. a44 The funds were used to improve 
underground infrastructure for the central and southern parts of the mine. Ore and 
waste haulage systems, ventilation and compressed air facilities were updated or 
built. The George Cappendell Shaft (GCS) complex at Blackies mine had been 
started in the early 1980s. It could now be completed to exploit the resources to 
the south of the property from the surface down to Level 50. Construction 
commenced for a new shaft system, the Kwesi Mensah Shaft (KMS) at the 
Justice's mine area to also reach Level 50. The Eaton Turner Shaft, the most 
northerly shaft in operation following the closure of the old Main Shaft, was 
44° Interview, Sam Jonah, Johannesburg, 14 December 2004. 
441 Telephone conversation, John Pott, 6 June 2005. 
442 Rowland to Botchwey, PNDC Secretary for Finance and Economic Planning, 12 September 
1984, Lonmin, Grosvenor House, London. 
443 Board minutes, GH, 5 December 1984. 
4" James Capel flotation document 1994, p. 21. 
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refurbished.445 Table. 3.9 and Figure 3.10 show the operations and location of the 
shafts in 1994. 
Mechanised equipment to increase productivity at the mine face (for 
example, scrapers and electric load-haul-dump vehicles) were purchased. The old 
treatment plant, the Pampora Treatment Plant was updated and a Tailings 
Treatment Plant was commissioned. The tailings from extracting gold from the 
high-grade ore mined over the decades had been dumped in tailings dams. These 
could now be economically processed to extract more gold using a low cost 
tailings treatment process. 
Sansu Project 
The Rehabilitation programme achieved its target increase in production of 
400,000 ounces in 1990, two years earlier than planned. 446 The operational 
success led to a second IFC-led project. The new goals were to develop surface 
mining in the Sansu area, exploit lower grade ores underground, boost exploration 
and improve efficiency. To treat surface ore and lower grade ore cost effectively a 
heap leach operation commenced and an oxide treatment plant was built. Heap 
leach technology involves placing an impervious lining on a suitable site, 
dumping the ore on it and spraying a dilute cyanide solution over the ore; the 
solution passes through the heap and dissolves gold in the process, the gold-
containing solution at the bottom of the heap is then drained or pumped to a gold 
recovery facility. The Sansu Oxide Plant was designed for surface-mined and 
underground ores with oxidised properties. The technology is relatively simple: 
the ore is crushed and milled, put into carbon tanks where the carbon attracts the 
gold, cathodes are used to strip the gold off the carbon (called electrowinning), the 
cathodes are then smelted to produce dore bats 447 The result of diversification in 
grades of ore extracted and treatment facilities resulted in a greater degree of 
production flexibility, increased production volumes and increased levels of gold 
recovery. Production reached 654,298 ounces in 1992. Funding for the Sansu 
Project came from a new IFC loan of US$60m, and US$33m from retained 
445 Ibid., pp. 27 — 30. 
446 Appendix 3. 
447 James Capel flotation document 1994, p. 54. 
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earnings. 448 According to AGC's former CFO, standby loans arranged in case of 
cost overruns in the Rehabilitation and Sansu Projects were never drawn on {49 
Ashanti Mine Expansion Project (AMEP) 
The IFC supported AGC with a third, more ambitious project in November 1992. 
The total costs were estimated at US$305m: US$140m provided by banks and the 
remainder from retained earnings:150 AMEP aimed to build on and sustain the 
growth trend established in the previous seven years by fully exploiting the mine's 
untapped lower grade resources, particularly underground lower grade quartz and 
sulphides and surface sulphides. Open pit (surface) production was expanded and 
infrastructural improvements over- and underground, particularly mechanisation 
and improving shaft access to allow the use of large machinery, were made. 
Although several attempts at mechanisation had been made at various periods in 
the past, the scope of this had always been constrained by the underground 
architecture. Under AMEP access ways and haulage capacities were significantly 
increased to allow fully mechanised stoping: for example stope lengths of 15m 
were extended up to 400m. 451 AMEP also provided for further treatment plant 
developments. A Sulphide Treatment Plant was designed to treat AGC's sulphide 
reserves more effectively. Part of this plant included the BIOX process. The 
traditional treatment of refractory sulphide ores involved roasting the crushed ore, 
which releases arsenic compounds into the atmosphere. A South African company 
had patented a process using bacteria under controlled temperatures, pH and 
nutrients to breakdown refractory ores. The process takes place in tanks where the 
action of Thiobacillus Ferro-oxidans bacteria feeding on the ore separates the gold, 
arsenic and sulphides. This allows the gold to be extracted in orthodox ways (the 
arsenic, in a separate process, is transformed into a stable, insoluble state for 
storage). 452 AGC was one of the first mines to use this new technology on a large 
commercial scale. The funds made available from AMEP were also put towards 
448 Ibid., p. 21. 
449 Interview, Mark Keatley, London, 17 April 2004. 
no AGC annual report, 1992; James Capel flotation document 1994, p. 21. 
451 James Capel flotation document 1994, p. 27. 
452 Ibid., pp. 37-40. 
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human resource development, safety and loss control, a cost reduction drive and 
environmental improvements. The IFC put particular emphasis on the latter. 453 
Environmental tests conducted in 1981 by the University of Science and 
Technology, Kumasi, revealed arsenic poisoning at Obuasi.454 It was appreciated 
by the board back then that new technology would be needed to eliminate arsenic 
from being released into the atmosphere. Research showed that a market existed 
for arsenious oxide which could be precipitated from the PTP's flue dust. 
Experiments for large-scale arsenic recovery were conducted. 455 Installation of a 
commercial arsenic collection plant started at the end of 1982. 456 Due primarily to 
financial difficulties this project could not be completed until IFC funding was 
allocated as part of AMEP. 457 A new department for the protection of the 
environment was established in 1991 with three environmental officers and a 
labouratory to analyse air, water and dust quality.458 Periodic reports and action 
plans were produced for the IFC, the Minerals Commission and Ghana's fledgling 
Environmental Protection Agency. 459 
Since gold is a finite resource, a statistic producers and analysts focus on is 
the ratio of output to new reserves identified each year. Newly proved reserves 
should ideally match the gold produced as an indicator of future output. 
Exploration to identify new resources is therefore an important mine operation. 
Up until 1986 Obuasi had focused exploration underground - about 90 years of 
detailed geological sampling results had accrued and this gave a high level of 
certainty on the position and direction of the main underground ore body. 
Financial constraints, however, prevented further exploration of the concession. 
AMEP funding allowed exploration to commence on the surface, along the strike 
and to greater depths of the main ore body, as well as in other parts of the 
concession. Greater use was made of more expensive but more accurate diamond 
drilling equipment. Over the years land adjacent to the original concession had 
been acquired and in 1993 a mining licence was obtained for an additional 65 
square miles, bringing the total concession area to 190 square miles. 46° These 
outlying areas of the concession were divided into separate exploration projects 
458 Board minutes, GH, 15 May 1991. 
454 Board minutes, GH, 21 January, 10 June 1981. 
455 Board minutes, GH, 20 January 1982. 
456 Board minutes, GH, 18 November 1982. 
457 Board minutes, GH, 10 December 1985, 20 February, 15 May 1991. 
458 Board minutes, GH, 20 February 1991. 
459 Board minutes, GH, 15 May 1991. 
460 65 square miles plus the original 100 square miles, plus 25 square miles acquired in 1909. 
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and extensive geochemical sampling employing a computer database commenced. 
Anomalies would be followed up with trenching, drilling and geological mapping. 
AMEP set a target annual gold production of one million ounces by 
1994/5.461 The funds allowed the latest technology to be deployed to profitably 
extract gold from very low-grade surface soils and old tailings dams. Within a 
year AMEP's changes appeared to be working: surface mining contributed 40% 
of gold production at a cash cost of about US$100 per ounce employing 800 
employees (compared to 60% of production from underground operations at a 
cash cost of US$215 per ounce using 4,200 employees). Total cash costs of 
US$173 per ounce placed the company among the lowest in the global industry. 462 
The financial year ending 1993 produced 770,410 ounces of gold. 
Growth during these three IFC-led projects was due to capital investment, 
the exploitation of previously unpayable low-grade ore sources and technological 
improvements in production methods (the increase in mechanisation and the 
addition of new treatment processes). The changes allowed the cut-off grade 
which had historically been about one ounce per ton to be reduced significantly to 
0.2 ounces per ton. 463 Growth in terms of output and productivity was impressive 
even bearing in mind the low starting point: an increase in gold output of over 
300% between 1986 and 1993, and 700% in ore output. Productivity measured by 
gold ounces produced per employee rose from 25 ounces in 1986 to 80 in 1993. 
The amount of exploration undertaken shot up from 605 metres of drilling in 1988 
to 53,000 metres in 1990. 464 
Table 3.9: Major operating shafts in 1994 
Shaft Purpose Hoisting capacity 
GCS Men/Materials/Hoisting 30,000 tons per month 
KMS Men/Materials/Hoisting 138,000 tons per month 
South 
Shaft) 
(renamed Ellis Hoisting 57,000 tons per month 
Timber Men/Materials - 
Adansi Men/Materials/Hoisting 37,000 tons per month 
ETS Hoisting 30,000 tons_per month 
Source: Ashanti Goldfields Company Limited Company Profile 1994. 
461 The company's financial year ran from October to September until 1996 when it was changed 
to January to December. 
462 James Capel flotation document 1994, p. 74; AGC annual report, 1994. 
463 James Capel flotation document 1994, p. 2. 
464 Appendix 3. 
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Figure 3.10: Schematic of operating shafts in 1994 
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Source: James Capel flotation document 1994, p. 27. 
In 1994, as part of the government's divestiture and privatisation plans, a 
reduction was sought in the state's 55% stake of AGC. Private buyers were 
investigated before it was decided to rather float AGC simultaneously on the 
London and Ghana Stock Exchanges. 465 The quickest way to have listed on the 
London Stock Exchange would have been to create a UK holding company, 
Ashanti Goldfields (UK), with Ashanti Goldfields (Ghana) as a foreign 
subsidiary. 466 That way Ashanti UK would list its shares on the London Stock 
Exchange and be subject only to UK law. However the management and the 
government were adamant not to lose the Ghanaian identity, reflecting the 
symbolism of the firm to the nation. So it was decided to list AGC in the form of 
Global Depository Receipts, that is, as an international listing that would allow 
investors from all over the world to buy, register, sell and transfer shares through 
a depository such as an international bank without having to worry about cross-
border differences in regulation. 467 
465 Board minutes, GH, 27 May 1992; Taylor (2006), pp. 126-8. 
466 Interview, Mark Bankes, AGC's external corporate lawyer, Norton Rose, London, 16 April 
2004. 
467 Interviews, Bankes, London, 16 and 20 April 2004. 
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It was during the IPO preparations that all parties agreed it would be 
appropriate to issue the Ghana government a golden share, representing ultimate 
sovereign rights of control and veto. 468 It proved a politically expedient 
mechanism to win over public support for the EP0. 469 For the flotation the 
company name was changed in January 1994 from Ashanti Goldfields 
Corporation (Ghana) Ltd to the Ashanti Goldfields Company Ltd. 470 Rawlings's 
transformed political party, the democratically elected National Democratic Party 
(NDC) expedited statutory changes needed to Ghana's laws to allow the flotation 
to proceed, including the repeal of NRCD 132.471 The government provided an 
undertaking that no past environmental liability would be borne by the newly 
named company. 472 Importantly, a new mine lease was granted for 30 years from 
5 March 1994 for the original concession area and the contiguous plots acquired 
later.473 
Organizational changes at senior management level had been occurring 
throughout the IFC period to ensure effective project management. Further 
changes were made leading up to the flotation to conform with international 
governance practices. From 1994 the MD became the chief executive officer, and 
a chief financial officer and a chief operating officer were appointed. These were 
not just nomenclature changes but reflected the internal restructuring of reporting 
lines and some responsibilities. Several committees were established: the chief 
executive's committee for day-to-day operation and strategy; a management 
executive committee chaired by the chief operating officer; a strategic planning 
committee, a finance committee, audit committee, remuneration and nomination 
committee and a charitable donations committee. 474 
The government initially sold down its 55% to 35% to allow public 
participation. It would later reduce its stake further to 17.2%. Lonrho maintained 
their initial stake of 45%, but along with other shareholders, the issuing of new 
equity over time would significantly dilute their holdings. 
458 Board minutes, GH, 15 December 1993. 
469 Taylor (2006), pp. 131,183, 252, 256. 
47° Board minutes, GH, 28 January 1994. 
471 Board minutes, GH, 19 August 1993. The amendments included the Companies Code 
(Amendment) Act 1994; The Minerals and Mining Law (Amendment) Act 1994; Bank of Ghana 
Exchange Control Act 1961 exemptions were also granted to AGC: Board minutes, GH, 5 March 
1994. 
472 Board minutes, GH, 5 March 1994. 
473 Board minutes, GH, 14 February, 5 March 1994; AGC Ghanaian Offer Mini Prospectus, 1994, 
p. 4. 
474 AGC annual report, 1994, p. 25. 
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The flotation was supported by approximately 32,000 individual Ghanaians. 
They accounted for 90% of the shareholders in number, but they held fewer than 
100 shares each, their aggregate holdings representing 0.3% of the total issue. 
Ninety-eight per cent of issued shares in terms of value were held by 47 
institutional shareholders including the government of Ghana and Lonrho. 475 
The flotation marked the beginning of AGC's evolution as a transnational in 
its own right (see Chapter 7, 'Enterprise'). Amep failed to achieve its target of one 
million ounces from Obuasi in 1995, which had been a key promise in the IPO 
marketing material. Following this disappointment, five mines in Africa were 
acquired between 1996 and 1998 — two in Ghana (Ayanfuri and Bibiani) and one 
each in Tanzania (Geita), Guinea (Siguiri) and Zimbabwe (Freda Rebecca). In 
1999 extensive exploration projects were underway in eight African countries (all 
the aforementioned plus South Africa, Central African Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Ivory Coast and Mali). 
To assist in financing the acquisitions strategy, AGC became the first 
African operating company to list on the New York Stock Exchange in February 
1996. 476 US$250m was raised on this market by the issue of 7-year 51/2% 
convertible bonds. 477  Multinationalisation achieved growth in output, but dented 
profitability as costs rose to develop the acquired sites which were not yet in 
production (see Chapter 7, 'Enterprise'). 
Financial crisis and the end of autonomy 
From an all-time high of US$875 an ounce in January 1980 gold had declined 
steadily to reach a low of US$253.20 in July 1999. While technology and 
productivity gains in mining and lacklustre retail demand for jewellery brought 
prices down, the main reason for the decline was the behaviour of gold producers 
and central banks. Producers sold gold forward which dampened spot prices and 
falling inflation diminished the use of gold as a store of value. This partly 
motivated central banks, including the Bank of England, to offload their gold 
reserves particularly after 1996. 478 
475 AGC annual report, 1994, p. 58. 
476 Dow Jones, 'Emerging Markets Report', 21 February 1996. 
477 AGC annual report, 1996. 
478 Financial Post, 1 September 1999; Business Wire, 14 September 1999; Reuters News, 14 
September 1999, all via www.factiva.com . 
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AGC had first sold gold forward following Lonrho's acquisition. A small 
amount of forward sales of gold were made for a short period before gold spot 
prices started to rise at the end of 1971. 479 AGC did not get involved again in 
derivatives until 1989 when part of the Sansu Project IFC loan was assumed in the 
form of a gold loan. AGC borrowed gold which was immediately sold for 
US$40m to be repaid either in gold or cash, depending on movements in the gold 
price, bullion lease rates and US dollar interest rates. 48° The first put options 
(contracts giving AGC the right without obligation to sell gold at a fixed price at a 
future date) were bought in the second quarter of 1990: 29,424 contracts from 
Degussa, AGC's gold refiner. 481 As gold prices dropped markedly from 1996 (see 
Figure 3.11) AGC's hedge book grew in size and complexity. 
Figure 3.11 
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Source: www.nma.org/enumerate/gold/gold.htm  
Early in 1999 AGC had estimated that the price of gold would trade in the 
US$250—US$270 region, and so designed its hedge book to realise an average 
price of at least US$355. 482 This would cover the cost of production as well as the 
479 SPRS 3/63/1, board minutes, 19 February 1971. 
480 Board minutes, GH, 7 December 1988; 15 February 1989. 
481 Board minutes, GH, 19 August 1990. 
482 Mark Keatley, 'Paper on the management of the hedging portfolio', April 1999. 
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company's financing and capital expenditure needs. 483 To achieve this, 
straightforward downside protection was obtained through forward sales 
(contracts to deliver gold some time in the future at a price specified today) and 
the purchase of put options. Out of 22.6 million ounces of reserves, 36% (8 
million ounces) were protected over the ensuing fifteen years through forward 
sales and puts. Buying puts provides excellent price protection but they are 
expensive. To help finance the cost of this downside protection 3.5 million ounces 
of gold were committed to selling call options - contracts obliging Ashanti to sell 
gold at a specified price if the holder of the call chooses to exercise its right to buy. 
On average, the premium earned on the sale of two calls would cover the cost of 
purchase of one put contract. 484 
AGC's hedge book also committed a further 7.6 million ounces 
(ultimately of its own but initially borrowed from bullion dealers) to lease rate 
swaps. The purpose of these instruments was to increase cash flows into treasury, 
in so doing this increased the average realised gold price of the hedge book. 
Under these swap agreements AGC committed varying amounts of ounces that 
converted into dollars either at the spot gold price or at a set gold price. AGC 
would pay a floating lease rate on these dollar amounts (on a monthly, quarterly 
or semi-annual basis) in exchange for receiving fixed lease rate income. These 
fixed amounts ranged between 0% and 2.25%. 485 
AGC had 85% of reserves committed in one form or another. 486 And out 
of the total amount of ounces contained in the hedge book, 36% could be 
described as pure protected ounces. 487 The remainder helped to boost the average 
realised price of gold only indirectly by primarily earning income. The value of 
these hedges was directly linked to changes in the volatility and price of gold, the 
bullion lease rate and US dollar interest rate. 488 In June 1999, with the gold price 
483 HSBC International Mining Division, 'Ashanti Goldfields Asset Performance', 6 October 1997, 
p. 37. 
48" Interview, Srinivasan Venkatakrishnan, former CFO AGC and currently CFO Anglogold 
Ashanti, Accra, 6 May 2004. 
485 Annual reports 1999, 2000. 
486 8m ounces pure protected ounces, plus 3.5m ounces issued calls, plus 7.6m lease rate swaps out 
of 22.6m of reserves — AGC annual report, 1999, pp. 21, 53-7. 
487 Annual reports 1999, 2000; the annual reports themselves distinguish between 'protected' 
ounces (as in the case of put options and forward sales) and 'committed' ounces (as in the case of 
the call options sold and the lease rate swaps). 
488 AGC annual reports 1999, 2000; board minutes, GH, 24 March 2000, presentation by Group 
Treasurer to the board on hedge book status. 
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fairly stable and below US$265, and with lease rates under 1.4%, the value of 
Ashanti's hedge portfolio was a positive US$290m. 
On 26 September 1999, fifteen European central bankers released a press 
statement declaring a moratorium on bullion sales, gold leasing and a reduction in 
their gold derivatives positions.489 The gold price surged by 20% in response to 
the announcement, peaking at US$324 on 5 October 1999. 49° Lease rates 
responded by rising to 9.9% on 29 September 1999 and remained above 5% until 
mid-October. AGC's hedge book, which had been designed in expectation of low 
and falling spot gold prices and cheap lease costs, consequently dropped in value 
from a positive US$290m in June 1999 to a negative US$570m that October 491 
In the wake of the central banks' moratorium at the end of September 
every dollar increase in the gold price knocked approximately US$10m off the 
value of Ashanti's hedge portfolio. Every 1% increase above 2% in the gold lease 
rate knocked US$20 off the US$355 target realisable price (through the cash 
outflow effects of the lease rate swaps). 
The US$570m paper loss represented how much it would cost AGC to 
honour all of its hedge contracts on 5 October 1999. Each type of instrument in 
the hedge book, from the simple instruments to the more exotic structures, 
dropped in value. But the lease rate swaps were disproportionately responsible for 
much of the depreciation, followed by the call options sold. 492 
AGC had varying credit lines (or margin free limits) with each hedge bank, 
totalling US$300m in the aggregate. The banks demanded the difference between 
the negative US$570m mark-to-market valuation of the hedge book on 5 October 
and the US$300m permitted credit, that is, they demanded US$270m in margin 
calls. AGC had US$70m in available cash. 493 AGC's liquidity position was 
already vulnerable because of high debt servicing obligations accrued in the 
growth phase. There had also been an industrial strike in May 1999 that lasted for 
twelve days and reduced revenue and cash flow for the second quarter. The 
development of a gold mine in Tanzania (the Geita mine) and weather-related 
489 'Gold Surges on Pledge of Central Bank Sales Restraint', Agence France-Presse, 27 September 
1999, via www.factiva.com . 
490 The closing gold price on the trading day before the announcement was $268.40. 
491 AGC annual report, 1999, Chief Executive's Review. 
492 Ibid. See also, Christopher L. Gilbert, 'Derivatives: Use and Abuse', Inaugural lecture given at 
the Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, 26 October 2000, p. 13. 
492 Interview, Venkatakrishnan, Accra, 6 May 2004. 
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operational problems at the mine in Siguiri in Guinea further contributed to the 
lack of liquidity. 494 
The inability to satisfy the hedge banks put the company in breach of its 
other debt contracts. At the worst point of the crisis, total debt, including the 
US$570m hedge losses, came to just under US$lbn.495 Any of AGC's creditors 
could have foreclosed, forcing the company into bankruptcy. The share price 
dropped from US$7.27 prior to the central bank announcement in September to an 
intraday low of US$1.62 during the crisis. 
By February 2000 an agreement was reached with the company's 23 
revolving credit facility bankers and seventeen derivatives counterparties to 
provide margin-free trading for three years in exchange for warrants over 15% of 
the firm's equity. 496 These warrants could be exchanged for ordinary shares at a 
price of US$3 per share within a 5-year time frame. As part of the deal, AGC 
obtained a loan of US$l 00m to bring Geita into production. Conditions were 
attached to the solutions package. Governance changes to strengthen the board's 
supervision were requested: most critically a new chief financial officer and 
treasurer were appointed. A new Risk Management Committee and Corporate 
Governance Committee were set up. No dividends were permitted for three years. 
AGC's future borrowing and hedging policy needed the approval of the banks. 
The company was also forced to sell 50% of Geita to reduce its overall gearing. 
Anglogold, the South African gold mine company created from Anglo-
American's gold interests in 1998, won the bid paying US$335m (considerably 
exceeding AGC's valuation of US$200-250m). 497 Other factors that promoted 
Anglogold rather than competing bidders were that Anglogold offered a 
deadlocked joint venture, that is, equal management control over Geita. In 
addition, the South African company had a significant presence in other parts of 
Africa, like AGC. 498 A good working relationship was established between the 
two companies. 
The banks demanded as part of the package a change in hedging policy. The 
main elements of the new policy were to continue price protection but with 
494 AGC annual report, 1999. 
4" Ibid. 
496 AGC annual reports 1999, 2000. There were in fact nineteen derivatives counterparties, but two 
of these did not impose any margin limits on AGC, and therefore, were not owed anything. 
497 Board minutes, GH, 22 February 2000. 
499 Board minutes, GH, 24 March, 4 April 2000; Taylor (2006), pp. 229-30. 
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simpler instruments, strengthened supervision, and decreasing levels of committed 
ounces 499 
AGC's balance sheet remained weak even after the 50% sale of Geita in 
2000 largely because of the outstanding bond debt issued in New York in 1996. 
This amounted to US$216m and would mature in March 2003. In 2002 the 
balance sheet was restructured through a private equity placement with Lonrho 
raising US$75m. The bankers were also encouraged to exercise their warrants 
over the 15% of AGC's equity, which raised US$45m. AGC refinanced their 
existing bank debt with a new US$200m facility on softer and more flexible terms. 
With these funds totalling US$320m the US$216m outstanding bonds were 
redeemed at par and in cash, and US$70m of old bank debt was repaid, leaving a 
balance of US$34m for working capita1. 50° Gross gearing consequently fell to a 
manageable 53% in 2003 from a peak of 164% in 2000. 5°1 AGC's share price 
responded by breaching US$6. In 2002 AGC's hedge bank partners, satisfied with 
the financial rehabilitation of the firm, agreed to extend margin-free trading 
indefinitely. 502 
As a result of the successful working relationship with Anglogold at Geita, 
and also because the future development of Obuasi required mining at levels 
below 5,000 feet with different technological and capital requirements, merger 
talks with Anglogold, deep level mining experts, commenced late in 2002. 
Geology tests at Obuasi below Level 50 revealed ore with assay values of 56 
grammes per tonne, compared with average values of 8 grammes per tonne above 
Level 50. 503 These valuable prospects at depth had first been indicated in the late 
1960s when approval was given for the construction of the Spears shaft. At that 
time there were exploration plans to test down to level 72. 504 The structural 
engineering, ventilation and refrigeration equipment and skills needed to mine to 
Level 100 (approximately 10,000 feet below the surface) were beyond AGC's 
means.505 Besides these operational motives to find a strategic partner, the gold 
industry was in the process of consolidation in response to rising costs and a need 
for rationalisation. Out of 26 major gold mining companies existing in 1997 only 
499 Board minutes, GH, 3 February 2000, 
5(3° AGC annual report, 2002, Financial Review; Taylor (2006), pp. 244-7. 
3°1 Appendix 3. 
502 AGC annual report, 2002, Financial Review. 
503 Board minutes, GH, 23 April 2001, 27 May 2002. 
504 MS 14170/122, consultant engineer to GM, 4 April 1966; vol. 124, consultant mechanical 
engineer to general manger 3 January 1967; SPAS 3/56/4, chairman's address AGM, 4 April 1967. 
505 Interview, Joe Amanor, Geology Manager, Obuasi, 29 March 2005. 
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thirteen remained in 2002. A few had gone bankrupt but most had been 
absorbed. 506 AGC was the smallest of the world's senior producers by market 
capitalisation to remain independent. Prior to the crisis, AGC had attempted a 
takeover of Lonmin (Lonmin was created from the separation of Lonrho's mining 
and non-mining activities), but the financial crisis had put a halt to that (see 
Chapter 7, `Enterprise'). 507 
On 17 April 2003 Anglogold offered, in an all paper transaction, 26 
Anglogold shares for 100 AGC shares. This valued the company at US$1bn, 
equivalent to US$7.20 per share and representing a 43.9% premium on the closing 
share price of the day before. 508 This was in line with recent premiums paid in the 
acquisition of Acacia by Anglogold, Battlemountain by Newmont and Homestake 
by B arrick.5°9 
A rival bid for the company was then made by Randgold. On 23 September 
they offered one Randgold share to two AGC, or US$11.14 per AGC share 
(US$1.5bn in total). 51° Anglogold responded with an improved share ratio of 
29:100, valuing AGC at US$1.43bn, intentionally below Randgold's. 511 Randgold 
increased their offer to the equivalent of US$12.57 per share or US$1.7bn. 512 
 However, the board continued to recommend Anglogold's offer on the basis that 
their expertise and cash flow could meet the long-term development of the Obuasi 
`Deeps' despite Randgold's offer of a higher initial purchase price. 513 
Based on advice from Soci6t6 Generale and a parliamentary committee 
established to consult with the firm, as well as the ministry of mines, the 
Environmental Protection Agency, the Bank of Ghana and the Mine Workers' 
Union, the government of Ghana released a public statement on 28 October in 
support of the board's recommendation for a merger with Anglogold. 514 
The government considered the merger proposal from its dual role as a 
shareholder and as a regulator. As a shareholder, Anglogold had offered the 
government an additional 1% of the merged entity, to be called Anglogold 
5°6 C1BC report on refinancing options, Board minutes, GH, 27 July 2001. 
507 Taylor (2006), pp. 154-5, 172, 183-4; see Chapter 7, 'Enterprise'. 
508 Board minutes, GH, 17 April 2003, and AGC Press Release, 5 August 2003. 
509 Board minutes, GH, 12 February 2003. 
500 Board minutes, GH, 14 October 2003. 
511 Times Online, 15 October 2003 and FT.com , 16 October 2003. 
512 Board minutes, GH, 27 October 2003; Dow Jones Newswire, 14 October 2003, via 
www.factiva.com . 
513 Board minutes, GH, 14 October 2003. 
514 Ministry of Information Press Release 28 October 2003; Daily Graphic, Ghana, 28 October 
2003. 
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Ashanti. In exchange for this, the golden share would be limited to the Ghanaian 
assets and liabilities. This 1% represented an additional 2.6m shares on top of the 
government's 6.3m shares for its existing 17.2% ownership of AGC. The 
government's total stake in the new company would be 3.4%. The additional 
shares were worth US$100m on 28 October, and likely to appreciate. If 
Anglogold paid the same dividend rate as they had in 2002 then the government 
would earn US$llm, which would be the highest dividend ever paid to the 
government in Ghana's mining history. Furthermore, Anglogold had committed to 
spend US$220m on the existing Obuasi mine in the first four years, US$44m on 
exploration of the Obuasi Deeps, and thereafter, depending on the exploration and 
feasibility studies, US$570m on the development of the Deeps. 515 
As a regulator, the government was satisfied with Anglogold Ashanti's 
promises not to implement new job cuts in the first two years. If expansion plans 
at Obuasi were achieved it was envisaged that more jobs would be created in the 
future. The merged entity would designate 1% of Ghanaian profits for community 
works in Ghana, and commitments were given to expand training, health and 
safety initiatives. Corporate tax revenue stood to increase with Obuasi's growth. 
The new company's listing on the Ghana Stock Exchange and the creation of low 
denomination depositary securities especially for the small Ghanaian investor met 
with approval too. 516 
On 12 February 2004 the Ghanaian Parliament ratified a stability 
agreement between the government and Anglogold Ashanti. It was agreed to 
extend Obuasi's mine lease from 2024 to 2054, and to cap Anglogold Ashanti's 
royalties at 3% and corporation tax at 30% for fifteen years. The company would 
be exempt from any adverse changes in laws affecting its operations. It would be 
allowed to retain foreign currency offshore without any restrictions on dividend 
payments. 517 Other legal approvals from the Ministers of Mines and Finance, the 
Bank of Ghana, and the Ghana Stock Exchange were also required and obtained. 
Significant opposition to the merger and AGC's consequent loss of 
autonomy was expressed by some politicians, parts of the media and members of 
the public in Ghana. Mine employees were concerned about their job security as 
well as the imposition of a South African culture on the firm. AGC implemented 
515 Details for the foregoing paragraph taken from Parliamentary Debates, 12 February 2004, Col. 
1120. 
516 Ibid. 
s ' 7 Ibid. 
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an intensive public relations campaign to convey the merits of the proposal, 
stressing Anglogold's expertise and wealth that would extend the Obuasi mine's 
life.518 
On 26 April 2004 the Ghana High Court announced the cancellation of all 
Ashanti Goldfields Company Ltd shares, their reissue to Anglogold Holdings Plc, 
and the creation of Anglogold Ashanti, through a scheme of arrangement (that is 
on the basis of a minimum of 75% of shareholders approving the merger). 
Summary 
Between 1897 and 1968 AGC can be described as a free-standing British 
company with its bi-national, single sector operation. 519 However, unlike many of 
the company's Victorian contemporaries AGC did not start operations with an 
inflated capital base suggestive of fraudulent or self-seeking founding directors. It 
did not have a market reputation for being overly capitalised. 520 A maiden 
dividend was paid remarkably quickly and the regularity of dividend payments for 
most of the company's history showed a genuine shareholder-focus (explored in 
detail in Chapter 6, `Capital'). The head office was not just a "brass nameplate": 
in fact the premises were moved several times to accommodate the growing 
administration needed for the mine. 521 While other free-standing companies failed 
to evolve appropriate management structures AGC, both at the mine and in 
London, quickly established roles of responsibility, such as the London 
commercial manager and departmental managers in Obuasi. The firm also 
internalised external expertise. Crucially, the role of the consultant engineer, 
starting with W. R. Feldtmann, was brought in-house. The company availed itself 
of outsider expertise where necessary, particularly from South Africa. This was 
seen in the early cyanidation and flotation experiments. The firm kept abreast of 
industrial research through personal networks with international gold mines and 
518 Taylor (2006), pp. 256-7; 'Project Horoscope Q&A', AGC media crib concerning the proposed 
merger with Anglogold, Gold House, 2003. 
519 M, Wilkins, 'The Free-standing company, 1870-1914: an important type of British foreign 
direct investment', Economic History Review, 41, 1988, p. 262. 
528 SPRS 3/1/36, enclosure in Argenti Sechiari and Co to Spears, 26 July 1945. 
521 From incorporation until the Lonrho takeover AGC's head office moved from Aldermanbury 
Postern to larger premises in New Broad Street, Southampton Street, Old Jewry and then London 
Wall. 
156 
subscriptions to relevant journals. 522 General managers and consulting engineers 
visited other mines in the country and abroad to learn about different operation 
techniques and equipment. 523 These characteristics help to explain AGC's 
profitability and longevity which were atypical of the experience of most free-
standing companies. 524 
Much of AGC's history was characterised by poor labour relations, lack of 
corporate responsibility and racism. Changes in the last two areas started to occur 
from 1969, and not from Independence in 1957. The firm never satisfactorily 
resolved its tensions with the workforce and experienced strikes in every decade, 
often protracted and violent. Significant transformations in the management 
structure and control emerged as late as 1986. Ownership changes in 1972 failed 
to materially alter the existing chain of power. Change in this regard eventually 
came from within the firm; it could not be foisted upon it, even by rule of law, and 
it was practically constrained by the lack of qualified African personnel. Sam 
Jonah, thanks to his unique set of 'identities' not only as a Ghanaian, but as one 
brought up in Obuasi, as a career mine engineer, as a Lonrho employee (following 
his appointment as managing director), and as a personal friend of prominent 
members of the Rawlings administration, 525 was able to execute corporate 
changes on an unprecedented level. 
The ability to generate decent revenues despite changing industrial and 
national economics was partly due to Obuasi's geological good fortune. Putting 
luck aside, Part Two analyses the smartness of management decisions made by 
looking into four critical aspects of the business: land, labour, capital and 
enterprise. 
522 There are many examples, including: MS 14164/6, minutes 9 December 1924 (regarding new 
Canadian metallurgical research); MS 14170/70, New Consolidated Goldfields to GWE Turner, 24 
March 1939 and Turner to GM, 28 March 1939 (new reagents available in USA); vol. 75, 
Secretary to mine manager, 4 and 12 December 1941 (the Albert Silver process); vol. 97, 
consulting engineer to GM, 4 December 1953 (research on long hole drilling); vol. 98, consulting 
engineer to GM, 22 January 1954 (research on new ion exchange process); vol. 116, consulting 
engineer to GM, 26 February 1963 (on melting gold electronically); vol. 117, Secretary to GM, 14 
August 1963 (subscription to Mine Ventilation Society of South Africa), 
523 See for example, MS 14164/7, minutes 28 January 1930; MS 14170/61, directors to GWE 
Turner, 9 February and 8 March 1932; vol. 79, Turner to GM, 8 September 1944; vol. 116, 
consulting engineer to GM 31 May 1963. 
524 Compare Wilkins (1988), pp. 263, 264, 271, 275. 
525Taylor (2006), pp. 101-2, 122-3. 
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Timeline of key events in AGC's history 
1895 Cade's agreements with Biney, Ellis and Brown, the Bekwaihene and 
Adansihene. 
1897 Incorporation of the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation. Concession 
agreement concluded between Governor Maxwell, the Cote D'Or 
Company, the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation, and Biney, Ellis and 
Brown 
1898 Mining starts at Obuasi 
1900 Maiden dividend paid 
1903 Cade's death 
1904 Successful adoption of cyanidation 
1909 Commissioning of the Central Treatment Plant 
1927 Purchase of Bibiani mine 
1930 J. H. Batty's appointment as chairman 
1933 Elm gross revenue reached 
1935 First flotation experiments 
1937 Elm pre-tax profit reached 
1945 Spears appointed chairman 
1947 Pampora Treatment Plant commissioned 
1950 Spears appointed managing director 
1955 Eaton Turner Shaft completed to Level 42 
1961 Sale of Bibiani mine to Ghana government 
1968 Lonrho takeover 
1969 New mine lease granted 
1972 Partial nationalisation, cancellation of mine lease and creation of AGC 
(Ghana) Ltd 
1974 Adansi Shaft commissioned 
1976 lm tons milled 
1982 First ever pre-tax loss recorded 
1984 Partial nationalisation compensation settled and suspended mining lease 
reinstated 
1986 Jonah appointed managing director; Rehabilitation and Expansion Project 
started 
1987 George Cappendell Shaft commissioned 
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1989 Sansu Project started 
1990 Tailings Treatment Plant and Heap Leach Plant commissioned 
1992 Ashanti Mine Expansion Project started; Arsenic Recovery Plant installed 
at PTP 
1993 Sulphide Treatment Plant with the Biox process commissioned 
1994 New company name, Ashanti Goldfields Company Ltd, and new mine 
lease granted; flotation on the London and Ghana Stock Exchanges; 
commissioning of Kwesi Mensah Shaft 
1995 10m tons of ore milled 
1996 New York Stock Exchange listing; acquisition of Freda Rebecca, Ayanfuri, 
Bibiani, Siguiri and Geita mines; lm fine gold ounces produced 
1998 20m tons of ore milled 
1999 Financial crisis 
2000 Sale of 50% of Geita to Anglogold; PTP decommissioned 
2002 Balance sheet restructuring concluded 
2004 Anglogold takeover 
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CHAPTER 4: LAND 
THE SECURITY OF THE ASHANTI GOLDFIELDS CONCESSION 
AGREEMENT OF 3 JUNE 1897 
The purpose of this chapter - is to examine the 3 June 1897 concession agreement 
which was the legal basis of AGC's operations until 1 January 1969. The mineral 
rights therein were not the subject of as much debate as were the much less 
valuable surface rights and other native rights mentioned in the Agreement which 
were repeatedly questioned by Africans, European traders and government 
administrators alike. Changes in colonial personnel 'on the spot' and the absence 
of clear legal direction from London contributed to ambivalent and inconsistent 
interpretations of the 1897 Agreement. It was in the interest of neither the British 
government nor the company to seek a conclusive legal ruling on the validity of 
the Agreement or to obtain amendments to clarify AGC's rights because of the 
financial sums at stake: the government's royalty payments and AGC's 
profitability. Contrary to property rights theory it is seen that clearly defined 
rights were not in practice as important as the company's behaviour in defence of 
their perceived rights, the establishment of a corporate custom, and political 
inertia. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Two key tenets of property rights theory are 
stated as a useful test for the historical experience of AGC. The contents of the 
1897 Agreement and the ambiguities in the contract are then discussed. (The 
complete agreement can be found in Appendix 10). This is followed by an 
account of the problems and protests that arose over time concerning AGC's 
security of title in relation to the rights of others to occupy, farm, trade, and even 
to mine on AGC's concession where the firm was not actively conducting 
operations. I 
Property rights theory suggests that: 
I ARG7/5/68, Acting Colonial Secretary to Acting Chief Commissioner Ashanti, 10 October 1923; 
see also AGC general mines manager (GM) to DC, 19 May 1904; and ARG7/5/68, Acting 
Colonial Secretary to Acting Chief Commissioner Ashanti, 10 October 1923. 
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1) to maximise private gain title holders will attempt to increase and enforce 
the exclusivity of their property rights, and 
2) well defined property rights are critical for the promotion of economic 
activity. 2 
Property rights from an economic perspective are broader than formal legal rights. 
AGC's concession agreement of 1897 as a formal, legal document was therefore 
only one dimension, although a fundamentally important one, of their claim to 
property rights. Other factors that would affect the security of their title included 
the existing land legislation, the actions of government, the establishment of habit, 
or path dependence based on AGC's own behaviour. The discussion below 
assesses all these dimensions with a view to test the theoretical statements above 
in order to determine just how secure AGC's property rights were. 
The 1897 Agreement 
On 3 June 1897 after extensive discussions in London (see Chapter 3) an 
agreement was signed, with the approval of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
Joseph Chamberlain, ratifying Cade's 1895 transactions. There were four parties 
to the Agreement: first, the governor of the Gold Coast Colony, Si William 
Edward Maxwell; second, the African entrepreneurs, Biney, Ellis and Brown; 
third, the Cote D'Or Company that had financed Cade's initial expedition; and 
fourth, the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation, a better capitalised company, newly 
formed to take over Cote D'Or's interests. 
In order for Cade to be confident of the security of the transfer of the 
concession held by Biney, Ellis and Brown and originally granted to the Africans 
by the King of Bekwai on 3 March 1890, he had written three separate but related 
agreements during his 1895 expedition. On 1 August 1895 he made the Africans 
confirm their title by signing a new agreement with the King of Bekwai. On 15 
August 1895 he got the Africans to enter into an agreement with the King of 
Adansi realising that the 1890 concession also covered Adansi land. Cade then 
followed this with a third agreement between himself, on behalf of the Cote D'Or 
Company, and Biney, Ellis and Brown dated 27 August 1895. 
hi the second paragraph of the 1897 Agreement the original contract 
between the Africans and the Bekwaihene granted on 3 March 1890 is described 
Eggertsson (1990), pp. 35, 40. 
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as an "Indenture" paying a yearly rent of £100. This was increased to £133 on 1 
August 1895. The 15 August 1895 agreement with the Adansihene allowed for an 
annual rent of £66. The agreements between the Africans and chiefs dated 3 
March 1890, 1 August 1895 and 15 August 1895 were referred to collectively by 
the British government as "the Concessions". 
On 27 August 1895 Biney, Ellis and Brown sold these Concessions on to 
Cade's Cote d'Or Company. The 1897 Agreement goes on to say that it was 
Biney, Ellis and Brown and the Cote D'Or company who invited the Governor of 
the Gold Coast to enter into a new agreement with them. The justification given 
for this was that the territories of Bekwai and Adansi had come under British 
protection. Interestingly, the Governor did not use his authority to validate the 
Concessions. Rather, the seventh paragraph of the 1897 Agreement reads, 
Whereas the Governor does not admit the validity of the Concessions or 
any of them but has in exercise of his authority agreed at the request of the 
said parties...to authorise the Company [AGC] to occupy the said land as 
being part of the unoccupied lands of the said Protectorate. 
In other words, the British Government was granting fresh and new authority for 
AGC to use the land based on the principle that it was 'unoccupied land' and by 
inference that the Governor, on behalf of the Queen, 3 held legal rights to 
`unoccupied land'. 
The Concessions agreed in 1890 and August 1895 were surrendered and 
cancelled. A new agreement, new rights, and new authority to occupy the area 
was then granted by the British government for 90 years from 1 January 1897. 
The boundaries of the 100 square mile plot were described. Without any formal 
survey it must be pointed out that the exact physical limits of the plot could only 
be estimated diagrammatically. Due to the measurement costs the exact 
boundaries of AGC's 100 square miles were not delineated even as late as 1969. It 
was seen in Chapter 3 how this later gave rise to disputes with local chiefs and 
rival concessionaires. 
The remainder of the 1897 Agreement consisted of seventeen conditions 
for AGC to comply with, of which the following are noteworthy. Condition 1 was 
financial. AGC were to pay 5% gross royalty to the colonial government and £133 
3 See paragraph 6 of the Agreement. 
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per annum to the Bekwaihene and £66 to the Adansihene via the Colonial 
Treasurer. Condition 2 set the scope of AGC's activities. These were broad 
enough to be described as the grant of an 'imperium in imperio' because the 
Agreement allowed for mining operations in addition to trading and the 
cultivation of agricultural goods. 4 To these ends the company could build 
townships and fell timber and "use any waters". These powers were then laid 
subject to a very broad and undefined concept of existing African rights: 
This Agreement is to be subject in every respect to the existing rights of 
any native or natives in respect of the said land or any part thereof and 
accordingly every operation hereby authorised must be conducted so as in 
no way to affect or interfere with any such rights. 
The governor retained rights in Condition 3e to take possession of any land 
needed for public works. There was an obligation imposed on AGC to employ at 
least one native per acre of the land used for mining purposes. 5 Although given 
water rights, AGC were ordered not to foul any waterways. 6 Within the scope of 
Condition 2 the company was permitted to under-lease.7 Written consent from the 
governor could be sought to permit activities not expressly mentioned in the 
Agreement. 8 
The 1897 Agreement covered both AGC's private rights as well as the 
communal rights of natives and, to a lesser extent, the government's rights. The 
coexistence of different types of ownership rights (private, communal and state) is 
not unusual, however with respect to the company's private rights and those of the 
Africans in particular, the document lacked clarity and specification. It is easy to 
see how the ill-defined partitioning of different rights held by different agents to 
the same plot of land could give rise to future problems. 
Before assessing the specific ambiguities of the 1897 Agreement it would 
be useful to understand the state of Ashanti land law at the time. 
4 D. Kimble, A Political History of Ghana: the Rise of Gold Coast Nationalism, 1850-1928, 
Oxford, 1963, p. 24. 
5 Condition 8. 
6 Condition 9. 
7 Condition 11 
8 Condition 10. 
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The indigenous land tenure system and the state of land law in Ashanti and the 
Gold Coast at the end of the 19 th century 
No land legislation had been passed by the British for Ashanti by June 1897. 
Following the invasion of Kumasi in 1896 and the removal of Ashanti's central 
authority structure there was a period of confusion regarding land rights. 9 The 
critical question was whether Ashanti lands, and not just Kumasi, now belonged 
to the British government or remained in the hands of private, indigenous owners. 
In other words, could the government grant concessions or simply recognise those 
obtained from African owners? Governor Maxwell's initial actions show that in 
his mind he had personally replaced the Asantehene as paramount chief with 
direct dominion over Kumasi as well as Ashanti's wider territories. 10 Maxwell had 
instructed the Kumasi Resident on 10 February 1896, just weeks after the invasion, 
not to recognise any concession in any part of Ashanti "but that every concession 
to be valid must be sanctioned by the Governor, and he caused all the kings of 
Ashanti to be warned that they must not grant any rights without the Governor's 
authority." 11 Maxwell also wrote to Chamberlain advising that the British "assert 
exclusive control over the mining lands". 12 
Maxwell had a particular vision for the gold industry involving a handful 
of very large, "really powerful" companies with rights over whole regions such as 
Ashanti and Wassaw. 13 These companies would be given tax collection powers on 
behalf of government and be made responsible for constructing roads and towns. 
Another aspect of this oligopolistic scheme would be that land owners would 
receive rent but none of the tax revenue nor company profits. These ideas must 
have influenced the negotiations between Cade and the government that 
culminated in the 3 June 1897 Agreement. 
In addition to the AGC agreement, Governor Maxwell personally made 
another direct concession of land to a certain Mr Russe11. 14 This set a regrettable 
precedent for the Colonial Office that other concessionaires would later attempt to 
9 Hamilton (1978), p. 198. 
Wilks (2000), pp. 45, 48. 
11 PRO CO 879/57/578, Chamberlain to Hodgson, 20 February 1900. 
12 PRO CO 96/271, Maxwell to Chamberlain, 9 March 1896, cited in Hamilton (1978), p. 228. 
13 PRO CO 96/280, Maxwell to Chamberlain, 10 December 1896, cited in Hamilton (1978), pp. 
230-1. 
14 PRO CO 879/57/578, Chamberlain to Governor F.M. Hodgson, 'Position of the colonial 
government in regard to lands in Ashanti', 11 August 1899. 
165 
rely on, but unsuccessfully. 15 AGC themselves were surprised and confused when 
the Colonial Office refused in 1900, after two years of preparatory work and 
negotiations, to grant them a concession similar to that obtained in June 1897 to 
work King Prempeh's mines near Kumasi. Chamberlain advised the company that 
their request was beyond the Gold Coast government's powers. 16 He later wrote 
that AGC's Obuasi agreement was "not to be taken as a precedent", although he 
failed to explain why not. 17 
Could it be argued that the Colonial Office negotiated the AGC contract in 
a legal vacuum? Nearly three years after the Kumasi invasion Chamberlain wrote: 
"The future permanent arrangement, however, for Coomassie and the adjacent 
territory which had been under the direct dominion of Prempeh was, and still is, 
left undetermined" (italics mine). 18 The quote leaves open the suggestion that the 
colonial administration left the Ashanti land question unresolved on purpose. 
Delaying the establishment of a definitive position for one thing removed future 
criticism for the unique treatment of AGC. 
The British did have the Gold Coast land laws to provide guidance, and 
there was also the indigenous land law of Ashanti (which matched those of the 
Gold Coast) that could have been applied. After several failed attempts to impose 
English-type land legislation, however, the colonial administration had by 1897 
accepted that indigenous law should govern land transactions in that coastal 
territory. 
In the 1890s the British considered declaring unoccupied or waste land in 
the Gold Coast Colony as Crown land. As African objectors repeatedly pointed 
out there was no such thing as waste land since all land had an owner be it an 
individual, a family or a chief. 19 The motives for seeking to possess Crown lands 
were two-fold: to allow for European plantation cultivation for cash crops and to 
allow total control over gold production. To these ends the Crown Lands Bill was 
drafted in 1894. In October 1895 African opposition led to the rejection of the 
Crown Lands Bill which would have permitted government control of all 'waste 
15 Ibid. 
16 PRO CO 879/57/578, C.W. Mann, AGC Secretary to Colonial Office, 15 December 1898; 
Chamberlain to Hodgson, 24 August 1899; Colonial Office to AGC, 20 March 1900; Cade to 
Colonial Office, 3 April 1900; Colonial Office to AGC, 24 April 1900. 
17 PRO CO 879/57/578, Chamberlain to Governor F.M. Hodgson, 11 August 1899. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Kimble (1963), p. 336. 
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lands, forest lands, and minerals' . 2° The African protestors were those who stood 
to gain from controlling land use, mainly the chiefs but also would-be concession 
brokers and entrepreneurs. 
Government then proposed a new bill to deal with the problems of 
concession speculation and uncertainty of title. The Lands Bill of 1897 
significantly trimmed the British government's involvement from Crown 
ownership to regulator of land use. However, the Lands Bill would allow the 
government in the Gold Coast, with retrospective application, to grant 
Government Land Certificates which superseded African rights of ownership. The 
Government could also declare that any piece of land had no owner, and then 
authorise its occupation. 21 Although the government's arguments for these 
provisions were that they provided regulation against the exploitation of Africans 
by European concessionaires the Bill encountered heavy local opposition. The 
African argument again centred on the non-existence of 'unoccupied' land, and 
the fact that the Bill subjected every holder of a government Land Certificate to 
English Law which would have marked a revolution of the indigenous land 
system rooted in matrilineal inheritance. 22 A recurring argument in the African 
petitions was the point that the Gold Coast Colony had not been acquired by the 
British through conquest, cession or treaty, therefore the British had no inherent 
rights to land. Furthermore, previous legislation such as the 1876 Public Lands 
Ordinance, amongst others, never implied that Gold Coast land (nor minerals) 
belonged to the Queen. 23 Faced with opposition from both European 
concessionaires and Africans against government's encroachment in private land 
transactions, Chamberlain withdrew the Lands Bill. 24 
What is surprising, then, is that these debates - in which opposition to 
government ownership of land and therefore the government's right to grant 
concessions was so effectively expressed - coincided with Cade's negotiations for 
his Ashanti concession. Indeed the draft Lands Bill stipulated, as the 1897 
Agreement did for AGC, a 5% gross royalty on mineral products. The role of J. P. 
20 Phillips (1989), pp. 59-61; R. Howard, Colonialism and Underdevelopinent in Ghana, London: 
Croom Helm, 1978, p. 40; Kimble (1963), p. 339. 
21 Kimble (1963), p. 340. 
22 Speech of the APRS solicitor to Chamberlain, 5 August 1898, cited in Kimble (1963), p. 353. 
23 Kimble (1963), p. 337-8. 
24 Kimble (1963), p. 354. Besides African and European opposition, external rebellions in South 
Africa and Sierra Leone and the threat of the same in the Gold Coast as well as the Bill's dilution 
of chiefly powers and the uninhibited growth of cash crops based on the existing land rules all 
played a part in the withdrawal of the Lands Bill-Howard (1978), p. 42. 
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Brown is worth highlighting here. He was a leading member of the Aborigines 
Rights Protection Society (ARPS) established in the Gold Coast in 1897 primarily 
to contest the Lands Bil1,28 and he was also a party to the AGC Agreement of June 
1897. Brown may have failed to note the contradiction: the AGC Agreement was 
a government-granted concession, the very idea vehemently opposed by the 
ARPS. Or perhaps he assumed that Ashanti territory would be treated differently 
to the Gold Coast. 
Maxwell's influence (and that of Cade's personal connections) must have 
been considerable to have successfully persuaded Chamberlain to allow the 
governor to grant AGC's concession while at the same time preventing such 
action from being legalised in the Gold Coast. In retrospect, Chamberlain 
admitted that concerning Ashanti territory "it was not contemplated that any 
concessions would be granted by the Government". 26  
So AGC were undoubtedly given special treatment. Possible reasons for 
this could have been the opportunity to experiment with Maxwell's model of 
oligopolistic gold production; the hope that AGC would generate considerable tax 
revenue for the administration; while the credentials of Frederick Gordon and the 
Earl of Bessborough must have helped. The ad hoc and inconsistent treatment of 
Ashanti concessions between 1896 and 1900 can also be explained by the absence 
of a class of educated Ashanti lawyers, journalists and landowners who could 
have organized themselves as the Gold Coasters did to protect their indigenous 
rights. 27 The Ashantis did express their displeasure though — according to 
Hamilton the confused award and recognition of concessions to some and not 
others was a contributory factor in the origins of the Yaa Asantewaa war of 
1900. 28 
Some order and clarity was introduced to the Ashanti land rights situation 
following the successful passage of the Gold Coast Concessions Ordinance 1900. 
This aimed to regulate European owned concessions while preserving African 
`freehold' property rights and freedom to make grants. Although it limited the size 
of concessions to five square miles for minerals and to a maximum of two 
concessions per concessionaire, in practice this could be overcome by acquiring 
25 Kimble (1963), p. 341-4 
26  PRO CO 879/57/578, Chamberlain to Governor F.M. Hodgson, 11 August 1899 referring to his 
Despatch 478 of 23 December 1898. 
27 Hamilton (1978), p. 197. 
28 Hamilton (1978), p. 227; PRO CO 879/57/578, Hodgson to Chamberlain, 9 September 1899. 
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contiguous concessions under different corporate names. The ordinance limited 
lease and option periods to definite time limits to prevent granted lands from lying 
unused. Before this law was passed Chamberlain agreed that it should be 
fundamentally replicated for the whole of Ashanti including Kumasi, with some 
added provisions. 29 
African chiefs, those involved with concessions broking and others with 
an economic interest in land use complained amongst other things about the long 
lease period of 99 years which would not allow usufruct rights to return to a stool 
within a lifetime. 30 After such a long timeframe the rights of the original grantor 
could be open to contest. But the significant difference between this law and the 
failed predecessors was that the Concessions Ordinance did not grant the colonial 
government ownership rights in minerals or 'unoccupied' lands. The British had 
no general rights of compulsory acquisition of lands, except in limited 
circumstances for public utility purposes when compensation had to be paid. The 
policy established in the Gold Coast was essentially to leave land ownership to the 
indigenous tenure system. 
While it is reasonable to presume that the Gold Coast Colony laws would 
have directed the Colonial Office in their considerations for Ashanti, the strongest 
reason to suggest that British land policy would differ between the Gold Coast 
and Ashanti was the fact that the Ashanti, or more accurately, Kumasi, had been 
successfully invaded by a British army. The Ashanti Order-in-Council (1901) 
declaring the annexation of the territory stated that the Queen's army had 
conquered the land. 31 However, Bekwai and Adansi, where Cade's concession 
was located, had agreed to British protection and had become British allies before 
the fall of Kumasi in 1896; they could therefore argue that their lands were not 
conquered. 32 Chamberlain himself recorded, 
It was decided not to annex even Prempeh's dominion — much less the rest 
of Ashanti, whose chiefs accepted British protection, and entered into 
treaties with the Queen. 
29 PRO CO 879/57/578, Chamberlain to Hodgson, 20 February 1900. 
3° Howard (1978) p. 48. 
31 K Bentsi-Enchill, Ghana Land Law: An Exposition, Analysis and Critique, London: Sweet and 
Maxwell, 1964, p. 18. 
32 Bentsi-Enchill (1964), p. 18, fn. 20. 
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It seems to me, therefore, that there is no ground for treating these kings 
and chiefs in the matter of land concessions differently from the chiefs in 
the rest of the Protectorate. They were not conquered, and, even if their 
Paramount Chief was conquered, the British Government waived any right 
of conquest over them which could be implied therefrom by entering into 
treaties with them. 33 
Thus, by 1900 it was eventually decided that the legal position regarding 
land for Ashanti was to be the same as in the Gold Coast Colony. 34 In both 
Ashanti and the Gold Coast Colony land tenure was to follow the indigenous 
system which was based on community ownership along with individual or 
familial rights of use, rather than private ownership. The communal, or stool, land 
was controlled by a chief (the Omanhene) who was not supposed to take decisions 
concerning land use independently of his elders. In the few occasions where land 
was alienated it could rarely be further sold on, and if it was not being used then 
the land would revert to the original grantor. 35 While land tenure was limited to 
usufruct rights, the crops grown on land were privately owned. Recognition of the 
landowner (the stool) was a condition of enjoying use-rights. 36 
Pressures on land from cash crop production and other economic 
opportunities such as foreign mineral production led to transformations in 
indigenous property ownership, starting in the coastal region. For example, 
according to indigenous law, minerals were owned communally by the stool; 
those permitted to extract minerals were obliged to hand over to the stool chief a 
share (usually a third) of the output. But by the end of the nineteenth century 
foreign mining interests had successfully persuaded chiefs to accept annual rent 
instead of a share of the output. Indigenous land law was dynamic, and stool 
boundaries were also changeable. 37 That said, the 1897 Agreement did not fall 
33 PRO CO 879/57/578, Chamberlain to Governor F.M. Hodgson, 11 August 1899. 
34 This was in marked contrast to the situation in the Northern Territories, where a 1904 ordinance 
vested all the land and minerals in the Crown. The Concession Ordinances for the Gold Coast 
(1900) and Ashanti (1903) were not applied retrospectively to any existing concession such as 
AGC's. S. Berry, Chiefs know their boundaries: Essays on Property, Power, and the Past in 
Asante, 1896 —1996, Portsmouth: 2000, pp. 5, 6. 
35 Howard (1978), p. 38. 
36 G. Austin, Labour, Land and Capital in Ghana: From Slavery to Free Labour in Asante, 1807-
1956, Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2005, p. 99. 
37 Berry (2000), pp. 6, 7; Austin (2005), pp. 100, 258-61. 
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within indigenous land law; nor did it comply with the limited rights of 
government to land according to existing Gold Coast legislation at the time. 
Peculiar aspects of the 1897 Agreement 
Some immediate legal issues and inconsistencies are apparent in the 1897 contract. 
First, the owners of the land were not party to the contract, that is the Adansihene 
and the Bekwaihene. Yet, the contract stipulates that rent is to be paid to them. 
This consideration acknowledged the chiefs' land ownership rights while 
simultaneously excluding them from the Agreement. 
Second, the Agreement states that the British government had the 
authority to grant the occupation of land as if it had come into Crown possession. 
The basis of this authority is unclear; if it was due to conquest then why did the 
Agreement attribute rental income to the chiefs rather than to the Crown? This is 
inconsistent and contradicts the existing indigenous Ashanti land laws and the 
British laws for the Gold Coast Colony at the time. 
Third, the Agreement labels the parcel of land as "unoccupied". The 
meaning of this was unspecified and the reality of this was quite the opposite. 
AGC's first manager, John Daw, found Africans at the location chosen for the 
start of operations. 38 
Fourth, while granting wide rights of use to AGC, the Agreement made 
this "subject in every respect to the existing rights of any native or natives in 
respect of the said land or any part thereof'. These native rights were left 
undefined, yet they were given superiority over AGC's activities. With the 
passage of time AGC was confronted with events on the ground, particularly in 
connection with this native rights clause, that threw the irregularities of the 1897 
Agreement into sharp focus. 
Existing occupation rights 
When Cade, Daw and their European workers arrived at Obuasi, a location chosen 
because of the existence of indigenous mine pits and workers, Daw wrote that 
they had to throw Africans living there off the land along with about a thousand 
38 MS24669, John Daw, report on expedition, 12 December 1898. 
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gold workers.39 It is interesting that the future Concessions Ordinance, although 
not applicable retrospectively to AGC, expressly called for compensation to be 
paid to natives with regard to giving up their habitation, otherwise the government 
could withhold the certificate of validity. 49 In 1904 the AGC manager wrote to the 
Chief Commissioner of Ashanti acknowledging the right of Bekwais and Adansis 
to settle on the property without paying any ground rent; that would only be 
charged to outsiders. 41 In 1924 when AGC's general manager, G.W.E. Turner, 
asked the District Commissioner (DC) of Obuasi for help to evict unwanted 
settlers he admitted that the 1897 agreement did not give the firm powers to evict, 
and hence the need for the government's support in the situation - which, it would 
seem, was forthcoming.42 
Existing ownership rights 
Out of the 100 square mile plot AGC initially only mined a small two square mile 
area. In the early 1930s activities had only reached seven square miles. As the 
mine expanded its use of the land, not for mining, but to cut timber for fuel 
purposes and later to establish reforestation plantations, 43 they faced increasing 
complaints from locals. 
By 1929 the £66 paid to the Adansi Omanhene was being shared equally 
between him, the Akrokerrihene and the Edubiasihene. Obuasi village itself was 
Akrokerri land. The mine workings at Sansu and Ayeinm villages were Edubiasi 
land. The Adansihene likely agreed to share his rent with these sub-chiefs because 
from the company's arrival in 1897 AGC was visibly conducting mine operations 
first at Obuasi and then at Ayeinm. 
In 1932 the Ayasihene, another sub-chief of Adansi, protested to the DC 
that AGC were cutting his trees without permission or consideration near the 
Rivers Jimi and Pampora. 44 The reply he received, to his astonishment, was that 
AGC was within their rights as that land lay in their 1897 concession. If that was 
the case, the Ayasihene enquired, then why did he not receive a share of AGC's 
39 Ibid. 
40 Concessions Ordinance (1939) pgh. 8, s. 12. 
41 ARG 1/5/1/2, Daw to Chief Commissioner Ashanti, 19 May 1904. 
42 ARG 7/5/59, notes to DC from G.W.E. Turner, 2 December 1924. 
43 ARG 7/5/60/1, AGC GM to DC regarding reforestation plans of about 4 square miles a year, 3 
January 1941. 
44 ARG 7/5/60/1, Ayasihene to DC, 3 August 1932. 
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rent or royalty?45 The Akrofuomhene later made a similar protest: Eight of his 
villages had "been included in the concession lands of the Ashanti Goldfields 
Corporation Ltd, Obuasi without being sold by my predecessors, or leased to the 
aforesaid Mining Company. And that my Stool has never had a share of the 
Concession Rents... , 46 Other Adansi claimants, the Adontenhene and 
Dompoasihene, would later state their cases. 47 
Ayasi land lay between Edubiasi and Akrofuom. AGC's pumping station 
was wholly on Ayasi land. 48 The DC's advice to the Ayasihene was to appeal to 
the Adansihene for a stake in the rent, and not to AGC.49 The problem was that 
the three chiefs already sharing the Adansi rent of £66 refused to share it further. 59 
 Disputes between Adansi division chiefs over their entitlements to AGC rent and 
royalty would rage for decades. 51 Adansi differed from other Ashanti polities in 
that it had a long history of relative decentralization, with the Adansihene being 
only marginally more powerful than the leading sub-chiefs (unlike the 
Mamponhene, for example). 
From 1939 until 1956 Adansi's £66 rent was held by the treasury in 
Kumasi until the chiefs could establish their claims either amicably or, it was 
suggested, through the Native Court at Fomena, to decide how to distribute it 
equitably amongst them. 52 It is interesting to note that one of the driving forces 
behind the restoration of the Ashanti Confederacy Council and the return of the 
Asantehene from exile was the hope that a revived central authority would help to 
settle such divisional disputes. In Adansi's case this failed. A possible explanation 
for this could be that the Asantehene only added to the list of claimants for a share 
45 ARG 7/5/60/1, DC to Ayasihene, 6 August 1938. 
46 ARG 7/5/60/1, Nana Osei Bonsu, Akrofuomhene to DC, 17 September 1939. 
47 ARG 7/5/60/1, Adansihene, Kwaku Nkansah ll, to Edubiasihene and Akrokerrihene, 21 March 
1940; Adansihene to DC, 2 February 1941. 
48 ARG 7/5/60/1, Ayasihene to DC, 23 January 1940. 
49 ARG 7/5/60/1, Assistant Treasurer Obuasi to the District Treasurer Kumasi, 6 February 1929; 
District Commissioner Bekwai to DC, 9 February 1929; Akrokerrihene's linguist to the DC, 9 
February 1929; Edubiasihene to DC, 11 February 1929; memo, Assistant Treasurer Kumasi to 
Sub- Accountant Obuasi, 3 May 1933; DC to Ayasihene, 26 January 1940. 
5° ARG 7/5/60/1, Ayasihene to DC, 22 August 1930. 
51 ARG 7/5/60/2, see Akrokerrihene to Government Agent Obuasi, 18 January 1954; Government 
Agent Obuasi to Government Agent Bekwai, 22 November 1954; Government Agent Obuasi to 
Government Agent Bekwai, 27 April and 15 May 1955; Berry (2000), pp. 8, 9. 
52 ARG 7/5/60/1, DC to Adansihene, copied to claimants, 30 October 1940. 
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of AGC's fortunes, and could therefore have been perceived as a rival rather than 
a helper.53 
AGC were largely shielded from these chieftaincy conflicts thanks the to 
the stipulation in the 1897 Agreement that the Colonial Treasury would be the 
medium through which the rent was received. The company was thus spared the 
anger of the local chiefs evident in the extensive correspondence between them 
and the government administrators. Throughout the suspension of Adansi rent 
distribution the company's conscience was clear as it continued to make yearly 
payments to the Kumasi Treasury. The impasse was broken in 1956 when the 
Adansi council, created by the Local Government Ordinance (1954), started to 
receive the rent as well as the arrears held in Kumasi. 
The underlying problem in these disputes was the fact that the rightful 
owners of the entire 100 square mile plot were not party to the 1897 agreement. 
For the Omanhene of Adansi to prove his legal claim to the whole £66 it was 
realised that the parties to the contract (which did not include him) would have to 
go to court on his behalf, including the Governor. 54 But there was no obvious 
incentive for the parties to the original contract to start litigation for the 
Adansihene's benefit. As Governor Maxwell had assumed authority to grant 
occupation of the land no efforts had been made to ascertain who the occupants 
and owners were back in 1897. 55 
Most of AGC's gold workings were in Adansi territory: the £133 to £66 
division of rent between Bekwai and Adansi inadequately reflected this. It was 
only in 1942 that the Adansihene learnt that Bekwai, owning less than one tenth 
of the AGC concession area (and where no mining was undertaken) received 
ARG 1/4/5/10, draft letter Chief Commissioner Ashanti to Colonial Secretary, n.d. but likely 
1931; c.f. J. Dunn and A.F. Robertson, Dependence and Opportunity: Political Change in Ahafo, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973, pp. 53-55, 259. 
ARG 7/5/60/1, Adansihene to DC, 25 November 1940 and 5 February 1941. 
55 It could be argued that the Omanhene of Adansi was the sole owner, and the sub-chiefs only 
custodians of their smaller areas, but according to indigenous land practice sub-chiefs held allodial, 
or 'absolute' rights of transaction, so long as the Omanhene received a share of the benefits. The 
Concessions Ordinances of 1900 and 1903 recognised this and required notice of proposed 
concessions to be given to all occupants and local chiefs. In compliance with this, AGC negotiated 
with the appropriate sub-chiefs when seeking firewood concessions neighbouring the 100 square 
miles plot: see for example ARG 7/5/42, AGC GM, to District Commissioner Bekwai, 24 August 
regarding separate payment of firewood concession royalties to Bekwai, Adansi and Akrokerri 
Native Authority Treasuries; 26 January 1954 firewood royalties receipt for Akrofuom local 
council from AGC to Assistant Government Agent. Local stools made more money out of 
firewood concessions which paid rent and royalties than from mining rent and royalties. For 
example, Akrofuom firewood royalties in April 1953 totalled just under £90 whereas they received 
nothing from AGC: ARG 7/5/42, 27 April 1953. 
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twice as much rent as him.56 AGC did react in a small way to the inequity by 
granting a 'voluntary yearly bonus' to Adansi of £34 from 1932 which was paid 
directly to him.57 By framing the additional money as a bonus, rather than rent, 
AGC maintained the terms of 1897 intact. As a later DC observed, the allocation 
of rent according to the 1897 Agreement was not based on land ownership. 58 The 
Akrokerrihene rightly voiced to AGC, "neither the Edubiasihene's name nor mine 
is embodied in the Agreement, but there is no earthly reason why the actual 
owners of the land should not be signatories to an agreement which covers their 
land."59 
In a draft letter to the Colonial Secretary, probably written in 1931, the 
Chief Commissioner of Ashanti expressed his own opinion that the Adansi rents 
from AGC were "meagre," "inequitable" and anomalous. 60 He stated that other 
mines in Ashanti paid more to native landowners than AGC. As a remedy, he 
suggested that the government make a contribution of about £20,000 out of the 
royalty payments received (totalling £36,000 in 1931) to the Golden Stool as a 
special fund out of which the Adansis could receive a fair income and Ashanti as 
a whole would benefit. 
Existing farming rights 
An existing native right that the 1897 Agreement surely meant to uphold is what 
is termed in Twi didi asaseso - the right given by stools to their subjects, and even 
to aliens, to grow food. As Austin explains with respect to food farming 
"cultivation rights were virtually a free good." 61 As AGC initially concentrated 
mining activities in a small area the encroachment of didi asaseso was gradual. 
AGC received approval from local administrators to impose a farm rent of 
one penny per bearing cocoa tree within the 100 square miles, 62  which was the 
standard rate paid to landowners in Ashanti in this period. 63 By the 1940s AGC 
56 ARG 7/5/60/1, Adansihene to DC, 20 May 1942; Acting DC to AGC GM, 14 September and 
reply 19 September 1944. 
52 MS 14170/61, Secretary to acting mine manager, 9 August 1932; ARG 7/5/60/1, AGC GM, to 
the sub-accountant, Obuasi 22 February 1946. 
58 ARG 7/5/60/2, Government Agent Obuasi to Government Agent Bekwai, 27 April 1955. 
59 ARG 7/5/63, Akrokerrihene to GM, 1 March 1951. 
ARG 1/5/4/10, draft letter Chief Commissioner Ashanti to Colonial Secretary, n.d. but likely 
1931 as it mentions the death of Asantehene Prempeh, 
61 Austin (2005), p. 103. 
62 ARG7/5/59, AGC GM, to DC, 12 February 1922. 
63 Austin (2005), pp. 263-4. 
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was issuing farming permits to those farming within their boundaries at a cost of 
one shilling a year. These fees were strongly protested by the Adansihene and 
sub-chiefs because they were the landowners (not tenants) who ought to have 
been receiving such rent. 64 AGC's motive was not the income from the cocoa 
trees and farms but rather to reaffirm their 1897 rights. The company claimed that 
only out of good grace and "not of right" that they paid some compensation to 
farmers when they cleared land within their concession. 65 The DC by this time 
wrote to AGC questioning the application of farm charges since "the Adansis had 
existing farming rights on the area when the concession was taken out." 66 The 
local administrators continued to receive complaints from Africans and requests 
for compensation for the destruction of crops. One case detailed by a linguist of 
the Akrofuornhene on 22 April 1947 to the DC mentioned that although AGC had 
paid £9 compensation for an area of one square mile the company had destroyed 
cocoa trees along with food plants (plantain and cocoyam) and failed to allow 
them the chance to harvest, leading to hunger. 67 AGC were adamant that they 
were not touching working farms, but this did not include abandoned farms. 68 
 Therein lay the confusion. What may have looked to the European eye as 
abandoned may not have been. AGC likely did not understand the land rotation 
cultivation practices used for food crops nor the method of planting crops 
irregularly without fenced boundaries that was customary. Cocoa farmers may 
also have left trees infested with capsids temporarily to return to them at a later 
date, as this was one method of dealing with this pest. 69 
The company had an ever-increasing need for wood fuel until the 1950s 
when greater use started to be made of oil-generated electricity. Prior to this there 
were yearly extensions of tramways deeper into the forest to extract wood. In 
1941 it was decided to start a reforestation programme in areas closest to mine 
operations to reduce wood transport costs 70 The General Mines Manager wrote 
with assurances to the DC that the company would pursue reforestation without 
64 ARG7/5/59, Adansi Omanhene to DC, 27 September and 6 November 1922; ARG 7/5/62, 28 
July 1943 and 30 August 1943 from Odikro of Kwapia to DC. 
65 ARG 7/5/62, AGC to DC, 23 November 1942. 
66 ARG 7/5/62, DC to AGC, 14 September 1943. 
67 ARG 7/5/62; for another example see K. K. Benyin to DC, 21 October 1947. 
es ARG 7/5/62, Acting AGC GM, to DC, 15 April 1944. 
69 Austin (2005), p. 81. 
7° ARG7/5/60/1, AGC GM, to DC, 3 January 1941. 
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affecting any food farms and that they would only take over 'abandoned' cocoa 
farms.71 At least by their words AGC was aware of native rights to grow food. 
With the growing level of complaints one DC hesitated to give AGC the 
benefit of the doubt. In 1943 the DC questioned AGC's reforestation plans. 
Reforestation was not an activity explicitly permitted in the 1897 Agreement and 
therefore the project needed the Governor's written approval. Furthermore if this 
was granted he reminded the firm that it would need to be carried out "with due 
regard to the existing rights of any native." 72 The DC agreed with the Adansihene 
that 1897 did not give AGC complete surface rights, 73 and particularly concerning 
food crops it was imperative to maintain good availability of local food in the area. 
Yet without the use of sanctions to support such words the continued complaints 
from Africans show that AGC were allowed to exercise their private rights 
unattenuated. 74 
Existing gold mining and goldsmithing rights 
Gold production and smithing were recognised by the colonial administration as 
long-established indigenous industries in the Obuasi area. 75 AGC tried with some 
success to use the 1897 Agreement to impose controls over small-scale African 
mining and goldsmithing within the concession. They were able to restrict 
goldsmiths through the issue of licences, although the company regularly 
complained about individuals operating in the vicinity without an AGC licence. 
One acting Colonial Secretary was of the view that where mining 
operations were not being carried out by AGC on the property (they were working 
less than one tenth of the plot) then the natives maintained rights to mine gold; if 
AGC were later ready to use those areas they could take them over without 
compensation.76 
71 Ibid. 
72  ARG7/5/62, DC to AGC GM, 21 June 1943. 
73 ARG7/5/62, DC to Chief Commissioner Ashanti, 18 December 1942. 
74 The best example of unattenuated rights, not discussed in this chapter but revealed in Chapter 3, 
'A Chronological Narrative', was AGC's ability to get away with polluting the environment 
without facing any of the costs. It was not until the 1897 Agreement was replaced in 1969 that 
small, arguably inadequate, steps were taken towards changing this. From the mid-1980s IFC 
oversight and funding ushered in proper environmental repairs and pollution prevention. 
CS019/2/2, Chief Commissioner Ashanti to Colonial Secretary, 15 January 1932. 
76 ARG7/5/68, Acting Colonial Secretary to Acting Chief Commissioner of Ashanti, 10 October 
1923. 
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Local goldsmiths resented having to apply to AGC for a licence in 
addition to a government licence. African goldsmiths in the other gold mining 
areas did not have to suffer this extra bureaucracy and imposition. 77 AGC's 
defence was that it needed to stop illicit gold trading and furthermore, licensing 
goldsmiths was a right attached to their 1897 concession agreement. 78 
Existing trading rights 
AGC created the Ashanti-Obuasi Trading Corporation (AOTC) as a separate 
company in 1904 and transferred to it the trading rights contained in the 1897 
Agreement. AOTC was the only large-scale European trader allowed to operate 
within the concession until 1952. 
The debate about AGC's monopoly trading rights started soon after 1903 
when the government moved the Commissioner for Southern Ashanti, Captain C. 
H. Armitage, from Kwisa to Obuasi because of the latter's growth. Obuasi was 
then placed under the rules and regulations of the Ashanti Administration 
Ordinance (1902). Armitage initially ordered the AGC mine manager to stop 
issuing trading licences (and collecting ground rent). However, following a series 
of conferences with the Resident at Kumasi, Captain Donald Stewart, and with 
Governor Matthew Nathan's approval, it was agreed to allow the company to 
continue with these actions provided that Bekwais and Adansis were not targeted. 
From 1910 the District Commissioner of Obuasi issued each trading licence, but 
only with AGC's written approval. '  
From this early juncture there followed a series of complaints from 
Africans and Europeans. 80 The opinion of the local administration was that 
although a monopoly existed, and "all monopolies are theoretically bad", AGC's 
monopoly was not detrimental to the local people. 81 Several lines of reasoning 
were given to support this view of the District Commissioner of the time: it was in 
AGC's interest to keep staff supplied with cheap and plentiful goods; the AGC 
ARG 9/5/2, Obuasi Urban Council to Government Agent Obuasi attached to Chief Regional 
Officer to Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 6 October 1953; Government Agent Obuasi to 
Government Agent Bekwai, 14 October, 16 November, 30 November 1953; Chief Regional 
Officer to Government Agent Bekwai, 18 March 1954. 
78  ARG 9/5/2, AGC to Government Agent Obuasi, 14 October 1953; Chief Regional Officer to 
Government Agent Bekwai, 18 March 1954. 
7° PRO CO 96/684/1, 'Memorandum as to trading rights, AGC'. 
88 MS 14164/4 minutes, 9 May 1911; 16, 30 April, 14, 28 May 1912; vol. 6, 25 October 1927. 
81 ARG7/5/68, DC to unnamed but probably provincial commissioner Kumasi, 21 May 1929. 
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concession area was only five miles by twenty, so people did not have to go too 
far to find alternative tradesmen; and a comparison between basic goods bought 
from AOTC in Obuasi and from other retailers in Kumasi found that AOTC sold 
dearer cement and spirits but cigarettes, sugar, milk and groceries were generally 
cheaper.82 Opposing arguments from the chiefs were that the lack of competition 
retarded the development of the area, 83 as other traders would create positive 
agglomeration and population effects. 
AGC controlled its trading rights through the Obuasi Sanitary Board 
which was run as a joint corporate-government committee including the AGC 
general mine manager. The Obuasi Sanitary Board issued trading licences to 
individual Africans (petty traders, not large store owners) subject to the approval 
of the AGC general manager. These trading licences in 1929 cost 2s/6d per month. 
Adansis and Bekwais, as well as strangers, faced the same charge. This was in 
breach of the earlier "understanding" reached between the firm and government 
that trading licences would only be issued to aliens, that is non Adansis and 
Bekwais. 84 (Exactly how the company were to distinguish Adansis and Bekwais 
from other Africans was never addressed in the documents and perhaps shows the 
government's lack of genuine practical concern). But AGC refused to formalise 
this "understanding" with a Supplemental Agreement that would in any way 
modify or dilute the original 1897 Agreement." 
At the heart of the issue was whether the "existing rights" of Bekwais and 
Adansis before 1897 did or did not include trading. As with the other rights 
discussed above, official opinion and action vacillated. In 1913, F. C. Fuller, 
Chief Commissioner of Ashanti wrote a 'Memorandum with reference to the 
trading rights of AGC Ltd' expressing his personal view that "There is no doubt 
whatsoever, in my own mind, that natives of Bekwai and Adansi retain full 
trading rights over their respective possessions". 86 In other words, AGC via the 
AOTC, only enjoyed a partial monopoly. The monopoly applied to every alien 
besides the native owners of the soil. However, Fuller did not press the issue, 
because for one thing, there were many individual petty traders who operated with 
or without a trading licence. Furthermore, if the government fought too strongly 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 ARG7/5/68, F. C. Fuller, Chief Commissioner of Ashanti, 'Memorandum with reference to the 
trading rights of AGC Ltd', 18 December 1913. 
85ARG7/5/68, C. W. Mann, AGC Secretary, to C. H. Armitage, DC Obuasi, 6 May 1909. 
ARG7/5/68, 18 December 1913. 
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for general trading rights against AGC's will, the firm might withdraw its 
cooperation and monetary assistance for the Obuasi Sanitary Board and the 
government would then have to meet the full cost of upkeep, sanitation, 
administration and policing of the Obuasi township. 87 AGC's real concern seems 
to have been to exclude coastal traders who represented European companies from 
operating within their concession. 88 
It is only on the issue of existing native rights to trade that we see an 
official refutation of AGC's interpretation of the 1897 Agreement. But even here 
government's words in London and on the spot had no bite and made no impact 
on the company's actions. The official stance first voiced in 1904, backed by the 
opinion of the Crown Law Officers in 1913, 89 and repeated in 1929 was that the 
government had repudiated AGC's trading monopoly in principle, although this 
was of "little practical effect"(emphasis in original).90 The repudiation was not to 
be made public knowledge 91 
Despite the official anti-monopoly stance, the colonial authority's 
responses to enquiries about trading in Obuasi remained inconsistent. Soci6t6 
Commerciale de L'Ouest Africain (SCOA) was informed by the Colonial 
Secretary in 1928 that "AGC does not have monopoly trading rights". 92 Less than 
a month later, a Mr T. Filson representing an American firm interested in buying 
cocoa in the area was told by the DC to apply to AGC for permission because the 
firm held monopoly trading rights. 93 When the matter was referred to the Chief 
Commissioner of Ashanti he informed the American that AGC had no monopoly, 
however, "no firms other than AOTC have traded or are trading within the 
concession." 
AGC were angered by any loose interpretation of the rights of Adansis and 
Bekwais. 94 They were conscious to reassert their understanding of 1897 at every 
87 ARG7/5/68, C. W. Mann, AGC Secretary to Acting Chief Commissioner Ashanti, 26 October 
1909; FC Fuller, Chief Commissioner of Ashanti, 'Memorandum with reference to the trading 
rights of AGC Ltd', 18 December 1913. 
88 ARG 1/5/1/1, Acting Chief Commissioner Ashanti to Acting Colonial Secretary, 29 November 
year not given but 1909. 
ARG 1/5/4/9, Undersecretary of State, Downing Street to AGC, 26 July 1913. 
90 ARG 7/5/68, Governor Nathan to John Daw, 6 February 1904; Colonial Secretary to DC or to 
Chief Commissioner Ashanti (unclear), 2 April 1929. 
91 ARG 7/5/68, Colonial Secretary to DC or to Chief Commissioner Ashanti (unclear), 2 April 
1929. 
92 ARG 1/5/4/10, Colonial Secretary to Societe Commerciale de L'Ouest Africain, 8 March 1928. 
93 ARG 1/5/4/10, DC to Mr T Filson, 4 April 1928. 
94 PRO CO 96/684/1, Tumer to Colonial Secretary 15 January 1929; Morgan, AGC Secretary to 
Undersecretary of State, 10 July 1929. 
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opportunity. For example, when the company surrendered land to the government 
for public buildings the surrender deed was always made subject to the retention 
of their trading and mining rights. 95 The extent of AGC's trading rights was yet a 
further example of the ambiguities and confusion surrounding 1897. The debate 
on trading rights rumbled on for decades, re-emerging whenever third parties 
raised objections. 
Following the admission of Africans to government in 1951 the Obuasi 
Urban Council attempted to put government pressure on AGC via the ministry of 
commerce and industry for the company to abandon voluntarily the trade 
monopoly. 96 The issue was raised in the Legislative Assembly by the local 
member for Adansi, N.B. Abubekr. 97 AGC, no doubt responding to the nationalist 
political changes, allowed a small Co-operative Wholesale store to open in Obuasi 
early in 1952. 98 And then, after obtaining AOTC's consent, AGC placed an 
advertisement inviting trading companies to apply for a limited number of 
licences. 99 Applications were received from the Union Trading Company , Bata 
Shoe Company, SCOA, Adansi Consumers' Cooperative Society Ltd and a Syrian 
businessman, Abdul Wahab. 100 Three licences to compete with AOTC were 
granted to the Adansi Coop, Union Trading Company and Bata. 101 While AOTC 
interpreted this as an abandonment of AGC's trade monopoly AGC saw it as 
continued control over the exercise of their rights, since they retained licence 
granting and issuing powers. 102 
When an Indian set up shop without a licence, AGC sought to evict him 
but received local legal advice that "nothing could be done about it". 163 
Determined not to set an undesirable precedent they decided on a pragmatic 
3° MS14170/94, Secretary to GM, 19 December 1951; MS14170/96, Secretary to Acting GM, 15 
January 1953; MS14170/97, Secretary to GM, 2 July 1953. The company intentionally avoided 
drawing government's attention to section 3e of 1897 which gave the government full rights to 
take back land within the concession for public purposes, without any compensation (except that 
deemed reasonable by the Governor for any improvements made or buildings erected). AGC's 
lawyer's cleverly recommended the use of surrender agreements in these cases rather than to give 
up the land by assignment specifically because a surrender agreement could be made subject to the 
key rights enjoyed from 1897. 
96ARG 7/5/63, resolution of the Obuasi Urban Council to the Minister and Government Agent 
Obuasi, 12 August 1952. 
97 ARG 9/5/2, general manager UAC Ltd to Ministry of Commerce and Industries, 6 October 1952. 
98 ARG 7/5/63, Government Agent Obuasi to Government Agent Bekwai, 27 August 1952. 
99 MS 14170/93, Secretary to Acting GM, 28 September 1951. 
1°° MS14170/94, Secretary to GM, 17 January 1952 and 27 March 1952; vol. 95, 11 July 1952. 
1°1 MS14170/95, Secretary to GM, 11 July 1952. 
102 MS14170/9, Secretary to GM, 13 October 1952; MS14170/98, Secretary to GM, 29 January 
1954. 
1°3 MS 14170/97, Secretary to GM, 6 November 1953, 13 November 1953, 11 December 1953. 
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softly-softly approach and asked the trader to regularise his operation by applying 
for a licence with assurances that it would be forthcoming. 104 
With the changing political context in the Gold Coast and Ashanti after 
World War II, the colonial government's obligations to wider stakeholders, 
besides expatriate business, grew. The government was increasingly sensitive to 
African protests, which is evident in their changing public stance on AGC's 
trading rights. Although it had been tolerable in the 1920s to keep their criticisms 
of AGC's monopoly rights private, by 1951 the administrators felt that it was time 
for a "show down" and a public statement by government declaring that AGC did 
not legally have exclusive trading rights. Nationalism had made the previous 
approach politically dangerous. 105 
Legal opinions sought 
The above discussion showed the variety of ways in which the 1897 Agreement's 
concern for existing native rights were ignored, misunderstood or unclear. Some 
in government believed that the 1897 Agreement was illegal. In a letter stamped 
`secret' from the Chief Commissioner of Ashanti to an unnamed recipient 
(probably the Governor, Sir Alexander Ransford Slater, since it was addressed to 
a Sir) in 1929, the Commissioner's conclusion was that the 1897 Agreement was 
invalid. 106 Nearly two decades later, Chief Commissioner of Ashanti, E. G. 
Hawkesworth wrote to the Acting Colonial Secretary, Captain V. J. Lynch: "I 
gather from an unofficial source that counsel's opinion in London has been sought 
and that it is to the effect that there is considerable doubt as to Government's right 
to grant the concession to the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation." 107 This may have 
been the official belief but it was not transmitted to the local chiefs for in July 
1949 the Acting Chief Commissioner of Ashanti informed the Adansis through 
the DC that the British government had acted appropriately in connection with 
1897 and that the Agreement was "not open to challenge by way of petition". 108 
1°4 MS 14170/97, Secretary to GM, 6 November 1953. 
105 ARG 1/5/4/10, 30 August, year not given but 1951 from permanent secretary to the ministry of 
commerce and industry to Chief Commissioner Ashanti. 
108 ARG 1/5/4/9, 2 June, year not given but 1929. 
107 ARG 1/5/4/10, 18 October 1945. 
1°8 ARG 7/5/60/1, Acting Chief Commissioner to DC, 5 July 1949. 
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The local chiefs were not passive and had spent significant sums on their 
own legal advice in Kumasi as well as in London. 1°9 The Adansihene had sought 
legal clarification on whether 1897 specified how the rent was to be shared with 
sub-chiefs and whether AGC's title to the land was good." ° Despite requests to 
AGC for a copy of the 1897 Agreement the company always hesitated to provide 
this." 1 The solicitors acting on behalf of the Adansihene concluded after two 
years of enquiries that it was too late to claim that AGC's title was bad. This was 
because the Agreement had not been contested by their client or his forebears in 
nearly 50 years, during which time the stool had accepted rents (up until 1939). 
The legal team, however, appealed to the Secretary of State to pay the stool a 
larger rent. The Gold Coast government replied that they were not prepared to 
pursue the matter, advising the Adansis to approach AGC directly for any 
discussion of an increase. 112 The Adansihene also learnt from his lawyers that 
1897 contained no details on if, and how, he was to share his £66 rent. 
A new dimension to the Adansis protest emerged. In a show of unity, eight 
Adansi sub-chiefs along with the Adansihene and Adansihemaa (Queen Mother) 
wrote to the DC that they would not take receipt of the rent held by Kumasi 
Treasury since 1939 originally because of division disputes, but now also because 
they wanted to contest the paltry amount of £66. If AGC's title was good, they 
wanted consideration to be given to their development needs bearing in mind the 
profitability of AGC and the fact that government was receiving a 5% gross 
royalty. They charged the government with failing to have protected their interests 
as an "uncivilised race" and British subjects. 113 The Africans had drawn the 
behaviour of the British government back in 1897 into the debate. To try to get to 
the bottom of the matter an Acting DC asked AGC for copies of the original 
agreement between the Bekwaihene and Ellis, Brown and Biney of 3 March 1890, 
and the subsequent agreements in August 1895, but these were not delivered (and 
copies apparently could not be found in the colony). 114 
109 ARG 7/5/60/1, DC to Adansihene 13 March 1944; Adansihene to DC 14 February 1944; DC to 
Chief Commissioner Ashanti, 12 May 1944. 
113 ARG 7/5/60/1, DC to Adansihene, 13 March 1944; Adansihene to DC, 14 February 1944; DC 
to Chief Commissioner Ashanti, 12 May 1944. 
ARG 7/5/60/1, DC Obuasi to Ayasihene, 27 February 1941; ARG 7/5/60/2, Dompoase local 
council to Lands Dept and Government Agents at Obuasi and Bekwai, 6 May 1958; MS 14170/91, 
Secretary to Dawsons and Co, AGC solicitors, 2 November 1950. 
13 ARG 7/5/60/1, J. J. Peele and Co. to Adansihene, 22 August 1946. 
113 ARG 7/5/60/1, Adansihene and other chiefs to DC, 26 September 1945. 
114 ARG 7/5/60/1, Acting DC to AGC GM, September 1948. 
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With specific reference to the monopoly trading rights element of the 1897 
Agreement, AGC approached their own lawyers, and the Crown Law Officers 
were approached by the government. Although this legal conclusion on monopoly 
trading went against AGC it did not materially affect their practice of limiting 
trade licences until after 1951, when African political pressure led to change, 
albeit allowing the firm to retain extensive measures of trading controls. 
It was recognised by AGC and the government (the only surviving parties 
of the 1897 Agreement) that judicial intervention would be needed in order to 
clarify the ambiguities of 1897 once and for all. "The only way to test the matter 
will be to take it into Court", wrote J. E. W. Flood at the Colonial Office, adding 
that AGC behaved "as though they have been given landlord rights over the whole 
area. I do not think that they would succeed in a claim that they had such rights; 
but again, in the last resort it would have to go to the Courts." 115 
Stalemate 
Neither the government nor AGC chose to take that legal step. As AGC's 
Secretary put it with respect to trading rights, but equally applicable to the rest of 
the 1897 Agreement, "We have always firmly maintained our claim to full and 
exclusive Trading rights, but have never been anxious to do more than this. Nor 
have Government been prepared to take the matter to the Courts." 116 
It would have been in AGC's interest to legally prove the validity of 1897 
in its entirety in order to protect its rights and continued operations: unless they 
realised the Agreement rested on shaky legal grounds, in particular their 
monopoly trading rights and their interpretation of other 'existing native rights', in 
which case instigating legal action would have been foolish. AGC repeatedly 
avoided dissemination of the Agreement, 117 and they consciously avoided drawing 
the local administrators' attention to the government's rights therein. 118 The 
company's oft-repeated argument was that Governor Maxwell had full rights to 
115 PRO CO 96/684/1, J.E.W. Flood of Colonial Office to a Mr Bottomley (status unclear, likely a 
Law Officer), 5 March 1929. 
16 PRO CO 96/684/1, Morgan, AGC Secretary, to Undersecretary of State, 15 May 1929; MS 
14170/91, Secretary to Park, 16 November 1950. 
117MS 14170/63, Secretary to mine manager, 17 October 1933; vol. 91, Secretary to Dawsons and 
Co, AGC solicitors, 2 November 1950. 
118 MS14170/91, Secretary to Park, 16 November 1950; vol. 94, Secretary to GM, 19 December 
1951; vol. 96, Secretary to Acting GM, 15 January 1953; vol. 97, Secretary to GM, 2 July 1953. 
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grant the concession and all the terms contained in 1897 because Adansi and 
Bekwai were under his authority. 119 
It would have been in the government's interest for the validity of 1897 to 
be upheld to justify their collection of AGC's significant royalties, which by 1945 
had amassed to £1.7m, to the exclusion of the Bekwais and the Adansis. It seems 
that the strongest justification for the imposition of 5% gross royalty on AGC was 
the view that the government held land and mineral rights. As discussed above, 
this standpoint was rejected in the Lands Bill, but in the case of AGC's plot the 
1897 Agreement gave such rights to Governor Maxwell on behalf of the Queen. 12° 
 The much reduced 5% royalty on net profits later enacted in the Concessions
Ordinances reflects the government's limited role as a regulator of mining activity 
rather than as a legal owner of land or minerals. The unusually generous terms of 
the government's royalty from AGC would be at risk if the 1897 Agreement was 
invalidated. Any redefinition of the 1897 rights would have had positive and 
negative wealth effects. So a stalemate situation arose and both parties, the 
Colonial Office and AGC, decided to do nothing. 
The ambivalent 1897 agreement was replaced in 1969 with a new mine 
lease concluded between the Ghana government, Lonrho Limited and AGC. 121 
 The legal framework underpinning this agreement was the Minerals Act 1962 
which vested in the President of Ghana, on behalf of the people, all minerals and 
waterways. 122 Unlike 1897 this agreement was strictly a mineral and timber lease. 
No mention was made of any local chiefs. However, it seems an occupational rent 
of 030,000 per annum was paid to the Adansi stool (see Chapter 3, `A 
Chronological Narrative'). This diminished the greatest grievances of 1897. 
Property rights predictions reviewed 
AGC did indeed attempt to increase the exclusivity of their rights and to enforce 
these. This was demonstrated in the control of trading rights, goldsmith licences, 
119 PRO CO 879/57/578, Hodgson to Chamberlain 4 January 1900, enclosure, Daw to King of 
Bekwai 8 June 1899; ARG 1/5/4/9, AGC GM, to DC, 28 July 1923. 
120 1897 Agreement, sixth and seventh paragraphs. The fact that Condition 3e in the Agreement 
allowed government to repossess land within the concession without paying compensation also 
suggests that government were staking ownership rights in the land itself. 
121 'Agreement and Lease dated April 15 1969 between the Government of the Republic of Ghana 
in trust for the people of Ghana and Ashanti Goldfields Corporation Limited and Lonrho Limited', 
Lonmin, 4 Grosvenor Place, London. 
122 The Minerals Act 1962, Act 126, Laws of Ghana. 
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and rent collection for crops. They were able to enforce these control measures 
with pragmatism, obfuscation, and at times with the active support of the local 
colonial administration. Often their success was down to the government's 
inaction, as was seen in the government's stance over monopoly trading rights 
until nationalist political pressure forced AGC to advertise a limited number of 
available licences. The changeover from a colonial government to Nkrumah's 
post-colonial CPP government failed to rectify the inequities and ambiguities of 
the 1897 Agreement. This was for a number of reasons. First, Nkrumah was keen 
not to isolate foreign capital even as his socialist leanings grew — AGC was the 
most important company in Ghana's most significant industrial sector; 123 second, 
Nkrumah and Spears had built up a good personal relationship enabling the 
chairman to speak frankly to the head of state on his annual visits with the aim of 
protecting and improving AGC's lot; 124 third, at the time of Independence the 
mine industry had just experienced its longest bout of industrial unrest in 1955-6 
which led to the closure of the Tarkwa and Abosso gold mine, the oldest 
producing mine in the country. This awoke the new government to the impact of 
further closures on jobs and revenue, and as a result there was a desire to support 
AGC and other foreign mines rather than undermine their security. 125 Fourth, 
Nkrumah's leadership from the early 1950s had weakened the strength of 
chieftaincies by, amongst other things, introducing local government and judiciary 
reforms that competed with the status of chiefs. Thus, it can be argued that the 
voice of the Adansihene, already weak from his historically slim superiority over 
his sub-chiefs, was further quietened. 126 
That well-defined property rights are critical to promote economic activity 
was not found to be the case for AGC. Besides the 1897 document's lack of legal 
clarity vis-à-vis both indigenous Ashanti land law and existing British legislation 
in the Gold Coast Protectorate, there was also a lack of definition in the very 
boundaries of the concession. In connection with surface rights where AGC's 
private rights stopped and started and where African rights did remained unclear. 
Nevertheless, the ill-defined lease agreement did not hinder the growth of the 
mine's operations. It could be argued that the lack of clarity favoured AGC by 
123 Crisp (1984), pp. 128, 140. 
124 Egremont (1997), pp. 282, 307-9. 
123 Crisp (1984), pp. 119, 120, 126. 
126 R. Rathbone, Nkrunzah and the Chiefs: the Politics of Chieftaincy in Ghana, 1951-1960, 
Oxford: James Currey, 2000, pp. 68, 69, 72, 110; Dunn and Robertson (1973), pp. 174-6. 
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allowing the firm to assert their own interpretation of their rights. No internal 
documentary evidence was uncovered to show that uncertainty over the 1897 
document adversely affected AGC's investment decisions. To have reacted 
negatively to these uncertainties would have publicly shown that AGC believed it 
stood on weak legal ground. Instead, a bolder strategy was taken and AGC 
consistently behaved as freeholder landlords. The acceptance of this strong stance 
by third parties, however reluctantly, and the passage of time gave the company 
sufficient confidence to make expensive and long-term investment decisions such 
as the Pampora Treatment Plant completed in 1947, as well as the ambitious 5-
year growth strategy planned in 1967. 
Property rights are not only determined by formal laws and documents but 
by informal practices. AGC's behaviour as landlords and their insistence on not 
amending or supplementing the original document had a consolidating effect on 
their perceived rights and established a sort of accepted corporate custom. 
The 1897 Agreement gave AGC a breadth of rights, however ill-defined, 
that were government-sanctioned and unique. This gave the company some 
competitive advantages over rival firms. The sheer size of the concession 
(compared with the five square miles permitted under the Concessions 
Ordinances) provided AGC with valuable timber resources and kept competitors 
at a reasonable distance reducing the competitive pressure on them for mine 
labour supply. These factors would have directly impacted their gold production 
costs. The paltry annual rents paid to African chiefs were also a boon; and the 
assertion of surface rights potentially put the company in a better position to 
control its environs and workforce, for example, by restricting goldsmith licences 
and the trade of alcohol exclusively to the AOTC (although the floating nature of 
the population in a mining town would have still posed significant challenges of 
labour control). 
Summary 
Secure title to property is seen as fundamental to economic activity in property 
rights theory. It was seen here that legally ill-defined property rights did not 
equate to insecurity of title. Security of title was provided not so much through the 
words of a formal document but from the choice of behaviour of the firm and 
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government. Only determined political change in the late 1960s was able to set the 
1897 Agreement aside. 
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CHAPTER 5: LABOUR 
A PRINCIPAL-AGENT ANALYSIS OF CAPITALIST FREE LABOUR 
RELATIONS 
This chapter assesses the contribution principal-agency theory can make to the 
Marxian/class approach of exploring the social relations of production. Tension 
between AGC and its workforce was at its worst in the decade or so after World 
War H, which is the historical focus of the chapter. The problems encountered by 
management at this time and the attempted solutions are explored within a 
principal-agent framework. 
The start of AGC's operations in 1898 are of particular interest from an African 
labour history perspective because the firm's establishment created an industrial 
operation with opportunities for capitalist free labour market expansion in a 
region that was in transition from coercion as the dominant source of labour.' Free 
labour is defined here as the voluntary provision of labour by those who, lacking 
in land or capital, sell their labour for a wage that is dictated by the market. Such 
labour relations, particularly in an African mining context, have usually been 
analysed in a class, or Marxian, framework, 2 with a focus on occupational 
consciousness and the degree of proletarianisation. 
From the outset Cade recruited day labourers in the form of carriers, 
general hands and skilled labourers such as carpenters and masons, some of whom 
were trained to be miners. 3 Competition from the British government's labour 
needs in Cape Coast made it difficult and expensive to secure caniers. 4 But it 
seems that for actual mine work in Obuasi, the company's first mine manager was 
able to remark in those early years that the supply of African labour was "amply 
sufficient".5 Nevertheless, due to the limited equipment available and the inability 
to produce much gold in the first production year, AGC made use of pre-capitalist 
labour relations in the form of tribute workers, a type of tenant, from whom they 
obtained gold, it would appear in exchange for granting permission to continue 
Austin (2005), ch. 6. 
Perrings (1979); Crisp (1984); Freund (1981); Konings (1980); for a non-Marxist but a class 
emphasis see Lentz and Erlmann (1989), pp. 69-111. 
3 MS 24669, Daw's report to shareholders at EGM, 12 December 1898. 
4 MS 24670, Cade Letters, 24 November, 9, 10 and 25 December 1897. 
5 MS 14164/1, Daw to shareholders, 3 July 1899. 
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their traditional gold mining methods on AGC property.6 It is also worth noting 
that the day labourers maintained flexibility to come and go as they pleased. Thus 
AGC's workers, initially drawn from the coast, Kroo men, and Sierra Leoneans, 7 
 maintained 'social security' links with home regions.8 
Class analysis of capitalist labour relations has paid less attention to the 
intra- and inter-firm mechanisms that shape the capitalist-labourer relationship. 
Here is where principal-agent analysis can add insight because the theory pivots 
on the contractual ties and associated costs between capitalists and workers. These 
contractual ties are determined by intra-firm peculiarities as well as inter-firm, or 
market, considerations. The social relations of production are the chief concern of 
Marxist historians and principal-agent theory can contribute to that because it 
focuses on the human interface between capital and labour. Principal-agent 
analysis at the same time is able to reflect the power relations which are of great 
interest to Marxists by highlighting the mechanisms, or institutions, used to 
display and resist power. The connection between capitalist-labour relationships 
and principal-agency theory is not often made in the literature.' 
Principal-agent theory was detailed in Chapter 1, a brief summary is 
provided here followed by a description of the various principal-agent labour 
relationships at AGC. The theory is used to explore the relationship between the 
firm and its African workforce at Obuasi between 1945 and 1957, which was the 
most turbulent period in AGC's labour history. The focus of the analysis is on the 
intra-firm institutional changes that evolved to mitigate the costs associated with 
capitalist-labour relations at this time. 
Principal-agent theory 
Principal-agency theory is a microeconomic theory that describes economic 
relationships of unequal power. The fundamental issue is that agents have 
knowledge but no incentives while principals have incentives but lack knowledge; 
effort is costly for agents which leads to slacking and other undesirable behaviour. 
The divergence between principal and agent was aggravated in AGC's case by the 
6 MS 24669, Extracts from John Daw's reports, pp. 1-3; MS 14169, Bullion Books, 1897. 
'MS 24670, Cade letters, 24 November 1897; MS 24669, John Daw report at EGM, 12 December 
1898. 
8 The migrant composition of AGC's workforce is not treated in this thesis as the topic has been 
covered elsewhere; see Lentz and Erlmann (1989), and Konings (1980). 
9 Hart (1995), p. 5, fn. 5. 
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following factors: distance and telecommunication problems; cultural and 
ideological chasms; and the initial absence of rules and regulations over capitalist 
labour relations in Ashanti. The nature of the problems that arose between the 
owners of capital and the suppliers of labour at AGC and the mechanisms 
introduced to overcome these agency problems are discussed below. 
The actors 
The owners of capital, in the case of a firm, are the shareholders, they are the 
principals. 10 Shareholders entrust the directors and managers of the firm, the 
agents, to look after their interests. 
Table 5.1: Principal-agent labour relationship 1 
Principal 	 Agent 
Shareholders 	 Directors/Managers 
The managers in turn take on a principal's role when they appoint staff to carry 
out instructions. 
Table 5.2: Principal-agent labour relationship 2 
Principal 
	
Agent 
Managers 	 Subordinates 
In AGC's case, up until 1972, the fact that operations took place in Africa created 
additional internal principal-agent links, as shown below. 
1° The definition of capital here is limited to the provision of equity funding and the ownership of 
the mining land concession. 
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Table 5.3: Principal-agent labour relationships in AGC pre-1972 
Principal Agent 
Shareholders ____,,,, Directors 
Directors ___,.. London managers 
London managers ____r, White Obuasi managers 
White Obuasi managers ______,.. African mine staff 
African mine headmen .___,.. African mine gang members 
Table 5.4: Principal-agent labour relationships in AGC post-1972 
Principal Agent 
Shareholders _ ► Directors 
Directors London consultants 
London consultants ___,.. Obuasi managers 
Obuasi managers _1, All mine staff 
Mine headmen _1,.. Mine gang members 
The focus of the ensuing discussion is on the principal-agent relationship 
between AGC managers (a 'composite principal' comprising the directors, 
London consultants and Obuasi managers) on the one hand, and the African 
workforce in Obuasi, on the other, between 1945 and 1957. AGC's directors were 
substantial shareholders and therefore the ultimate principals. They dictated 
strategy, mining policy, capital expenditure and, in a more managerial role, they 
also took responsibility for the recruitment of all European staff. The London 
management team in this period provided in-house technical expertise to support 
the directors' decision-making They provided the planning and implementation 
details for all projects to take place on the mine and oversaw the purchasing of 
stores and equipment. 11 By this stage in the company's history the Obuasi 
manager had diminished power and very limited autonomy: his primary role was 
to execute instructions from London. 12 Where the Obuasi manager did maintain a 
large degree of control was over the recruitment of African workers. From the 
11 MS 14170/85, Directive No. 6. December 1947. 
12 MS 14170/96, Management Directive No. 23. 
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perspective of the African worker the three layers of European management were 
to all intents and purposes one entity. 
Capitalist labour relations in the era of labour turmoil, 1945-1957 
This section examines the problems arising in the principal-agent relationship 
between AGC managers and African workers in a tumultuous period of the 
company's history, and the managers' formal, informal, direct and indirect 
responses to overcome these problems. 
Three types of African labour relationships co-existed on the mine during 
these years: day labourers, monthly salaried workers and contractors. The vast 
majority of Africans employed at the mine were paid daily wages: of an average 
of 5,500 Africans employed each month only about 150 were paid monthly 
salaries. Management complained about the difficulty in verifying the identity of 
day labourers - although workers were issued with employee badges these could 
be passed on to friends. Another problem with this category of worker was erratic 
attendance and absenteeism. 13 In this AGC management experienced problems 
akin to the factory discipline problems of early industrialising workers in 
eighteenth century Europe. 14 To combat absenteeism and to reduce wage 
administration management attempted to impose a 26-shift pay system instead of 
weekly or bi-monthly pay days. Discontent and the threat of strike action, along 
with the realisation that strikers could hold out for longer following receipt of a 
26-shift pay packet than they could with weekly wages, forced this innovation to 
be withdrawn. 15 
There were no formal employment agreements with wage workers. They 
obtained a worker identification number and badge upon recruitment for which a 
deposit was paid by the worker redeemable whenever he decided to leave AGC's 
employment. The number of waged workers fluctuated with the farming season. 
In April and May in particular many would leave the mine to their own farms or 
to seek employment on farms. This group of contract-less 'employees' had no 
formal representation or communication channels with management until the 
13 MS 14170/81 Cable received from Obuasi 10 October 1945; vol. 82, Secretary to acting mine 
manager, 18 October 1946. 
14 See for example, G. Clark, 'Factory Discipline', Journal of Economic History, 54, 1994, pp. 
128-63. 
15 MS 14170/89, Secretary to Norman, 11 August 1949; vol. 96, Secretary to acting mine manager, 
2 January 1953; vol. 99, Spears to Edwards, 26 November 1954; vol. 101, Secretary to GM, 13 
October 1955. 
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creation of trade unions such as the Winding Enginemen's Union, 16 and most 
significantly the Mine Employees Union (hereafter, the Union) in 1944. The 
chairman and managing director of AGC, General Spears, bitterly resisted the 
introduction and expansion of the Union at Obuasi. His views about unionism 
extended to European staff who were told at the point of recruitment in London to 
forget all about British trade union rules and restrictions. 17 Ownership of capital 
infers power, but increased labour unionisation created a competing source of 
power to the capitalists. 
The second type of employee was in the minority, the salaried African. 
Their numbers had only reached about 150 at the end of 1950. 18 They occupied 
jobs such as Engineering Draughtsmen and Wage Clerks. Until 1947 all of these 
members of staff also worked without any employment contract or even letters of 
appointment. From 1947 a small proportion of the most senior salaried Africans 
were given employment agreements. Following a complaint brought by a salaried 
worker, one F.O. Darko, management decided that the existence of written 
conditions of engagement would have pre-empted the problem. 19 The board soon 
started to consider whether the most senior salaried African employees who had 
demonstrated ability and "long and loyal service" should "be granted the privilege 
of being placed on agreements." 20 An employment contract was viewed by 
London not as a right but a privilege. In any case a principal-agent relationship 
existed even for those Africans working without formal employment contracts. 
In the absence of transparent rights and obligations it is not surprising that 
labour relations were described by management as "delicate" and on one occasion 
at the point of "open rupture". 21 Reasons can be suggested to explain why 
operations were able to continue for so long with a workforce only informally 
employed. On the part of the employer there was no statutory requirement to 
provide employment contracts; it was perhaps also felt that the administrative cost 
of contracting with thousands of Africans with a high labour turnover (estimated 
between 80% and 90%) was prohibitive.22 On the part of the African workers the 
informality allowed flexibility to work stints at their convenience. In practice 
16 MS 14170/81, Secretary to GM, 13 September 1945. 
17 MS 14170/88, Secretary to Norman, acting mine manager 30 June 1949. 
H MS 14170/91, Secretary to GM, 3 November 1950. 
19
Exact details of the complaint are not given - MS 14170/83, Secretary to GM, 13 March 1946. 
2° MS 14170/84, Secretary to GM, 23 January 1947. 
21 MS 14170/85, GWE Turner to Park 25 July 1947. 
22 Crisp (1984), p. 97. 
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underground recruitment was conducted by headmen with the permission of white 
supervisors, rather than at the general management level. 23 There was for a period 
of 50 years from the start of operations an absence of demand from both the 
workers and management to formalise the labour relationship. 
The third type of labour relationship was with independent African 
operators who provided contract services. The mine obtained significant quantities 
of wood for fuel and stoping through African contractors who delivered to AGC's 
railheads. A comparison conducted in 1954 showed that it cost AGC 19s/2d per 
stack of firewood obtained by their own staff compared to 13s/7d from 
contractors. 24 The large discrepancy was due mostly to the costs arising from 
maintaining AGC's locomotives and rail lines deep into the forest. Some of the 
fuel contractors obtained their wood from within AGC's concession, others 
externally. 
Principal-agent problems 1945-57 
The principal-agent problems encountered between AGC's management and the 
African workforce between 1945 and 1957 need to be analysed in the wider 
context of the momentous political changes at this time and the state of the gold 
industry in the colony. The history of this period was outlined in Chapter 2, but 
pertinent connections between the national and industrial developments and 
AGC's labour relations are elicited here. 
There was a national crisis over the cost of living following World War II. 
Basic consumer goods such as sugar, flour and cotton cloth had increased in price 
by as much as 350% and decreased in import supplies by as much as 75% 
between 1939 and 1948. 25 For the same period the real wages for Accra day 
labourers had dropped 20% while the cost of living had more than doubled. 26 
 These trends had in fact started early in the 1930s. The situation was similar in 
urban areas across the country. It was acknowledged in Obuasi by AGC's 
23 SPRS 3/1/34, 'Memo on the working conditions at the Ashanti mine, West Africa in relation to 
theft of gold', 17 May 1936 -the report added that nothing was compulsory for the natives and that 
they came and went as they pleased. 
24 MS 14170/87, Secretary to GM, 15 October 1948; vol. 98, report on Firewood by George 
Cappendell, assistant to the consulting engineer, attached to letter 21 May 1954 unsigned but from 
the Secretary to Edwards. 
2 ' D. Austin, Politics in Ghana, 1946-1960, London: Oxford University Press, 1964, p. 67, citing 
from the Watson Commission Report. 
24 Austin (1964), p. 67, citing from W.B. Birmingham, 'An Index of Real Wages of the Unskilled 
Labourers in Accra'. 
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management, who tried to allay the problem by importing consumer goods and 
growing food to sell to the workers at cost price. 27 Money wages were increased 
at AGC (see Table 5.6 below) but not sufficiently to keep in line with the rising 
cost of living. 28 
The crisis led to a national boycott in January 1948 by Africans of 
European and other foreign stores who were wrongly deemed wholly responsible 
for the shortages and high prices. 29 The United African Company (UAC) was 
perceived as the worst offender. Whether it was generally known that UAC was 
the majority owner of the AOTC store in Obuasi is unclear, but no doubt the 
AOTC would have been targeted. 
The United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) took advantage of the level 
of public protest to combine the immediate economic wants with political ones. 
Danquah and the UGCC Secretary, Nkrumah toured the country during the 
consumer boycott with their nationalist message. 39 The protests over the rising 
cost of living climaxed in February 1948 with the Accra riots. Although the 
colonial administration admitted to being caught off guard, 31 there had actually 
been an increase in militant action in the colony since the 1930s with the rural 
cocoa hold-ups and urban unrest with railway and mine workers. 32 A belated, 
somewhat reluctant establishment of a Gold Coast Labour Department ensued in 
1938, followed by the arrival of trade union advisers. The official view of 
unionisation, though, was that it was not appropriate for "inarticulate and illiterate 
labour". 33 
The mining industry had a long history of independent protest at the level 
of the firm, mostly instigated by isolated segments of the workforce, particularly 
Northern underground workers upon whom ore production rested. However, in 
June 1944 a Fante carpenter and Nzima electrician (both former teachers) at the 
Abosso mine succeeded in forming the Gold Coast Mines Employees Union 
(MEU), with the aim of representing all mine workers across the industry. 34 The 
literate, southern leaders then had the difficult task of recruiting from the mass of 
27 MS 14170/ 83, Secretary to GM, 15 April 1946; .vol. 82, Secretary to acting mine manager, 13 
August 1946; Spears to Gale and George 27 November 1946. 
28 Cooper (1996), pp. 252-54; Crisp (1984), p. 76. 
29 Austin (1964), p. 69, fn. 36; pp. 70-3. 
30 Austin (1964), pp. 7, 73. 
31 Austin (1964), pp. 3, 11. 
32 Cooper (1996), pp. 126-7; Crisp (1984), pp. 66, 71. 
33 Commissioner of Labour to Colonial Secretary, 10 January 1944, quoted in Crisp (1984), p. 71; 
see also p. 77. 
34 Crisp (1984), p. 77. 
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mine workers who were by this time predominantly from the north of the colony 
and uneducated. The Labour Department unwillingly accepted the union's 
formation to encompass all types of mine workers with an initial membership of 
1,780 (7% of mine workers). 35 One motive for the organization of a general 
miners' strike by the Union in 1947 was to win mass support by proving their 
ability to improve the worker's lot. The success of the pay award that followed 
saw an increase in union membership to 40% in 1947/8. 36 While miners' strikes in 
the 1930s and early 1940s had mostly been isolated and sectionalised the 1947 
general miners' strike marked a turning point in the scale and scope of miners' 
resistance. 
So the aggressive political changes were matched by aggressive action in 
the mining sector and at AGC. But this was not a causal relationship, although the 
phenomena were connected. Nationalism per se was not the concern of the MEU: 
the founding executives made it a point to avoid mixing political issues with their 
main priority of improving the pay and conditions of miners by not striking as part 
of Nkrumah's Positive Action campaign started in 1948.37 Furthermore, there is 
no reason to assume that the significant proportion of Northern Territory and 
foreign workers at the mines shared a nationalist agenda driven by educated 
Akans. 38 
However, the growing militancy throughout the country was connected by 
underlying factors. Increasing primary education contributed to a greater 
awareness of rights,3 ' coupled with knowledge of resistance movements abroad 
publicised in newspapers such as the African Sentinel. 4° Improved road and rail 
transport, telephony and the radio permitted better communication to dispersed 
units which assisted mass organization. Spears reported that: 
the end of the war has also brought about the end of a period. Times have 
changed. There has been a profound evolution. of the African population. 
Obuasi is no longer an isolated spot but in daily touch with other parts of 
the Colony. The natives listen to the wireless and have a picture, however 
35 Ibid. 
3° Crisp (1984), p. 99. 
37 Crisp (1984), pp. 78,101-3. 
38 An estimated 75% of underground workers in 1933-4 were non-Akan: Crisp (1984), p. 62; see 
also pp. 101-2, 114. 
38 For statistics see Austin (1964), pp. 13-15. 
4° Crisp (1984), p. 67. 
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distorted, of the outside world. The needs of the Africans are greater than 
they used to be. They expect more. There are disturbing elements in their 
midst. Questions of welfare, housing, etc. have assumed an importance 
they have not had hitherto.'" 
With an increase in education and information there was a power shift 
away from the traditional elite (the chiefs and the well educated) to the less 
educated commoners. 42 Furthermore, the shared plight over the rising cost of 
living provided a single issue that different elements of society could protest 
against. 
It was upon these underlying characteristics that Nkrumah's break-away 
CPP was able to attach a radical nationalist agenda. With specific reference to 
growing militancy in the mining sector and at AGC certain other factors can be 
added to the foregoing list. In the 1930s mining capital eventually managed to 
coalesce effectively in the Gold Coast Chamber of Mines thanks to AGC's 
membership in 1935 and the creation of the London Advisory Committee of the 
Chamber which was established to lead strategy. 43 The Chamber then started to 
behave in a more united fashion which was significant because it meant that there 
was now a single industry body to hear and decide on grievances. The legalisation 
of trade unions forced the Chamber to negotiate with the newly-formed MEU who 
could now channel diverse complaints. In addition, the government's periodic 
review of minimum wages in the public sector provided a benchmark against 
which miners could compare themselves. 44A11 these external factors exposed the 
fragility of AGC's African labour relations and this was manifested in frequent 
strikes, as the table below shows, and continual threats of strike. 45 
AGC had a long experience of worker resistance. This took many forms, 
the commonest being covert and individual protests such as desertion, 
absenteeism, lateness, indifferent effort, and gold theft. Prior to 1945 there were 
sporadic episodes of more overt, communal resistance in the form of strike action 
that was independently organized without the coordination of any union. As early 
as 1898 there were short stoppages by small sections of the workforce; in 1905 the 
ai SPRS 3/1/38, report on 1945 visit to Obuasi. 
42 Austin (1964), pp.12-17. 
43 MS 14170/64, Secretary to mines manager, 16 July 1935. 
44 Crisp (1984), pp. 88-9. 
45 MS 14170/99, Spears to Edwards 2 and 26 November 1954; vol. 101, Secretary to GM, 16 
September 1955. 
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firewood cutters stopped work over pay; again in 1909 when the whole mine 
protested for increased wages; there were three sectional strikes of hammer boys 
and other underground workers in 1919 over wages and the use of paper currency; 
in 1920 the Central Treatment Plant workers struck over pay; the whole mine 
struck in July 1925 for better pay; in 1934 there were two sectional strikes 
involving some underground workers and the firewood workers over pay and 
other grievances; and two in 1935 involving underground workers and then all 
workers primarily over low wages." Notable features of these strikes were that 
management rarely conceded and that they were not too frequent: between 1898 
and 1944, 46 years, there were twelve or thirteen strikes. 
But between 1945 and 1957 strikes at AGC became more frequent: eleven 
in twelve years. The increase was characteristic of the whole mining industry 
where the lost man days due to industrial action ran between two and three times 
the national average.47 AGC was not the most militant of the mines in this period, 
according to Crisp that notoriety belonged to the Abosso mine where there were 
nineteen strikes between 1950 and 1954 alone." 
AGC's strikes between 1945 and 1957 differed from their experience of 
pre-war labour disputes in that they were generally of longer duration, they often 
extended to all mine departments and were marked by extreme tension, deep 
distrust and occasional violence." They included two lengthy general miners' 
strikes organized by the MEU. 
46 MS 24661/5 circular to shareholders 13 November 1919; Crisp (1984), pp. 19, 31, 37, 44-5, 50, 
58-9. 
4' Crisp (1984), pp. 98, 109. 
48 Crisp (1984), p. 114. 
49 MS 14170/89, Secretary to GM, 20 October 1949; vol. 92, Secretary to George, 1 June 1951; 
vol. 93 cable received from Obuasi, 29 June 1951. AGC sought permission along with other mines 
to stock tear gas grenades to use in case of African riots on mine. Spears wanted to electrify mine 
fences, use non-lethal gas bombs, armour protected vehicles and increase the number of rifles held 
at Obuasi: MS 14170/86, Spears to Rt. Hon. A. Creech Jones, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
23 June 1948; vol.89, acting Secretary to GM, Bibiani, 22 September; Spears to Park, 27 
September 1949. 
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Table 5.5: Strikes affecting AGC, 1945-57 
Strike date and 
duration (where 
known) 
Areas affected Main grievances 
22 Nov — 9 Dec 
1945 
Machine boys initially, 
then all Obuasi depts. 
Wages and the cost of living 
29 Sep — 3 Nov 1947 All Gold Coast mines Wages and the cost of living 
18 Oct-Nov 1949 Underground workers, 
Obuasi 
Wages 
2 days October 1951 Machine boys then spread 
to underground and surface 
In support of a machine boy made 
redundant (with compensation) 
because he had TB 
June 1952 Underground workers and 
Ashanti Times staff 
Newspaper staff retrenchment 
7 —23 July 1952 All underground and most 
surface workers 
Management's sacking of 
'undesirables' 
December 1953 Workers at south and main 
shafts 
Objection to enclosure of shaft areas 
March 1954 Main shaft workers Objection to the introduction of crush 
barriers 
26 Sep- 10 Oct 1955 5,200 out 5,800 African 
workers 
Objection to 26-shift payment system 
20 Nov 1955-28 Feb 
1956 
All Gold Coast mines, then 
AGC-specific from 18 
February 
General miners' strike for improved 
wages, but extended at Obuasi in an 
attempt to gain reassurances that 
strikers would be re-engaged 
1 day, 10 October 
1957 
Unofficial strike of- 
underground workers 
New body search methods introduced 
Source: MS 14170, vols. 80-105; Crisp (1984), ch. 5. 
Strike action can be seen as a form of hold-up where the agents withhold 
their labour services from the principal. The first three strikes were due to 
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dissatisfaction with the main incentive to work, wages. As real wages failed to 
keep up with the rising cost of living worker commitment and morale fell. 
The general miners' strike of 1947 and the Gorman Award imposed by 
government to resolve the dispute marked an important milestone for the fledgling 
Union. Crisp writes that the outcome was "the greatest humiliation ever 
experienced by mining capital in the Gold Coast." 5° The miners received pretty 
much what the Union had demanded - increased minimum wages of 2s/6d -3s/Od 
for underground workers and 2s/Od-2s/6d for surface workers, on a par with the 
award given by the Korsah Committee to government workers a year earlier. In 
addition to the pay improvement, a 45-hour week was imposed along with 
overtime rates, two weeks' annual paid leave for workers with at least a year's 
employment, up to a month's paid sick leave per annum and gratuities for those 
who were forced to leave work due to bad health or who left after serving five 
years or more. 51 The success encouraged further use of the strike weapon to 
achieve worker aims. 
Thanks to the efficacy of the Union in negotiating industry-wide pay 
awards wages ceased to be a major cause of disputes. Whereas over 37% of strike 
action by all miners in the country between 1947-50 had been due to wages, this 
fell to 4.3% between 1951 and 1954, a decline matched by AGC's strike 
experience. From 1950 the principal-agent relationship was afflicted by other 
problems centred on a lack of communication, negotiation and consensus on work 
related changes introduced to effect the mine's policy of retaining fewer but more 
efficient workers. The main cause of strikes as seen in Figure 5.5 then centred on 
perceived injustices stemming from the new labour control strategy. Bearing in 
mind the diversity of the AGC workforce where nearly twenty tribes were 
represented on the payroll and workers also differed in skills, length of service 
and areas of operation, these 'injustice' strikes show a growing sense of 
polarisation from management and worker solidarity. 52 This supports the notion of 
occupational consciousness, rooted no doubt in the shared dangers of mining work. 
The immediate business effect of repeated industrial disruption and wage 
rises was a reduction in productivity and profitability. The tables below show 
5° Crisp (1984), p. 87. 
51 Ibid.; &IS 14170/86, Secretary to GM, 22 April 1948; vol. 87, Secretary to GM, 18 November 
1948. 
52 SPRS3/1/34, 'Memo on the working conditions at the Ashanti mine, West Africa in relation to 
theft of gold', 17 May 1936. 
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increasing costs per African worker without a commensurate increase in output 
per man or profitability per ton of ore mined. 
Table 5.6: African staff numbers and monthly costs: Underground workers* 
Month 
of 
Numbers Total 
earnings 
Earnings 
per man 
Tonnage Tonnage 
/man 
Wage 
cost/ton 
January £ 
1939 1,853 5,206 56s/2d 19,513 10.5 5s/4d 
1943 1,221 3,610 59s/2d 17,500 14.3 4s/2d 
1947 1,871 6,714 73s/11d 16,401 8.8 8s/2d 
1951 2,407 17,322 144s/Od 20,092 8.3 17s/3d 
1952 2,665 18,653 140s/Od 19,500 7.3 19s/ld 
Table 5.7: African staff numbers and monthly costs: underground and 
surface workers* 
Month 
of 
Numbers Total 
earnings 
Earnings 
/ man 
Tonnage Tonnage 
/man 
Wage 
cost/ton 
January £ 
1939 5,857 15,858 54s/2d 19,513 3.3 16s/3d 
1943 5,383 14,475 53s/10d 17,500 3.2 16s/6d 
1947 5,765 21,231 73s/8d 16,401 2.8 25s/10d 
1951 5,249 36,478 138s/11d 20,092 3.8 36s/4d 
1952 5,685 39,317 138s/4d 19,500 3.4 40s/4d 
Table 5.8: The decline in annual profitability and productivity, 1939-53* 
1939 1947 1953 
Tons treated 234,175 194,400 281,031 
Gold ounces 263,427 192,640 180,326 
Gross revenue £1,994,131 £1,661,142 £2,364,963 
Costs/ton 34/6 d 67/7 d 83/5 d 
Profit/ton 135/9 d 103/4 d 84/9 d 
Output/underground worker 10 t 8.2 t 8.2 t 
*Source: MS 14170/94, schedules attached to letter not signed but from Spears to J. I. L. Edwards, 
GM, 12 June 1952. 
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Management decided to address the mine's declining productivity and 
profitability by engaging South African business efficiency consultants, 
Production Engineers Limited, and establishing a work study department. The 
remit was to look at labour utilisation and performance, and budget control. 53 It 
was hoped that the information gathered would allow a reduction in dependence 
on African workers by increasing mechanisation where economical to do so. 
Production Engineers suggested various forms of work re-organization. These 
were experimented with and monitored. This initiative led to significant 
procedural changes, particularly in the organization of underground work: 
streamlined supervision roles, improved grade control (that is, mining delineated 
ore rather than waste rock) and new mine planning techniques. 54 The end of the 
first year of the introduction of work study, 1954/5, saw a reduction in mine 
costs. 55 The success was due to gathering accurate information, knowing clearly 
the desired outcomes and finding the best responses through experimentation. 
Interestingly, training Africans was never seriously acted upon as a solution to 
low productivity. Despite a lot of talk of Africanisation, the company's lack of 
technically qualified Africans reflected management's view, particularly Spears's, 
that the Africans were too lazy to put in the work to pass the needed exams. 56 By 
1955 only three salaried Africans earned more than £600 a year, which compared 
to an underground day labourer's annual income of approximately £80. 57 These 
three most senior Africans were in non-technical, administrative posts, including 
the editor of the Ashanti Times . 58 
Unfortunately for the African workers, the efficacy of their hold-up tactics 
was diminished by the very nature of the services they were withholding — their 
labour had little inherent value or specificity. Virtually all the complaints about 
new labour controls and productivity measures were ignored by AGC's 
management. The efficiency changes were implemented successfully despite the 
strikes. Very little investment had been made by management to improve the 
stock of African human capital, this weakened the power of the strikers to achieve 
their aims. Had there been some asset or investment specificity in the majority of 
ss MS 14170/98, Spears to Edwards, 17 March 1954. 
54 MS 14170/100, consulting engineer to acting mine manager, 29 April 1955. 
55 MS 14170/103, Secretary to Edwards, 4 October 1956. 
56 MS 14170/94, memo by the Chairman to the GM, 6 June 1952. 
'7 Based on 5s/Od per day. 
58 MS 14170/101, Secretary to GM, 17 November 1955. 
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the workforce perhaps management would have done more to avert industrial 
action, rather than react to it. The manual, as opposed to technological, manner of 
mining at Obuasi explained the dispensability of most of the African workers. 59 
 The most skilled segment of AGC's workforce were the underground artisans 
such as the hammer, machine and blast boys. They were the most able to hold up 
the production process, and at times they instigated strikes. Yet, two factors 
diluted their hold-up ability: they were a minority and their skills were basic. 
The failure of the Union to achieve any concessions on behalf of workers 
protesting against management's efficiency drive (a strategy adopted not only at 
AGC but across the Chamber of Mines), led to weakened Union support. 6° 
 Between 1950 and 1954 there was a return to smaller-scale, firm-level strikes as 
in the pre-union days. 
A second general miners' strike in 1955/6 failed to regain support for the 
Union. A new union leader, D. K. Foevie, supported by the CPP in his election, 61 
 decided on this action when wage negotiations came to an impasse in 1954. The 
general strike lasted 90 days, and an extra ten days at AGC. It was not a success 
owing to a lack of support from the CPP and the TUC, and also because the 
owners of the Tarkwa and Abosso mine called the workers' bluff by sacking them 
all and closing operations. Workers drifted back to work at most of the other 
mines by 17 February although the Union did not officially terminate the strike 
until 23 March. Foevie was forced to compromise: to the displeasure of the rank-
and-file miners. Union membership consequently fell to a mere 14% of the mine 
workforce. 62 Pay increases were awarded but not to the level of the union's initial 
demand The government offered £200,000 to the worst off mines to help them 
absorb this added cost. 63 
Between 1945 and 1956 AGC management conceded wage increases 
when they were imposed by the Chamber. The company resented these 
concessions and put the blame on the non-gold producing members of the 
Chamber who could pass the added labour costs onto their product costs, unlike 
gold producers. 64 At AGC increased wages were usually accompanied by the 
" Compare A. Dye, 'Avoiding Hold-Up: Asset Specificity and Technological Change in the 
Cuban Sugar Industry, 1899-1929', Journal of Economic History, 54, 1994, pp. 628-653. 
° Crisp (1984), pp. 111, 116. 
61 Crisp , (1984), p. 113. 
62 Crisp (1984), p. 127. 
" Crisp (1984), p. 119-20. 
64 MS 14170/95, Spears to GMs AGC and Bibiani, 21 August 1952. 
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withdrawal of services and amenities deemed to be non-essential. For example, 
following the industry-wide Gorman pay award, in response to the miners' strike 
of 1947, management decided to stick solely and strictly to this award.65 A review 
of all expenditure on staff in excess of Gorman led to the withdrawal of the 
Christmas Bonus, suspension of building plans to create the Batty Township, and 
suspension of African evening classes. 66 It was hoped that such action would teach 
Africans a lesson that if they hurt the mine by striking then they hurt themselves. ° 
 Management were quick to differentiate between African labour rights and 
privileges. They wanted Africans to appreciate the latter and rarely spoke of their 
rights: "the Africans should realise we are not prepared to continue to give them 
amenities which apparently are accepted as of a right." 68 
The mineworkers readiness to strike indicates that during this turbulent 
time the labour supply for mine work throughout the country was tight: in other 
words, that it would not be that easy for employers to replace them. This is 
supported by the fact that there was a boom in the economy in the early 1950s as 
commodity prices rose and construction projects increased providing alternative 
wage opportunities. Nevertheless, at Obuasi local unskilled labour supply was not 
so restricted, and AGC managed to recruit new workers during the September-
October 1955 strike. 69 The real shortage was in artisans. 70 Management saw a 
silver lining in the general miners' strike that followed because it brought 
financially weaker mines to the point of closure and potentially increased the 
supply of new recruits at Obuasi. 7I Besides the Tarkwa and Abosso mine, three 
other mines closed as a direct result of the 1955/6 strike. 72 
Whereas a class approach to labour history would focus on the 
exploitation of African workers, the principal-agent analysis forces questions to 
be asked about the nature of the intra-firm contract between management and 
workers (including the fact that there was little investment in training or 
technology- see Chapter 6, 'Capital' for details on this) as well as the inter-firm 
relationship (that is, the state of the market for mine workers). Labour competition 
would tend to mean that bad employee conditions would not be tolerated, for 
66 MS 14170/86, Secretary to GM, 22 April 1948. 
66 MS 14170/ 87, Secretary to GM, 18 November 1948. 
67 MS 14170/93, Secretary to acting mine manager, 16 November 1951. 
6° MS 14170/85, Secretary to GM, 12 December 1947. 
69 MS 14170/101, cable to Obuasi, 29 September 1955. 
7° AGC annual report, 1954. 
71 MS 14170/102, Secretary to Edwards, 11 January 1956. 
72 Crisp (1984), p. 133. 
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workers would go elsewhere and therefore the job market would act as a sort of 
regulator of employers. 73 AGC's relative isolation and consequently better labour 
supply conditions than in the Tarkwa region partly explains the dismissive and 
often harsh response given to worker complaints there and the criticisms the firm 
meted out to the Chamber. 
Attempts to resolve capitalist labour problems, 1945-57 
AGC's reaction to labour problems up until 1956 was to attack. The general line 
taken to strike demands was "no appeasement". 74 Spears was always prepared for 
a strike showdown rather than continual submission to Union or Chamber 
demands.75 At the start of the 1947 strike the chairman calculated that sitting it out 
for two weeks without making any concessions would cost AGC less than 
agreeing to the demands. 76 Spears despised the audacity of workers trying to force 
management's hand on anything. 77 This "no appeasement" attitude was apparent 
during several episodes. For example, when Africans threatened to boycott the 
AGC canteen Spears instructed the subsidised facility to be closed in the hope that 
the workers would miss the service. 78 This action would pre-empt any Union 
sense of victory. 79 Again, when the staff of the in-house newspaper the Ashanti 
Times went on strike in June 1952, Spears's reaction was not to address their 
grievances but to threaten to keep the staff locked out or to close the operation. 8° 
The names of strikers were noted. 81 Many were dismissed - 'liquidated' as 
management put it - when the opportunity arose. 82 The Union complained about 
AGC pinpointing and victimising strikers by not re-employing them nor allowing 
them to work in other departments. 83 The government, too, requested the 
73 Clark (1994), p. 130. 
74 MS 14170/95, cable to Obuasi, 16 July 1952. 
75 MS 14170/85 unsigned but Spears to Gale, GM, 29 September 1947. 
76 Ibid., MS 14170/85 unsigned but Spears to Gale, GM, 1 October 1947. 
77 Ibid. 
78 MS 14170/85, Secretary to GM, 9 October 1947; MS 14170/86, Secretary to GM, 15 and 23 
January 1948. 
79 MS 14170/86, Secretary to GM, 15 and 23 January 1948; Secretary to acting mine manager, 31 
May 1948. Some provision was however made for underground workers at the manager's 
discretion. 
MS 14170/94, Spears to Edwards, 20 June 1952; vol. 92: Spears to George, GM, 6 June 1951. 
sl MS 14170/85, acting Secretary to GM, 15 October 1947; vol. 97, Secretary to GM, 19 
November 1953. 
82 MS 14170/95, Spears to GM AGC and Bibiani, 21 August 1952; vol.94, Spears to Edwards, 20 
June 1952; vol. 87, Secretary to Gale, 16 July 1948. 
83 MS 14170/86, Secretary to Gale, GM, 18 March 1948. 
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reinstatement of dismissed workers. 84 However, AGC refused to give any 
reassurances of this kind: management treated industrial action at Obuasi as a 
private matter, not open to government or union intervention without invitation. 85 
Part of AGC's managerial offensive was to encourage defiance of the 
Union. 86 The workers, in particular the salaried African staff, were put on notice 
that if they took part in strikes they would forfeit all benefits and they would be 
put on the bottom pay scale irrespective of length of service, if reengaged at all." 
The fact that some eager workers could be prevented from work through 
intimidation or threats of violence would not be accepted as an excuse. 88 
Management were happy that the small number of salaried Africans kept 
working during the 1955/6 strike, and interpreted this as loyalty. 89 As a reward, 
Spears agreed to consider providing the African senior staff with more housing9° 
 which illustrates the nature of the relationship: one based on bribery and 
privileges rather than rights and responsibilities. A loyalty bonus was also paid to 
these workers and the day labourers who worked throughout the long 1955/6 
strike. 91 These carrot and stick offensive tactics did little to align management-
worker interests, perhaps with the exception of the 150 salaried Africans who 
formed about 3% of the workforce. 
AGC also attempted to improve the flow of information to and from 
management to help resolve the labour problems. Some of these strategies were 
positive and proactive, others were negative and reactive. 
A negative initiative was taken during General Spears's first official visit to 
Obuasi in 1945 which coincided with a strike. A mine detective was appointed, 
followed by the establishment of a spy network to infiltrate Union meetings and 
gather intelligence on strike plans. 92 Regular intelligence reports were sent to 
84 MS 14170/95, cables to Obuasi 8 and 9 October 1952; MS 14170/102, cable received from 
Obuasi, 31 December 1955. 
88 MS 14170/95, cable received from Obuasi 16 July, reply to Obuasi, 17 July 1952; MS 
14170/102, cable received from Spears in Obuasi to London office, 15 February 1956. 
86 MS 14170/85, Secretary to GM, 20 November 1947. 
87 MS 14170/89, Spears to George, 1 December 1949; MS 14170/95, Secretary to Edwards, 22 
August 1952. 
8 ' MS 14170/88, cable to Obuasi, 24 March 1949. 
86 MS 14170/101, cable to Obuasi 7 October 1955. 
90 MS 14170/101, unsigned but Spears to Edwards 31 October 1955. 
91 MS 14170/102, unsigned but Spears to Norman, acting mine manager, 1 May 1956. 
92 MS 14170/81 Secretary to GM, 3 December 1945. 
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London by the European head of security. 93 European staff were encouraged to 
learn African languages primarily because of the intelligence advantages that this 
would give management. 94 The mines at Obuasi and Bibiani investigated 
purchasing and training carrier pigeons to be used during strikes to communicate 
intelligence. 95 This was a negative development in the sense that it did not foster 
trust nor promote the flow of information from management to workers. 
A major realisation during the early post-war strikes was that management 
were not clear what the workers' grievances were due to the absence of 
recognised communication channels. 96 The benefits of opening formal, two-way 
communication channels were apparent, but AGC did not want to accept that this 
would be in the form of the Union. A dearth of information at the worker level, as 
well as the merits of providing this, was seen when the Chamber in a meeting with 
the Union discussed the proportion of mine income going to the government in 
taxation, and the little direct benefit provided by the government to Africans from 
this income. By all accounts the union members were shocked by this revelation. 
Spears immediately saw the opportunity to present the government rather than 
management as the devil, and he considered how this could be transmitted to 
headmen underground, and possibly all workers, but not via the Union. 97 
Spears was angered by the Chamber's acknowledgement of and negotiations 
with the Union. He felt it would only strengthen the union leaders and wondered 
why the Chamber should "lead the enemy to coalesce".98 Spears believed that the 
Union was a fashion despite the fact that it had government support and ILO 
backing. He hoped to divide and rule by not assisting union administration in any 
way, for example, by not allowing the deduction of dues from wages, and he 
hoped a rival mines union would arise to compete with the Union.99 In fact, when 
intelligence reported a possible split in the Union with a breakaway of Northern 
Territory miners Spears encouraged the mine management to assist such a splinter 
93 The Ashanti Times editor also sent local news paper cuttings and political intelligence reports - 
MS 14170/86, Secretary to acting mine manager 28 May 1948; vol. 88 Secretary to GM, 38 April 
1949. 
94 MS 14170/82, Secretary to acting mine manager 29 July 1946, 5 September 1946; vol. 85, 
Secretary to GM, 17 February 1947. 
w MS 14170/88, Spears to George 5 May 1949; MS 14170/89, Secretary to Bibiani Ltd 19 July 
1949. 
96 MS 1170/89, Secretary to GM, 20 December 1949. 
97 MS 14170/85, Spears to Gale, GM, 15 September 1947. 
98 MS 14170/86, Spears to Gale 10 February 1948; Robert Annan, London Advisory Committee 
member of the Chamber to Spears 9 February 1948. 
99 MS 14170/95, Spears to GM, AGC and Bibiani 21 August 1952. 
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group behind the scenes. m° AGC resisted the unionisation of the mine's police 
force, and to that end considered recruiting policemen from Ivory Coast in an 
attempt to avoid the building up of solidarity with the union. 1°1 Management 
refused leave for staff to attend trade union courses or to subsidise such 
courses. 102 While AGC were legally unable to prevent the establishment of an 
Obuasi branch of the Union the company set up two alternative internal 
institutions to compete with the Union: departmental committees and the Senior 
Staff Association. 
Departmental committee meetings were set up as a forum for labour-
management discussions following the 1945 strike. They were not open to any 
union involvement, and only selected Africans from various departments were 
appointed to participate. Each committee was run by the European head of 
department. The African committee members wore special badges to identify 
them as such. The general mines manager sat on some of these committees such 
as the Wages Committee and Canteen Committee. 103 Spears argued that this 
arrangement would bring African worker and European manager closer than a 
trade union would, using the excuses that the Gold Coast African was not at a 
stage of development to sensibly employ the trade union institution, and that 
unionism portended socialism. 504 AGC refused to register the departmental 
committee members with the Labour Department or to submit the ballot of 
nominees to these committees to the supervision of the Labour Officer. Spears 
threatened to abolish the departmental committee mechanism altogether rather 
than subject it to government interference. Committee members would continue to 
be appointed by managers until a point in the future when Spears felt that the 
workers would be ready to elect their own representatives. 105 These committee 
meetings were not well attended by Africans and they were held irregularly 
despite London's repeated reminders to the general manager to ensure that they 
lo° MS 14170/102, unsigned but Spears to Norman, acting mine manager, 17 April 1955. 
101 MS 14170/94, unsigned but Spears to Edwards, GM, 26 February 1952; Spears 'Notes by the 
Chairman to both Mine Mangers and Colonel Bean' following establishment of joint Union and 
Chamber fact finding committee, 5 June 1952. 
102 MS 14170/94, unsigned but Spears to Edwards, GM, 5 March 1952. 
1°3 MS 14170/83, Secretary to GM, 5 February 1946; vol. 82, Secretary to GM, 10 December 1946. 
104 MS 14170/82, Spears to GM, 19 December 1946. 
105 MS 14170/83, OGR Williams of Colonial Office to Spears, 24 May, and Spears to GM, Gale, 
28 May 1946; vol. 84, Spears to Williams 27 May 1946; Secretary to GM, Gale 6 June 1946; vol. 
84, Secretary to acting mine manager, 23 June 1947. 
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took place. 1°6 In addition to the Commissioner of Labour's disapproval of the 
AGC committees the Union also expressed discontent with this AGC-specific 
institution and threatened strike action if they were not abandoned. 1°7 
The departmental committee arrangement was given another tier in the 
form of a management committee consisting of two African members from each 
department committee with the general manager. It was hoped that this would 
improve communication lines. 108 Again, the desire of African workers to receive 
more information was apparent when the general manager took committee 
members on a tour of the property highlighting all the new projects and giving a 
picture of the entire operation. According to the manager this was appreciated by 
the Africans. 109 No doubt it helped them to see for the first time how and where 
their particular roles fitted into the larger picture. The episode showed how top-
down information could contribute towards a common understanding and purpose, 
which are prerequisites for worker commitment. 
As explained above, it was only from 1947 that some salaried Africans 
were put on formal employment agreements. Management then started to think 
seriously about pensions, retirement homes, housing for first and second grade 
senior Africans on contract, incremental pay scales and qualification requirements 
for promotion. 110 From 1949 a directive was given that no long-service African 
could be sacked by department heads without the possibility of appeal to the 
general manager. 111 In 1950 an association was established for the African 
salaried staff with the condition that members were prohibited from joining, or 
remaining members of, the Union. The Salaried Staff Association (SSA) was put 
on a more formal footing in 1954 when it was registered as a trade union with a 
constitution. 112  A clause banning Union membership was added to the 
constitution, rather than to members' employment agreements. 113 For this 
renunciation of Union rights management further offered African senior staff a 
to Gale, GM, 13 May 1947; Secretary to acting GM, 17 June 1947; vol. 
manager 7 December 1951; vol. 100 Secretary to GM, 23 June 1955. 
to acting mine manager, 7 August 1947; MS 14170/87, Spears to 
September 1948. 
to GM, 13 August 1948. 
to GM, 21 April 1950. 
to George, GM, 25 March 1949. C.f. Cooper (1996), pp. 332-6. 
Ibid. 
112 MS 1,4170/99, unsigned but Spears to Edwards, 20 May 1954; R.J. Vile, Colonial Office to 
Spears, 20 May 1954; in 1954 the SSA was also permitted to elect its own officials. 
113 MS 14170/99, unsigned but Spears to Edwards, 20 may 1954; Oliver Lyttelton to Spears, 1 
June 1954. 
106 MS 14170/84, Secretary 
93 Secretary to acting mine 
IO2 MS 14170/85, Secretary 
George, GM, of Bibiani, 28 
1 " MS 14170/87, Secretary 
109 MS 14170/90, Secretary 
110 MS 14170/88, Secretary 
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level of gratuities in excess of the Gorman rate, and scholarship and mine school 
opportunities for their children. 114 Senior staff employment agreements were 
endorsed in 1953 with a clause making it clear that their salaries were not subject 
to Union wage negotiations. 115 
The SSA was immediately viewed by management as the sole negotiating 
body with the workforce. 116 A distinction was made between senior salaried 
Africans and other salaried Africans, the latter being referred to as Affiliated 
Members of the Salaried Staff Association. Only senior salaried Africans were 
guaranteed employment contracts. 
The Union considered action against this new institution following the 
mine management's refusal to allow Union members to be present during SSA 
meetings. 1° However, AGC managed to win government support here. The 
Colonial Office came round to the SSA institution in the interests of 
Africanisation as Spears used its existence and growth as proof of the increasing 
number of Africans in senior roles (although AGC did not inform the Colonial 
Office of their desire to cap the number of Africans in this category to just 50 to 
maintain the 'sought-afteredness' of these agreements !) 118 When the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies informed AGC that the SSA would have to be registered as 
a trade union some sticky issues arose. Spears remained adamant that the 
association would not be allowed to join the TUC nor affiliate itself to the Union; 
if, however, SSA dues were to be collected from salaries then AGC would be 
obliged to do the same for Union members, something they had resisted since 
1944. 1° The SSA had no credibility with the majority of the African workforce. 
They were viewed as blacklegs and quickly became identified with "them" not 
"us". 12° Hence, in the period under discussion, the SSA did not help to avoid 
industrial unrest. 121 
114 MS 14170/90, Directive 7, Spears to George, 3 January 1950; vol. 91 Secretary to acting mine 
manager, September 1950; vol. 92, unsigned but Spears to George, 13 March 1951. 
115 CAST had a similar provision in their employment contracts with senior Africans (that 
company had an altogether more responsive attitude to unionisation than AGC — Stockwell [2000], 
p. 185); MS 14170/97, Secretary to GM, 12 October 1953; vol. 98, unsigned but Spears to 
Edwards, 26 April 1954. 
116 MS 14170/98, unsigned but Spears to Edwards, 26 April 1954. 
117 MS 14170/90, Secretary to GM, 29 June 1950. 
118 MS 14170/99, RJ Vile, Colonial Office to Spears 20 May 1954; MS 14170/93, Secretary to GM, 
20 December 1951; MS 14170/91, Secretary to GM, 3 November 1950. 
11 ' MS 1,4170/99, unsigned by Spears to Edwards, 9 October and 24 November 1954. 
120 MS 14170/95, Secretary to GM, 9 October 1952. 
121 Spears's senior staff association endured as an institution parallel to the unionisation of junior 
members of staff up to 2004 and his departmental committees persisted at least until 1967. 
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Another, more subtle, strategy used by the mine in an attempt to align 
worker interests to management's was to try to bridge the cultural gap between 
Africans and European management and to forge a new mine culture peculiar to 
the firm. This had several prongs. 
Spears and Colonel Bean, the head of the Chamber, devised a plan to give 
the Asantehene an interest (presumably financial) in the mine with the hope that 
his influence would encourage Africans to be less militant: 22 They sought the 
Asantehene's advice and support in the matter of sacking known strike 
agitators. 123 The Asantehene and government officials were also invited to a 
Durbar Day when workers were given a paid holiday. 
Mines Day was another cultural innovation by Spears. It was a holiday for 
workers, aimed to build camaraderie and loyalty, and above all to let Africans 
know how much they needed AGC as an employer. 124 The main speech on the 
first Mines Day in August 1947 was written in London by the consulting engineer, 
G.W.E. Turner, for the GM to deliver. The speech used the patronising and 
paternalistic analogy of the mine as a mother and the employees as "good 
children", it urged African workers to be "proud to say I am a Corporation Boy" 
and called for unity among the mine community — between Africans and 
Europeans, and between all staff and management. 125 
In 1946 Spears started the Ashanti Times as an in-house newspaper (it was 
later circulated in Accra and Kumasi as well as Bibiani and Obuasi). It was seen 
by Spears as "an extremely powerful instrument", the "main purpose" of which 
was to "provide a platform from which the African would gradually be brought to 
realise the importance of the Mines to their welfare". 126 It was hoped the paper 
would improve labour relations, provide a management communication outlet and 
foster a sense of community by, for example, praising good workers and 
advertising production achievements. 127 London's control over the biased content 
of the Ashanti Times did not bode well for the paper's performance, however 
powerful a tool management considered it to be. The paper ran at a loss with poor 
circulation figures and was frequently boycotted by Africans: 28 The paper was a 
122 MS 14170/86, Spears to Gale, 23 March 1948. 
123 MS 14170/87, Secretary to Gale, 16 July 1948. 
124 MS 14170/82, Secretary to acting mine manager, 18 October 1946 
125 MS 14170/84, speech attached to Secretary to acting GM, 12 June 1947. 
126 MS 14170/85, Spears to Gale, GM, 15 September 1947. 
127 MS 14170/84, Spears to BC Freestone, editor Ashanti Times, 14 May 1947. 
128 Stockwell (2000), pp. 182-3. 
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failed attempt to shape the mine's culture away from militancy towards unity. 
(Lonrho stopped its publication in 1970). 
The most obvious way to overcome principal-agent problems is to incentivise 
the agents appropriately. AGC tried many forms of incentives with varying 
degrees of success. Non-pecuniary incentives included the award of leather bound 
certificates for long service, 129 Good Conduct, Long Service and Valour 
badges, 13° a Roll of Honour board for outstanding work done by members of 
staff, 131 welfare provisions such as accommodation, 132 the provision of foodstuffs 
such as rice at cost and a canteen, 133 an antenatal and child welfare centre, 134 
 leisure facilities such a library for African staff and instruments for a mine 
band, 138 boy scouts and girl guides associations in Obuasi, 136 and an African Club 
for socialising. 137 
There were also performance incentives. A bonus to Africans based on 
production was introduced for the first time for underground workers, and in the 
fuel and fitting departments, from December 1946. 138 The production bonus was 
to be based on efficiency rather than simple output, to reflect extra effort, for 
example tons per shift boy underground rather than total tonnage. 139 To improve 
teamwork and efficiency underground a suggestion was made for a joint African 
and European bonus scheme based on team performances during shifts. 140 
Headmen's team bonuses earned were displayed at the mine head. 141 An accident 
bonus scheme was also tried. 142 
Management were aware of the moral hazards associated with bonuses. A 
shaft sinking bonus (proposed for European staff ) was abandoned because it 
could detract attention from maintenance to the detriment of safety and could lead 
to the neglect of other work areas. 143A lot of consideration went into designing 
129 MS 14170/81 GWE Turner to GM, 17 October 1945. 
130 MS 14170/82, Secretary to GM, 12 July 1946; vol. 88 Secretary to GM, 26 April 1949. 
131 MS 14170/87, Secretary to Gale, 9 July 1948. 
132 MS 14170/82, Secretary to GM, 16 July 1946. 
133 MS 14170/82, Secretary to acting mine manager, 29 July and 3 October 1946. 
134 MS 14170/82, Spears to GM, 27 November, 1946. 
135 MS 14170/82, Secretary to acting mine manager, 29 July 1946. 
136 MS 14170/83, Secretary to GM, 3 January 1946. 
137 MS 14170/88, cable to mine, 23 June 1949; Secretary to acting mine manager, Norman, 30 
June 1949. 
138 MS 14170/84, Secretary to GM, 23 January 1947; 26 February 1947. 
139 MS 14170/84, Secretary to GM, 1 May 1947. 
140 MS 14170/86, Park, consulting engineer to Gale, GM, 10 March 1948. 
141 MS 14170/98, Spears to Edwards, 12 March 1954 
142 MS 14170/102, Secretary to acting mine, 1 June 1956. 
143 MS 14170/88, Secretary to GM, 30 April 1949. 
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bonus schemes to not only increase earnings but to also reduce costs and to set the 
thresholds high enough to maximise effort. 144 
Although the consulting engineer acknowledged that focusing on perks 
and bonuses would not be enough to satisfy either Europeans nor Africans and 
that attractive basic pay was needed, 145 this does not appear to have been the view 
of General Spears. Were it not for industry-wide pay awards AGC would not have 
taken the initiative to raise African pay levels. Even these increases were aimed to 
primarily meet the cost of food (over 50% of the daily wage would be spent on 
food), 146 rather than to signal an attractive basic pay. 
When AGC started operations in 1898 they did so with minimal 
government labour or mining regulations. This changed with the creation of the 
Mines Department in 1903 and markedly so from the 1940s. External regulation 
forced internal changes in the management-labour relationship. The establishment 
of a Labour Department in the Gold Coast, the legalisation of trade unionism, the 
Workmen's Compensation Act which took effect from January 1942 and provided 
a payment scale for work-related accidents and deaths for those earning less than 
£300 per annum; and the Labour Amendment Ordinance 1949 which set out a 
minimum gratuity scheme for daily paid workers, all forced AGC and other 
employers to improve work conditions. 
Another external factor influencing the capitalist-labour relationship was 
the development in communication technology. By this period the company were 
able to make use of air mail and telephone links. However, cables or telexes 
remained the preferred choice of communication because of the speed (24-hour 
receipt) and the paper trail left behind (a major disadvantage of telephone use). 
Ironically, communication between London and Africa did not pose as severe a 
problem as communication in Africa between managers and workers. This 
suggests that physical distance was not at the heart of AGC's labour turmoil. 
A change in strategy 
The 1955/6 strike which lasted three months was a watershed in labour relations. 
Its sheer duration and the crippling effect it had on the Tarkwa and Abosso mine 
(in which AGC held substantial shares) forced management to accept that their 
144 MS 14170/88, Secretary to acting mine manager, 30 June 1949. 
145 MS 14170/86, Park, consulting engineer to Gale, GM, 10 March 1948. 
146 MS 14170/103, Secretary to Edwards, 20 August 1956. 
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"no appeasement" approach, in fact their fundamental attitude towards their 
African workforce, had to change. From this date London tried to avoid discontent, 
rather than react to it. 147 
African Personnel Officers were appointed for the first time for each mine 
shaft, 148 and an African assistant was attached to the European Welfare Officer. 149 
 The African personnel officers were given the responsibility of dealing with 
investigations and dismissals for absenteeism. 150African workers were no longer 
to be referred to as 'boys' unless they actually were juveniles. 151 New compound 
housing, not just senior staff housing, was to be provided as a matter of urgency, 
and withdrawn amenities were re-introduced such as the English evening 
classes. 152 The African Club was resuscitated with permission for a swimming 
pool and Union involvement in its management committee. 153 
Spears and his management team came to realise that opposition to the 
Union was more costly than cooperation. Ghana's political independence as a new 
reality may also have contributed to the change in the chairman's attitude towards 
the workers. AGC agreed reluctantly to give a table to the Union on pay day to 
allow them to collect dues. 154 Spears also decided to extend free health treatment 
to a limited number of Obuasi branch union members and their immediate 
families. 155 
Soon after Independence, the head of the Union, Foevie, met "amiably" 
with the London Advisory Committee of the Chamber. 156 Spears seized the 
opportunity to build bridges and, after seeing the positive effect that a £500 gift 
from the Chamber to the Union made, asked the Obuasi General Manager for 
suggestions to keep the union sweet. 157 Spears himself suggested cash gifts to the 
Obuasi Union officials no doubt to buy a sense of obligation from them, and this 
147 MS 14170/103, Secretary to GM, 5 October 1956. 
148 MS 14170/102, unsigned but Spears to Norman, acting mine manager, 14 June 1956. 
149 MS 14170/102, Secretary to GM, 29 June 1956 
15° MS 14170/103, Secretary to GM, 16 November 1956 
151 MS 14170/103, unsigned but Spears to Edwards 2 August 1956. 
152 MS 14170/103, Secretary to GM, 25 October 1956 
153 MS 14170/104, Secretary to acting GM, 10 January 1957; Secretary to GM, 18 April 1957; vol. 
105 Secretary to R . Wilson, GM, of Bibiani, 28 November 1957. 
'54 MS 14170/103, Spears to GM, 10 December 1956; vol. 104, unsigned but Spears to Brown, 
GM, 14 June 1957 
155 MS 14170/104, unsigned but Spears to Brown, GM, 29 April 1957. 
156 MS 14170/105, Spears to Brown, 2 July 1957. 
' 57 Ibid. 
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quickly generated a cooperative relationship on the mine. 158 The rapprochement 
was two-sided: in a letter from Foevie to Spears the union leader hoped for better 
future relations, acknowledging AGC's influence and therefore the importance of 
Spears's advice. 159 
This new attitude towards the Union and the African workforce in general 
was put to the test when underground staff went on an unofficial one-day strike in 
1957. They were protesting against the introduction of rubber gloves used during 
body searches. The strike was quickly resolved by management modifying the 
procedure, and expressing willingness to make searches as tolerable as possible, 
and the promise to purchase metal detectors from America. 160 In place of the "no 
appeasement" attitude a more pragmatic view was taken as it was appreciated that 
the cost of a strike was greater than any gold that body searching would 
uncover. 161 
Heated debates between management and the Union continued over shop 
stewards, a closed shop policy, and individual firm versus industry-wide mine 
wage bargaining. Nevertheless, 1957 saw the start of the merger of Union and 
management interests: the Union became part of management, and often spoke of 
the same aims such as worker discipline, productivity and industrial prosperity. 162 
 Official industrial action across Ghana dramatically cooled following 
Independence, particularly among mine workers who were only responsible for 
7% of man days lost from strikes between 1956 and 1960. 163 The unpleasant 
experience of the 1955/6 general strike left both the Union and the Chamber eager 
to avoid protracted conflicts in the future. The fragility of mine finances, as 
evidenced by the four mines that closed during 1955/6 and threats by other mines 
that they too would be forced to follow suit, concentrated minds. Other factors 
help to explain the retreat of the Union. The CPP successfully co-opted the TUC 
as a branch of the political party with responsibility to avoid industrial protests as 
they would hamper Nkrumah's economic policies. The Industrial Relations Act 
1958 effectively made strikes illegal by requiring unions to submit to arbitration 
158 Ibid.; MS 14170/105, Spears to Brown 16 July, 11 September 1957. in 1964 the MWU Branch 
Secretary and Chairman at Obuasi were promoted to Personnel Officer and Shift Boss 
respectively; as senior salaried staff they were now obliged to quit the Union and did so, leaving it 
weakened — Crisp (1984), p. 140. 
b9 MS 14170/105, Foevie to Spears 6 July 1957. 
160 MS 14170/105, cables received from Obuasi 11, 12 October 1957. 
161 MS 14170/105, Spears to Norman acting mine manager 28 October 1954. 
162 Crisp (1984), pp. 127, 134. 
162 This was considerably less than the period 1948 to 1951 when the miners 70,522 man-days lost 
was more than twice the average in the colony: Crisp (1984), pp. 98, 129. 
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rather than strike action. Under this law all unions were brought under the 
umbrella of the TUC. 164 Although initially reluctant, the renamed Mine Workers 
Union (MWU), conformed. The Union leadership was gradually replaced by CPP 
supporters and elections were done away with. Foevie himself moved from 
serving labour's interests to serving capital's when he was appointed managing 
director of the State Gold Mining Corporation and head of the Chamber, while 
retaining the Life General Secretary role of the Union. 165 
However, as the economy deteriorated under Nkrumah, the Union's 
atrophy could not prevent the rank-and-file miners from protesting. Covert, 
individual methods of resistance gradually increased and there was a return to 
sporadic, collective strike action at individual mines, although these were illegal. 
There was unofficial strike action at AGC in 1964. When the NLC and Progress 
Party disappointingly failed to improve the workers lot there was a further 
increase in industrial militancy of a particularly violent nature as the cost of living 
once again rose beyond wage increases. 166 At AGC police shot four dead during 
the strike of 1969, and further unrest occurred in 1970. 167 There were no major 
strikes at AGC until 1977. The late 1970s also witnessed low labour productivity 
and rising incidents of gold theft as the economy rapidly declined. 168 Informal 
resistance persisted at AGC throughout the economic crisis years of the early 
1980s contributing to the repeated failure of the mine to meet its production 
targets, frequent dismissals for absenteeism and gold theft. 169 A decade of 
improved labour relations and productivity was experienced between 1986 and 
1996 which mirrored the positive political economy effects of Structural 
Adjustment from 1986 and a return to democratic rule in 1992. AGC faced 
shareholder pressures from its drive to achieve one million ounces following the 
flotation in 1994. Adverse changes in the world gold price then necessitated 
retrenchment and renewed efficiency drives. These factors contributed to an 
increase in worker resistance culminating in a costly twelve-day strike in May 
1999 over pay. 17° A wave of strikes that year among civil servants, hospital and 
164 Crisp (1984), pp. 128-9. 
165 Crisp (1984), pp. 133-4, 137. 
166 Crisp (1984), pp. 151, 153. 
167 SPRS 3/60/5, memo from Powers, 8 March 1969; 3/60/1, Spears file note, 9 September 1969; 
3/61/1, Spears to Busia, 17 June 1970. 
168 Crisp (1984), pp. 172-5. 
169 Board minutes, GH, 9 July 1980; 20 January 1982; 17 February, 19 May, 11 August, 1 
December 1983; 14 August 1984. 
170 Board minutes, GH, 27 July 1999; AGC annual report, 1999. 
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university workers also reflected the Ghanaian economy's new difficulties of 
inflation and stagnant growth which reduced real wages. 
Analysis of the period 1945-57 
The institutionalisation of annual wage negotiations between the Union and 
Chamber removed the commonest cause of friction in the principal-agent 
relationship. This mechanism enabled information on the cost of living and the 
state of the global gold market to 116 regularly factored into pay incentives. Prior 
to this external development it was very difficult for AGC managers to appreciate 
the average African's economic needs — General Spears appeared genuinely 
shocked to learn about the predicament of an employee of seventeen years' loyal 
service who could not afford to buy a decent suit of clothes. 171 The wage 
negotiations also helped union representatives to appreciate the cost constraints 
facing the industry. 
Information asymmetries were suffered by both the principals and the 
agents. It seems that a major cause of this was not distance or technological 
barriers but culture and ideology. Lovejoy and Richardson provide an account of 
how culture can impact principal-agent costs. They show how the institution of 
pawning served to lower principal-agent costs in the slave trade. 172 The 
importance of "historical, cultural, political, and social processes" in contract 
enforcement is also highlighted by Greif in connection to transaction costs and 
exchange. 173 This notion is also applicable to the formal and informal contracts 
establishing principal-agent relationships. There were three key points of cultural 
or ideological divergence that AGC's management and workforce struggled to 
reconcile in the immediate post-war years: capitalism versus trade unionism; 
European superiority versus African; and imperialism versus nationalism. 
On these topics AGC's dominant figure, Spears, set the general tone for 
management. His views about unionism were apparent from the evidence cited 
above. In connection to nationalism, Spears was quick to use the Ashanti Times to 
publicise any news stories of mismanagement or irregularities at the hands of 
Africans, for example at the Union and the Cocoa Marketing Board's purchasing 
171 MS 14170/99, Spears to Edwards, 22 December 1954. 
172 P. Lovejoy and D. Richardson, 'Pawns Will Live When Slaves is Apt to Die: Credit, Slaving, 
and Pawnship at Old Calabar', LSE Dept of Economic History Discussion Paper No 38, 1997. 
173 A. Greif, 'Contracting, Enforcement and Efficiency: Economics Beyond the Law', Annual 
World Bank Conference on Development Economics, 1996, p. 262. 
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company. This was presented as proof that the Gold Coast was not ready for self-
government. 174 The Ashanti Times was not allowed to publish anything that would 
put the British monarchy or British business in a bad light. 175 Regarding racial 
prejudice, there is some evidence of this at management level. Spears's attitude 
reflected that of many colonial administrators, 176 namely that Africans were not 
on the whole intellectually capable for positions of responsibility: in an article 
penned by him for the Ashanti Times he stressed the importance for Africans to 
learn to obey and know their limitations; he praised lowly, menial workers such as 
the sweepers, hewers and water drawers, the implication being that this was the 
role appropriate for Africans to play in the grand scheme of things. 177 The 
condescending and offensive tone of this article, as well as other comments in his 
correspondence, 178 goes a long way to explain the difficult labour relations in this 
period and AGC's pathetic progress with Africanisation. 179 Racial prejudice 
explains why Italians, Maltese and South Africans were targeted for technical 
positions rather than prioritising African training despite the massive cost savings 
that using Africans would have made. 186 
Spears's military background may account for the bellicose stance that the 
company held for over a decade in the face of labour problems. He failed during 
this time to bring the Union "to heel" via confrontation, 181 eventually succeeding 
through subtler means of financial corruption and favourable external 
developments. That the Union was brought on-side did not remove worker 
discontent and it was seen how the principal-agent relationship in this regard was 
primarily moulded by the state of the general economy and the miners' cost of 
living. Resistance was not predicated on the union institution. 
174 MS 14170/94, Spears 'Notes by the Chairman to both Mine Mangers and Colonel Bean' 
following establishment of joint Union and Chamber fact finding committee, 5 June 1952; Ashanti 
Times leader for 6 June 1952; vol. 101, Hansard enclosure in Secretary to GM, 2 December 1955. 
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177 MS 14170/90, article attached to acting Secretary to GM, 24 March 1950. 
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period of decolonization, pp. 171-6. 
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Mine workers had to await the development of labour laws to define and 
secure their rights - for example, with respect to sick pay and accident liability. 
Interestingly though, AGC's case showed that in a situation of virtually no laws, 
the company and workers were able to operate in a manner conducive to growth 
and profit until the post-World War II period. I82 It was the transition period 
-from few laws to many - that caused the greatest tension in capitalist labour 
exchange at the mine. 
Summary 
Informal, formal, direct and indirect attempts to mitigate principal-agent problems 
at AGC were attempted with varying degrees of success. The power struggle 
between management and the workforce appeared to be resolved with a 'merger' 
of Union and management interests and the growth of a patriotic ideology that 
was anti-industrial unrest. However, rank-and-file workers exercised their ability 
to protest in the same ways as they had done prior to the creation of a miners' 
union. They were prompted to do so in reaction to economic hardships and in 
solidarity for perceived injustices imposed by management. 
Agency theory revealed that for capital to extract a surplus from labour it 
has to surmount certain difficulties. The ability of capital to make labour work in 
a way satisfactory to it is not automatic nor certain because free labour starts with 
knowledge and control advantages over capital. In order to mould labour to 
capital's wishes costly mechanisms such as increased supervision and security, 
and a conducive external environment such as labour competition and state 
support, are needed. Sometimes these imperatives are too costly or unfavourable 
leading to the failure of enterprises. Besides the closure of four mines in 1955/6, 
South African capital had withdrawn much of its investment in the Gold Coast in 
1913 after four years of effort failed to procure from government the labour 
control regulations they deemed vital for profitability. I83 
The bias in Marxian and class historians' support of labour is avoided by a 
principal-agent analysis of the social relations of production. In Crisp's seminal 
work on Ghanaian miners' struggles he admiringly concludes: "Ghana's mine 
182 Compare the case of successful early sugar investors in eastern Cuba who benefited from the 
initial absence of well developed property rights: A. Dye, 'Avoiding Hold-Up: Asset Specificity 
and Technological Change in the Cuban Sugar Industry, 1899-1929', Journal of Economic History, 
54, 1994, pp. 628-653. 
183 Crisp (1984), pp. 38-41. 
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workers have been engaged in a determined struggle to resist their exploitation 
and subordination. Obstructing and defying the relentless efforts of capital and 
state to control their activities, the mine workers have persistently asserted their 
autonomy, displaying a degree of militancy and solidarity rare amongst African 
workers". 184 The words reflect the book's lack of criticism of the actions of the 
rank-and-file protesters while mine capital and the state are less favourably 
portrayed. Yet, if labour demonstrates resistance to the extreme then there would 
be no employment for them at all, as was seen at the Tarkwa and Abosso mine. 
The crux of principal-agent theory is the alignment of interests. This demands 
compromise, a convergence of needs, or stated differently, a reduction (rather than 
elimination ) of labour's natural knowledge and control advantages coupled with 
the augmentation of capital's visibility. This necessary trade-off between capital 
and labour is not obvious in the Marxian/class approach. 
The analysis showed too that power in the workplace is not one-sided, it 
shifted between capital and labour. Between 1945 and 1956 labour had the upper 
hand. AGC's profitable survival shows that it eventually obtained and retained 
sufficient control over the workforce to stay in business, but not on its original 
terms. Management was forced to take a more moderate and accommodating 
stance towards the workforce. 
A matrix of intra- and inter-firm conditions determine the nature of 
capital-labour relationship at any one time. Again, principal-agent adds to the 
Marxian approach by making the contracting environment an integral part of the 
analysis. The labour market, the state of the gold industry and the changing laws 
and institutions of the contracting environment were critical aspects of this 
analysis. 
A limitation of the principal-agent approach, however, was seen in the 
concept of solidarity. Since this approach focuses on the interface between capital 
and labour it offers less insight into important developments within capital, or 
within labour. By treating each category as a homogenous unit, pertinent 
cleavages and conflicts within are lost. Class analysis is better able to explain the 
phenomenon of solidarity-building. 
1 " Crisp (1984), p. 179. 
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CHAPTER 6: CAPITAL 
FROM WEALTH TO THE BRINK OF BANKRUPTCY 
This chapter looks at changes in the sources, structure, uses and productivity of 
capital over the history of Ashanti Goldfields. It will be shown that a late change 
from reliance on equity to reliance on debt put the company's independence at 
greater risk.` Nevertheless, for most of the company's history capital was used 
productively. Profit generation rather than the redistribution of economic rent 
distinguished AGC from its competitors. The extreme distortion of markets and 
prices by Ghanaian governments in the 1970s and 1980s directly impacted the use 
of capital relative to other factors of production. In terms of earnings distribution, 
the government's direct financial gains from the company's activities varied over 
time, sometimes to the detriment of operations. AGC shareholders fared very well 
if the company's entire history of real share price change and dividend income is 
considered. 
Capital is viewed broadly and considered in three respects: company finance, the 
capital intensity of production and the social distribution of earnings. The section 
on company finance looks at the sources of funding available to AGC namely 
equity, debt and retained earnings, the changing proportions of these and the 
implications of such change on the firm's longevity. This is followed by an 
examination of the capital intensity of production which focuses on ACC's 
investment in capital relative to that in labour and land. The last section assesses 
the distribution of AGC earnings among two prominent stakeholders: the 
shareholders and the government, and again, the relationship this had to the firm's 
survival. 
Company Finance 
Equity was the predominant source of external finance for AGC. Virtually no 
long-term debt was assumed until the mid-1980s. The mine's geological wealth 
and, for the most part, careful production planning permitted reliable cash 
generation. AGC was not only profitable for most of its history but also cash-rich. 
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This changed from 1996 when increasing reliance was put on cash generation 
from the hedging programme (rather than solely from production). As debt and 
capital outlays rose with multinational expansion AGC's financial footing became 
increasingly precarious. 
Equity 
AGC was incorporated on 25 May 1897 with an authorised share capital of 
250,000 shares at £1 par value. Priority was given to family and friends of the 
founding directors in the share allocation and £64,000 was quickly raised.' A 
further 50,000 shares were allocated as fully paid to the Cote D'Or Company 
shareholders who had funded Cade's reconnaissance trip. Shares were soon 
trading at a premium, 2 and as subsequent tranches were issued the shares were 
over-subscribed. 3 A mining student who worked at AGC in the summer of 1900 
commented in his memoirs that AGC's mine was "creating quite a stir in financial 
circles". 4 By 1903 there were 1,961 shareholders.5 The issued shares were divided 
in February 1904 from 155,000 at £1 each to 775,000 at 4s each as it was felt that 
investors preferred smaller denominations. 
The remainder of the initial authorised capital of £250,000 was fully issued 
in 1920 to assist in financing post-war mine rehabilitation. No further changes 
were made to the authorised share capital until 1930. Three share issues between 
1930 and 1933 raised the nominal share capital to £1m. 6 In 1939, in order to allow 
the doubling of production capacity, two new shafts and a new treatment plant 
were planned. The finance for this was raised through the capitalisation of 
reserves and a pro rata equity issue to existing shareholders. The nominal capital 
was increased to £1,250,000 (£1,248,557 fully paid), and in the process £679,803 
was raised through the share premium. 7 
Between 1943 and 1955 the paid-up share capital remained unchanged, 
however the company's securities were converted from ordinary shares of 4s each 
into ordinary stock of 8s each to reduce administrative costs. In 1956 authorised 
MS 24659, circular dd. 18 February 1897. 
2 MS 14164/1, report on EGM, 21 July 1898. 
3 MS 14164/1, minutes, 15 August 1898. 
4 MS 24669, Reminiscences of Thomas George Madgwick, Mine Engineer, 1899-1900, p.1. 
5 MS 24661/1, report on AGM, 16 December 1903. 
6 The Mining Manual, 1925-72; Turner (1947), p. 9. 
7 Ibid. 
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capital was increased from £1,250,000 to £1,875,000, and the ordinary stock 
converted back into ordinary shares in September 1957. The following year the 
net book value of the remainder of the 90-year lease commencing 1 January 1897 
was increased from £46,115 to £546,000. Authorised shares were increased to 
12,500,000 at 4s each, and again in 1960 to 15,000,000. 8 
Major changes to nominal capital were made following Lonrho's purchase 
of the company. On 15 April 1969 the nominal capital was increased to 
20,000,000 ordinary shares of 4s each of which 3,745,674 shares (valued at 20s 
each) were issued as fully paid to the Ghana government in part consideration of 
the grant of a new lease for 50 years from 1 January 1969, representing 20% of 
the issued share capital. Lonrho took the company private following their 
successful bid for AGC. 
As a result of NRC Decree 132 in 1972, the company's ownership was split 
55% to 45% for the government and Lonrho, respectively. The equity capital in 
the new company, Ashanti Goldfields Corporation (Ghana) Ltd's first balance 
sheet was set to zero. Shareholders' funds would not return to the pre-
expropriation level again in real terms until the end of the 1980s. 
Following the partial nationalisation in 1972 no new equity was raised until 
the company floated in 1994. With an initial offer price of US$20 per share, the 
1994 flotation valued the company at US$1.67bn. The government and Lonrho 
received 79,999,000 fully paid shares and 3,900,000 of new shares were issued to 
the public, generating US$78m in new funds for AGC. (Lonrho held on to all of 
its shares but the government immediately sold down its stake from 55% to 35% 
raising just over US$450m for the treasury). 
A separate equity issue of US$60m in August 1995 was used specifically to 
fund a new subsidiary, Ashanti Exploration Ltd. 1° Equity was diluted by 24% in 
1996 when new shares to the value of US$376.4m were issued for payment 
towards mines acquired that year. 11 As part of a major balance sheet restructuring 
exercise in 2002 a private equity placement with Lonrho raised US$75m cash and 
• helped to reduce gearing. 12  This placement and the exercise of share warrants 
8 The Mining Manual, 1962. 
9 AGC annual report, 1969, notes 2 and 6b. 
AGC annual report, 1995. 
u AGC annual report, 1996; see Chapter 7, 'Enterprise'. 
12 AGC annual report, 2002. 
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issued by AGC to its creditor banks and hedge banks as part of the solution to its 
derivatives crisis further diluted equity by 17% in 2002. 
For most of AGC's history, the company had a preference for equity 
financing and only resorted to debt for specific short-term needs until 1986 when 
debt became a regular and growing source of capital, see the capital structure 
graph 6.4 below. 
Equity was mostly issued for specific investment purposes, for example, the 
£679,803 in 1939 for the construction of the Pampora Treatment Plant; in the 
1950s to complete and equip the Eaton Turner shaft and expand the power station; 
and in 1995 for an exploration subsidiary. Other purposes for issuing equity were 
to bolster the balance sheet. For example, the increases between 1930 and 1933, in 
large part through the capitalisation of reserves, was motivated by the feeling 
among the directors that the company's capital base was too small relative to the 
value of the company's assets and the amount sunk into developing the mines. 13 A 
non-investment purpose for new equity in the 1990s was the issue of scrip 
dividends to conserve cash; and the equity issue from the conversion of warrants 
in 2002 was an inevitable part of the rescue package with creditors who elected 
not to exercise their rights to foreclose during the 1999 crisis. 
Owning a gold-rich, cash-generating mine enabled AGC to make regular 
dividend payments: dividends were paid in 93 of the firm's 107 years — of the 
fourteen years when shareholders received nothing, five were from 1999 to 
2003. 14 Prior to the mine being taken private in 1968, AGC's habit of paying 
dividends regularly could have made raising capital through new equity relatively 
easy since management had a reputation for acting in shareholders' interests. (The 
relationship between changes in the share price, a proxy for changes in demand 
for AGC's shares, and the decision to assume debt or issue equity is discussed 
below.) On the other hand, the cash generation ability of the mine would also have 
suited debt finance by giving creditors confidence in future regular payments. 
However, the mining industry until relatively recent developments in geology and 
exploration was surrounded by uncertainty. Whether a discovered ore body would 
continue, in which direction, for how long and with what gold content, and the 
success of exploration efforts for new deposits created a level of uncertainty 
13 MS 14164/7 minutes, 8 November 1933. 
14 AGC annual reports; board minutes, GH, 1972-1994; Appendix 3. 
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unsuited to debt. The late appearance and growth in the use of debt in the firm's 
life is now considered. 
Debt 
AGC assumed long-term debt for the first time in 1904 when a bank loan for 
£21,000, increasing to £30,000, was incurred mainly for experiments in 
cyanidation but also for immediate working capital needs. 15 In the 1906 financial 
year 1,600 5-year 7% debentures were issued for £50 each, raising £80,000. A 
small proportion of this debt was redeemed early at a premium and the remainder 
converted into shares by 1910. The debt was first used to repay the bank loan and 
debenture issue costs. The remainder went towards implementing W. R. 
Feldtmann's 1905 recommendations to develop the mine's ore reserves. 
Feldtmann required nearly £30,000 for new capital expenditure. 16 His report was 
attached to the debenture prospectus for investors' information. This debt was 
cleared before the maturity date and no long-term debt was incurred again until 
1986. 
Early in 1982, AGC's managing director, George Cappendell, had made 
overtures to the IFC to seek their assistance for capital expenditure and 
development plans at Obuasi. 17 No systematic investment had been made in the 
mine for a decade. Raising equity for rehabilitation was not a viable option 
because of the unattractiveness of Ghana for investors. 18 Lonrho, it appears, were 
not prepared to inject their own capital on a long-term basis — they were already 
pre-financing all of AGC's monthly operation costs and experiencing continual 
delays in repayment from the government. 19 The majority shareholder, the 
government of Ghana, was close to bankruptcy. However, the IFC consultations 
gathered momentum following Ghana's implementation of Structural Adjustment 
in 1983. 
Between 1986 and 1992 AGC borrowed US$245m with IFC assistance to 
rehabilitate and expand Obuasi, through three separate syndicated loans with 
' 5MS 24661/1, report on AGM, 15 December 1904. 
16 MS 24661/1, W. R. Feldtmann, report on Obuasi, 15 July 1905. 
17 Board minutes, GH, 20 January 1982. 
18 J. Ahiakpor, 'The Profits of Foreign Firms in a Less Developed Country: Ghana', Journal of 
Development Economics 22, 1986, p. 330; see Chapter 2: The Research and Historical Context on 
the state of Ghana's political economy in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
19 Board minutes, GH, 18 November 1982. 
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international banks. 20 The loans required government approvals for escrow 
accounts to be established in London to permit the bankers direct access to 
repayments. 21 These loans were of short duration, not exceeding five years, and 
they were all repaid. The table below summarises the use of each of the three IFC 
syndicated loans. 
Table 6.1: The use of IFC -led debt packages, 1986 -1995 
Project name Total 
project 
Cost 
IFC 
loans 
Use of debt 
Rehabilitation and 
Expansion, 1986- 
1990 
US$160m US$45m Updated underground infrastructure: 
haulage, ventilation, shafts; mechanised 
mining; updated Pampora Treatment 
Plant. 
Sansu, 1990-1992 US$93m US$60m Surface mining and oxide ore treatment 
plants. 
Ashanti Mine 
Expansion (AMEP), 
1992-1995 
US$305m US$140m Underground and overground mine 
expansion; human resources, 
environment, health and safety 
improvements. 
Further syndicated debt accrued in June 1995 without the IFC's involvement. 
A 5-year revolving credit facility (RCF) arranged by Barclays with the 
participation of seventeen other banks gave AGC access to US$185m on flexible 
terms and without any political risks insurance. 22 The money was targeted for 
exploration, business development and working capital. 
A return to the bond market was made in February 1996 when US$250m 
was raised by issuing 5 1/2% 7-year convertible bonds, convertible into ordinary 
shares at a strike price of US$27 per share (the prevailing share price at the time 
was US$25). The securities were issued on the New York Stock Exchange and 
made available as bearer bonds in other international markets. The aim was to 
attract a wider range of investors. The US$250m financed AGC's new growth 
strategy of acquiring mines already in production. 
2° See Chapter 3: A Chronological Narrative. 
22 Board minutes, GH, 15 April 1985; see Glossary for a definition of 'escrow account'. 
22 AGC annual report, 1995, p. 27. 
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The RCF would be renewed and extended to US$270m in December 1998 
and then to US$326m in February 2000. Each new facility repaid the previous one 
and, in the case of the 1998 package, US$50m went towards an acquisition, the 
remainder to the completion of mines bought in 1996 at the development stage, 
and for working capital. A reduced RCF of US$200m was put in place in June 
2002. 
Gross gearing did not continually exceed 50% until 1996, reaching 164% in 
2000 with total debts peaking during that year at US$693.3m. 23 The decline of 
gold prices between 1996 and 1999 caused a decline in the share price of all gold 
companies. AGC's share price performed worse than industry indices because of 
its equity dilutions, the fact that the Ghana government held a golden share, the 
lack of liquidity created by two large shareholders owning over 50% of the stock, 
and market reservations over the speed and execution of the growth strategy. 24 
This made it unattractive to issue new equity in the open market between those 
years, which partly explains the high and rising assumption of debt during this 
period. That this was indeed how the company was thinking is seen in the board 
room discussion on fund-raising options which culminated in the decision to issue 
convertible bonds rather than equity. 25 
The growing debt burden squeezed cash flow. This is captured in Figure 6.2 
which shows the deteriorating interest cover ratio between 1988 and 2004. A lack 
of liquidity lay at the crux of the hedging crisis when AGC was unable to meet 
US$270m of margin demanded by hedge counterparties in October 1999. 
23 AGC annual report, 2000, p. 19. 
24 HSBC Global Mining Division, AGC equity research report, 30 October 1998, p. 2; board 
minutes, GH, 24 March 2000 — presentation by Robert Knapp of Millennium Partners USA, an 
institutional investor, on shareholder perceptions of AGC. (See Chapter 7, 'Enterprise') 
25 Board minutes, GH, 24 January 1996. 
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Figure 6.2 26 
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The company's high gearing was also unusual for the sector. AGC's 
competitors such as Anglogold, Barrick, Goldfields and Newmont had in 2000 
gross gearing levels of 3%, 22%, 16% and 67% respectively. 27 With reduced 
technological and geological uncertainty in modern times, one reason why gold 
producers remain relatively debt-free is the fact that their product can be viewed 
as natural money, not just a commodity. (Indeed, when currencies were backed by 
gold, the paper and coins were derivative instruments of gold, merely representing 
the underlying asset). 28 Being able to produce the closest thing to money should, 
with sound production planning and careful investment avoid the need to borrow 
excessively. Steps taken by AGC to reduce gearing started with the sale in 
December 2000 of 50% of the Geita mine for US$335m, US$236m of which went 
to repay debt. 29 Then, in 2002, the cash injection from Lonrho's US$75m equity 
placement and US$45m from bankers exercising their share warrants together 
with a new RCF of US$200m allowed the early redemption of AGC's outstanding 
26 Interest cover calculated as earnings before tax and interest payments divided by interest 
obligations on long-term debt. 
27 Calculated from their respective balance sheets for 2000. Interestingly, AGC had set themselves 
a policy back in 1995 that gross gearing should not exceed 45% - board minutes, GH, 1 September 
1995. 
28 'Real gold, paper gold and fool's gold: the pathology of inflation', 12 October 1999, 
www.goldensextantcom/commentary4. html, accessed 10 March 2005. 
29 AGC annual report 2000, p.19. 
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US$250m convertible bond debt. These actions brought gross gearing down to 
53% in 2003. 3° 
Short-term debt — that is, debt expiring within a year - was a constant feature 
of the company's balance sheet from inception. The major components of this 
debt were salaries, royalties, tax and suppliers' invoices. Short-term debt was 
financed by bank overdrafts. Supplier debts were frequently owed to Lonrho 
between 1972 and 1986. They were lending £800,000 per month for the mine's 
working capital in 1982. 31 
The company's experience with debt in its later years was motivated by the 
quest for growth. While this growth remained organic (between 1986 and 1995) 
the debt could not be described as a burden, gearing averaged 35% during this 
period. It was the company's inorganic growth from 1996 with the spate of 
acquisitions that a huge need for debt finance arose. The debt was not needed 
primarily as consideration for the purchases (this was largely settled using AGC 
shares), the need for borrowed cash was rather to develop the sites acquired that 
were at exploration or mine development stage. Geita, Bibiani and Siguiri all 
required project finance to bring them into production. (For details see Chapter 7, 
`Enterprise'.) 
It would be rational to expect that at times of rising share prices new capital 
would be sourced from equity, and during share price slumps debt would be 
preferred, holding all other factors constant (these other factors, such as share 
ownership profile, industrial considerations and political risks, are material, 
however). Figure 6.3 lends support to this over-simplified expectation. In 1904 
when long-term debt was first assumed the share price had plummeted 80% in the 
preceding 12 months. And in 1909 a 426% annual rise in the share price allowed 
the early conversion of bond debt into equity. Towards the end of the firm's 
history the rise in debt levels matched a continuous decline in share price. 
However, it is worth noting that the decision to issue bonds in 1906 to finance 
Feldtmann's mine plan coincided with a rise in the share price on the back of his 
optimistic report on the mine's future. 
3° See Appendix 3. 
31 Board minutes, GH, 18 November 1982. 
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Figure 6.3 
The timing of debt with changes in shares price 
=Gross gearing -'- Annual peak share price in £2002 
180% 	 
160% - 
140% - 
120% - 
T100% - 
0 80% - I 
£250 
£200 
£150 2) 
Q. 
£100 rt 
£50 
£0 
60% 
40% 
20% 
0% 
4:bc6 	 41e 4 ' 4:11: 	4.cbb‘ 	4.43 <"6 4:zb 	\ch \c5
o 
  4:59) 	ee 026 a c6 11‘ c6 	 5 <ocb c3tx fb 
An appreciating share price would encourage raising new capital by issuing equity. 
The falling share price in later years coincided with increasing debt. 
Figure 6.4 
Capital structure, 1899-2003 
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Equity was the prime source of finance in AGC's history. 
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Retained Earnings 
The richness of the Obuasi mine allowed a reliable flow of cash and considerable 
investment to be made from retained earnings over the company's life. Indeed 
retained earnings were the only source of capital between 1972 and 1985 with the 
inability and reluctance of the majority shareholders to contribute investment 
funds and the economic and political turmoil in Ghana limiting the supply of 
lenders. Just over 50% of the IFC phase projects were funded from retained 
earnings between 1986 and 1994. 
Hedging income became an important component of retained income from 
1990. The hedge portfolio grew to cover over 80% of AGC's proved and probable 
reserves and production for fifteen years in the future, with nineteen different 
hedge counterparties. After price protection, AGC's stated objective in its hedging 
strategy was "to raise cash in order to pay back debt or to finance capital 
expenditure or acquisitions." 32 From the selective, early termination of in-the-
money positions the hedge book generated positive cash flow. From the last 
quarter of 1996 until 2002, income earned from the hedge book consistently 
exceeded operating profit, as disclosed in AGC's annual reports. The hedge 
book's performance between September 1996 and July 1999 effectively countered 
the drop in gold prices from US$380 to US$253 an ounce. Until the hedging crisis 
erupted at the end of September 1999 AGC always realised a price above spot for 
their gold. AGC was viewed by the market as a sophisticated and successful 
hedger. 33 Empirical evidence is available to both support and reject the benefit of 
hedging for shareholders of gold companies. 34 But what is clear is that hedging 
income was a critical part of gross revenue and retained earnings from1990, and 
this is illustrated in Figure 6.5. 
32 Mark Keatley, 'Paper on the management of the hedging portfolio', April 1999, AGC internal 
document; HSBC International Mining Division, 'Ashanti Goldfields Asset Performance', 6 
October 1997, p. 37; HSBC Global Mining Division, AGC equity research report, 30 October 
1998, p. 2. 
33 See for example, Bill Shepherd, 'The art of hedging gold', Global Finance, March 1999, The 
Economist, 11 November 1999; HSBC Global Mining Division, AGC equity research report, 30 
October 1998, p. 2 identifies AGC's "well managed hedge book" as one of the firm's key 
strengths. Corporate Finance magazine, January 1999, profile AGC's CFO and Treasurer as 
`Dealmakers of the Month' for their hedging strategy. 
34 Two empirical studies with contradictory conclusions are Matthew Callahan, `To Hedge or not 
to hedge...that is the question: empirical evidence from the North American gold mining industry 
1996-2000', Financial Markets, Institutions and instruments, Vol. 11, 4, November 2002 and John 
Wixley, 'Is gold hedging bad for shareholders?' paper delivered at the Euromoney Gold 
Investment Summit, 6 September 2002. 
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Figure 6.5 
Hedging income as a contribution of total revenue, 1990-2003 
•Bullion Revenue 	0 Hedging Revenue 
450.0 
400.0 
350.0 
300.0 
250.0 
E ca 
200.0 
150.0 
100.0 
50.0 
 
1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
An important use of capital from all three sources was on machinery and 
equipment. The next section considers changes in this by analysing capital 
intensity. 
Capital Intensity of Production 
Back in the 1930s, while other Gold Coast mines were producing 95% of output 
using rock drilling equipment, the figure for AGC was only 15%. 35 The reason 
offered by the company was that the nature of the ground at the stopes made the 
vibrations from the rock drills too dangerous. 36 The firm's relatively better labour 
supply in comparison with other mines in the colony also explains why AGC did 
not feel impelled to rely on machinery. Oral evidence from those who worked at 
AGC in the 1970s and early 1980s describes AGC as highly labour-intensive until 
the IFC rehabilitation programmes. 37 By measuring the value of tangible fixed 
assets per employee we can get a comparative picture of changes in capital 
35 Mines Department annual reports, 1929-30, 32-33. 
36 Mines Department annual reports, 1929-30. 
37 Interviews: Joe Amanor, Geology Manager, Obuasi, 29 March 2005; Sam Jonah, Accra, 23 
January 2004. 
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• 
• 
intensity over time. Figure 6.6 below has been derived for the years where data for 
both fixed assets and total staff numbers are available. 38 The nominal asset values 
were all converted to 2002 pound sterling values, using the UK GDP deflator 
series via www.eh.net . 39 
Figure 6.6 
Capital stock per employee (£2002) 
,c,pn cf5 	,i/tx 	c,1), cbcb t,11, 431:, 456 IX C35 _AC 	k), 	op, c5C) 
Ncb Ne5 Ne5 NC NC N5 1'15 1:5 \5 15 1:15 1'5 \c5 	1:5c3 	
AC5 
NC:5cb 1
(b.C5 
 115 1'5 
Actual values of capital stock per employee for selected years from Figure 6.6 are 
shown below: 
Table 6.7: Capital stock per employee (in £2002) 
1905 1937 1951 1960 1973 1979 1992 1997 2002 
£2,291 £5,705 £5,361 £9,993 £3,077 £1,026 £31,687 £62,546 £47,359 
It can be seen that the level of capital intensity from 1905 was only 
gradually increased, doubling by the 1930s. However, by the late 1970s it appears 
that the mine was less capital-intensive than it had been in 1905. In 1979, the table 
38 The value of the lease of the goldfields is excluded from fixed assets. 
39 For the period 1898 to 1972 this method is satisfactory since AGC procured most of its imported 
equipment from the UK and accounted for their capital expenditure in pound sterling. For the later 
1970s, with the valuation of assets in cedis and the extreme exchange rate distortion, this method 
is less robust, and adjustments are considered below. 
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above shows two times less capital in real terms was employed per worker than in 
1905. 
The company started to report its financial accounts in cedis from 1973. The 
cedi was overvalued by a factor of between nine and ten from 1973 to 1981. 4° As 
a result, the accounts grossly understate the free market cost of imported fixed 
assets. Assuming that AGC had been able to exchange cedis for dollars from the 
Bank of Ghana, and used the under-priced dollars to pay for imports then Table 
6.7 probably shows too low an amount for 1973 and 1979, and fixed assets per 
employee for those years could possibly have been in reality about £30,000 and 
£10, 000 respectively. However, the company records show continual difficulty in 
both procuring import licenses and foreign exchange. The consulting engineer 
reported in 1979: 
The major difficulty continued to be the allocation of Import Licence and 
foreign exchange needed to pay for spares and materials essential to 
efficient production. Due to reduced imports during the year conservation of 
stocks of materials available at the mine continued; measures taken 
included rationing of reagents, explosives and consumable mining stores. 41 
The statement is supported by further complaints along the same lines in the 
board minutes.42 As an exporter, the artificially high exchange rate was an implied 
tax on AGC, diminishing the income available for purchases. While the capital 
stock per employee may not be have been quite as low as the table above shows 
for the 1970s, the evidence indicates that AGC, like the Ghanaian manufacturing 
sector, was effectively starved of imported capital goods during this period. The 
sharp drop in the capital/labour ratio between 1973 and 1979 (even after adjusting 
for exchange rate distortion) suggests that machinery was not being repaired or 
replaced at this time; and/or it was rational to use more labour because it was 
relatively cheap. 
Supporting the evidence that capital was replaced with greater manpower is 
the fact that the number of employees averaged 4,765 in the 1960s compared with 
7,850 in the 1970s — a period of declining ore and gold output (see Appendix 3). 
Rimmer (1992), p. 149. 
41 Consulting engineer's report 1979 attached to annual report that year. 
42 Board minutes, GH, 23 January 1976, 6 April 1979, 14 October 1981, 19 May 1983; see also the 
Ghana Chamber of Mines annual report 1980, president's address, pp. 3, 4. 
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During this decade the relative availability of labour in Ghana was high as 
population and unemployment increased while land became relatively less 
abundant. This would imply cheaper labour costs. 
Oral evidence from a senior miner who worked during this period adds that 
the mine was operating on a "barter system", Obuasi would swap equipment with 
the State Gold Mining Corporation; for example, if they were in need of dynamite 
and the SGMC in greater need of reagents, then these vital inputs would be 
bartered. 43 
By 1997, following the IFC loans, capital intensity peaked at £62,421 per 
worker. The drop thereafter marks the end of Obuasi's surface mining activities 
and the decommissioning and closure of assets relating to that. 
Most of the mine's life was characterised by low capital intensity relative to 
labour. The reasons for this were in the first instance practical. The heavy ground 
alluded to in the company's explanation for only producing 15% of ore with rock 
drills back in 1929/30 was a geological reason; geographical distance and lack of 
skills in the early years would also have hindered the feasibility of obtaining or 
manufacturing spare parts and machinery on site, leading to more labour-intensive 
methods. However, the fact that gradually more capital was being spent per 
employee until the 1960s suggests that the practical obstacles were being 
overcome. But the 1970s and early 1980s saw a level of investment in capital 
goods below that desired by the mine managers. 
In terms of the capital to land ratio, a striking feature of AGC is the 
negligible rent paid to landowners for the original concession, compared to other 
costs (see Chapter 3). But another aspect of the cost of land to the firm was the 
royalty and mineral duty paid. These were based on the gold extracted and 
therefore provide a measure of the cost of the land that can be usefully compared 
to AGC's' capital base and operating costs. Excluding the twenty expropriation 
years from 1973 when the equity base of the company was set to zero, the cost of 
land averaged 4% of the company' s long-term capital (shareholders' equity and 
long-term debt combined)." Measured in this way, land was relatively cheap, and 
became even more so as the company grew in its last decade from 1994. As a 
proportion of direct operating costs (again 1898-2003 but excluding 1973-93), the 
royalty and minerals duty paid for gold averaged 12% per annum. Whether this 
43 Interview, Jonah, Accra, 23 January 2004. 
44 Calculated from Appendix 3, 1898-2003 (excluding 1973-1993). 
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was low or not could be determined by comparing with other components of 
operating costs, such as wages. Wage data was not available for the most part, but 
it was possible to make such a comparison for the years 1994-2000, as Table 6.8 
illustrates. The results confirm, for this limited time frame, that land was 
relatively cheap for AGC - cheaper than both capital and labour. 
Table 6.8: Relative cost of land (measured by royalty payments) 
Year 
Royalty as% 
total capital 
Royalty as% 
operating costs 
Wages as% 
total capital 
Wages% 
operating costs 
1994 1.6% 6.9% 6.4% 27.3% 
1995 1.5% 5.9% 5.6% 22.9% 
1996 1.3% 2.9% 6.1% 13.8% 
1997 0.4% 1.6% 5.3% 20.3% 
1998 0.8% 2.7% 5.8% 20.3% 
1999 1.3% 3.8% 6.9% 20.9% 
2000 1.9% 4.2% 9.4% 21.2% 
Average 1.2% 4.0% 6.5% 20.9% 
Of the three main factors of production land was relatively the cheapest resource 
for AGC, followed by labour and then capital. In the 1970s and early 1980s the 
harsh economic environment in Ghana increased the cost of capital to an extent 
that the mine was de-modernising. This threatened the viability of production, 
despite AGC's geological wealth. 
Capital Productivity 
Since the firm's capital structure was entirely equity based for most of its history 
the return on capital employed (ROCE) statistics match the return on equity 
(ROE) statistics for most years, as Figure 6.9 shows. 
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Figure 6.9 
Capital productivity, 1899-2003 
ROCE was calculated by dividing earnings before interest and tax by the 
sum of shareholders equity and long-term debt. For ROE the denominator 
excludes long-term debt. 
The ROCE tells us the efficiency of use of the company's assets. The 
general picture for the firm is good. For the years where financial data is available, 
AGC averaged 26% ROCE, which is impressive: ROCE of 20% is used as a 
yardstick of very good performance. 45 Prior to 1972, ROCE seldom dipped below 
10% and exceeded 50% in 1932, 1934 and 1968. The bare figures, however, 
impart very little information: comparison with the cost of borrowing and a risk-
free yield produce a better understanding of the firm's capital productivity. 
For the years when long-term debt was assumed and for which the financial 
data on cost of borrowing and the data to compute ROCE are available, a 
comparison is made between the cost of borrowing and ROCE. 
45 Global Investor glossary, http://www.finance-ossary.corniterms/return-on-capital-
employed.htm?id=1581andginPtrCode=00000andPopupMode  
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Table 6.10: Cost of debt and capital efficiency 
Debt assumed Cost of debt ROCE 
1908 debentures £80,000 7% 19.81% 
June1992 US$140m IFC AMEP LIBOR* + 1.78% = 6.38% 26.45% 
June 1995 US$185m RCF LIBOR + 1.05% = 6.85% 14.58% 
February 1996 US$250m 
convertible bonds 
5.5% 9.89% 
December 1998 US$270m RCF LIBOR + 0.83% = 5.83% 5.59% 
February 2000 US$326m RCF LIBOR + 2.5% to 4% = 9.3% to 
10.8% 
-10.81% 
June 2002 US$200m RCF LIBOR + 1.75% to 2% = 4.15% 
to 4.4% 
9.22% 
*LIBOR figures from British Banking Association, http://www.bba.org.uk/excel/libor/,  1 used the 
12-month USD average for the month concerned. These loan rates are variable so the comparison 
with the annual ROCE is only reasonable for the first month when the debt was assumed. Over the 
life of the debt LIBOR varies. 
It can be seen that for the most part AGC's earnings yield comfortably 
covered the gross cost of borrowing. However, in 1998 ROCE was unsatisfactory, 
as it neither met the 7-year 5.5% convertible bond cost nor the 5.83% RCF cost 
assumed in December. (LIBOR rates climbed over the proceeding two years, 
which would only have worsened the ROCE - cost of bon -owing gap.) In 2000 the 
borrowing rate far exceeded the efficiency of capital, owing to the sudden write-
off of assets at Obuasi related to surface mining. This analysis adds another 
dimension to understanding the cause of AGC's financial crisis: besides rising 
gearing levels the table shows that between 1998 and 2000 AGC was destroying, 
rather than creating, value.46 
When AGC's ROCE is compared with the return on a UK risk-free 
instrument the general picture of a good history of capital productivity can be 
further dissected. The risk-free instrument used is the UK Government 2.5% 
Consol, chosen because the data series goes back to the nineteenth century. 
46 ROCE should strictly have been compared with the risk weighted average cost of capital 
comprising the cost of debt and the opportunity cost of equity. This would have produced a less 
favourable comparison to ROCE for each of the years under consideration due primarily to the risk 
premium component in the cost of equity. 
239 
Figure 6.11 
Comparison of AGC's profitability with a risk-free instrument 
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Source: Consol yield data from http://www.globalfindata.com . 
Again, the company's best performance was prior to 1969. Several factors 
would anticipate a wide margin, or premium, between AGC's return on capital 
and the risk-free yield. First, the nature of the firm's industry. Mining, particularly 
in the firm's establishment years was dogged by uncertainty, as mentioned above. 
Second, the firm's location in Africa, thousands of miles from investors, created 
obstacles to the quality and timeliness of information, which would further 
aggravate uncertainty. With telecommunication advances the premium to be 
attached for this aspect of uncertainty would have diminished significantly over 
time. But a third factor necessitating a risk premium, which increased over time, 
was the political and economic uncertainty from the late 1940s over African self-
government. 47 How to quantify the changing value of these elements of 
uncertainty is not attempted here. But the analysis in itself suggests that, in 
qualification of the first impression from the raw ratios of an impressive return on 
47 See Stockwell (2000), pp. 105-110. 
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capital, AGC's performance was inadequate compared to the risks in 1900, 1902, 
1905, 1923, 1970-72, 1996-2000. 
The remainder of this chapter is concerned with the impact of the utilisation 
of capital on two of AGC's stakeholders. The analysis starts with shareholders 
before considering the government in its dual capacity as a stakeholder and then 
from 1969 as a shareholder. 
A Shareholder Perspective  
The first 9,346 shares offered to the public in August 1898 traded for £2, a further 
10,000 shares in January 1900 at £10, and in May 1901 20,000 shares were issued 
at £25 each. 48 In 2002 pound sterling terms that was the equivalent of £174, £806 
and £2,066 per share, respectively.49 From the start of operations in March 1898 
AGC produced operating profits, allowing the first dividend to be paid two years 
later in September 1900, for the financial year ending June 1901. Excluding the 
share price from these early years when the enterprise attracted speculative 
interest, the graph below plots the 52-week peak closing share prices from 1903 to 
2003, along with the dividends received per share (all in £2002), followed by an 
analysis of the results. 
Figure 6.12 
Shareholders' fortunes, 1903-2003 
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The events giving rise to peaks in the share price are tabulated below. 
Table 6.13: Share price appreciation in certain years 
Year Share 
price 
(£2002) 
Event explaining the share price peaks 
1906 £73 The widely circulated independent report by an experienced mine 
industry chemist, W. R. Feldtmann, concludes that the mine has 
positive growth prospects. Feldtmann's subsequent appointment 
as Consulting Engineer marks the start of a scientific approach to 
AGC's gold processing.5° 
1909 £230 The 	mine 	strikes 	the 	richest 	ore 	since 	operations 	started. 
Identified on the mine map at 3 Level SW, about 300 feet below 
the old Obuasi surface workings, the ore assays more then 302 
dwts per ton for over 500 feet. 51 (5 dwts per ton was payable). 
1927 £74 Previous years' experiments to improve gold recovery with 3 
types of processing is eventually perfected to the use of an 8-unit 
dry crushing and roasting plant with cyanidation. Monthly output 
increases to 10,500 tons from 9,000. 52 
1933 £121 Gold premium attracts investors to gold stocks encouraging new 
mine start-ups. 53 
1936 £186 Gold production capacity to be more than doubled from 18,000 
tons per month (using the old roasting process) to an additional 
20,000 tons per month using new flotation technology ordered in 
1936. 
1945 £98 The end of the war anticipates the removal of restrictions on gold 
production as well as the completion of the new flotation plant 
suspended because of the wartime labour and supply conditions. 
1996 £20 AGC breaks the million-ounce threshold with the acquisition of 3 
junior mine companies. 
The events explaining troughs in the share price are tabulated below. 
5° See Chapter 3, 'A Chronological Narrative'. 
51 MS 24661/2, report of Consulting Engineer, 31 October 1909. 
52 The Mining Manual, 1925-30. 
' 3 Mines Department annual report 1932/33. 
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Table 6.14: Share price depreciation in certain years 
Year Share 
price 
(£2002) 
Event explaining share price troughs 
1905 £6 The initial quick and easy extraction of oxidised surface ore 
ends. Encountering more refractory ores gold recovery drops to 
60%; disappointing cyanidation experiment results. 54 
1911 £8 Reduced ore reserves for the second year in a row; the main 
Obuasi chute hits barren rock at 8 Level just as Justice's surface 
mine is worked out. 55 
1923 £24 Post-1918 	fuel 	costs 	rise; 	constant 	tweaks 	to 	processing 
techniques in an attempt to recover more than 80% of the gold 
from increasingly refractory ores from lower underground levels. 
Increasing capital expenditure to resolve processing and fuel 
problems without commensurate improvements in income. 
1941 £85 The first year showing a decline in gold output since 1923, due to 
WWII conditions, lack of manpower and inputs. 
1957 £13 Uncertainty about the newly independent Ghana. 
1965 £6 The introduction of withholding tax on remitted dividends, and 
the general perception of rising Ghanaian tax and regulatory 
costs; perception that Nkrumah's government is in trouble.56 
2000 £3 Significantly over-geared balance sheet, dividend moratorium, 
and other consequences of the financial crisis such as loss of 
management credibility dampen the share price. 
The events associated with hikes and troughs in the share price well 
illustrate the prospective information embodied in the share price, and that the 
market, bearing in mind the analysis has looked at the annual rather than daily 
picture, generally appeared to respond in the right direction to news released by 
54 See Chapter 3, 'A Chronological Narrative'. 
55 MS 24661/2, Consulting Engineer's report, 30 September 1911, and report on AGM, 14 
December 1911. 
56 Spears, for example, comments that "Ghana is in grave financial straits" Financial Times, 31 
March 1965, borne from AGC's own experience of the Bank of Ghana delaying the release of 
money owed to them. That Ghana's taxes were seen to be affecting the share price adversely see 
report on AGM, 3 April 1964, MS 24661/7. 
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the firm. While the share price is forward-looking, the dividend reflects the 
backward or historic performance of the firm. The returns to a shareholder from 
their investment consist of both of these factors: the change in the share price 
from the time they purchased it, and the absolute amount of dividend income. 
In terms of real dividend income over time, Figure 6.12 shows that AGC 
shareholders enjoyed a golden period between 1924 and 1939. Prior to that, shares 
experienced erratic swings in value. A steady depreciation in the value of an AGC 
share followed the Second World War, in tandem with the labour and political 
unrest and change discussed in Chapter 2. When the company listed again on the 
LSE in April 1994 the buoyancy of the 1P0 price soon gave way to falling real 
values due to a combination of firm-specific and industry factors. 
In a fiery interchange between a shareholder and the board of directors at the 
annual general meeting in 1911 the opinion was expressed by an irate shareholder 
that an appreciating share price is preferable to rising dividends. The dissident 
shareholder criticised AGC for paying high dividends and compared the 
company's floundering share price at the end of 1911 to the prospering shares of 
South African gold mines that paid far less in dividends. 57 Cash paid out to 
shareholders could alternatively be re-invested, improving future performance. 
The shareholder expressed a rather modern, late twentieth century outlook where 
shares are primarily bought for capital appreciation rather than dividend income. 
Another point of grievance by the shareholder back then was the unevenness 
of dividends paid by AGC. Sometimes there would be one (for example, in 
calendar year 1909), two (for example, in calendar year 1907) or more usually 
three dividend payments during the year. And the amounts paid at each instalment 
varied. The graph below showing dividends paid as a percentage of fully paid-up 
share capital illustrates the absence of any dividend smoothing pattern save for the 
two decades from 1947. 
57 MS 24661/2, report on AGM, 14 December 1911. 
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Figure 6.15 
Dividend paid as percentage of share capital 
The turning points in dividend fortunes generally mirrored (but did not 
drive) that of the share price. There is a positive but weak relationship between 
these variables. Declining dividends during World War II occurred with an 
appreciating share price, and the period between 1947 and 1967 when fairly 
constant dividend payments were made coincided with a declining share price 
(Figure 6.12). The correlation between real dividend payments and real share 
prices produced a coefficient of 0.58. 
The final judgement on AGC's performance from a shareholder's 
perspective is made from a comparison with the performance of the London all-
share index between 1897 and 2004. The year-on-year change in the real value of 
AGC's shares is plotted against the change in the UK all-share index. Whereas the 
data for AGC is the annual share price peak, the index data is taken from the 
closing position on 31 December each year (this is how the series is presented 
from www.globalfindata.com). The comparison is therefore skewed in favour of 
AGC, see Figure 6.16. With this reservation in mind the performance of AGC 
appears comparable to that of the London all-share index for the most part. The 
period 1904 to 1914 for AGC is marked by share price volatility showing some 
years when share value appreciated considerably more so than the index, and vice 
versa. For this reason the same graph is plotted excluding the most erratic, partly 
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speculative-driven, early years of 1898 to 1914, see Figure 6.17. The golden 
period for AGC shareholders identified above as 1924 to 1939 is confirmed but 
with qualification — in two of those fifteen years, 1929 and 1934, AGC 
underperformed the market. From World War H until 1968 the shares - with the 
exception of two outperforming years, 1963 and 1966 - either under-matched or 
just matched the growth in the all-share index. Interestingly, even prior to the 
eruption of the financial crisis in 1999, the company's shares were 
underperforming, in fact, they had done so from their return to the London Stock 
Exchange in 1994. From 2000, the balance sheet restructuring efforts and the 
prospect of a merger with Anglogold significantly appreciated AGC share value 
in comparison to the index. 
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The sum of changes in AGC's share value between 1904 and 2003 is 
1,263%, compared with 602% for the all-share index over the same period. This 
tells us that the real value of AGC shares appreciated twice as much as the all-
share index. An AGC share, if viewed over the company's entire history, fared 
very well. 
Attention is now turned to an assessment of the Gold Coast and Ghana 
governments' direct benefits from AGC's capital utilisation. 
Government's direct financial benefits 
Since AGC's capital was deployed to deplete minerals, the capital resources of a 
sovereign government, it is appropriate to consider what benefits accrued to the 
government. The analysis is limited to direct financial benefits because the scope 
and measurability of other types of benefit, such as human capital and 
infrastructure development, could prove intractable. 
The 1897 mine lease agreement stipulated the payment of royalties at 5% of 
gross revenue from gold won as well as any other earnings derived from the 100 
square mile concession. The royalty was commuted to £500 for five years to assist 
the company in their establishment.' 
In 1934 a 15% export duty on gold premium income was imposed through 
an amendment of the Customs Tariff Ordinance? An Income Tax Ordinance was 
introduced in the Gold Coast in 1943. Then in 1947 a Profits Tax, an additional 
income tax of 5%, applicable only to mining companies was imposed on the 
company. 3 AGC had been exempted from this Profits Tax in 1931 because the 
1897 agreement levied a 5% royalty on gross revenue (as opposed to net profits), 
which no other mine company in the colony paid. However this exemption had 
been withdrawn by 1946. 4 In 1948 a Gold Coast Ordinance created a new Gold 
Duty and abolished the export tax on the gold premium. 5 AGC's chairman, Spears, 
complained that the new gold duty, being specifically designed to give relief to 
low grade mines in the colony, resulted in AGC subsidising them. The duty was a 
variable rate ranging from zero to 21% depending on a mine's ratio of profit to 
MS 14169 vol.2. p. 97, royalty statement. 
2 Mines Department annual report, 1933-4. 
3  Address by the Chairman of the Corporation attached to AGC's AGC annual report, 1948. 
4 Ibid. 
The Gold Duty Ordinance 1948; Mines Department annual report 1948-9; see also 'Address by 
the Chairman of the Corporation' attached to AGC's AGC annual report, 1948. 
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gross revenue.6 Spears compared AGC's and the gold industry's tax burden to that 
of other mineral sectors in the colony such as diamonds, manganese and bauxite. 
These faced significantly lower Gold Coast taxes and their production was not 
constrained by a fixed price at a time of rising costs. AGC's arguments for relief 
centred on this fact as well as the importance of their product in helping the UK 
government to purchase much-needed dollars. In 1952 AGC's lobbying seems to 
have paid off. The colony introduced a Minerals Duty of 3% of revenues to 
replace the export and gold duties. 7 This reduced AGC's tax burden. However, 
what Spears perceived as excessive tax would be his bugbear for the next twenty 
years. 
Nkrumah's post-Independence government maintained the industry-specific 
tax system established by the colonial authority. The company, though, was now 
hit by non-industry specific taxes as the new regime attempted to broaden the 
sources of state revenue. Compulsory saving in the form of Ghana National 
Development Bonds can be seen as an added tax on the company in the early 
1960s. 8 Under the regime corporation tax was increased. Other taxes affecting the 
company included the Excess Profits Tax, Withholding Tax on dividends remitted 
from Ghana, and a Sales Tax Act in 1965 which greatly increased AGC's cost of 
petroleum products for fue1. 9 An increase in personal taxes such as the removal of 
marriage allowances on income tax affected the cost of living for workers and the 
attractiveness of jobs in Ghana to expatriates. l°  Laws to improve workers' 
benefits, and the new exchange controls also impacted the firm. 11 Spears 
constantly bleated to his 'friend' Nkrumah that the mine's tax and regulatory 
burden was too onerous. 12 This time the arguments focused on AGC's ability to 
contribute to Ghana's 7-Year Plan, particularly with its emphasis on 
industrialisation. 13 Spears attempted to extract concrete assurances from Nkrumah 
that taxation would be capped at 50% of profits. Besides the fact that taxation 
calculated on profits would be too open to manipulation by the company, Figure 
6 Address by the Chairman of the Corporation attached to AGC's AGC annual report, 1948. 
Mines Department annual report, 1952-3, the rate is deduced from AGC's AGC annual reports, 
1961-68. 
s MS 24661/7, AGC annual reports, 1962, 1963. 
9 Ghana Trade Report 1964-5. See also MS 24661/7, Consulting Engineer's report, 1962. 
1° MS 24661/7, report on AGM 3 April 1964, reported in the Financial Times, 6 April 1964. 
11 Exchange Control Act 1961. 
12 MS 24661/7, report on Spears's Visit to Ghana May — June 1964. 
13 Ibid. 
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6.18 shows that during Nkrumah's rule AGC's tax burden peaked at 34% of gross 
revenue, less than the 51% endured in 1944 during colonial times. 
Spears wrote of great expectations for tax relief with the change in regime in 
1966, because the National Liberation Council (NLC) were perceived as friendly 
to the West. He foresaw "improved prospects for the mine." 14 However, the three 
years of NLC control actually saw an increase in the percentage of gross revenue 
going to government coffers. Some of this was through tax increases, for example 
the increase in corporation tax from 45% to 50%, 15 but in 1969 the most 
significant increase in the government's share of AGC's business came with the 
20% ownership in the company offered by Tiny Rowland. The government for the 
first time shared in the company's profits. 
Busia's People's Party significantly reduced AGC's tax burden to 17% of 
revenues in 1970. The advantageous situation was short-lived for the firm. 
Following Colonel Acheampong's 1972 coup, government attention turned to 
those foreign firms at the "commanding heights of the economy." 16 The National 
Redemption Council Decree 132 singled out the diamond producer Consolidated 
African Selection Trust Limited and AGC for state control. Thereafter the 
combination of taxes and dividend income accruing to the state rose to 55% of 
AGC's gross revenue in 1974. 17 In 1984 the government still enjoyed over 40% of 
gross bullion revenues (in that year that represented 188% of post-tax profit 
amount). 18 
It was not until the introduction of the PNDC Minerals and Mining Law 
1986 that the state's direct share in AGC's business significantly reduced. The 
1986 law turned around the disinvestment faced by the industry by redressing the 
imbalance between the industry's needs and the government's extraction of 
income. The flexible and low royalty terms and tax write-off provisions for capital 
investments, in particular, were effective (see Chapter 2). 
The 1986 law can be seen as a swing to the opposite extreme of NRCD 132, 
reducing the state's share of AGC's fortunes to as little as 2% of gross revenue in 
1997 and 1998. For most years following the 1986 law change AGC paid little or 
14, MS 24661/7, report on Spears's Visit to Ghana January - March 1966. 
Although other taxes such as employer's social security contributions and withholding tax were 
reduced. 
16 Text of speech by Col. I. K. Acheampong, May 1973, from Speeches and Interviews by Col. I. 
K. Acheampong, vol. II (n.d. but Accra 1973) pp/ 119-25. 
17 Calculated from AGC annual report, 1974. 
18 Calculated from AGC annual report, 1984. 
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	I 
no corporation tax because capital allowances exceeded depreciation costs thereby 
erasing any corporate tax liability. 
The chart below shows the percentage of AGC's gross revenue accruing to 
the state in the form of duties, direct taxes, compulsory savings and dividends. 
Figure 6.18 
The percentage of AGC revenue directly benefiting the government 
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The same data plotted against the percentage of gross revenue put toward 
new capital expenditure each year provides quantitative evidence that a growing 
state share during the 1970s met with diminishing investment, see Figure 6.19. 
The correlation coefficient between the two variables for the 71 years for which I 
have both capital expenditure and government revenue data is —0.40, but -0.85 for 
the 1970s. 
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Figure 6.19 
The relationship between government's share of revenue and capital 
expenditure 
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A comparison of changes in Ghana's mineral fiscal law with that of other 
gold producing LDCs, indeed with First World gold-producing countries, is 
worthwhile but beyond this thesis. It would seem though, that 2% of gross 
revenue as compensation for the exploitation of a non-renewable asset and for the 
environmental damage caused during and after the mining process is insufficient, 
even derisory. In 2005 discussions were underway in Ghana to amend the mining 
law. This should hopefully refine the balance between incentivising capital and 
benefiting wider stakeholders. 19 
Summary 
AGC relied mostly on equity capital throughout its history. It was able to do this 
partly because its production methods were not capital-intensive until heavy 
investment was made from the late 1980s. Capital was used productively save for 
a handful of years when the margin between the firm's return on capital employed 
and that of a risk-free instrument appeared intuitively too slim to adequately cover 
the risks associated with AGC's business and location. ROCE did not meet the 
cost of borrowing between 1998 and 2000, showing that the final years of the 
19 Of course, there is no guarantee with corruption and weak government institutions that an 
increase in financial contributions from the mines sector will benefit local people or national 
interests. 
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company, a period of rapid growth, were prone to capital inefficiency. It was not 
just high gearing and low liquidity that precipitated AGC's demise. 
An AGC shareholder over the century 1903 - 2003 fared better than the 
London all-share index in terms of share price appreciation. AGC's regular 
dividend payments until 1969 illustrates the company's profitability in 
comparison with other mines in Ghana, whose foreign owners had all exited by 
1965. In this respect AGC also differed from the majority of British free-standing 
companies established in the late nineteenth century. 
The government as a stakeholder increasingly benefited from AGC's 
operations, reaching a zenith in the 1970s. (How far successive governments used 
such revenue for the benefit of the local population is a separate question not 
treated here). However, there was a negative relationship between the growth of 
government's share of company income and the level of reinvestment. This 
confirms that AGC's operations were seriously directed to generating profit via 
production, rather than being to a large extent a carve-up of economic rent. 
Merely redistributing economic rent between shareholders and government 
(through dividends and taxes) would have been suggested had there been no 
relationship between tax and levels of new investment. 
Changes to Ghana's legislation to attract investment for the sector 
coincided with the introduction of international debt finance to AGC. The firm 
benefited from the new mineral laws from 1986 and, in its last decade, arguably 
paid too little back in the form of direct taxation. 
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CHAPTER 7: ENTERPRISE 
THE EVOLUTION OF AN AFRICAN MULTINATIONAL 
The chapter investigates the evolution of AGC into a multinational enterprise. 
Existing multinational theories are tested against the firm's experience and are 
found wanting on several counts. AGC does not fit the dominant description of 
LDC MNEs as low-capital enterprises funded by retained earnings and family 
sources. The theories tested understate the importance of entrepreneurship and 
fail to consider the causal role of international finance - specifically, the role of 
borrower reputation, shareholder expectation, and the innovative use of financial 
instruments - in the growth of a firm. In AGC's case, these factors were critical in 
explaining why and how the company extended its borders internationally when it 
did. 
Enterprise, the often neglected factor of production, can be defined as readiness to 
take on risk. Distinct from management, which connotes day—to-day co-ordination 
and execution tasks, enterprise involves setting future strategy, seizing on 
uncertainty and market and price discrepancies to expand the firm's productive 
possibilities. 1 Firm growth, like economic growth, requires more than an increase 
in inputs, or dependence on exogenous technological developments. 2 Endogenous 
innovation at the level of the firm is critical to growth, and it is the entrepreneurial 
function that drives such innovation. 
An examination of AGC's international growth will allow an assessment 
to be made of the role of enterprise in this process. The company evolved into a 
MNE between 1996 and 1999. From a single mine at Obuasi in Ghana the firm 
acquired and developed five additional mines in a short space of time: two others 
in Ghana and one each in Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Guinea. Using theoretical 
tools from theories on multinationalisation the initial internationalisation of the 
firm is investigated: when it occurred, why and how. 
The chapter is organized as follows: the literature on MNE theory is 
critiqued; this is followed by an assessment of the specific branch of MNE theory 
Baumol (1968), pp. 64-6. 
2  Compare, N. Crafts, 'Economic Growth', in J. Mokyr (ed.), Oxford Encyclopedia of Economic 
History, vol. 2, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 137-45; M. Bleaney and A. Nishiyama, 
`Explaining Growth: A contest between Models', Journal of Economic Growth, 7, 2002, pp. 43-56. 
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that focuses on LDC MNEs. The chain of events in the film's international 
expansion is constructed. Five hypotheses, representing the main tenets of the 
MNE theories, are investigated: 
1. The desire to extend monopoly power induces internationalisation. 
2. Transaction cost considerations explain the firm's boundary 
extensions. 
3. Ownership advantages combine with location cost savings and 
transaction cost savings to encourage internationalisation. 
4. Low-capital, 	low-technology and 	small-scale operations 
characterise LDC MNEs. 
5. The exhaustion of domestic expansion opportunities leads to 
internationalisation. 
Each hypothesis is analysed in relation to the evidence with the aim of 
determining the internal and external factors influencing the firm's 
internationalisation and what role, if any, entrepreneurship played in that. 
Conclusions are made about the adequacy of the existing MNE theories in 
explaining AGC's growth experience and the role of entrepreneurship in this 
process. 
Definition of a multinational 
Definitions of multinational enterprises vary. The definition used in this chapter is 
a firm directly controlling income-generating activities in more than one country. 
By this definition AGC, although established as a free-standing British foreign 
investment in 1897, was not a multinational since income was only generated in 
Ghana. 
From early on, however, the company did investigate additional 
opportunities abroad such as tin mining in Malaysia. 3 Extensions of the firm 
boundary within Ghana were also examined. Options were taken out on a tin 
concession in Winneba, for example, in 1919. 4 Had such forays proved 
worthwhile the properties would likely have been established as separate 
3 MS 24661/6, report on proceedings of AGM, 20 December 1921. 
4 MS 24661/5, report on proceedings of AGM, 11 December 1919. 
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companies. There was of course the Bibiani mine subsidiary in Ghana which was 
majority-owned by AGC between 1927 and 1961. In 1951 AGC established a 
UK-registered subsidiary, the West African Finance Corporation (WAFC), as a 
vehicle to hold all their portfolio investments in British, Ghanaian and other 
foreign mining and non-mining enterprises. 5 Since AGC did not directly control 
and manage the interests held by WAFC, it did not meet the above definition of a 
multinational. AGC became a multinational in 1996 when directly managed 
operations in a second country commenced. 
The theoretical literature on MNEs 
MNE literature is multidisciplinary. Contributions have come from pure 
economics, development economics, strategic management, business studies, 
business history and industrial organization. This chapter is concerned with the 
literature on why and how a domestic firm expands its operations abroad. 6 
The creation of distinct theories to explain the MNE phenomenon started in 
the 1960s. Prior to that neoclassical trade theory offered a plausible explanation 
for corporations operating abroad. Under the assumptions of perfect competitive 
markets, identical production functions, given technology and undifferentiated 
marketing and management, the orthodoxy held that capital would move from 
areas of capital abundance (such as the USA) to areas of capital scarcity (such as 
developing countries) where it could earn higher rates of return. This explanation 
appeared to fit the majority of multinational enterprises existing in the first half of 
the twentieth century. Led by Britain, an estimated 60% of Western European and 
American foreign investments before World War II went to Latin America, Asia, 
Africa and the Middle East. 7 Examples of such MNEs would be Du Pont, Royal 
Dutch/Shell and United Fruit. However, these DC-to-LDC MNEs were highly 
natural resource-based. This suggests that the motivation to obtain higher rates of 
return on capital was secondary to the firms' natural resource needs. After 1945, 
the trend in MNE development shifted away from LDCs to developed countries. 
5 In 1968 the West African Finance Corporation's investments included Standard Bank of West 
Africa Ltd, Allied Breweries, British American Tobacco, Consolidated Goldfields, BP: SPRS 
3/55/5. 
6 Many of the articles and books produced on this topic are quite old, pre-1990s. Since the late 
1980s, the MNE agenda has moved from explaining causes to focusing on the impact of MNEs on 
host and home countries, which is outside the scope of this thesis. 
J. Greer and K. Singh, 'A Brief History of Transnational Corporations', Global Policy Forum, 
2000, p. 3. 
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Two-thirds of American foreign direct investment now headed for Europe, 8 an 
area of relatively high capital supply; furthermore, many US firms did not export 
their capital along with their operations but borrowed funds from the host country 
raising further doubts about the orthodox explanations. 9 The eventual increase in 
cross investment, for example, Ford establishing in Japan and Toyota establishing 
in the US, put paid to location theory explanations that firms would move abroad 
to exploit variations in real wages and productivity between countries. 
Hymer in his 1960 PhD thesis adapted the orthodoxy to produce a theory of 
multinationalisation by introducing the concept of ownership advantage. 10 
According to this, there are disadvantages to operating abroad such as unknown 
cultures and transport and communication costs. For a firm to internationalise 
would mean that it possesses some advantages which host country firms do not 
and which exceed the costs of operating abroad. Hymer's theory takes a 
microeconomic perspective and is often called the market-power theory because it 
stresses that advantages related to size (barriers to entry, technological intensity 
and marketing) motivate international production in order to secure greater 
monopolistic power. There is empirical support for Hymer's theory. For example, 
the US Tariff Commission in 1973 showed that large oligopolistic firms at home 
were the most likely to become MNEs, while small domestic firms showed weak 
foreign presence. The UN's World Investment Report 2003 shows that a small 
number of companies own the majority of MNEs around the world and dominate 
global output in their industries. Hymer added that entrepreneurship and historical 
accident also play an important role in multinationalisation. Shortfalls in his 
analysis included the lack of definition of ownership advantage. He confused 
firm-specific advantages with country-specific ones. He failed to see the two-way 
relationship between advantages and growth - his thesis focuses exclusively on 
how advantages cause a firm to grow internationally, ignoring how growth itself 
creates advantages. Hymer assumes that a firm's domestic advantages are easily 
transferable abroad: however factors such as experience and reputation may not be. 
In addition, a company's advantages are not necessarily oligopolistic or 
monopolistic. They may be better described as competitive advantages 
8 J.H. Dunning, J. A. Cantwell, T.A.B. Corley, The theory of International Production: Some 
Historical Antecedents' in P. Hertner and G. Jones (ads.), Multinationals: Theory and History, 
Aldershot: Gower, 1986, p. 33. 
9 S. Hymer, The International Operations of National Firms: A Study of Direct Foreign Investment, 
MIT Press, published posthumously in 1976 unrevised. 
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irrespective of the structure of the product market. For example, Lecraw's study 
of MNEs in Thailand in the mid-1970s showed that they were operating in very 
competitive manufacturing markets. These firms' advantages cannot be described 
as monopolistic. 11 Hymer is unable to explain the different forms international 
operations can take, such as joint ventures and licensing, he concludes that the 
form taken abroad is indeterminate. 12 The market power theory has also been 
criticised because of the increasing use of non-equity, inter-company alliances to 
increase market power, particularly with respect to technology and innovation. 13 
Transaction cost theory in the Coase-Williamson tradition became the 
preferred explanatory model for the MNE phenomenon from the late 1970s." 
International vertical and horizontal integration have been explained by efficiency 
gains that arise from internalising production where there are market failures. This 
approach therefore contradicts the market power school: the boundary of the firm 
in transaction cost theory expands in order to maximise efficiency, whereas the 
market power theory states that the motivation is security (and oligopolistic 
behaviour would more likely lead to inefficient, welfare-reducing consequences). 
Whereas the market power theory focuses on final product markets, transaction 
costs are more concerned with inputs and intermediary markets. Ownership 
advantages such as strong management or marketing skills are taken as given. In 
addition to the conceptual problems in separating transaction costs from 
production costs, Williamson's emphasis on asset specificity has been criticised 
because the motivation for multinationalisation may relate to a firm's intangible 
assets such as know-how. No one-off sunk investment is made but know-how is 
accrued over time, often through trial and error. Transaction cost explanations 
seem to work from an ex-post perspective, the theory is less attractive in trying to 
predict whether a firm will make the initial first investment abroad or not. 
Dunning integrates Hymer's ownership advantage concept (0) with the 
internalisation concept (I) from transaction cost theory and traditional location 
theory (L) to produce his 0-L-1 paradigm. 15 Although Dunning claims that this 
up. Lecraw, 'Direct Investment by Firms from Less Developed Countries', Oxford Economic 
Papers, Vol. 29, 3, Nov. 1977, pp. 442-57. 
12 Hymer (1976), p. 91. 
13 J. Cantwell, 'A Survey of Theories of International Production' in C.N. Pitelis and R. Sugden 
(eds.), The Nature of the Transnational Firm, New York: Routledge, 2000, second edition, pp. 16-
17. 
14 See for example, 0. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, Firms, Markets, 
Relational Contracting, London: Macmillan, 1985. 
15 J.H. Dunning, 'The Eclectic Paradigm of International Production' in Pitelis and Sugden (2000). 
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model is `mesoeconomic' (that is, at industry, rather than firm or national, level), 
much of his analysis is microeconomic, which is why it is included in this single-
firm case study. 16  He defines ownership advantages as "any kind of income-
generating assets that make it possible for firms to engage in foreign 
production"; 17  these must exist prior to the initial move abroad and are 
endogenous to the firm. The firm will also take into account locational factors 
(exogenous) as well as transaction costs savings before expanding abroad. 
Dunning adds that firms go international not only to exploit OLI advantages but 
also to enhance them, to find complementary advantages. Dunning's use of the 
concept of advantages is also imprecise. For example, he refers to internalising 
advantages but according to transaction costs theory, markets and not advantages 
are internalised. He equates internalisation advantages to ownership advantages, 
which blurs his three-prong analysis into a two-pronged one. He fails to clarify 
what a firm's advantage is relative to — is it to host country firms or to other 
international firms? 18 
According to Pitelis and Sugden, resource- and competence-based, 
endogenous growth explanations from the strategic management literature form a 
new strand in MNE theory. 19 The resource-based view stems from Penrose's 1959 
book, The Theory of the Growth of the Firm in which she defines a firm rather 
loosely as " a collection of productive resources" and states that a firm's growth is 
a "process" dependent on the interplay between internal resources and external 
opportunities. 2° Rather than suffering from diminishing returns to scale as the firm 
grows, Penrose asserts that management is not a fixed factor — firms can 
continually alter their administrative structures according to increases in size. 
Furthermore, the entrepreneurial leader, as distinct from management, is the 
Schumpeterian innovator, the agent who perceives the growth opportunities best 
16 Some MNE theories focus exclusively on mesoeconomic or macroeconomic causes of 
multinationalisation. These have been excluded from the review because we are interested here in 
microeconomic behaviour. See for example, Dunning's Investment Development Cycle (J.H. 
Dunning, 'Explaining the international direct investment position of countries: towards a dynamic 
and developmental approach', in J. Black and J.H. Dunning (eds.), International Capital 
Movements, 1982) and Nelson and Winter's industrial technological competition explanation in 
R.R. Nelson and S.J. Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, 1982. 
17 Dunning in Pitelis and Sugden (2000), p. 124. 
18  See M. Casson, 'General Theories of the Multinational Enterprise: their relevance to Business 
History', in Hertner and Jones (1986), pp. 42-63. 
19 Pitelis and Sugden (2000), p. 3. 
2° E. T. Penrose, The Theory of the Growth of The Finn, 1959, p.15. 
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suited to the firm's internal resources. The individual entrepreneur can set the tone 
for the firm to create an entrepreneurial culture. 
Kay adapts Penrose's work to the multinational enterprise. He categorises a 
firm's resources into: marketing, production, R and D, and country (that is, the 
legal framework, economy, political context, language and culture). 21 These 
resources are dynamic. A company will seek to grow in a direction that creates or 
utilises its strongest resource linkages. However, a firm's expansion is often 
uncertain and contingent on factors outside the firm's control. The resource-based 
theory predicts that firms would exploit resources domestically first before foreign 
expansion and that countries with low "psychic distance" (that is, more culturally 
or historically linked) would be preferred. 22 MNE expansion is caused by a lack of 
further domestic opportunities. The resource-based approach exposes the point in 
time when a firm will seek to grow as well as why it should chose to diversify 
abroad as opposed to branching into a different product at home: this decision is 
determined by the strength of its critical resource linkages and the exhaustion of 
domestic opportunities. 
The Literature on Multinational Enterprises from Less Developed Countries 
In reaction to the growing number of `Third World' MNEs observed from the 
1970s, a new branch of MNE research developed with a much greater political 
economy context and related to a broader debate encompassing economic 
development. This work by researchers such as Wells, Lall and Lecraw focuses 
nearly exclusively on Latin America and Asian manufacturing firms. They use a 
Hymer-based monopolistic advantages explanation: the same factors that make a 
firm oligopolistic at home will induce it to go abroad. Whereas the monopolistic 
advantages identified as important for DC MNEs are technology and marketing 
related, they conclude that for LDC MNEs the critical advantages are the ability to 
adapt standard technologies flexibly and cost effectively to the 'Third World's' 
economic, employment and climatic conditions. LDC MNE firm sizes are 
relatively small and technological `descaling' occurs. As a result, greater use is 
made of local labour and materials. Low managerial and technical staff costs, 
21 N. Kay, 'The Resource-Based Approach to Multinational Enterprise' in Pitelis and Sugden 
(2000). 
22 Ibid., p. 153. 
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ethnic advantages to political access and host government preference are also 
identified as monopolistic advantages for LDC MNEs. In contrast, DC MNE 
advantages are listed as: large firm size, access to capital markets, technology, 
product differentiation, complex organization management skills, and vertical 
control over factor markets (see Table 7.1 below). A further difference observed 
was the greater likelihood of LDC MNEs to choose joint ventures with local 
agents rather than 100% ownership. Lecraw's sample of twenty manufacturing 
LDC MNEs in Thailand showed independent foreign units, unlike the divisional 
structures typical of DC MNEs. 23 These were often managed by relatives of the 
owner of the home country firm. 
Table 7.1: Sources of monopolistic advantages for MNEs 24 
DC MNEs LDC MNEs 
Large firm or group size; divisional 
structure 
Ownership is in the form of 
conglomerates 
Access to capital markets 
Technology Technology is mostly disembodied and 
adapted to 'Third World' conditions 
Product differentiation Occasional product differentiation 
Marketing know-how Marketing skills (imitated as opposed to 
acquired through experience) 
Management skills, complex 
organizations 
Management adapted to 'Third World' 
conditions 
Access to low-cost inputs Low-cost inputs (especially managerial 
and technical personnel) 
Vertical control over factor/product 
markets 
Host government preference Host government preference 
Ethnic advantages 
Familial management 
zs Lecraw (1977). 
24 Adapted from S. Lall (ed.), The New Multinationals: The Spread of Third World Enterprises, 
Chichester: Wiley, 1983, p. 7. 
262 
Lall states that these advantages are country-specific and dynamic. He 
locates the most likely source of difference between the characteristics of MNEs 
from India, Hong Kong, Brazil and Argentina as the "differing trade and industrial 
strategies". 25 No mention is made of Africa, except as a destination for some 
Asian MNEs. 
La11 and Streeten categorise the monopolistic advantages of a firm as 
"permissive", "causal" or "consequential". 26 Causal advantages induce 
internationalisation; permissive advantages facilitate internationalisation but on 
their own do not provide sufficient motivation; consequential advantages arise ex 
post. One causal factor mentioned by the authors is the existence of a 
Schumpeterian, dynamic leader who could induce internationalisation. However, 
they state that the "prime" causal factor is technology, which is related to size. 27 
 Access to raw materials and marketing could also be causal. Finance, economies 
of scale, bargaining and political power are labelled "permissive" factors. After 
gaining experience from entering into new markets, a firm could find the process 
of further expansion much less costly, global integration could allow better 
exploitation of input costs, in this sense some advantages are consequential and 
acquired cumulatively. 
In addition to a firm's advantages Lall and Streeten discuss external 
motivating factors to internationalise: short term strategic gains, host country 
political stability, market growth prospects, threats to established markets, local 
competition and tax incentives.28 Some of the motivating factors discussed, such 
as earnings remittance restrictions, are not as relevant today as they would have 
been in the late 1970s. 
The authors' explanation for the choice of international production versus 
licensing or other contracting options ignores any market failure / transaction 
costs considerations. The criticisms of Hymer's theory discussed above apply. 
25 Ibid., p.8. 
26 Lall, S. and P. Streeten, Foreign Investment, Transnationals and Developing Countries, London: 
Macmillan 1977. 
27 Ibid., p.25. 
28  Ibid., p.37. 
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Table 7.2: Summary of the main characteristics of LDC-to-LDC MNEs as 
portrayed in the literature 
Characteristics of LDC-to-LDC MNE 
Manufacturing of low margin, undifferentiated goods 
Standard, disembodied technology 
High level of joint ventures 
Low production cost advantages rather than marketing advantages 
High labour input 
Cheap managerial and technical manpower 
Internal and/or indigenous local fmancing 
Small plant size 
(It is worth noting that many of the approaches above, particularly the 
market power approach, complement Marxist interpretations of the MNE 
phenomenon. Within Marxism generally, the global growth of large monopolistic 
firms would represent an advanced and expected stage of capitalism.) 29 
Problems and limitations of existing literature and research 
There are notable limitations to the existing literature. Research on the causes of 
multinationalisation is dated. This wrongly gives the impression that the 
phenomenon is well understood and that decades-old findings still hold. As 
Hertner and Jones stress, more empirical evidence on the motives and behaviour 
of modern MNEs is sorely needed. Too much that has been written is speculative 
and in the aggregate; they call for research into the "inner workings" of individual 
firm's motives through the use of documents. 3° This chapter therefore responds to 
this gap in the research with respect to modernity and methodology. 
Apart from the resource-based approach, the other methods are static and 
fail to capture the dynamism in the multinationalisation process. This chapter will 
attempt to capture the different stages AGC experienced in its evolution into a 
MNE. 
29 See for example, J. Peoples and R. Sugden, 'Divide and Rule by Transnational Corporations' in 
Pitelis and Sugden (2000), pp. 174-192. 
30 P. Hertner and G. Jones, 'Multinationals: Theory and History' in Hertner and Jones (1986), pp. 
1-18. 
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The literature, particularly on LDC MNEs, ignores the role of international 
finance; one is left to think that firms from these countries have no access to the 
international financial markets. This implies that capital exported in the 
multinationalisation process must be indigenous or from retained earnings. Lall 
and Streeten treat capital as a permissive advantage — not a causal factor in 
internationalisation, they write, "it is unlikely that in the absence of other 
oligopolistic advantages, the mere access to (cheaper or more) finance will act as 
an inducement to direct, as opposed to purely financial (portfolio) investment, 
though theoretically it is possible that this by itself may facilitate expansion via 
take over or merger". 31 This chapter will determine whether the role of capital in 
AGC's MNE evolution was "permissive" or "causal". 
There is an over-emphasis in the empirical studies on the manufacturing 
sector - bearing in mind the dominance of the service sector in modern 
economies, 32 this represents a significant limitation in the application of existing 
MNE theories. Villela gives two examples of extractive LDC MNEs. 33 The first is 
YPF, an Argentinean petroleum company. However, this firm expanded abroad 
into marketing distribution and not into exploration and extraction. 34 In Brazil, the 
state-owned subsidiary of Petrobras, Braspetro, was created in 1972 to exploit 
Petrobras's twenty-year experience in exploration and oil and gas production and 
to diversify its oil sources. Insufficient information is provided on Braspetro's 
internationalisation, we are only told that most of its foreign operations are joint 
ventures. Villela focuses his analysis instead on Brazilian manufacturing. It would 
have been informative for the author to compare the differences in motivation and 
method between Brazilian manufacturing and extractive MNEs.35 More empirical 
work is needed on the services and extractive sectors. In so doing it may be 
possible to define more testable hypotheses applicable to specific sectors. The 
MNE literature perhaps lays undue emphasis, in this era of globalisation, on 
whether a company is from a developed or less developed country. The analysis 
Lall and Streeten (1977), p. 20. 
32 In 1999, 80% of U.S. GDP, for example, was attributable to the services sector. 
"A. V. Villela, 'Multinationals in Brazil', in Lall (1983), pp. 220-249. 
34 J. Katz and B. Kosacoff, 'Multinationals in Argentina' in Lall (1983), pp. 137-219. 
35 A detailed investigation into Braspetro's evolution into a MNE would provide a useful 
comparative exercise with AGC. Both firms were publicly listed. While the Brazilian government 
owns 55% of Petrobras, the Ghanaian government owned at various stages between 17.2% and 
55% of AGC and therefore both firms would have encountered political considerations 
surrounding international expansion. This is a worthy area of future investigation but is outside the 
scope of this thesis. 
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of AGC's experience may show that the developmental stage of a firm's home 
country is less relevant from an analytical point of view than the firm's industry. 
The neglect of reputation as an asset, the importance of relationship 
networks and a general "undersocialising" of the firm, as Granovetter would put it, 
is noticeable, particularly in the transaction cost approach. The influence of 
financial reputation, and business relationships in general, on the boundary of the 
firm is investigated in this case study. 
I was unable to unearth any research on another sub-Saharan African MNE; 
from the LDC MNE literature one could wrongly conclude that black African 
MNEs do not exist. Research on AGC therefore goes a little way to fill an 
important gap in the geographic scope of existing research. 
Chain of events 
The chain of events leading up to multinationalisation starts in 1986 with the first 
IFC-led project. As explained in Chapter 3, 'A Chronological Narrative', AGC 
successfully executed, in co-ordination with the IFC, three major capital projects: 
the Rehabilitation and Expansion programme, the Sansu Project and AMEP. 
Together they allowed the mine to implement large-scale mechanisation of ore 
production and to lower its cut-off grade by economically treating the diversity of 
ores found at Obuasi with appropriate technologies. This resulted in rapid growth 
in ore and gold production. 
Tentative Domestic Conglomerate Growth 
Through contact with the IFC, AGC was given the opportunity to make financial 
investments in other IFC projects within Ghana. In 1989, a 20% equity investment 
was made in a commercial bank, Ecobank (Ghana) Limited. The Togo-based 
Ecobank Transnational Inc with a network of banks throughout West Africa, was 
the majority shareholder. In 1990, AGC made a financial investment in Hotel 
Investments (Ghana) Limited to build Ghana's first 4-star hotel, Labadi Beach. 
AGC held 22.5% ownership and Lonrho was the majority shareholder, again there 
was IFC participation. These financial opportunities had been brought to AGC. 
However, in 1992 the company declared a proactive desire to seek and "identify 
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profitable investment opportunities in manufacturing, farming and services". 36 
 Subsequently, a new investment was made in agricultural interests held by SCOA, 
but this time a controlling, management stake was bought — 73% of Jei River 
Farms, a leading pineapple exporter. Jei River Farms became an AGC subsidiary 
wholly managed from head office. In 1994 another subsidiary, Limestone 
Products (Ghana) Ltd was created with 51% ownership. The following year this 
subsidiary was reduced to joint venture status with 50% ownership granted to a 
Belgian firm, who took on its management. The limestone business was treated 
alongside the hotel and bank interests as an "associated undertaking", 37 as was a 
second manufacturing investment in ICI Explosives (Ghana) Ltd (49%). While 
the associated undertakings would soon be divested, the company held on to Jei 
Farms for as long as possible, only selling it off when pressured to do so 
following the financial crisis in late 1999. The contribution of these subsidiaries 
and undertakings to income and profits was always small but positive (less than 
1% of revenue). 
Ecobank was available for financial advice and products, the limestone 
production provided an important input for the Sulphide Treatment Plant, as did 
the explosives enterprise and the 4-star hotel arguably benefited foreign visitors to 
the Accra head office. However, it is difficult to explain the rationale for the 
pineapple farm. A later annual report refers to these holdings as "strategic 
investments in other sectors of Ghana's economy". 3s It is possible that the 
business model espoused by Tiny Rowland with his extensive agricultural and 
hotel investments across Africa, was being replicated in miniature in Ghana. 
However, the small and constant size of these non-mining activities shows that a 
conglomerate growth path was never seriously developed. Had AGC remained a 
private company this alternative growth path would have been easier to execute, 
as such investments did not require large capital outlays and could be financed out 
of retained earnings. But once the decision had been taken to go public, new 
priorities and restraints would be set by shareholders and bankers. As a recently 
floated public limited company AGC would need to earn analysts' and 
shareholders' confidence, conglomerate growth would have been a difficult 
strategy to justify in terms of management experience and competencies. 
se AGC annual report, 1992, p. 22. 
37 The annual reports list subsidiaries separately from associated undertakings. The distinction 
between the two was whether AGC had management control or not. 
sa AGC annual report, 1995, p. 13. 
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Flotation 
The marketing material produced by James Capel to attract investors for the 
flotation spelt out the company's growth credentials, plans and targets. 39 
■Output to reach one million-ounces in 1994/5 and to be "maintained above 
this level for sometime thereafter." 
■Proven and probable reserves to provide another 17 years of mining. 
■Improvements in mechanization and processing to further reduce cut-off 
grade and consequently increase reserves. 
■Exploration within the existing concession to be pursued based on already 
identified geological anomalies (italics mine). 
■Exploration, advanced projects and major operations within Ghana (italics 
mine). 
■"The strategy of AGC is to develop the potential of its mineral concession 
(italics mine) to create long term value for its shareholders through 
profitable growth". 40 
Ghana's good geological setting with a 300km northeast-southwest gold belt, 
favourable investment climate, political and economic stability and infrastructure 
were highlighted in the marking literature to support this strategy. 
The growth path identified at the time of flotation was to focus first on the 
existing concession, followed by consideration of the potential outside the mine 
but within Ghana. It is noteworthy that no mention is made of international 
exploration or acquisitions in the flotation marketing document. This may have 
been because the flotation promoters did not want to present a new avenue of 
operations where the company did not have a track record and therefore sufficient 
credibility. The document shows that the company's priorities were on the Obuasi 
concession and Ghana. 
The million-ounce target was partly influenced by the fact that gold 
producers are categorised by mining bankers according to their output: producers 
of a million-ounces or more are 'senior' producers, 500,000 to 999,999 ounces are 
39 James Capel flotation document 1994. 
40 Ibid., p.22. 
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`intermediary', and below that are 'juniors'. The categorisation directly affects the 
producer's cost and availability of capital with bankers preferring to lend to 
seniors, whose larger revenue streams give greater confidence that loans can be 
repaid. 
AGC's flotation on 26 February 1994 valued the company at US$1.8bn, 
shares started trading at US$20. 
PLC 
The first annual report produced after flotation announced the establishment of a 
100%-owned subsidiary, Ashanti Exploration Limited, "to facilitate an aggressive 
international exploration and development programme" (italics mine). 41 
Expansion beyond Obuasi would be achieved through exploration, evaluation of 
mine development projects and acquisitions of operating mines. The motivation 
for this strategic move was attributed to "... technical, managerial and financial 
expertise. Synergy with our existing supplies and technical support functions for 
developing new mining properties will provide a competitive edge for Ashanti". 42 
Looking at the output achieved in the 1994 reporting year, 822,954 ounces, 
it is clear that the previous years' growth rates had decelerated sharply. 1994's 
output growth of 7% was the lowest since 1987. To deliver the promise of a 
million-ounces by 1995 - the promise upon which the successful marketing of 
flotation had hinged - would require an unrealistic increase in output of 22%. This 
may have been a strong factor in initiating an "aggressive international 
exploration and development programme". 43 
The first mining acquisition was made in 1994, a 49% controlling stake in 
Midras Mining Limited of Ghana. Midras was an early stage alluvial mining 
project, not yet operational, located about 30 miles northwest of Obuasi. It was 
purchased for US$1.6m cash and AGC took over its management. 
By the financial year-end in 1995 the one million-ounce target had not 
been. achieved — 932,323 ounces were produced. The failure was attributed to 
lower than planned tonnage and grades from the underground mine and an 
"AGC annual report, 1994, p. 6. 
42 ibid., p.13. 
43 Ibid., p.6. 
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increase in refractory ores from the open pit mines. 44 Nevertheless the 
commitment to the million-ounce target was repeated by Sam Jonah, the CEO, 
"The expansion of AGC's gold production from underground gives us confidence 
that even while gold production from our large surface operations begins to scale 
down, the Company can maintain production from Obuasi around the one million-
ounce per year mark for the foreseeable future". 45 The diction choice is 
revealing: "around" one million-ounces replaces the previous year's promise "to 
take AGC past the million-ounce benchrnark". 46 The need to manage, or reduce 
shareholder expectation is apparent. 
In addition, we see that the firm's "aggressive international exploration and 
development programme" has been specified as "gold mining elsewhere in Ghana 
and Africa as a whole" (both italics mine). 47 
In 1995, the company ventured for the first time into the international debt 
market without the auspices of the 1FC. A US$185m syndicated revolving credit 
facility (RCF) led by Barclays with sixteen other participating banks was 
concluded. It was 100% secured on the company's gold sales and certain offshore 
bank accounts, at a rate of Libor plus 1.05% (compared to an average of 1,78% 
over Libor for the previous IFC loan).48 Most of the participating banks had been 
involved in the previous IFC syndicated loans. The RCF replaced existing long-
term debt and provided funds for continued Obuasi expansion projects. US$60m 
in new equity was raised specifically for Ashanti Exploration Limited for which 
debt finance was not available due to the high levels of uncertainty. 
Ashanti Exploration initiated grassroots exploration in Ghana, Ethiopia, 
Eritrea and Guinea; exploration projects already advanced by other firms were 
built on in Niger, Senegal and Mali. 49 All of these projects were joint ventures, 
mostly with AGEM/1AMGOLD a Canadian-based international exploration and 
mine development company. The terms of the partnership provided for a 50% 
share in exploratory costs and AGC would operate any successfully developed 
mine arising from the explorations. AGEM had discovered a lucrative mine in 
44 Refractory ores contain properties that hinder the recover}, rates of the normal gold extraction 
process. These refractory ores require intermediary processing before satisfactory levels of gold 
can be achieved; therefore they increase costs and reduce gold output. 
45 Board minutes, GH, 19 May 1995; AGC annual report, 1995, Chief Executive's Review. 
46 AGC annual report, 1994, Chief Executive's Review. 
47 AGC annual report, 1994, p .6 compared to AGC annual report, 1995, p. 4. 
48  Board minutes, GH, 19 May 1995; Libor is the London Interbank Offer Rate, see glossary for 
definition. 
49 Board minutes, GH, 16 December 1994. 
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Mali and had existing partnerships with senior operators, they were seen to be 
reputable exploration experts. 5° At the same time the company commenced an 
Obuasi-specific exploration initiative. International specialists in structural 
geology, geochemistry and geophysics were commissioned for the task with three 
aims - to improve understanding of geology to optimise surface and underground 
mining and mine planning; to search for new deposits within the Obuasi 
concession; to transfer international best exploration and geological practice by 
training AGC staff. 
Late in 1996 the chief executive admitted defeat over Obuasi's million-
ounce target. The drive for quantity had resulted in soaring costs, lack of attention 
to grade control, the mining of excess reclamation material instead of gold ore and 
a demoralised staff. 51 The target production for Obuasi was reduced to 850,000 
ounces. AGC had lost its reputation as a low-cost producer with cash operating 
costs in 1993 of US$173 per ounce now at US$252. 52 One mine industry analyst 
remarked that investors felt that they had been "legged over", that the pre-flotation 
promises had not been realistic and the IPO had consequently been overpriced. 53 
 It seems to me that the realisation that exploration projects and Midras, still in its 
development stage, would not produce output quickly enough for shareholders led 
the company to acquire mines that were already in production. 
Table 7.3 shows the acquisitions made in 1996, how they were financed and 
the types of mine bought. 
5° AGC annual report, 1995, p. 15. 
51 Board minutes, GH, 23 August 1996. 
52 The world average costs per ounce in 2002 was US$235 including depreciation costs which are 
not included in Ashanti's cash cost figures. www.gold.org . 
53 Interview, Mark Horn, mining and metals industry analyst, M. Horn and Co. Ltd, London , 17 
February 2005. He added that there had been considerable hype in the mining equity market in 
1993/4 because of the bullish activity of junior firms across Africa in the wake of Structural 
Adjustment economic improvements. Investors and analysts had perhaps been remiss in their 
scrutiny of AGC's forecasts. 
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Table 7.3: Acquisitions made in 1996 
Mine name and type Acquired company Financing 
Freda-Rebecca mine, Zimbabwe; 
open pit (2-year mine life) and 
underground production (over 7 
years expected mine life). 
100% acquisition of 
Cluff Resources, a 
British junior. 
Cost US$156.4m. 
Paid by US$67.8m in 
AGC shares; US$86.6m 
cash; US$2m deferred. 
Ayanfuri Mine, Ghana; open pit, 
5-year mine life. 
Iduapriem mine, Ghana; 
open pit production (initial 5-year 
mine life extended to 13 years). 
Through the 
acquisition of Golden 
Shamrock Mines Ltd 
(GSM), an Australian 
junior, AGC acquired 
80% of Iduapriem 
(20% held by Ghana-
Australian Goldfields) 
and 85% of Siguiri 
(15% held by Guinea 
gvmt). 
GSM cost US$235.8m. 
Paid by US$172.6m in 
new shares; US$37.5m 
preference shares; 
US$19.9m cash; 
US$5.8m deferred. 
Siguiri mine development 
project, Guinea; open pit mining 
to commence in 1998. 
Development costs estimated at 
US$55m. (Over 10 years 
expected mine life). 
Bibiani mine, Ghana; a mine 
development project. Open pit 
mining to start in 1998, estimated 
development costs of US$83m. 
(Over 10 years expected mine 
life). 
100% acquisition of 
International Gold 
Resources, a 
Canadian junior. 
Cost US$125.7m; 
US$98.8m in new shares; 
cash US$15.2m; deferred 
US$11.7m. 
The acquisitions were not made without market criticism. It was felt by 
some that the choice of mines, with the exception of those in Ghana were 
geographically too isolated and therefore lacked cost synergies. There was also 
concern about AGC's rising debt commitments needed to develop the 
properties. 54 Siguiri required a US$60m project finance loan from Rothschild and 
Bibiani obtained US$40m project finance from Societe Generale, out of a total 
54 Interview, Horn, London, 17 February 2005; HSBC International Mining Division, 'Ashanti 
Goldfields Asset Performance' 6 October 1997, p. 7. 
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development budget of US$83m. 	AGC now comprised four operating mines: 
Obuasi, Ayanfuri and Iduapriem (all in Ghana) and Freda-Rebecca in Zimbabwe. 
Output from these four sources totalled 1,024,803 ounces in 1996. Three mines 
were under development: Midras and Bibiani in Ghana and Siguiri in Guinea. The 
exploration portfolio had grown to 35 properties in twelve African countries. The 
most promising prospect was at Geita in Zimbabwe where AGC owned a 85 
square mile exploration concession through the acquisition of Chuff Resources. 
These projects were pursued to "guarantee that we meet our future growth 
targets". 55 The aim was "to establish our credentials as an attractive growth 
company" .  According to the chief executive, the path taken was in-line with the 
firm's entrepreneurial spirit, "A vital ingredient in the Ashanti culture is the 
entrepreneurial spirit that has become our hallmark... an innovative and 
purposeful spirit and [to] operate with the full attributes of an owner-driven 
enterprise". 57 The emphasis on achieving continual growth and "an owner-driven" 
attitude is obviously for shareholders' reassurance. The pressure exerted from 
shareholders' expectations is evidenced in the fact that although net profit fell by 
40% in 1996 (due to increased costs of production including a 40% mine workers 
union pay increase, increased capital expenses and corporate costs associated with 
the acquisitions) the recommended dividend per share matched that paid in 1995. 
To finance continued growth, US$250m was raised by issuing 7-year 5.5% 
Exchangeable Notes on the New York Stock Exchange in February 1996. These 
notes were exchangeable into shares at a strike price of US$27. However, by the 
end of 1996, the company's share price had plummeted to US$12.50 and would 
decline further in 1997 to US$6.87, from an all-time high of US$27. 55 Over this 
period the world gold price declined from around US$400 an ounce to around 
US$300 an ounce, which affected all gold producers' share prices. However, 
comparing AGC's share price performance to the precious metals industry shows 
that from the middle of 1996, AGC began to fare worse than the industry when 
measured by the performance of the Dow Jones Precious Metals index and 
HSBC's Gold Index . 59 This can be explained by the firm's rising cash operating 
55 1996 AGC annual report, p.7. 
56 Ibid., p. 6. 
57 Ibid., p. 7. 
56 US$27.50 was the closing price on 2 February 1996; US$6.87 was the closing price on 4 
December 1997. 
59 Dow Jones precious metals industrial classification 1996-2000, www.ft.com ; HSBC 
International Mining Division, 'Ashanti Goldfields Asset Performance' 6 October 1997, p. 6. 
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costs (discussed above), the increasing debt levels (gross gearing jumped from 
34% in 1995 to 88% in 1996 to 118% in 1997, see Figure 7.8 below), as well as 
the extensive use of new share issues to fund acquisitions and to pay dividends, 
considerably diluting existing shareholders' stakes. Authorised share capital was 
increased from 150 million shares to 200 million shares in 1997 to facilitate the 
further use of company shares as currency for acquisitions. 
Management teams experienced in production and development were 
recruited or seconded to the acquired mines. A federalist management philosophy 
with divisional boards for each producing mine was implemented. 60 Extensive 
staff changes were made at Obuasi with the introduction of a new Obuasi 
managing director and a new general manager; the group's chief operating officer 
was also replaced with the aim of improving discipline at all levels, supervision, 
training and cost control. Management succession planning was introduced along 
with incentive bonuses. Specific actions to curb costs included staff cuts and 
renegotiations of supplier and service contracts. Growth necessitated improved 
reporting, so quarterly reporting for each division was introduced. In 1997, non-
gold activities acquired with some of the purchased firms, such as copper and 
silver mining interests, and non-African gold mining properties, were put up for 
sale, as were the undertakings in Ecobank and ICI Explosives. Interestingly, Jei 
River Farms and Hotel Investments (Ghana) Limited were not, at this stage. All 
these measures were aimed at demonstrating the firm's focus on gold production 
and improving profitability alongside growth. 
A corporate "vision" was adopted in 1997, "To be the premier gold 
producing company in Africa" and the number of times the word "aggressively" is 
used in connection with this vision is noteworthy. 61 The vision was supported by a 
decision to cap dividends in the future to a quarter of distributable earnings in 
order to retain funds for growth. 
The acquisition of Samax Gold Inc (a junior Canadian exploration and 
mining firm) for US$140.1m in November 1998 extended the area of the Geita 
concession in Tanzania where excellent exploratory results had trebled the 
measured and indicated resources to 6.4m ounces of gold — once in production 
this would make Geita one of the largest mines in Africa outside South Africa. 
Samax was paid for using a US$50m debt facility, US$44m in cash, US$42.1m of 
eo AGC annual report, 1996, p. 4. 
G1 Ibid.; AGC annual report, 1997 p. 1. 
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2.5% Mandatory Exchangeable Securities (in effect, deferred shares), and US$4m 
in the form of 5% Loan Notes (a type of bond). The acquisition of Samax 
included a 50% interest in Golden Pride, a 180,000-ounce per annum producing 
mine in Tanzania managed by Resolute Limited, Australian operators, which was 
later sold in 1999; 50.4% ownership of a small 15,000-ounce a year mine in 
Prestea, Ghana, and an exploration property in Congo Brazzaville. 
In December 1998 the RCF was refinanced and extended to provide 
US$270m, this time led by Chase Manhattan for a 5-year period at an interest rate 
of Libor plus 0.83% (compared with + 1.05% before). 62 The new facility had 
reduced security requirements and less strict financial covenants. This indicates 
that AGC was reaping the reduced capital cost benefits of being a senior producer. 
In addition, most of the financiers now had a relationship spanning twelve years 
with the firm; despite recent production problems at Obuasi debt obligations had 
always been paid on time, sometimes even ahead of schedule, the company 
therefore benefited from a good credit reputation. Examples of a good borrower's 
record were the repayment of the Bibiani and Siguiri project finance loans in the 
first year of bringing these mines into operation in 1998. The company was aware 
of their "established financial credibility and access to international capital 
markets". 63 Nearly all of the RCF's US$270m was used to repay the previous 
facility and part of the Samax acquisition costs. 
Although the bankers' favourable lending showed approval of AGC's 
international growth strategy, industry analysts were aware of the risks of the 
approach. Rising debt levels was a particular threat to AGC's future performance, 
as was the company's uncertain ability to permanently reduce costs. 64 
In 1998, 50% of AGC's total output of 1,547,610 ounces was generated by 
the mines acquired since 1996. Cost reduction strategies started to pay off and 
earnings were slightly better than the previous year. 
Exploration properties increased to 40 in thirteen African countries in 1998 
including a 49% controlling interest in Kimin, a prospect in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo acquired for an initial consideration of US$5m. Certain joint 
ventures were discontinued because of unsatisfactory geological results. 
62 Board minutes, GH, 29 June 1998. 
62 1998 AGC annual report, p. 8. 
" HSBC Global Mining Division, AGC equity research report, 30 October 1998, p. 2. 
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In response to the declining global gold price, the company increased the 
amount of production sold forward in their hedging portfolio, and plans were 
made to phase out the highest cost mine at Iduapriem, and Midras, the alluvial 
mine only recently commissioned, was sold. Obuasi's surface mines were also 
nearing the end of their economic lives, estimated for 2000. Development of the 
lucrative Geita prospect, scheduled to commence in 1999, was therefore critical to 
future output growth, cash flow and profitability. 
In 1998 AGC initiated merger talks with Lonmin, the majority shareholder. 
The strategy was to form an African precious metals enterprise with Lonmin's 
South African platinum mine to be added to AGC's gold mines. 65 AGC's chief 
executive, Sam Jonah, insisted that the new enterprise would be called Ashanti, 66 
 the merger would be a takeover of Lonmin by AGC, in part to make it easier for 
the Ghanaian government to accept the proposal, since it held a golden share 
giving it powers to veto any corporate change of this nature. No doubt, personal 
ambition to see the continued growth of AGC was also a factor. Lonmin agreed to 
this approach but talks stalled over country of domicile issues and the divestment 
of Lonmin's coal interests. 67 Another motivation for this combination was risk 
diversification: the gold price trended downwards largely because of the loss of 
gold's status as a reserve asset evidenced by central banks selling off gold 
reserves to invest in higher return securities. Low inflation and a strengthening 
dollar also diminished the appeal of gold as an investment. Platinum had different 
marketing and price dynamics to gold; it had greater industrial uses (unlike gold's 
predominant consumer use) and would therefore complement gold production. 
1999 saw rationalisation in exploration projects. Grassroots explorations 
were narrowed down to focus on sites surrounding existing properties, the number 
of projects falling to 25 in six African countries. 
AGC's hedging portfolio had been expanding - in line with the belief that 
gold prices would continue to fall - from 14% of proved and probable reserves in 
1994 to 85% in 1999.68 When the hedging crisis struck at the end of September 
1999, the merger with Lonmin was seen as a possible solution to the crisis as the 
combined entity would have had a stronger balance sheet, justifying the removal 
of margin requirements. The merger terms changed and Lonmin now proposed to 
65 Taylor (2006), pp. 154-5, 172. 
66 GH, Jonah to Nick Morrell, CEO Lonmin, 2 November 1998. 
67 Chief Financial Officer meeting notes, May 1998 — October 1999. 
68 AGC annual reports 1994, p. 19, 1999, pp. 21, 53-7. 
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take over AGC, however the government of Ghana refused to support the bid as 
they felt, amongst other factors, that Lonmin was getting AGC on the cheap. 69 
The crisis was eventually resolved by granting the bankers 15% ownership 
of the company with the issue of equity warrants in exchange for margin-free 
trading. The RCF was renewed and increased to US$326m at an expensive Libor 
plus 2.5% along with a separate US$100m debt facility to put Geita into 
production at Libor plus 2% (Geita's resource base had been further increased by 
geologists to twelve million ounces). 
AGC recorded in 1999 its first pre-tax earnings loss since the mine's IFC-
assisted rehabilitation of negative US$183.6m, largely attributable to exceptional 
write-down costs from closing Obi -Iasi' s surface mines and some treatment plants, 
this totalled US$171.1m. 
The financial constraints imposed by bankers brought an end to the firm's 
"aggressive" acquisitive phase. Although the company did purchase 90% of the 
Teberebie open-mine, adjacent to Iduapriem, in June 2000 from Pioneer 
Goldfields Company, deferring the US$13.8m consideration to be paid in five 
instalments over five years. The company maintained its vision "to be the premier 
gold producing company in Africa". 
The views of critical decision-makers 
The following observations about the company's multinationalisation phase were 
made following in-depth interviews and questionnaire responses from the critical 
decision makers.7° These interviews were conducted in 2004 with Sam Jonah in 
person while he still held the post of CEO at AGC and following the merger with 
Anglogold when he became the executive President of Anglogold Ashanti; with 
Mark Keatley in person and via email, Keatley was AGC's CFO from 1994 to 
2000 (before being recruited for this role he had been part of the IFC team 
assisting AGC with project finance); with Dr. John Clarke via email from Canada, 
formerly the executive director of strategic planning at AGC between 1994 and 
1998 (prior to this Clarke, a metallurgist by training, had managed the AMEP 
project). 
69 Taylor (2006), pp. 181-4; J. Kibazo, 'Three omissions that may cost Lemnin', Financial Times, 
15 October 1999. 
70 The respondent's answers to the questionnaire are attached in Appendix 8. And the interview 
questions are in Appendix 9. 
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Table 7.4: Internal view of factors motivating expansion abroad 71 
Very significant Quite significant Not significant 
Shareholder expectation To take advantage of the 
firm's reputation in 
raising international 
capital 
Inability to achieve lm 
ounces from Obuasi 
To further exploit the firm's 
managerial skills 
To further exploit the 
firm's technical skills 
Declining share price 
To exploit the firm's 
entrepreneurial culture 
To further exploit the 
firm's financial skills 
To diversify in order to 
reduce risks 
To avoid or reduce 
pressure of competition 
from other firms 
Ability to issue new shares 
to pay a significant part of 
acquisition costs 
To defend or expand 
existing market share 
Table 7.5 Internal view of the criteria affecting the choice of mine/project to 
develop or operate72 
Very significant Quite significant Not significant 
Geological setting Capital availability Availability of joint 
venture partners 
Ease of acquiring mining 
leases 
Availability of technical 
and skilled labour 
Availability of advanced 
technology 
Confidence in property 
rights and rule of law 
Good infrastructure Availability of cheap 
labour 
Absence of foreign 
exchange controls and 
profit repatriation limits 
Political stability Cultural affinity 
Tax breaks Business and family 
connections 
7' The respondent's answers to the questionnaire are attached in Appendix 8. 
72 Ibid. 
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The small number of interviewees is an obvious drawback. Furthermore, 
management would be expected to be biased towards painting their past decisions 
in the most favourable light. To try to balance some of this bias, interviews were 
conducted with three strategically-placed informants who were at arms length 
from AGC's executive decisions. Martin Martineau, an executive director of 
Samax (the mine company acquired by AGC in 1998) who also became a non-
executive director of AGC between 2000 and 2003 was interviewed. In addition, 
Gerard Holden, global head of mining and metals at Barclays Capital one of the 
firm's principal bankers was able to comment on AGC's strategy. For an investor 
and market perspective Mark Horn of Mark Horn and Co. Ltd, a metals and 
mining industry analyst was also interviewed. In addition, equity research reports 
on AGC and newspaper comments on the firm's strategy were reviewed. 
Notwithstanding the problems inherent with interview and questionnaire 
techniques, the questions were targeted at informants qualified to comment on the 
internationalisation strategy, the methodology is therefore insightful. The factors 
raised in all these interviews are now discussed to complement the mainly public 
record of events outlined above from the annual reports. 
The idea of international expansion was first mooted late in 1994 when a 
three-pronged strategy was formulated articulating the possibility. 73 The focus 
was on achieving growth — not on becoming a multinational. The growth strategy 
comprised the continued development of Obuasi, exploration and acquisitions. 
AGC's output had doubled in five years between 1989 and 1993 and the firm had 
developed "a taste for success and achievement" according to the chief 
executive. 74 With this background, Jonah commissioned John Clarke and Mark 
Keatley to investigate ways of doubling output again for the ensuing five years. 
Clarke was given the remit to seek opportunities in Ghana and internationally that 
utilised the skills already within the company. Keatley's task was to devise the 
financial means to deliver the growth strategy. 75  
Apparently, Obuasi's failure to achieve one million-ounces by 1995 was 
unrelated to the multinationalisation process. These were, as Clarke put it, 
"independent issues. Ashanti had a market opportunity to go international. Obuasi 
73 Board minutes, GH, 16 December 1994. 
74 1996 AGC annual report, p. 7. 
75 Interview, Keatley, London, 19 February 2004. 
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was the experience base that allowed the company to know that it could do the job 
well". 76 Obuasi's successful expansion projects had provided valuable technical, 
operational and managerial experience, giving the firm confidence to look for new 
opportunities. Obuasi's future was only one of the prongs in the strategy. 
Whatever happened at Obuasi, the explorations and acquisitions paths were to be 
fully explored. 
In response to the question 'What limited growth within the Obuasi 
concession?' Clarke's response was "capital and time".77 Capital in the sense that 
returns were diminishing for every dollar sunk into Obuasi.78 The company had to 
consider whether it could get a better return elsewhere. With respect to time, the 
highly profitable oxidised surface mines at Obuasi had a finite life and prompted 
the search for additional resources. Also, Jonah had (internally) set a 5-year 
deadline to double output again. From 1996 gold prices steadily declined, in an 
industry with a high proportion of fixed operation costs from equipment and 
machinery, the pressure to expand output to absorb fixed costs increased. This 
exerted more pressure for quick growth. Shareholder expectation was also high 
due to the company's flotation promises of growth. 
Despite the insiders' denial that failure to achieve a million-ounces at 
Obuasi was a contributory factor to the aggressive growth plans, it seems to me 
that had Obuasi been able to achieve and sustain a million-ounces a year, it would 
have bought the company more time to develop exploratory projects. Growth 
through exploration seems to have been the preferred path, evidenced by Ashanti 
Explorations Limited being set up in 1994, two years before the first acquisition 
of a producing mine. As one newspaper headlined following the million-ounce 
failure and the sudden spate of acquisitions, 'Ashanti Chief Learns Harsh Lesson 
of International Listing' referring to the pressure on Jonah to deliver the flotation 
growth promises." As late as October 1998 analysts felt that AGC still needed to 
"establish a credible pattern of sustainable performance", 8° and the market's 
attention was on AGC's "previous shortcomings" with forecasts and actual 
results. 81 
76 John Clarke to author, email correspondence, 31 s` May 2004. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Interview, Keatley, London, 19 February 2004. 
79 Evening Standard, 18 December 1996. 
HSBC Global Mining Division, AGC equity research report, 30 October 1998, p. 1. 
81  HSBC International Mining Division, 'Ashanti Goldfields Asset Performance', 6 October 1997, 
p. 1. 
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One reason why growth outside Obuasi but within Ghana was limited was 
the fact that following the attractive terms of the 1986 Minerals and Mining Law 
amendments, foreign operators flooded the Ghanaian gold sector. 82 This reduced 
AGC's ability to cherry pick operating mines. The very first exploration projects, 
however, were Ghana-based, initially surrounding Obuasi and also in the north of 
the country, outside the traditional gold belt. In any case there was a desire to 
geographically diversify so as not to "have all one's eggs in one basket". 83 
Growth down the conglomerate path was unacceptable to market analysts. 
Conglomerates were being treated unfavourably in the markets, Lonrho's own 
experience being a case in point: a depressed share price and negative analyst 
reports precipitated the separation of Lonmin from its agricultural, manufacturing 
and hotel sister-companies in 1995. AGC's profitable pineapple farm had grown 
into the country's largest pineapple exporter and there is a sense that the company 
regretted having to sell it following the crisis: "The pineapple farm was assumed 
to be a distraction to the main business by some market analysts. In fact it was not, 
as it took very limited involvement of HQtas fus4 
Information on potential acquisitions and prospects was gathered formally 
and informally. Formally, use was made of technical appraisals, market data, and 
contacts with financial institutions involved with mine financing who would be 
aware of operations for sale or in need of capital. Junior firms find it difficult to 
raise capital and often advertise their exploratory results with the hope of 
attracting larger operators as partners or buyers. Informally, attendance at mine 
conferences and industry relationships that spanned the globe, thanks to the 
international work experience of all three men, also contributed valuable 
information. Jonah in particular had been known to support junior exploration 
firms and mine producers with information on the mining business in Ghana, for 
example putting people into contact with relevant government departments to 
assist them in their projects. 85 After short-listing desirable operating mines to 
acquire, AGC gathered information from the companies to determine the state of 
affairs and whether the management would entertain offers. None of the 
acquisitions made were hostile takeovers. Considerable legal work was required 
82 Keatley to author, email correspondence, 9 June 2004; interview, Jonah, Johannesburg, 14 
December 2004. 
83 Clarke to author, 31 May 2004. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Interview, Martin Martineau, former Samax director and AGC non-executive director, 
Hildenborough, 16 May 2004. 
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to satisfy the regulations of different jurisdictions with respect to land ownership, 
tax, company and securities laws. 
Initially, the acquisitions search was not limited to Africa. One opportunity 
in Uzbekistan was considered in some detail. As Clarke recounted: 
We were invited to see some properties in Uzbekistan and did visit 
properties and conduct some review work there. The Uzbeks came to Ghana 
to see our Biox operations at Obuasi and were impressed with what Ashanti 
could offer in both development and management. Hence the invitation for 
us to visit them. It was clear that if we had continued we would have had to 
tackle the issue of 'why were we not making the most of our home ground 
advantage in Africa first?' - including understanding of politics and legal 
systems let alone wider geological and country risk issues. It was a valid set 
of questions that we asked ourselves (before others could ask us) and we 
decided that we had only just started to understand our opportunities closer 
to home. 86 
It became clear that it was in Africa that AGC could compete the strongest 
against other international buyers: 
The market opportunity was strongest within Africa where Ashanti's 
history and its development as a significant company, self-contained within 
Ghana, was a benchmark to offer elsewhere in Africa. We were not reliant 
on a foreign workforce in Ghana but we were willing to make use of non-
nationals who carried specific skills that could be used in the short-term to 
be passed on to our staff in the medium-term. Ashanti offered to 
governments the opportunity to replicate this model and to develop as a 
`Malian company' any interests it may develop in Mali, Zimbabwean in 
Zimbabwe, etc ... The issue could have been expanded to any nation wanting 
its own nationals to be a focus for its own mining business development but 
Africa had a clear advantage to Ashanti as a perceived 'African player' —
by governments and by business. We really did have an advantage both on 
the business and on the political front in what was perceived by the market 
place in general as a 'home market' for Ashanti. The whole continent 
86 Clarke to author, 6 June 2004. 
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(particularly sub-Saharan) gave an easy welcome to the new international 
Ghanaian mining company. 87 
Jonah pitched directly to African heads of state and ministers for support for 
mining and exploration licences and concessions. Prior to AGC's arrival, many of 
these politicians were used to negotiating with Westerners over large capital 
investments. In Jonah's opinion, being an African, he was treated with a greater 
degree of trust, even embraced. 88 There is evidence that AGC was given 
preferential treatment by African regulators, for example, the Tatagura and 
Christon Bank Exclusive Prospecting Orders granted in Zimbabwe in 1995 were 
unusual in their exclusivity. As a reflection of the good opinion held of AGC the 
company was asked to contribute to discussions on Tanzania's statute 
amendments to rehabilitate her mining sector. 89 From a banker's perspective, 
expansion across the continent was perceived more as an extension of the home 
market than internationalisation thanks to AGC's experience of Ghanaian 
business and politics.90 
Tangible proof that the firm did have an entrepreneurial culture included the 
adoption of the Biox treatment process in 1993. As one of the first mines to use 
this new technology on a large commercial scale, AGC demonstrated a pioneering 
spirit. The firm's inclusion of exploration projects in former Soviet-leaning 
countries such as Mali and Ethiopia, which had been largely ignored by Western 
companies, showed a leave-no-stone-unturned attitude. The purchase of a 
controlling stake of the Kimin concession in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 
1997 manifested an appetite for risk, bearing in mind the political instability in 
that region. Sam Jonah showed entrepreneurial ambition in setting high targets for 
the firm. His leadership was viewed as critical to the firm's success and future (as 
was later proved by the refusal of international bankers to accept his resignation 
during the financial crisis.) 91 These examples fit the definitions of 
entrepreneurship. 
The ability to issue new shares was pivotal in the expansion process. Neither 
Lonmin nor the Ghanaian government (the majority shareholders) had requested 
87 Ibid. 
88 Interview, Jonah, Johannesburg, 14 December 2004. 
89 Interview, Keatley, 19 February 2004. 
g° Interview, Holden, London, 19 March 2004. 
91 Interview, Holden, London, 19 March 2004; Taylor (2006), pp. 180, 220. 
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stringent limits on share issuance in the articles of association at the time of 
flotation — much to Lot -1min' s later regret. 92 When growth through acquisition was 
to be pursued Keatley spoke to Randall Oliphant the financial director of Barrick, 
a major Canadian gold producer that had achieved phenomenal growth through 
acquisitions. According to Oliphant the critical success factor had been the use of 
the company's own shares to pay for the acquisitions. Barrick shares were traded 
in Toronto and New York, accessible to North America's large institutional 
investors. Based on this information Keatley made the suggestion to list AGC on 
the New York Stock Exchange. 93 The Board agreed and this was achieved in 
February 1996. AGC was in fact the first African operating company to list in 
New York (another example of pioneering entrepreneurship). 94 The table below 
shows the percentage of shares used compared to the cash and debt component in 
the firm's acquisition of operating mines. 
Table 7.6: How Ashanti's major acquisitions were financed 
Acquisition Total cost % Shares paid % Cash and 
debt 
Cluff — Jan 96 US$156.4m 43% 57% 
International Gold 
Resources (IGR) — Jun 96 
US$125.7m 79% 21% 
Golden Shamrock Mines 
(GSM) — Oct 96 
US$235.8m 89%* 11% 
Samax — Nov 98 US$140.1m 30% 70% 
* Ordinary shares and preference shares. 
The growing use of shares as currency is evident in 1996, falling in 1998 but 
remaining substantial. By this time the payment strategy was contributing to the 
depressed share price. The company for the first time repurchased some of its 
shares from the market, hence the lower percentage use of shares to buy Samax. 
In fact, for the Samax transaction, ordinary shares were not used but rather 
Mandatorily Exchangeable Securities, exchangeable into ordinary shares at a 
deferred date. AGC also introduced the use of Loan Notes in the acquisition of 
92 Taylor (2006), pp. 246-7. 
92 Board minutes, GH, 16 December 1994, 1 December 1995 
94 Dow Jones, 'Emerging Markets Report', 21 February 1996. 
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Samax. The use of financial instruments in this way complemented the use of debt. 
The speed of the acquisitions and the level of borrowing required to develop these 
mines led to soaring gearing levels and interest repayment commitments which 
contributed to the lack of cash needed to meet the margin calls at the time of the 
hedging crisis. This is illustrated in the graph below. 
Figure 7.7 95 
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In 1993, Ashanti's output represented 1.1% of world output; the desire to 
defend or expand this market share was stated as a motivating factor to 
internationalisation. This goal was achieved: in 2000, output represented 2% of 
world mining production. 96 The graph below shows that between 1994 when the 
first mine acquisition was made (Midras) and 2000 when the last acquisition was 
made (Teberebie), the internal goal set in 1994 to double output again within five 
years was only narrowly missed. 
95 Gross gearing = debt payable after one year / shareholders' funds. 
96 Based on estimated world gold mining output of 70m ounces in 1993 and 82m in 2000; 
Ashanti's output was 0.8m ounces and 1.7m ounces respectively. 
285 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
!,3 800 
2,000 - 
1,800 
1,600 
1,400 
1,200 
1,000 
600 
400 
200 
0 
Figure 7.8 
Gold output growth during the multinationalisation phase, 1994 -2000 
However, in terms of cash flow and profitability too, the high costs of 
developing the acquired properties, together with Obuasi's ongoing cost 
containment difficulties, had a negative impact. Operations were running with 
negative cash flow. It was only thanks to income from the hedging portfolio that it 
was possible to offset the operational cash deficit. 97 
97 HSBC International Mining Division, 'Ashanti Goldfields Asset Performance', 6 October 1997, 
pp. 35-6. 
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Profitability during the multinationalisation phase, 1994-2000 
25% 
20% 
15% 
10% 
5% . 0 0 
0% 
-5% 
-10% 
-15% 
-20% 
        
         
         
   
I 
     
        
        
     
	I 
 
I 
 
       
       
        
        
1994 	1995 	1996 	1997 	1998 	1999 	2000 
Production of greater ounces, particularly from the low-cost open pit mines 
acquired, did improve output per worker as Figure 7. 10 shows. 
Figure 7.10 
Labour productivity 
1994 	1995 	1996 	1997 	1998 	1999 	2000 
98 ROCE = earnings before interest and tax / long term debt + shareholders' funds. 
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Results and Analysis 
AGC never set a goal to internationalise. The goal it did set in the early 1990s was 
to achieve continual growth. Internationalisation was one of several means of 
achieving this, but became for a few years the primary one. The chain of events 
revealed that efforts were first exerted on expanding the existing mine followed 
by exploration initiatives in Ghana, and the first acquisition (Midras) was made in 
Ghana, but this was a mine development project not yet in operation. Output 
targets set internally and publicly created pressure for quicker results and led to a 
decision to acquire mines already in production. The first of these acquisitions 
was Cluff Resources in January 1996, Cluff's portfolio simultaneously added a 
producing mine in Ghana (Ayanfuri), and in Zimbabwe (Freda-Rebecca). The 
company therefore became a multinational enterprise in January 1996, according 
to the definition of an MNE used here. The search for producing mines was 
initially global: however, it quickly transpired that the strongest commercial 
opportunities were African-based acquisitions. These were more favourably 
received by financiers, as well as African-based sellers and regulators, and they 
matched the firm's strengths and experience better than opportunities further 
afield. AGC's perceived risk of doing business in Africa was lower than her 
developed country competitors. The experience gained in coping with Ghanaian 
political and economic risks was invaluable. This realisation led to the decision to 
concentrate expansion within Africa. 
The aborted Lonmin merger plan illustrated the dynamism of corporate 
strategy. The inclusion of platinum to become an African precious metals 
company was also driven by the continual growth agenda. Jonah's personal 
ambition was another driving force. Penrose differentiates between a product-
minded entrepreneur and an empire-building one. The former focuses on 
improving and extending activities while conscious of performance — lowering 
costs and improving quality. The latter aims for growth for growth's sake. It 
would appear that Jonah was a combination of both these types of entrepreneur —
AGC's rapid growth led to a decline in profitability, and quality control fell at 
Obuasi following the million-ounce-chase. However, the company learnt from 
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this experience and by 1998 new priority given to organizational enhancements to 
reduce costs and maintain quality discipline were beginning to pay-off. 99 
Continued expansion by acquisition was curtailed by the need to consolidate 
the rapidly enlarged company and by the financial crisis. The crisis exposed 
liquidity problems caused largely by the heavy debt servicing obligations accrued 
to develop existing mines and to expand the boundaries of the firm. The firm lost 
its favourable borrower reputation, this was reflected in the significantly higher 
costs of borrowing and financial restraints imposed post-crisis. 
Based on the foregoing discussion, Table 7.11 below summarises the 
internal and external factors which caused or permitted AGC to become a 
multinational enterprise in the manner that it did. 'Necessary' or causal factors are 
those which in their absence multinationalisation would not have occurred when it 
did, if at all; 'permissive' factors are those that facilitated multinationalisation but 
were not critical. 
Figure 7.11: Factors contributing to AGC becoming a multinational 
enterprise 
Internal External 
Necessary r ■ Strong borrower reputation • Shareholder expectations 
■ Obuasi's inability to achieve • Long exploration lead times 
lm ounces by 1995 • Declining share price 
■ Operational success and 
experience from Obuasi's 
rehabilitation 
• Declining gold price 
• Entrepreneurial ambition 
■ Fund-raising ingenuity 
Permissive • Technical expertise • Willingness of junior 
■ Managerial expertise producers to sell 
■ African identity 
The evidence can now be used to test the hypotheses posed in the 
introduction. 
HSBC Global Mining Division, AGC equity research report, 4 August 1998, pp. 2, 3. 
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Hypothesis 1  
• 	The desire to extend monopoly power induces internationalisation. 
AGC's experience does not fit Hymer's power theory since the gold market is not 
monopolistic. There are a large number of producers and the gold price is difficult 
to manipulate by any one of them. 100 Even though AGC contributed 69% of 
Ghana's gold exports in 2000, this domestic dominance did not give it a 
monopoly in the gold market. The company has never been involved in gold 
marketing- all the bullion produced was sold to refiners who then sold AGC's 
gold onto the market. To defend and expand global market share was stated by 
management as a motivating factor to internationalise - but this is not the same as 
securing monopoly power. 
Hypothesis 2 
■ 	 Transaction cost considerations explain the firm's boundary 
extensions. 
According to transaction costs theory, market failure and inefficiencies 
motivate firms to internalise the supply, production or distribution of services and 
goods. There are three examples of this in the firm's evolution: first, the 
acquisition of a limestone subsidiary, Limestone Products (Ghana) Limited in 
1994, limestone being a critical ingredient for the sulphide treatment plant. The 
contractual arrangements changed a year later from a 51% controlled subsidiary to 
a 50% joint venture with management provided by a Belgian manufacturing 
expert, Carmeuse S.A. This domestic extension of the firm's boundary did secure 
supply and reasonable prices: 01 The second example was the 49% associated 
undertaking in ICI Explosives (Ghana) Ltd, which reduced the firm's import costs 
of explosives, a vital input for underground mining operations. The disposal of 
these interests shows that other contractual means of ensuring satisfactory 
delivery and prices of these inputs were achievable — market failure or 
inefficiencies were not so severe to necessitate internalisation. Third, Ecobank 
became a small, contributory lender in AGC's revolving credit facility 
100 The largest producer in 2000, Anglogold, had 9% market share. 
1°1 AGC annual report, 2000, p. 17. 
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(contributing less than 1% of the facility). 102 However, its value to AGC was 
potentially greater than this. Ecobank's Africa-wide presence would undoubtedly 
have given AGC advisory services and networking opportunities that would have 
smoothed the way for conducting business in neighbouring countries such as in 
the Ivory Coast. In any case, these interests temporarily increased the boundary of 
the firm within Ghana and not internationally. No obvious transaction cost 
explanation can be offered for the ownership stakes in the pineapple farm. 
It could be argued that AGC improved the efficiency of its existing capital 
market transactions by employing funds in several countries, rather than just one. 
Geographic diversification potentially improved the use of every dollar acquired 
in the market by reducing risk. In addition, the use of retained earnings and the 
company's own shares to fund foreign acquisitions can be seen as an 
internalisation of the capital market. The capital markets could, but would not, 
supply all of AGC's funding needs, therefore this could be viewed as a type of 
market failure from the company's point of view. In these latter respects the 
transaction cost approach to explaining multinationalisation is relevant to AGC. 
H pothesis 3 
■ 	 Ownership advantages combine with location cost savings and 
transaction cost savings to encourage multinationalisation. 
The company was conscious of and broadcast its internal advantages: 
financial credibility, project management experience, technical expertise, 
entrepreneurial spirit, experience of operating in an African political and 
economic context, and a business model that empowered indigenous staff. These 
combined ownership advantages induced and facilitated multinationalisation. The 
partial internalisation of capital markets discussed above did indeed combine 
positively with these ownership advantages. The location cost savings aspect of 
Dunning's O-L-I model, though, was not relevant to AGC's story. Location 
choice for a mineral extraction business was necessarily driven by geological 
considerations as well the amenability of acquisition targets to being taken over, 
and not by the exploitation of factor cost differences. 
102 Board minutes, GH, 26 October 1998. 
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Hypothesis 4 
• 	 Low-capital, low-technology and small-scale operations 
characterise LDC MNEs 
This conclusion from the LDC MNE literature, admittedly based mostly, but 
not exclusively, on manufacturing firms, is wholly inapplicable to AGC's case. 
AGC was in a capital-intensive extractive industry, the firm embraced the latest 
technological practices and operations were extensive. The LDC literature ignores 
the possibility of international finance influencing the growth of 'Third World' 
enterprises, which was an important factor in AGC's experience. It is important to 
note here that changes in political, economic and legal institutions in Ghana had to 
occur before the way was paved for international financiers to assist AGC. 
Hypothesis 5 
■ 	 The exhaustion of domestic expansion opportunities leads to 
multinationalisation. 
Obuasi's resources were far from exhausted when the company embarked 
on its acquisition strategy. The mine's life in 1994 was estimated at seventeen 
years and that excluded the potential benefits of new exploratory work within the 
concession. Just as manufacturing companies would plan for the depreciation and 
replacement of fixed assets so do gold mines for the replacement of their largest 
asset, the ore body. Even though mining a finite resource will ultimately cause 
physical boundary changes to the firm, this fact alone does not necessitate a move 
abroad nor does it explain why AGC's management sought to expand when they 
did. The discussion above showed that domestic opportunities continued to be 
exploited throughout the multinationalisation process: growth at home and abroad 
was mutually sought. 
The fact that priority was first given to domestic opportunities was not 
because Obuasi was exhausted. Domestic priority can be explained by AGC's 
obvious advantage in knowing Ghana's business system: laws, industry contacts, 
political economy, etc. 
Other elements of Kay's resource-based theory of multinationalisation did 
apply to AGC: by developing an African bias the firm showed that it was 
gravitating to destinations with "low psychic distance" and exploiting its strongest 
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linkages However, it is important to bear in mind that the African vision was a 
discovered strength rather than pre-planned. 
Summary 
Hymer's power theory, the traditional forward and backward integration aspects 
of transaction cost theory, and location theory were found to be the least useful 
explanatory tools in AGC's experience of multinationalisation. The role of 
international finance, specifically 
■ the benefits of reputation in acquiring funds 
■ shareholder expectation and 
■ financial ingenuity 
were critical elements of AGC's MNE evolution ignored by the existing theories. 
The MNE theories also underplayed the importance of entrepreneurship. Without 
Jonah's ambitious targets and the entrepreneurial attitude of the firm's finance 
team, which reflected the entrepreneurial culture of the firm, the extension of the 
firm's boundaries would not have occurred in the manner that it did. 
Penrose's theory of the growth of the firm provides a better all-round 
explanatory tool than the multinational theories. Penrose's observations that 
growth is a process, that management adapts in size and expertise to facilitate 
continued growth, and that entrepreneurial ambition is critical, capture the 
dynamics of AGC's experience well. Multinationalisation was a means to growth, 
not an end in itself. But even Penrose ignored the causal role that international 
finance can play in a firm's growth. 
The nature of the mining industry provides a second order of explanation to 
the company's multinationalisation: the cost structure of gold mining and the 
global price trend contributed to the search for growth. However, without access 
to the financial markets and an excellent borrower reputation, these industrial 
constraints could not have been resolved through multinationalisation which 
depended on debt and international market listings. Existing MNE theories are 
mostly based on empirical evidence from the manufacturing sector, which goes 
some way in explaining why their value in this case study was limited. Industrial 
characteristics were as relevant, if not more so, than Ghana's national 
characteristics which suggests that it would be more insightful for MNE theory to 
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focus on industrial differences rather than national ones, as has been the case 
particularly with the LDC literature. 
AGC's experience has highlighted an important gap in research, namely the 
need to evaluate the role of international finance in firm growth. In addition, the 
case study suggests that the theory of multinational enterprise may suffer from 
teleopathy: multinationalisation is a means to firm growth, therefore it might be 
empirically more illuminating to focus on understanding the ends - firm growth -
rather than focussing on the means. This suggestion is supported by the fact that 
there are numerous MNE theories and models offering nearly as many different 
explanations as there are firms (only the main ones were considered in this 
chapter). Casson rightly observes that, "there is no really satisfactory general 
theory of the MNE". 103 
103 M. Casson, 'General Theories of the MNE: their Relevance to Business History', in Hertner 
and Jones (1986), pp. 42-63. 
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CHAPTER 8: 
CONCLUSIONS 
The evidence and findings from Part One and Part Two are discussed here and 
related to the main theme of firm survival. The contributions of this study to other 
areas of economic history are considered, along with topics for further research. 
Endo enous factors omotin•lon•evit 
Certain corporate characteristics were apparent from the Chronological Narrative 
that contributed to the firm's survival: technical expertise, continuity of key 
personnel, responsive management, and executional conservatism. Chief of these 
qualities was the firm's reliance on technical expertise. Mining, mechanical, 
metallurgical and geological consultants were a constant feature of strategy 
development and execution. 
Obuasi's complicated and varied ores presented geological and 
metallurgical challenges encouraging continual information gathering, 
experimentation and adaptation of treatment processes. Although great emphasis 
was put on technical expertise, AGC could not be described as technologically 
pioneering until the Jonah era. Prior to this, the company was a relatively slow 
mover in the adoption of cyanidation and flotation, for example. AGC's approach 
until 1986 was to imitate best practice from abroad, making in-house adaptations 
to get the most out of new technologies. 
Another important trait contributing to AGC's longevity was the length of 
time served by critical employees, in particular managing directors and chief 
consulting engineers (see Appendices 5 and 6). This was important for continuity 
in strategy and the successful oversight of long-term project implementation. 
From the start of operations great emphasis was put on the quantity, type 
and speed of information required from the mine by the decision-makers in 
London. The archives show that an impressive and detailed array of reports 
covering all aspects of the mine's operations were sent monthly to London. 
Significant mine development findings were reported by cable or telex the same 
day. The speed with which operational problems were addressed was noteworthy, 
good examples being the recruitment of W. R. Feldtmann in 1905, C. Norris as 
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metallurgical consultant for the new flotation plant in 1945, and the engagement 
of the eminent geologist Norman Junner from the 1930s until 1968. These actions 
were often in quick response to unacceptable variations between mine forecasts 
and actual performance. Head office management were information-hungry and 
quick to respond to negative operational data from the mine. 
Until 1986 AGC can be described as a conservative company. The 
geological wealth of the mine could have tempted management to seek quick and 
easy, but unsustainable, profits. It would have been possible to mine out Obuasi's 
rich ores with minimal investment and speedy pay-back. However, as early as 
1905, such a strategy had been condemned in favour of a more conservative, 
longer-term outlook. Good mine planning and continual production, rather than 
quick, rich pickings, were sought. Further evidence of this conservative business 
ethos was seen in the extensive experiments and trials conducted before 
investment decisions were made. 
The first sign of departure from this conservatism came when Lonrho as 
newcomers in 1968 wanted to speed up the well-planned, 5-year expansion 
programme. However, they failed to achieve this because of external factors. 
Increasing operational difficulties caused by foreign exchange and import licence 
constraints could not support an aggressive growth strategy. During the lost 
decade of 1975-85 the firm was reduced to fire-fighting because of the harsh 
economic environment. Following the 1FC investments a new pioneering ethos 
and aggressive growth was pursued by Sam Jonah. Under Jonah's leadership the 
firm's new entrepreneurial spirit led, for example, to AGC acting as first-mover, 
rather than a follower, in the large-scale, commercial use of the Biox treatment 
process. However, this change from conservatism to entrepreneurial dynamism 
was inextricably linked to the 1999 financial crisis and eventual takeover. This 
suggests, paradoxically, that the pre-1986 conservative approach had been an 
important factor in the firm's longevity. 
From Part One the critical success factors were all management related —
reliance on technical expertise, the long service of corporate leaders, responsive 
management and a conservative growth ethos. In Part Two the contributions of 
the four factors of production were considered. 
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Land 
It was seen, surprisingly, that well-defined property rights were not a critical 
success factor for most of AGC's history. Ambiguities surrounded the original 
1897 lease agreement. For over a decade between 1972 and 1984 the mine 
operated without a mining lease whatsoever. The theoretical explanation for this 
would be that the legality of the title was less relevant than AGC's actual usage of 
the land that had been established and observed over time and taken as given. 
AGC succeeded in behaving as (and in being treated as) landlords although they 
were strictly only leaseholders (and not even that between 1972 and 1984). In so 
doing they founded what was referred to as a corporate custom. It was suggested 
that greater emphasis in property rights theory needs to be paid to habitual 
behaviour rather than title definitions and formalities. 
It was not in AGC's interest to establish clarity of property rights. This 
was because the legal basis of the 1897 Agreement was known to be shaky, and to 
have had this confirmed in court would have been foolish. AGC assiduously 
guarded the document from public scrutiny and from attempts to amend or 
supplement any part of it. There was economic value in the Agreement's 
ambiguities: lack of clarity allowed AGC to assert their own interpretations. A 
useful comparison showing that uncertainty and open interpretation of land rights 
can be valuable would be the way in which many chiefs subverted the attempts of 
colonial administrators to define their boundaries because delineation would have 
inhibited rent-seeking opportunities.' 
The role of the colonial government was relevant. As party to the ill-
defined agreement of 1897 and as a substantial financial beneficiary of it through 
AGC's royalty payments, it was not in the government's interest to legally contest 
AGC's interpretation of it at the risk of invalidating their own position. AGC 
enjoyed security of tenure largely because of government's active and passive 
support. This important state sanction continued with Nkrumah's post-colonial 
government. It was not until Lonrho made a bid for AGC that the NLC 
government in 1969 took the opportunity to set aside the 1897 Agreement, 
replacing it with a better defined, legally tighter lease. This had positive wealth 
effects for the Adansi landowners but was immaterial in terms of AGC's 
1 Berry (2000), p. 27. 
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continued security of title. The new lease did not in any way deter the furtherance 
of large investment programmes, which reflected AGC's confidence in their 
property rights. When the 1969 lease was arbitrarily suspended in 1972 the firm 
continued operations, only inhibited by the deteriorating economic situation in 
Ghana (and not by the absence of a mine lease). A lease was reinstated in 1984 to 
satisfy third parties: the IFC and bank lenders. These foreign financiers based 
their loans on formal evidence of secure property rights. Whereas long-established 
use rights provided AGC with sufficient security on a national level within Ghana, 
greater legal formality was demanded by international finance. Compliance led to 
an unprecedented period of growth for the company. It was only in recent times 
that AGC's experience better matched the theoretical prediction of property rights 
theory that clearly defined rights promote economic growth. But this was not 
found to be the case in the firm's early history when commendable growth was 
achieved even in the absence of well-defined property rights. 
Geology mattered. Obuasi's ores were unusually rich. This improved 
profitability. It allowed management greater manoeuvrability than the more 
marginal mines when it came to absorbing rising costs. It partly explains why 
AGC were not reliant on coerced or indentured labour early in the twentieth 
century when all the other Gold Coast mines were. Between 1927 and 1961 the 
Bibiani mine was managed in the same way as AGC and with the same access to 
expertise. However, the lower-grade ores there made it difficult to sustain 
profitability, which led to the mine being sold to the government. It cannot be said, 
though, that AGC's longevity was solely due to Obuasi's geological advantage. 
This is because in the late 1970s and early 1980s good geology plus a lack of 
reinvestment (albeit due primarily to external economic factors outside 
management's control) led to near terminal decline. Again, in 1999, good 
geology plus poor fmancial management brought the company to the brink of 
bankruptcy. So, although geology mattered, it was the combination with sound, 
conservative management, discussed above, that was essential for the firm's 
survival. 
Labour 
Labour was seen to be the factor of production least within the firm's control. An 
absence of labour legislation in Ashanti and the informality of employer- 
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employee relations when AGC started operations was conducive to the firm's 
initial growth. It was seen that there was little demand from workers themselves 
for formality as flexibility in their comings and goings suited them. Although the 
firm experienced sporadic and small-scale labour disputes in the early years, the 
disruption did not seriously impede production. This changed from the late 1930s, 
and most notably between 1945 and 1956. The transition from a regulatory 
vacuum to an environment of increasing government intervention by means of 
legislation and labour commissions along with unionisation ushered in a period of 
acute labour unrest. This was marked by protracted and violent strike action 
which significantly affected production. 
Principal-agent theory was used to examine the relationship between 
AGC's management and the African workforce. This revealed labour's natural 
knowledge and control advantages over capital: namely, how and whether labour 
applies effort in view of management's incomplete information and lack of 
observability. Considerable difficulties were encountered as management 
attempted to align worker interests with their own. The evolution of internal 
institutions, principally the Salaried Staff Association, together with annual wage 
negotiations and management's 'usurpation' of the Obuasi union leadership, 
helped to maintain a workable relationship from 1957. The post-independence 
government effectively outlawed strikes and viewed industrial action as 
unpatriotic, this provided capital with significant state support to erode labour's 
initial advantages. 
Yet still, unofficial strikes periodically disrupted production in every 
decade after 1957. For marginal mines, such as Tarkwa and Abosso, labour 
disruption made production uneconomic and forced closure. AGC enjoyed 
healthier margins from the richer ores as well as the geographic distance from 
other mines. This distance seems to have provided AGC with a separate, localised, 
labour market from that of the Tarkwa mining area, with different labour supply 
and demand characteristics. 
The principal-agent framework was advantageous over the Marxist/class 
approach to examining the social relations of production because it highlighted 
both the inter-firm and intra-firm factors impinging on the employer-employee 
contract. Rather than stressing the exploitation of one class by another, the 
approach taken emphasised the compromises that had to be made by both AGC 
management and its African workforce. 
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Capital 
Until the Jonah era AGC was a cash-rich, virtually debt-free company thanks to 
the rich ores as well as conservative investment and growth planning. This was 
undoubtedly a major contribution to the firm's longevity. The increasing use of 
debt from 1996 weakened the company's financial position in two major ways. 
First, rising gearing levels made it more and more difficult to service the debt. 
This exerted pressure on cash-generation from non-mining sources, namely from 
an ever-expanding and increasingly complex hedge book. Second, the borrowed 
funds were not deployed efficiently: although AGC achieved growth in terms of 
output following the acquisitions phase, return on capital employed deteriorated. 
Capital was shown to be relatively more costly than the other factors of 
production, followed by labour. Land was the cheapest resource for AGC. The 
company was starved of capital in the late 1970s and early 1980s as persistent 
difficulties were endured in trying to obtaining import licences and foreign 
exchange An extremely overvalued cedi further taxed the company's income. 
The mine could not be managed properly at this time because of the shortage of 
essential inputs. This culminated in AGC's first recorded pre-tax loss in 1982. 
Shareholders consistently fared well up to 1968 when AGC shares ceased 
to be traded on the London Stock Exchange. The company's return to the stock 
market in 1994 was not so successful. In the following ten years shareholders 
suffered from share dilution, high debt levels, low liquidity and a cash dividend 
moratorium between 2000 and 2003. The severe financial crisis of 1999 nearly 
obliterated shareholder value when bankruptcy was narrowly averted. 
It was seen that an appropriate taxation level was critical to growth. 
Government's tax revenue from AGC grew steadily, peaking in the Acheampong 
era when the tax level combined with economic conditions impacted detrimentally 
on AGC. It was argued that the tax provisions of the Minerals and Mining Act 
(1986) were, on the other hand, rather lenient. While the liberalisation legislation 
succeeded in rejuvenating the mine sector it did so perhaps to the cost of the state. 
The chapter on capital highlighted the difficulty for developing states to balance 
their revenue needs while also providing adequate incentives for capital to 
economically exploit finite resources. 
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Enterprise 
Enterprise was distinguished from management by two factors: the appetite for 
risk and the focus on future corporate direction as opposed to day-to-day 
operations. The Jonah era was identified as the most entrepreneurial in AGC's 
history. While the Jonah era could be seen as a success in terms of indigenisation 
and the expansion of the firm's boundaries abroad, it was a failure in terms of 
financial performance, shareholder value and corporate independence. The 
solution package offered to the company in the face of bankruptcy in 1999 led to 
the Anglogold takeover in 2004. 
Individual and corporate entrepreneurship were seen to be good for output 
growth but not for liquidity nor profitability. The pace of change was too great for 
the company's cash generation abilities leading to criticisms that Jonah's growth 
ambition was greater than his concern for shareholders. There were also 
management failures in the hedge portfolio supervision. Risk-taking is an 
important, perhaps the defining, aspect of entrepreneurship. The entrepreneurship 
of the Jonah era was a dramatic change from the conservative management of the 
past. Before 1986 it can be argued that AGC's managers were constrained by their 
perceptions of political risks. This encouraged them to be commercially cautious. 
However, in Jonah's case, his nomination as deputy MD from the Rawlings 
administration and the fact that he was a Ghanaian perhaps gave him a more 
positive assessment of the political influences on the firm thereby encouraging his 
appetite for commercial risk. Entrepreneurship in this case study, far from being a 
critical success factor for survival, had the opposite effect. 
Although aspects of the factors of production were analysed in isolation, 
they were obviously interrelated. For instance, it was apparent that the hold-up 
ability of labour was mitigated by the geological value of AGC's land, which 
made the company financially able to withstand repeated production stoppages. 
Poor labour relations encouraged greater capital investment in machinery. It was 
from the land (gold) that AGC created new financial capital. Entrepreneurship, in 
turn, had direct effects on the firm's capital situation. 
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Some implications for other areas of economic history 
It is often remarked that a single case study cannot make representative claims. 
However, this does not negate the usefulness and significance of lessons learnt 
when the subject of the study is of singular importance. The thesis revealed 
AGC's uniqueness and relevance to the Ghanaian economy in terms of gold 
production, export earnings, employment and the firm's status in the national 
psyche. The findings will contribute to certain historical topics affecting West 
Africa by providing evidence that either confirms our current understanding or 
highlights an exception, as well as by suggesting areas worthy of further research. 
From a Ghanaian history perspective, the extensive literature on land 
tenure has focused on the role of cash crops inducing changes in property rights. 2 
 Less has been written on the impact of mining concessions and their associated 
timber concessions on changes in land tenure. This account showed the disruption 
AGC's activities had on local land ownership, land use and chieftaincy politics. 
The evidence, particularly from Chapter 4, adds to the existing knowledge of the 
economic factors impinging on the Ashanti institutions of land tenure and 
chieftaincy. 
It was seen that Ghana's political junctures were less relevant to the firm's 
operations than economic junctures. With the exception of Acheampong's 1972 
coup and the expropriation that followed, changes in government per se did not 
herald operational discontinuities. Changes in economic policy, however, had an 
immediate impact on the firm's fortunes. This was evidenced in fiscal policy as 
well as in the effects of increasingly state-led policies between 1961 and 1983. 
Ghana's paradigmatic shift to a free market economy from 1983 provided an 
external environment conducive to investment which enabled the mine to be 
rehabilitated and to grow. AGC was an excellent example of how big government 
is bad for business: government controls on imports, currency exchange, prices, 
distribution and the majority ownership of AGC itself progressively shackled the 
company. The effects of macroeconomic policies on microeconomics was 
apparent. The benefits of Structural Adjustment on this single enterprise and on 
the gold sector were undeniable. 
2 See for example, G. Benneh, The impact of cocoa cultivation on the traditional land tenure 
system of the Akan of Ghana', Ghana Journal of Sociology, 6, 1970, pp. 43-61; E.A. Gyasi, 'The 
adaptability of African communal land tenure to economic opportunity: the example of land 
acquisition for oil-palm farming in Ghana', Africa, 64, 1994, pp. 391-405; Austin (2005). 
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Several observations are noteworthy from an imperial history perspective. 
First, sufficient evidence was provided in the thesis to support Hopkins and Cain's 
gentlemanly capitalism thesis. A critical role was played in the establishment of 
the firm by founding directors with aristocratic, financial and industrial links such 
as Frederick Gordon and Viscount Duncannon who became the Earl of 
Bessborough. Later directors recognised the fact that without these personalities 
Cade's Cote d'Or company would never have raised the capital needed nor 
obtained government approval for the mine concession. The reputation of these 
men and the fact that the original capital was wholly obtained from them and their 
circle of friends no doubt contributed to AGC's long-term profit maximisation 
motive, as opposed to a rent-seeking one. This distinguished the firm from many 
other Gold Coast mine start-ups. 
Second, although AGC fitted the free-standing company model, it was in 
many ways atypical of this genre of enterprise. This was attributed to a genuine 
shareholder-driven ethos, the firm's ability to develop quickly suitable 
management structures at home and at the mine (particularly technical 
management), and geological good fortune. 
Third, colonial government and imperial business are often portrayed by both 
liberals and radicals as being hand-in-glove. This is the long held view of 
dependency theorists, 3 and it re-emerges in the more recent radical pessimist 
perspective of Acemoglu, Robinson and Johnson. They use cross country 
regression analysis to connect the development problems of former colonies to the 
joint predatory behaviour of colonial administrators and colonial businessmen. 4 
 The liberal, Euro-centric perspective of Cain and Hopkins also propagates the idea 
of "unity" and an "extraordinarily high degree of cohesion" among colonial 
entrepreneurs and politicians. 5 This assessment was valid only for AGC's early 
history when there was indeed strong cooperation between the imperialists and 
AGC's imperial business. The evidence for this was the unique land concession 
granted to the firm, the tacit support provided by government which enabled AGC 
to ignore African surface rights and to damage the environment without cost, as 
3 See for example, W. Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Washington D.C.: Howard 
University Press , 1982, p. 169; S. Amin, 'Underdevelopment and dependence in black Africa —
their historical origins and contemporary forms', Social and Economic Studies 22, 1, 1973, 
pp.188-193; and with specific reference to Ghana, Howard (1978), pp.19-20. 
4 D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson and J. A. Robinson, 'The Colonial Origins of Comparative 
Development: An Empirical Investigation', The American Economic Review, vol. 91, 5, 2001, p. 
1375. 
5 Cain and Hopkins (2001), p. 43. 
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well as the company's low fiscal burden up until the 1930s. In the early colonial 
period the government's and AGC's incentives for establishing a British 
enterprise in Ashanti were aligned. However, from the 1930s, a combination of 
external shocks and internal changes in the colony broke up this close and 
cooperative relationship. 
External factors such as the collapse of the gold standard and the consequent 
increases in the market price for bullion and the Second World War triggered the 
introduction of new taxes which dramatically increased AGC's fiscal burden. The 
Gold Coast government's chief source of customs revenue from cocoa exports 
was threatened over the war years as cocoa prices plummeted, 6 and hence the 
need to widen the tax base. During this period too, labour disturbances in the 
Caribbean forced the imperialists to reassess their responsibilities towards their 
colonies. Greater welfare and development contributions were now demanded in 
addition to economic extraction. This resulted in increased labour regulation for 
AGC. 
The internal economic and political factors in the Gold Coast following 
the war introduced a new force for the colonial government to contend with of 
greater priority than any individual imperialist business. 
AGC's growing labour costs and rising tax burden from 1933 to 1957 
reflected the removal of the hand from the glove. This micro-level investigation 
highlighted the potential for conflict and divergence between the motives of 
private imperial business and the political and economic ones of the metropole 
and the government on the spot in the later colonial period. 
In terms of business history, the case study exposed the importance of 
growth management. The potentially negative effects of entrepreneurial 
dynamism was seen when profitability was compromised because of growth in the 
Jonah era. Contrary to the sentiment of modern management theories, caution and 
imitation, rather than risk-taking and innovation, stood AGC in good stead for 
most of its history. 
6 Kay (1972), table 21A: 'Value of major exports, 1900-60', between 1939 and 1942 cocoa export 
values drop by 55%, pp. 334-5. 
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Further research from AGC primary sources 
The primary sources consulted provided a wealth of data outside the time and 
thematic constraints of this thesis, but nevertheless worthy of further research. 
The Guildhall MS 14170 series, for example, contain details of AGC's mine 
supplies showing quantity and frequency of shipments from worldwide ports. This 
would allow changes in imperial trade networks to be mapped. In addition, the 
information could be analysed with respect to historical developments in mine 
mechanical and metallurgical technology. The types of machinery ordered and 
their specifications, the problems encountered with their use on the mine, the 
different chemical reagents used in extraction processes and some of the results 
obtained from experiments are found in the company records and would be of 
great interest to historians specialising in mining and technology. Case studies 
into the process of technology transfer could be carried out from AGC's adoption 
of specific inventions such as the Macarthur Forest cyanide technique. 
The firm's records would also allow an analysis to be made of the 
development of the modern concept of corporate social responsibility as well as 
the growth in public awareness of environmental damage, restoration and 
conservation issues. What AGC and its stakeholders perceived the company's 
responsibilities to be, how these perceptions changed over time, and the factors 
influencing this would be a fruitful area of research of interest to economic 
historians. 
Detailed changes in the internal management structure, health and safety 
practices, Africanisation and the provision of African welfare are further areas 
that a comprehensive history of AGC would need to cover. 
The topical issue of the role of multinationals in host country development 
was not treated in this thesis. AGC, having imperial beginnings and mining a non-
renewable asset, would, on the face of it, appear to be a typical example 
supporting accusations of exploitation. Although this important question was not 
addressed in the scope of this thesis the primary sources would provide sufficient 
data to explore this complicated question. The evidence is unlikely to lead to a 
simplistic answer. 
The Ashanti Goldfields Corporation was the single largest gold producer 
in Ghanaian history. Putting geological good fortune aside, the thesis attempted to 
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explore the endogenous decisions and behaviour of the firm that allowed the 
company to survive for 107 years. In summary, this longevity can be attributed to 
the managerial characteristics of reliance on technical expertise, long service, and 
conservative growth and investment strategies. These combined successfully with 
a valuable land concession. Longevity was threatened by poor labour relations and 
eventually halted by adverse effects of entrepreneurial risk-taking. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: AGC's contribution to colonial and post-colonial Ghana's gold 
production 
Year Total gold output 
(ounces) 
AGC gold output 
(ounces) 
AGC% of total 
1901 5,223* 4,786° 92% 
1911 253,977* 96,275° 38% 
1921 203,395* 68,817° 34% 
1931 246,075* 169,245° 69% 
1940/41 882,241° 264,079° 30% 
1950/51 694,886° 188,339° 27% 
1960/61 878,459° 380,776° 43% 
1970/71 693,770° 520,080° 75% 
1980/81 349,871° 252,498° 72% 
1990/91; 1991 846,269° 569,480* 67% 
2001 2,205,473* 1,583,535* 72% 
* Calendar year 
° Financial year end (either 30 June or 30 September) 
Sources: AGC Annual Reports, Ghana Chamber of Mines Annual Reports. 
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Appendix 2: Gold industry contribution to export earnings in colonial and 
postcolonial Ghana 
Year Total Export value Gold export 
value 
Gold% of 
total 
Cocoa% of 
total 
1900* £797,000 £38,000 5% 3% 
1910* £2,509,000 £790,000 31% 35% 
1920* £12,170,000 £889,000 7% 83% 
1930* £9,848,000 £1,056,000 11% 71% 
1940* £13,449,000 £7,208,000 54% 33% 
1950* £75,393,000 £8,719,000 12% 72% 
1960* £111,408,000 £11,088,000 10% 60% 
1970n 0460 mn 026 mn 6% 72% 
1980u 03,104 mn 0540 mn 17% 65% 
Sources: * Kay (1972), Table 21A, pp. 334-5; 'Hug (1988), Table 10.5, p. 203; *Earth Trends 
Country Profiles, Economic Indicators Ghana: 
http://earthtrends.wri.org/pdf library/country_profdes/eco_cou_288.pdf, accessed 15 May 2006. 
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Anyendix 3: Spreadsheet of AGC financial data 1899-2003 
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31,17E 
_ 
29% 88% 
12% 25% 
5 57F. 16% 50% 
8% 0% 
............ 
  
r22% 10% 
14,721 20% 10% 
14,763 13% 9% 
15,213 24% 49% 
2,925 24% 71% 
7,929 30% 87% 
18,278 40% 88% 
18,278 31% 67% 
8,981 34% 69% 
9,216 , 	 35% 70% 
7.587 35% 75% 
6,151 30% 70% 
4,200 31% 75% 
5,550 21% 58% 
3,802 13% 20% 
5.227 9% 25% 
4,175 13% 25% 
3,988 19% 38% 
5,855 20% 45% 
8,915 20% 50% 
8 435 26% 55% 
0,358 29% 65% 
9,511 40% 67% 
7,516 46% 90% 
8 950 66 n 125% 
10,894 49% 130% 
12,610 57% 75% 
7,216 44% 85% 
21 037 42% 95% 
20 787 44% 95% 
29 485 44% 95% 
30 865 40% 95% 
27,314 41% 80% 
21,882 38% 80% 
7,304 35% 80% 
6,247 41% 40% 
6,974 31% 40% 
8 2 27% 34% 
13,689 25% 33% 
8,3 9 26% 23% 
15,51 18% 15% 
19 786 23% 22% 
27.894 37% 34% 
29,398 34% 26% 
30,502 27% 213% 
1961 451,790 380,776 18.49 91.16% 16.86 3001,539 58,668 £4,834,429 £4,905837 M 259,85 37% 28% 
1962 480,598 417,447 19.3 90.01% 17.37 2,932,638 53,765 £5 224 679 £5,291,095 £2 532,527 36% 31% 
1963 468,139 444,251 21.58 87.96% 18.98 2,990,239 58,357 £5,575,291 £5,635,223 
1964 489,611 471,421 21.68 88.82% 19.26 3,323,254 65,318 £5,924,895 £5,988,133 
1965 514,584 466,953 20.87 88.99% 18.57 3,291,925 60,378 £5,895,069 £5,986,654 
1966 498.445 459,617 20.47 90.08% 18.44 3,673,760 56,084 £5,790.964 £5,985,110 M,920,939 39% 29% 
1967 545,337 473,217 19.51 88.67% 17.36 3,420,126 61,340 £5,967,657 £6,077,152 £2,950,373 39% 23% 
'1968 562,000 16.91 3,266,182 £7,377,458 17,527,627 E3, 39,2361 60% 25% 
1969 618,523 485,532 19.82 87.78% 17.40 3,642,638 £8,741.940 £8,952.62 £3,707,2421 20% 44% ___ 
1970 620,042 487,578 20.06 87.23% 17.50 3,751,822 £7,334,856 £7,532,351 £4,182,905 12% 49% 
1971 696,506 520,080 15.01 3,835,088 £8,518,060 £8,736,450 £4,892,117 4% 57% 
1972• 794,097 533,015 15.55 86.31% 13.42 4,427,654 85,332 £11,206,365 £11,384,650 £5,227,253 21% 75% 
1973 869,019 527,827 14.1 86.20% 12.15 5,161,602 £17,210,887 £17,822,571 £5,788,902 
_ 1974* 875,417 451,369 10.30 84.43% 8.70 6,580,251 91,516 £22 966 57 £23346657 £7,853,090 £5,961,919 £0  £4,874,214 £ .7322831 	£12.568 4171 	911 on' 
£23,701,501 £24,094,112 £10,181,662 000 £0 1 1975* 	954,438 	384,712 	8.10 	83.42% 6.76 7,103,235 87,120 4,946,099 £0 £4,339,623 1 385 827 £10 671 549 £0.03 
1,000 1976* 1 044,576 	372,689 3,634,250 
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1977* 	1.000,863 	351.512 3,932,418 £0 
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kPa
RFCC4  
-
 .--3999• 23,453,000 1,561,536 8.31 83.00% 
£0 	 £0 £0 I 
0 	£1,250,000 1978' 767,267 	265,684 	8.61 	80.46% 6.93 4,478,789 58,345 £11,248,370 £13,345,108 £9,529,636 £1,718,734 £6,189,175 £2,257,687 £12.42 £0 £4,501,260 £3,967,980 £6,170,327 	 £0 	0% £2,368,664 	£8,637,608 	7,824 	0237321 £1,166,667 £687,500 £3.091,487 
£11,378,055  £35,780,050 £9,226,187 £22.91 £0 £0 	£4,166,667 1979• 	768,133 	237,935 	7.98 	77.69% 6.20 5,598,529 70,610 £28,975,419 £32,145,605 217,597,364 013,102,725 £4,360,833 £11,322,947 £0 	0% £1,266,607, £2.927.376 	£9,205,584 	8,9731 	£4 636067 £4,666,667 £2,291,667 211,594,400 
£0 £0 	£4,166,667 1980* 778,060 	232,036 6,527,393 £10,976,465 
1981* 	856,728 	252,498 5,557,097 £0 £0 
E0 £0 	 £0 1982• 836,619 	268,080 5,076,278 £0 
0 £0 	£8,968,610 118,723,610 £4,823,897 £11,276,151 	 £0 	0% 1983* 	731,776 	243,171 7,377,878 
£61,543424 £122,988,455 £26,649,272 £3.38 £0 	£2,533,249 1984* 741,743 	243,279 6,584,625 £64,050,475 £68,476,103 £2,507,051 £5,062,450 £17,116,092 £26,377,032 £0 	0% £5,984,779 £5,323,834 	. 	£10,639,156 	 £6769094 £11,821,828 £1,393,287 M7,831,877 
£01 	£1,504,945 £2,846,500 , 	1985* 	886,381 	259,126 8,263,464 
£0 	£1,912,046 £3,499,350 1986* 897,580 	242,313 8,041,214 
£0 	09,951,041 . 	£17,303,150 isor 	955,854 	275,487 	7.87 	82.08% 6.46 8,623,506 
£36,669,833 059,967,020 £28,997,860 £26.84 22% £3,812,394 £0 	£6,613,757 , 	1988• 1,213,643 	292,932 	7.39 	70.57% 5.88 8,142,452 69,936 £69,239,630 £69.243,898 £32,569,796 £10,815,630 £112,011,127 £57,247,894 	£37,343,881 	33% £118,898,310 	£194,437,138 	 £2077188 £4,814,558 £3,637,566 £10,529,312 
£0 	£5,514,868 £137,328,968 	£208,992,494 £2214361 £8,362,058 £3,033,177 £13,609,596 £8,392,735 £129,658,961 £62,290,923 	£33,909,192 	26% £20,071,713 1989• 	1,547,729 	317,858 	7.97 	92.06% 6.46 14,870,831 81,930 £73.812,000 £79,503,139 £34,286,908 £39,525,093 060,150,809 £31,337,528 £22.15 21%  
19% 
£3,377486 
E4,698,377 £154.725,750 	x£219,817,352 	 £2342185 £0 £2,605,647 £4,947,832 £0 	£4,737,540 . £6,699,960 £133,031,710 £65,539,394 	£42,695,356 	32% £43,879,008 1990 2,289.334 	400,750 	7.86 	83.21% 6.54 22,358,295 85,605 £78,072,843 £82,789,342 £38,135,396 £39,937,447 £56,480,620 £29,450,177 £16.66 
£6,868,099 £0 	£6,067,225 £8,048,850 £170,960,745 £86,436,236 	253,632,751 	31% £198,325,446 	- £263,100,883 £3449217 £1,770,113 £3,336,974 £8,556,304 . 	1991* 	5,268,720 	569,480 	12.41 	83.56% 10.37 8,611,871 78,034 £114,973,911 £117,321,927 £57,207,863 £57,766,048 £76,633,120 £37,424,160 £10.136 20% 
£237,152,981 	£302,800,026 	9,526 l£4,237,288 £6,926,554 
£200,000 
£10,780,000 
£5,353,333 
--•  023,943,842 £11,086,667 M615,819 £0 	£11,073,446 , 	1992. 	6,710.000 	654,289 	13.27 	84.25% 11.18 8,602,270 72,637 £130,677,966 £134,802,260 £70,169,492 £60,508,475  £99,466,667  
£116,732,026 
£77,258,010 
£123,776,340 
£143,018,900 
£43,163,842 
£60,333,333 
£73,464,052 
£10.46 
£14.50 
£10.50 
26% 
21% 
21% 
£14,138,720 £130,451,977 £86,045,198 	£46,384,181 	36% £26,972,192 
1291333,333 	£362,535,257 	9,726 	£5.533333 1 
1 	£18.26 
£6,200,000 £0 	£9,733,333 1993. 5,823,851 	770,410 	12.74 	82.81% 10.55 18,076,000 72,355 £183,933,333 £183,400,000 £84,466,667 - £12,112,160 0203,066,667 £159,465667 	£109,666,667 	54% £125,533,333 
" 	1994• 	8.522.834 	822,954 	10.21 	80.41% 8.21 19,679,000 89,717 E208,209,150 £208,627,451 £89,477,124' £5751,634 £83,900,001 	 £13,725,490 £339,934,641 	£416,484,490 	9,946 £6209150 £326,797 - £4,097,928 £10,633,875 £16,816,330 	 16% £293,594,771 £169,281,046 	£90,915,033 	31% £81,960,784 
£86,900,001 	£20,632,911 ' 1995. 9,310,760 	932,323 	9.48 	81.75% 7.75 20,200,000 112,020 £226,455,696 £245,379,747 £122,911,392 £103,544,304 £123,605,470 £67,215,190 £13.20 15% £24,630,430 24% £370,696,203 £187,025,316 	£127,341,772 	34% 1113,397,436 £403,860,759 	£482,106,671 	10,495 	£7278481 £253,165 £5,947,564 £13,479,209 £19.23 
3 	£20.34 
3 	£10.49 
3 	£7.06 
- 	£6.89 
r 	£2.60 
3 	£4.33 
I 	£8.28 
£108,059,481 	£25,000,000 £16.22 
£15.09 
£9.97 
10% 
7% 
6% 
£14,294,872 
£14,146,341 
1996. 	12,506,000 	1,253,354 	8.01 	81.30% 6.51 24,200,000 £311,666,667 £381,536,462 £202,884,615 £108,782,051  
£54,451,220 
£72,168,675 
£125,498,440 
£61,037,126 
£78,675,105 
£52,243,590 
E33,963,415 
£25,963,855 
£28,841,715 	 23% £358,397,436 £430,000,000 	£314,358,974 	88% £157,692,308 £615,641,026 	- £710,245,761 	12,199 	£8,717,949 £64,103 £4,848,250 £13,630,302 
1997. 	12,007,000 	1,169,156 	8.60 	81.40% 7.00 23,000,000 £235,609,756 £323,963,415 £181,158,537 £109,019,501 	£13,292,6133 £14,900,440 12% £317,743,902 £511,097,561 	£374,634,146 	118% £148,192,771 £670,121,951 	£751,173,580 	12.010 	£2,865,854 £1,463,415 £2,630,189 £6,959,457 
, 	1998. 	20,391.000 	1,547,610 	8.65 	81.80% 7.08 23,000,000 £275,481,928 £361,626.506 £203,313,253 £13,975,904 £108,801,583 	£6,566,265 £7,158,250 	 8% £333,253,012 £563,915,663 	£380,843,373 	114% £95,903,614 £682,289,157 	£721,998,426 	12,650 	£5,542,169 £0 £1,312,185 £6,854,355 
£112,896,348 £0 £0 0% £242,160,494 £583,395,062 	£357,160,494 	147% £142,037,037 £622,222,222 	£664,199,639 	11,200 	£7,530,864 £1,666,667 £0 £9,197,531 6.90 22,600,000 £270,432,099 £359,320,988 £197,407,407 £73,024,691 £77,951,205 0113,333,333 £8.42 -16% £18,456,790 
-11% £33,750,000 £ 12 896,348 	 £0  2000. 	24,401.000 	1,737,264 	8.01 	132.40% 6.60 25,300,000 £319,210,526 £393,026,316 £213,881,579 £105,328,947 £111,071,335 -686,052,632 £8.77 i £0 	 , 0% £183,421,053 £432,500,000 	£300,460,526 	164% £87,236,842 £424,868,421 	£448,031,657 	10,429 	£9.013,15e £5,789,474 £0 £14,802,632 
£112,336,942 £0 - 	2001. 	24168.000 	1,656,784 	7.53 	83.50% 6.29 26,100,000 £316,527,778 £385.000.000 £218,888,889 £07,639,889 £100,689,790 £46,805,556 £9.06 12% £20,416,667 £0 0% £242,430,556 £456,319.44 	£300,555,556 	124% £34,444,444 £310,416,667 	x£320,116,187 	10,189 	£9,027,778 £6,666,667 £0 
£127,453,321 	 £0 £0 	 0% £298,333,333 £367.266,667 	£239,133,333 	80% 143,000,000 £470,800,000 	£470,800,000 	9,941 	£8,733,333 12,466667 £0 £7,266,667 25,842,000 	1,621,919 	7.35 	84.80% 6.23 27,800,000 £337,600,000 £368,133333 £215,400,000 £122,200,000 £122,200,000 £34,466,667 £8.34 9% £15,066,667 
£131,043,956 £0 26.176,000 	1,603,821 7.00 	83.40% 5.84 25,700.000 £360,000,000 £346,564,417 £218,588,957 £141,411,043 £141,411,043 £33,926,380 £8.35 9% £8,711,656 £0 0% £312,085,890 £297,423,313 	£164,539,877 	53% £51,779,141 £437,914,110 	" £437,914,110 	9 . 264 	£10,797,546 £3,006,135 £0 £13,803,681 
NOTES: 
N.B. Blank cells = data unobtainable. 
(1) The year shown corresponds to the financial year end; this was June 30 from 1898 to 1921; 30 September from 1922 to 1995; then 31 December from 1996. 
For the changeover years (1922 and 1996) 15 months' results are shown. 
(2) All tons are short tons of 2000 lbs; 1898-1910 long tons converted to short tons. Includes tailings retreated and heap leach tonnnage. 
(3a), (3c) Numbers in red, 1991-2003, expressed in grammes/ tonne; 1991-2000 figures refer only to the Pampora Treatment Plant; 2001-2003 refers 081910 the 
Sulphide Treatment Plant after the closure of the PTP. 
(3b) 1991-2000 figures refer only to the Pampora Treatment Plant; 2001-2003 refers only to the Sulphide Treatment Plant after the closure of the PTP. 
(4) Numbers in red, 1891-2003, expressed In millions of ounces. 
(5) All money amounts are shown In nominal pound sterling unless the column heading shows 02002' In which case the amounts have all been converted to 2002 
sterling values. 
(6) Direct mine cash operating costs (salaries, materials consumed, other direct production costs); excludes head office casts. 
(7) Eamlngs before deduction of Income tax but after the deductIon of royalty, minerals and experl duties. 
(8) Earnings before Income tax and Interest payments divided by the sum of shareholders funds and long-term debt. 
(9) Dividend attributable to each financial year, and not the amounts paid durirtg a calendar year. 
(10) Long-term debt divided by shareholders funds. 
(11) Annual additions to mines and shaft development, new plant and machinery, works and builldings. 
(12) Net book value of plant and machinery, buildings, main shafts and mine development. 
(13) The number shown may be a daily or monthly average, or the total on a specific date. It includes surface and underground workers, Africans and expatriates. 
The records mostly provide African employee numbers; where the exact number of expatriates was unavailable en estimated 100 has been added to the Wean total. 
(14) Figures In red may include foreign royalties that were not separated in the records from Ghanaian royalties. 
(15) Figures In red Include foreign direct taxes that were not separated In the records from Ghanalan tax. 'Other direct taxes . inicude compulsory savings, additional 
profits tax. 
(16) The sum of columns AG-AJ. 
4) 15 months data shown, change In financial year end. 
• com an accounts from 1972 to 1991 were resented in cedis. The table below shows the official Merlin exchan rates as stated in the accounts available, or the have been cal mimed from the World Bank  statistical database: htt ://unstats.unor unscVsnaama/SelectionCountry asp. 
1980 	1981 
6.00 	 6.00 
Year 
	
1973 
	
975 
	
1976 
	
1977 
Caths: Et 3.19 3.18 
	
3.18 3.181 	3.18 
1978•1979 
6.00 	6.00 6.00 13.38 
	
47.37 
	
69.77 
	
130.75 
	
251.23 
1988 
	
1990 	 1991 
378.00 453.32 
	
633.24 659.28 
• Company accounts from 1992 to 2003 were presented In US dollars, the table below  shows the avera r a annual exchan 
US$: £1 	1.77 	1.50 	1.53 	1.58 	1.56 	1.64 
	
1.66 
a rate used to convert the dollen hmounts  Into st^ dinq. 
1.62 
	
1.52 
2001 
1.44 
	
150 
	
1.63' 
COLOUR KEY: 
Overvalued cedl 
FigUtatrighidtlAng0hen4Angintigln'n4(oikar*4* * 6.015=:: ,21:.7.7: 1,77:ZI ...... 
Conversion to 2002 pound sterling values using UK GDP deflator series, vfa tinvw.eh.net . 
Appendix 3: AGC financial data, 1898-2003 
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Appendix 4: AGC Chairmen 
Year Name 
1897-1904 Frederick Gordon 
1904-20 Viscount Duncannon 
1920-30 Jeremiah Colman 
1930-45 J.H. Batty 
1945-71 Edward Spears 
1971-73 Alan Ball 
1973-77 Amon Nikoi 
1977-9 A.E.K. Ashiabor 
1979-81 J.N.A. Hyde 
1981-84 O.A. Jackson 
1984 —2000 Richard Peprah 
2000-04 Michael Beckett 
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Appendix 5: AGC Managing Directors 
Year Name 
1897-1903 E. A. Cade 
1903-05 J. Daw 
1905-13 No director held the M.D. title. The London Manager, CW Mann, 
assumed many M.D. roles. 
1913-1929 No M.D. position; C.W. Mann, appointed a director in 1913, 
continued to act in this capacity. 
1930-45 No M.D. position but a director, J. H. Batty, assumed many M.D. 
roles 
1945-68 Edward Spears 
1968-73 R.W. Rowland 
1973-78 R.D. Power 
1978-83 G. Cappendell 
1983-86 M.I. Bottomley 
1986-2004 S.E. Jonah 
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Appendix 6: AGC Chief Consulting Engineers, 1903 -1978 
Year Name 
1903-1905 John Daw 
1905 —1925 W.R. Feldtmann 
1925-36 J.S. Watkins 
1936-47 G.W.M.E. Turner 
1947-56 R.M. Park 
1956-72 R.D. Power 
1973-78 George Cappendell 
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Appendix 7: General Mine Managers Obuasi 
Year Name 
1898-1903 J. Daw 
1903-04 A. B. Litchfield 
1904-10 A.B. Litchfield and 
T. Bowyer-Bower 
1910-11 J.A. Mactear 
1911-20 J.S. Watkins 
1920-24 W. Ulrich 
1925-1936 G.W.E. Turner 
1936-37 G.M.O. Barclay 
1937-38 E.W. Spencer 
1938-45 G.W. Thomson 
1945-48 O.G.H. Gale 
1948-51 A.I. George 
1951-57 J.I.L. Edwards 
1957-61 P.H. Brown 
1961-66 R. Wilson 
1966-67 D.A.R. Hanvey 
1967-76 I.D.B. Corner 
1976-77 M.I. Bottomley 
1977-80 W.M. Box 
1980-82 C.J.G. Russell 
1982-85 D.J. Clarke 
1985-92 W.J. Hussey 
1992-94 C. Barker 
1994- Role ceases to exist 
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Appendix 8: Internal Questionnaire Responses' 
■ 	Would you describe the following motivating factors to expand abroad as 
insignificant, quite significant or very significant? (1= Not significant, 2= quite 
significant, 3= very significant) 
Jonah Keatley Clark Rounded 
Average 
liability to achieve lm 
ounces from Obuasi 
1 1 1 1 
Shareholder expectation 3 2 3 3 
Declining share price 2 1 1 1 
To further exploit the 
firm's managerial skills 
3 3 2 3 
To further exploit the 
firm's technical skills 
3 3 1 2 
To further exploit the 
firm's financial skills 
3 3 1 2 
To exploit the firm's 
entrepreneurial culture 
3 2 3 3 
To diversify in order to 
reduce risks 
3 2 3 3 
To take advantage of 
the firm's reputation in 
raising international 
capital 
3 2 2 2 
Ability to issue new 
shares to pay a 
significant part of 
acquisition costs 
3 2 3 3 
To avoid or reduce 
pressure of competition 
from other firms 
2 2 1 2 
To defend or expand 
existing market share 
1 3 3 2 
Any other motivating 
factor(s)? 
Opportunities 
presented 
themselves 
To take 
advantage of 
new 
opportunities 
in post-Cold 
War Africa 
African-
ness; 
managing 
subsidiaries 
with their 
own 
national 
focus 
The questions have been adapted from E.K.Y. Chen, 'Multinationals from Hong Kong' in S. Lan 
(ed.), The New Multinationals: The Spread of Third World Enterprises, 1983, pp. 88-136. 
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Would you describe the following criteria in selecting international 
acquisitions as insignificant, quite significant or very significant? (1= Not 
significant, 2= quite significant, 3= very significant) 
Jonah Keatley Clark Rounded 
Average 
Geological and technical 
feasibility results 
3 3 3 3 
Availability of joint venture 
partners 
1 2 1 1 
Capital availability 2 1 3 2 
Availability of advanced 
technology 
1 1 1 1 
Confidence in property 
rights and rule of law 
3 3 3 3 
Ease of acquiring mining 
leases 
3 3 2 3 
Availability of technical and 
skilled labour 
3 2 1 2 
Availability of cheap labour 1 1 1 1 
Good infrastructure 2 2 2 2 
Political stability 2 2 2 2 
Absence of foreign 
exchange controls and profit 
repatriation limits 
3 3 3 3 
Tax breaks 2 2 2 2 
Cultural affinity 1 2 1 1 
Business and family 
connections 
1 1 1 1 
Any other selection criteria? Geological 
areas that 
were 
strategically 
attractive, eg 
NW 
Tanzania, 
DRC, 
Guinea/Mali 
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Appendix 9: Interview questions discussed 
■ Please recount how AGC became an MNE and your involvement in this 
transformation 
■ When was the prospect of operating internationally first mooted? 
■ Had Obuasi been able to produce and sustain lm ounces per year would an 
internationalisation strategy have followed anyway? 
■ What limited growth within the Obuasi concession? 
■ What limited growth within Ghana but outside Obuasi? 
■ Was growth in non-mining activities (such as the pineapple farm) ever 
mooted? And if so, why was this alternative growth path not pursued? 
■ What was the remit of the New Business Division established in 1994? 
■ What informal avenues of gathering information on potential acquisitions 
were employed? 
■ Why was internationalisation limited to Africa? 
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Appendix 10: The 3 June 1897 Concession Agreement 
Source: ARG 1/5/4/9 
. 
AN 
	 , . 'AGREEMENT made this Third day . .ofJune:.:1897-11ETWEEN,!S 
'of' 
(hOtelia4iii: .k.gled. wthg,Goveinet"'.3ehith'e#OieOP 	 't . _  	 . „   
mean and include the Of finer for the time.. being administering 	, 
S;'_AND:30sg9tfipiticisapwri.„ 	og. Cape 'Crhiet, is 	 , 
of tiii,.sacorid:. part- and. piikant utak COMPANY LIMITER having its 
:tines-At NO:: 	Pavemeat •,in the. City 'at :441103[1:;0:::.,ttxil 
part. and ASHANII COLDPIELDS ::CORPORATt0N ' LIMITED having its, Registered h 
Offices at No 2 ATdermanbury Pastern in .phq 	(hereinafter called  
Ae.. c°°?Pairi'!"Wbirk .eifferees ion shall. in 	 AgiPaient••:fwhh*"ti?e,'POnt*g 
i so: admits include its successors and assigns) of the  
...WEENEAS:Ily, an pidenturd dated' 	1st day of s 4ngost!'.1.80kan, 
itaw . BoYakey then King of Bekwai of the 'aria part. and ; dia;:a• between    
.Edward. Riney; : 'Joseph Ettruson Ellis . and -Joseph. Peter.:BrOWn bf1:the . cither pa 
an Indenture therein mentioned made by Quicoe•ijsai:th.44'lat
,
tiima:E:)34 
- -and dated 3rd day of March 1890 was expressed to be .:carifirmed:'and MOdifi 
and the land hereinafter described together with the mining:: add other
Liberties specified. in the Indenture now in recital, were..-expresaed, to :Lb 
`leased to the said Joseph Edward Biney, Joseph .EttruanaEllia::anctJOSep 
Peter Brown for a term of 99 years from the 3rd day': o€ th 
yearly rental of 8100 until the said. premisei Should.be, Sold'.or.:441A* 
and after the. lapse of one year from the time when the slid ,:preMiSe  
have been sold or -disposed of at the yearly rent. or."1433. 
AND WHEREAS by an Agreement dated. the 15th aay of 'Avi,ust:: '49 
' between Kwakii Nkansa then. King of Adansi of the one pert..44..the.;;Said , L 
Joseph Edward'Biney, Joseph Ettruson Ellis, and Josenh'.Peter . Browrinf',:th 
other part the said King of Adansi purported .to:cotifitin- -thS,;,.0iitiefo,rr: 
recited Indenture subject to the payment 9f . theyearlY,, rentdf,:886;te 
King of Adansi for the time being end"the said Indentuie::of' ...the„ ,.3rty'aa 
of March 1890 and the 1st day of August 1895 and the 	Agreement :"of fie 
15th day of August 1895 are hereinafter collectively," 	to as -? ;  
the concessions".  
AND WHEREAS bY.an Agreement 'made the ' 21fh.'dair ' 0-1.1010.X.;:4,195, 134°:. 
the sail 'Joseph Edward DiaeY, JoseP 4 - Et trnson:7144- 4h4,4900. 0e0:46#6.- 
 of the Ane Parr and the Cote d'Or CompanylEim4ed, of. 	is.#4t1w 2 . 
premises comprised in the said Indenture of'theY:Ist ..dair,tif:Aniiier:I.40r 
and the said Agreement of .the. 15th: dey:CifIA.Ogosi10.5wete.,4greedWoe. 
sold to the Cote d'Or Company- -Limited :fpr the: - conaideratiOn,.!theraid 
mentioned and. it was thereby agreed: that:f. ddh sale should be completed 
on the 1st day of May 1896. ., 
AND WHEREAS the 'Territories .nf - Relmibi and Adanei.:are now under, the 
protection, of Her Majesty the Queen of :Gt4a -t - .Sritain and Ireland EmPreas 
of India and are under the control- of , thelGovernot on - behalf ' of Her. 
• 
AND WHEREAS :the Governor does motZadmit the validity of the 4Coceeeieee  
or any of them but has in exercise of his-authority akreed at .the request. 
WILLIAM REWARD  
Gold •oar On 
eemet}  
ILLS 
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: 	 • 
heretsi:ng....ehg. -second' 
Company to nacupy:the:eaid'ilan4;•iirsita 
the aaid1PrcrsctQrets  
. ; 411D .VHEREni ...fiat: the purpoie. of :iittniw•ap..‘diAtitteks-qrsq,. 
to the validity of the ConcesSione:otAny::nt them  
said parties hereto that tile Concesaiontivshcild:hd*# 
to-;Che,Governor 'and concellalead. that in lieu thereat the tomeanar ehauld , 
accept: such.. an. Authority. occupy •  the sa6id. ,  
AND WHEREAS in purauance.of such 4greeitent. the 
surrendered. and delivered to "the Governor and. hava hew:OW:tad •• • •	.•. 	• 	• ••- 
• NOW IT IS HEREBY AGREED AND. DECLARED That:the:C*1ply' is - heseby ; a Authorised: to occupy - during the term of 90 yearelfrolithe1at-414 
January 1897•for the purposes and subject to the conditions hereina fter
menticoned All that rectangular piece or parcel of land .(heieteiter . . led 
”the said.land") situated in that part of the Territi3ry of,:Bekwai ',kidt in as, 
edansi bounded on the North by a line running gest , to.West ten:34:iiik:.distant! 
from the-Hbuaasi Mine and on the South-by a Line ten: -A114 11.14,*i:414 3r;them 
said Obuaasi Mine and parallel to the Northern boundailt:Onthe•43r hy; , 
 line. drawn at right angles to the 'boundaries of the North:*.ithfSi4h...and 
two tiles distant from the said Obuaasi Mine' and cm. the:Nast 	 d.'.firie 
parallel to the Eastern boundary and three miles distant from .the'044,: i 
 Obuaasi Mine-which said land- shall for the purposes . cikehiaAgtee*nt„b . 
deemed . to -contain, 64,000 acres and -with. the position and beundirtie thereof 
is more particulerly',delineated and shewn on the pleu•lieretri -sane • 
therein surrounded with a red' line.  
. 	• 	. 	• 	.• AND 	IS HERMIT FURTHER AGREED that the said land Shall be 
the following conditions which shall be binding on the Company 
• •, • ••• 	• •• 	• 
10 The Company ghat]. pay to the CoIciiial Treasurer of the Ge Coast' v 
Colony at Accra: .. 
Y Y1 
(a) A commuted royalty of L500 during each pf the fire  €ive •Years t . 
of the said term, the first payment, to be . made 
(hi A yalty of 5 per cent commencing- 01-.grepiLi. 
s January 1903 and payable on each subsequent 	aptd 
1st day of July on , the gross value (to .be ant*tefi. 
as the Governor may require) of a/.1 gold' atid.1146.4t metals precious
Stones and mineral .oil gotten from Or out o•of jthe-'agd: 	miy part  
thereof daring the then. last preceding half YO s 
may from time to time bs.commuite.d4ot,..i-x.w.:".qa 
an.'etsCual'snm as may be agreed -upoltlietkterO• error . and tT}e 
Codpany And so that everr-conanted.t Oat . '..-p.47abrel,undel-jtliierand:the 
last preceding Section shall be payabla:,in..adia,iitalhY, equal half:yearl 
payments on every 1st 'day of January end',1st - day :Of. 	Provided 
always that if at the land of any half year s 
as aforesaid having heee,:eade) -elmillMaiiiiiit:: r .42,Sina.lesaTttwo  
hundred and !fifty painiii.s. then sein'OE; two 	dreiFead'tsfifty.2Pli. 
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17.6:014.4d4;iii1,.A sam of bI33 per annum to be r cawed by the said Caloni 
Treasurer on behalf:. tif:'rfie-.perscniieetgniS 
Uee&Chiefc. or King .. Of:414tat..for thestine being 
. 	simi:ofh66 ner;annnai,-,to'he, teeeived,br Colonia  
Treasurer on behalf ;Of the versa, radialAC*0e Governor 
:the.11ead•Chief or Ring,of'AdanS1::f0V elk • . 	 • 	. 	‘• 	•  or the .said.sums. Uf EL1.33. •!and.b6fwsball::be..PaY4+,i4Fi?:A4YPORrn 
	
1st ;'day of -January %in.eaclf . yea. each surly payments t 
made . on Or before the execution of-. this Agreement.- 
Z. The Company shall use or occupy..tha'said!',/and.:fb .  the purpose 
only of mining operations trading:cultiv.'ation of rubber o`r agricultural 
 produce or for any other. purposes which.MayfrOmj,tinn.to,eok:Iln*. 
previoua-y been expressly sanctioned in igrixiig:bY . the:•Gi4:4.0in.4 
CoMpany- may for - the .purpose of .anY such 'operations *kw i6a4:40-ii i..pridg, 
lay out townships in connection with any mining , or.agriCaltural:Zo.P.a...aa: : 
and erect buildings and machinery and cut.'and - fell;- tilab;145.***.704. . 
destroying rubber trees• or other velnabla timbal and;U*4ir50”.4s .:Pu 
this Agreement is to be 	 in every respecr.'tn'thkeXisting:::* 
of any native or natives: in respect of the said land or ,enY.'.part1,6 
and saccordingly every operation. hereby authorised audi'becOndUCted 
as in no way to affect or interfere with any such tights ? 
4 	 ' 	
, 	. 	. 	 • 
:3. The Governor and all persons; authorised., by. him may at any4time- n' it . 
(a) Take and retain. possession of any part of the: 	 yhich  
in the opinion of the Governor may be required got, 
works objects or things 	 opininU:114y  be of public 
utility or convenience without making any ,  :colOanSation. thetetdr . 
 except that such compensation as the Governor MaY4e0;raasO, 
. shall be made for 'any buildings works Or improvementS,arette 
made by the Company on any land . Eaken under -thin '.Settiorr.: 	 land  
. so taken shall thenceforth cease to be:subjent...to,.thia;Agria06-4;,:: 
(f) Use for any purposes. and in any manner any roads made 
Coiparty hereunder. 
4.
• 
Th Company at all times. during which a xayalty shall be payable 
hereunder aball provide and maintain all. ..tuCif'n*it**y,...i.04i46:-:04 ..Orn_ 
to be done all•such acts and things aathe':Osivetnutf*Wtrrl:•tiiiin'tn...'.'tina 
require for weighing and ascertaining- 	.:asiountiofri:the•sold:owitt,i 
metals precious .stones and mineral oil gotterrfrom  the said land 
, 	 . • 	. 
5. Thd Company at. all times during the aid :term shall kee^g such books 
make: such entries and do and,:permit.:.te -be dolle:Ulk*Cii*C011.4A4;nt" 
the Governor may from time to time require  for the purpose of spewing thee 
•amount and value of the  gold dad other 	.pioel.no 'seemed 4tLc1:1I:iO;tJ- 
. oil gotten from the said land: - 
- 	• 
6. The Company w thin 60 dayS. after ,eaci1ilar day of January and lnt. 
day of JulY . on'whi94.47i6i4PY, shill 7Wil4Wiaheranndr'ana4 , ren(ler40  the Governor such an account together with etch particulars asFit4i ::Governor.. • 
I — 
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7 ':The Company will at all`times during the 'said term make and keep: 
tine and corredt .plana i;f all. the mines: in or igai;',04..eaiddand and 
ilt:the:company!s :WorkingS- theieog.:1:(heteii2itter,03.10Vro*:*4:ee) : in sy 
- .manner and 	as. the 	seaTfrima- tiatesta . tike. ,reasonehli require    .  
:end wilt keep the same at -the.Officeot 	CoMpeOLT: an the said land and.. .   
Permit the Governor or any 
times to inspect and take copies of the said-Vland ,or. *sr; of them. 
. 	 ........ 
7 8. The Company shall carry on andcanducr.all4reeratiOne..here 
•authorised. in.- a proper and ,workmanLike manner and -Wilt...Eft..a:4; 
during. the said term carry on bona fide thining•operatiOna:on: the;.:A4 
land and employ therein continuously such numbers:- of'itatiyee,.(being,,not 
less than one man for everY acre of the said land:far the.:0.me:beinK; 
occupied •for mining purposes) as the Governor may :fide time to time 
require reasonable regard being had to 'the pOssitfility .of  such emplo 
	
..• 	. 	. being profitable to the Company. 	. 	• ..• 	: • .. 
9. The,CoMpany shall at „all timee during' the said tees.keen± 
of the said land as shall be,occupied.by it in a prOper..sailitar$(.104t 
and shall not foul any river spring or watercourse. and . the.:00erne.en 
his agents may enter into and upon any part of the einem:fii* : :te;P9kii.o!' 
of ascertaining the condition thereof or for any other'PerIke4":'*.a*v: 
the Governor may deem reaSonable and he or they. Marforithat :PUrpeSe:Us 
free of charge all the shafts tackle machinery 	 for 
the time being erected Or constructed under this•Agreethent:*4,theid 
shall render all such assistance .as may in the opinion cif 
be required for the purposes of this'Clause. 
10. The Company will not at any time during 'the seid..tep:thoup: 
previous consent in writing of the Governor carry on npan . e.ny'part.'nf 
said land any,  .operation not authorised by this. 
• 11. The Company will, not assign underlet or part W4443.  all or any.p 
of the Company's interest under this Agreemetk withon4:*the:PreVinee;I:go. 
in writing of the -Crivernor -such consent not : ta.he ;unreasonably .withhel d,  
and so that such consent shall not Be necessary in the  case of any 
underletting of any part of the said land-for anytripOse.:;Entber:thaiiiiiii 
which , may for the time being be authorised bybr ...under. this ,' . 	. 
12. 'The Company will at all tames during t efc rontinuance of 'this Agreem 
. observe and comply with all such ordinanceS orders and regulations as any 
frdm time to time be -in force with respect to 	tenure 
lands in the .Territories of Bekmai or.Adansl"fOr: iiinereInfiether purposes 
and this Agreement shall be subjeCt.id'all resiieete:to 'every' such'Ordinaike 
order or regulation.  . .  ' . 	 • 	, . 
13. The Governor shall not at any time during the continuance_of' 
- Agreement deal with or dispose , of . the land4r surrounding the saidSand in 
such a manner as to.pre4.Tent reasonable 'access being obtained' talthe 
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(g) rir'he-0301TianTshaIllat 	 after'la r" 1902,  during the sailit'teror (errant iihen.:pratie*. 
disturbancesepestilene.famineestrike or combine  
er:cause whickshall in, the opinaon;of the 	,r". 
control ;of- .the Company) cease to'-netry : on tbrie ..g.l.ae,134.324.4 o 
wader' this Agreement and- -tir employ:therein 'Coniiiniactnily:anch 
as:ought' to :be, employe& thexeln -Under •Cleasie. 8; hereof;  ' 
• (h),  If any rent or royalty payable hereunder shall;arre st  
)or unpaid. for 60 days- after the same. shall. be p4yalipiLiitiettOp:::t  
some Shall be formally' demanded or not; . ?"......:..,. ” 
(i) If the Company shall assign'underlet. or Part.soith.:all:or any  
part of  the Company'S interest under this 'Agreement Wittiont .  the pre:4On 
written 	of theGovernor except in- the, case of any such  rent- 
uhderletti L as under- theprovisions hereinbefore contained may be 
e. mad wish° t such consent-4 c 	, 	• 	... -. ,. • .- .. 
(j) If the. Company• shall commit any breach. 	the,c0nditiOn4 
hereinbe.fore containe.d with reference to the 	 rendering 
of accounts;. 
(k) LE without the previous Consent in writing.otthe;Grarernbr. 
the Company shall use any part of the said.lan& otherwise tlian.t* .... 
soma purpoSe for the. time being authorised by or under',the provision s 
' of this Agre.ement, then and in any such case the Governor Mair :reent 
upon the said Land or any part thereof in the namelok the whole and 
thereupon this Agrement shall (subject to the proyisione, of _the:next 
succeeding claude hereof) de_te.rmine but without prejudice to any rights 
then accrued to the Governor hereunder.  
• 
, 15. The CoMpany may within. twelve calendar months from/thedefetiinat 
`of this Agreement remove its. machinery and buildings dram the said:le:Ed.:I 
IA. The Governor may from time to time delegate to any person or:'perso . „ 
all  or any of Che powers or discretions vested in the Governor by this  
Agreement and say ;Eve sfach. directions as he may from' time to. time -. thinkfi. 
as, to the person to ,:ihora any rent or royalty payable heeunderaball. be 
 and the Company shall: comply with every such direction. The Company 
shall not ba ,Liabla for an.r iailure . to carry on mining bperationdr 
shall: Lo the a p 	of ,71,e-. Governor, have been caused .b anything. eyorni, 
. 	 . 	. . 
17.'Nochi.:IL herein- -::...-.:-..ained shall impose any personal liability on 1  
trthe Governor C9 ..) C. /ay 7.e..7.5aa acting under the authori of the Governor.. LII WIT21,F.G.4 whereof the parties of the first and .second part 'have 
..-4 hereunto se - r. eir r. - 0., t4 v,- hands 	seals and the plartiee:of -the-third 
and fourth hav bereurzto-caused their respective Common Seals' to be :affixed 
tbm, day and yelr fir...it. ..al:ova wrir.ten. 	- 	' ' .. ' - . 1 .... *.-''' • 
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SIGNED Baled and: delivered by 
above-eased SIR WILLIAM EDWARD ) William Maxwell 
ANNWEL4.e. the presence of . ) 
• 4-:qazilli19°Ii: Sagan=-, 	 . 	• 
SPINDIP,seatrAienti 	ifirect by, ibe-.) .J Edward 
above-named JOSEPEE:EDWATOI BIDET - )- r.3 Ettrusoe Ellis -,- 
- •JODEPt ETTRAt.014, talS.: auk JOSEPE., ) 	Ercs.4c. ••• 
MEN DROWN.,In:Ahet-presence of • . 	. 
U. 'COsia, • D.C. Seal. of 
TRE. Ccaomin*.; Seal. of THE:COTE, D' OR ) • 
• COMPANY AIM/YEII-sas hereunto: . ) 
afflicted: in the presence of . 	) • 
• Oso;  Bishop ) Directors': Ilatmen.e 
	
J. Wickenden • 	Secretary 
• . 	• 	• 	• 	• 
The .Common Whir of ASHANTIL GOLD- • • 	). • .• 
PTELD.4.0DEPORATION LIMITED vas 	) 
hereunto affixed ixt.the. presence ) 
t1/4 
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